acceleration clause in Connecticut

2002“To rule otherwise would nullify the effect of the acceleration clause.” City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Dessoff 3 Conn. App. 644, 650 , 491 A.2d 424 , cert. denied, 196 Conn. 811 , 495 A.2d 279 (1985).

2002“To rule otherwise would nullify the effect of the acceleration clause.” City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Dessoff 3 Conn. App. 644, 650 , 491 A.2d 424 , cert. denied, 196 Conn. 811 , 495 A.2d 279 (1985).

2002“To rule otherwise would nullify the effect of the acceleration clause.” City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Dessoff 3 Conn. App. 644, 650 , 491 A.2d 424 , cert. denied, 196 Conn. 811 , 495 A.2d 279 (1985).

2002“To rule otherwise would nullify the effect of the acceleration clause.” City Savings Bank of Bridgeport v. Dessoff 3 Conn. App. 644, 650 , 491 A.2d 424 , cert. denied, 196 Conn. 811 , 495 A.2d 279 (1985).

1998Burt’s Spirit Shop, Inc. v. Ridgway, 215 Conn. 355, 365 , 576 A.2d 1267 (1990); Christensen v. Cutaia, 211 Conn. 613, 617 , 560 A.2d 456 (1989).

1998Burt’s Spirit Shop, Inc. v. Ridgway, 215 Conn. 355, 365 , 576 A.2d 1267 (1990); Christensen v. Cutaia, 211 Conn. 613, 617 , 560 A.2d 456 (1989).

1998Burt’s Spirit Shop, Inc. v. Ridgway, 215 Conn. 355, 365 , 576 A.2d 1267 (1990); Christensen v. Cutaia, 211 Conn. 613, 617 , 560 A.2d 456 (1989).

1998Burt’s Spirit Shop, Inc. v. Ridgway, 215 Conn. 355, 365 , 576 A.2d 1267 (1990); Christensen v. Cutaia, 211 Conn. 613, 617 , 560 A.2d 456 (1989).

1992This is especially so when the transferee has not, as here, specifically assumed the mortgage. ". . . [I]n Connecticut, contracting parties have the power to make unauthorized transfers of mortgaged property an event of default, triggering an acceleration clause, especially when an unauthorized transfer places the property in the hands of grantees who fail to assume the recorded mortgage." Id., 761 , citing Lewis v. Culbertson, 124 Conn. 333 , 336-39 (1938).

1992This is especially so when the transferee has not, as here, specifically assumed the mortgage. ". . . [I]n Connecticut, contracting parties have the power to make unauthorized transfers of mortgaged property an event of default, triggering an acceleration clause, especially when an unauthorized transfer places the property in the hands of grantees who fail to assume the recorded mortgage." Id., 761 , citing Lewis v. Culbertson, 124 Conn. 333 , 336-39 (1938).

1991Berkowitz v. Kasparewicz, 121 Conn. 140 , 145 (1936).

1990The defendants are correct in their contention that we are obligated to give appropriate effect to the note “as a whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every provision, if reasonably possible.” Hatcho Corporation v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 20 , 485 A.2d 1285 (1985); Ingalls v. Roger Smith Hotels Corporation, 143 Conn. 1, 6 , 118 A.2d 463 (1955).

1990The defendants are correct in their contention that we are obligated to give appropriate effect to the note “as a whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every provision, if reasonably possible.” Hatcho Corporation v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 20 , 485 A.2d 1285 (1985); Ingalls v. Roger Smith Hotels Corporation, 143 Conn. 1, 6 , 118 A.2d 463 (1955).

1990The defendants are correct in their contention that we are obligated to give appropriate effect to the note “as a whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every provision, if reasonably possible.” Hatcho Corporation v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 20 , 485 A.2d 1285 (1985); Ingalls v. Roger Smith Hotels Corporation, 143 Conn. 1, 6 , 118 A.2d 463 (1955).

1990The defendants are correct in their contention that we are obligated to give appropriate effect to the note “as a whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every provision, if reasonably possible.” Hatcho Corporation v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 20 , 485 A.2d 1285 (1985); Ingalls v. Roger Smith Hotels Corporation, 143 Conn. 1, 6 , 118 A.2d 463 (1955).

1985“Although parties might prefer to have the court decide the plain effect of their contract contrary to the agreement, it is not within its power to make a new and different agreement; contracts voluntarily and fairly made should be held valid and enforced in the courts.” Robert Lawrence Associates, Inc. v. Del Vecchio, 178 Conn. 1, 22 , 420 A.2d 1142 (1979).

1985“Although parties might prefer to have the court decide the plain effect of their contract contrary to the agreement, it is not within its power to make a new and different agreement; contracts voluntarily and fairly made should be held valid and enforced in the courts.” Robert Lawrence Associates, Inc. v. Del Vecchio, 178 Conn. 1, 22 , 420 A.2d 1142 (1979).

1983Brummund v. First National Bank of Clovis, 99 N.M. 221, 224 , 656 P.2d 884 (1983); Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 289 N.C. 620 , 630, 224, S.E.2d 580 (1976); Ashley v. Leitch, 533 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Civ.

1983Brummund v. First National Bank of Clovis, 99 N.M. 221, 224 , 656 P.2d 884 (1983); Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 289 N.C. 620 , 630, 224, S.E.2d 580 (1976); Ashley v. Leitch, 533 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Civ.

1983Brummund v. First National Bank of Clovis, 99 N.M. 221, 224 , 656 P.2d 884 (1983); Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 289 N.C. 620 , 630, 224, S.E.2d 580 (1976); Ashley v. Leitch, 533 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Civ.

1978New Tork courts, when confronted with such acceleration clauses, have consistently construed them to be either valid liquidated damage clauses; In re Erlich Estates, 147 Misc. 468 , 265 N.Y.S. 324 ; or unenforceable attempts to impose a penalty.

1978New Tork courts, when confronted with such acceleration clauses, have consistently construed them to be either valid liquidated damage clauses; In re Erlich Estates, 147 Misc. 468 , 265 N.Y.S. 324 ; or unenforceable attempts to impose a penalty.

1938Rather the situation of the plaintiffs seems comparable to that of the plaintiff in Sperry v. Butler, 75 Conn. 369 , 53 Atl. 899 , of whom it is said (Prentice, J.), p. 375, “he exercised the privileges of a free agent when he purchased a mortgage note payable ten years from date, and the security therefor, in which was no provision for the payment by the mortgagee of the taxes and assessments as a part of the condition.” To imply the agreement as the majority opinion does seems to me to write a contract for the defendants which they neither signed nor effectively entered into.

1938Rather the situation of the plaintiffs seems comparable to that of the plaintiff in Sperry v. Butler, 75 Conn. 369 , 53 Atl. 899 , of whom it is said (Prentice, J.), p. 375, “he exercised the privileges of a free agent when he purchased a mortgage note payable ten years from date, and the security therefor, in which was no provision for the payment by the mortgagee of the taxes and assessments as a part of the condition.” To imply the agreement as the majority opinion does seems to me to write a contract for the defendants which they neither signed nor effectively entered into.

1936General Statutes, § 4387; Bardsley v. Washington Mill Co., 54 Wash. 553, 557 , 103 Pac. 822 ; Griffin v. Reilly (Tex. Civ.

1936General Statutes, § 4387; Bardsley v. Washington Mill Co., 54 Wash. 553, 557 , 103 Pac. 822 ; Griffin v. Reilly (Tex. Civ.

1933It did not state any due date and was, therefore, payable on demand, Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480, 485 , with a stipulation against foreclosure of the mortgaged property and insurance on the mortgaged property were paid “promptly.” The stipulation was not, as in Eberich v. Solomon, 112 Conn. 498, 503 , 152 Atl. 823 , an acceleration clause whereby the maturity of a debt due at some future time is accelerated at the option of a creditor because of the nonperformance of some act, but rather an agreement not to enforce an obligation due on demand as long as certain acts were performed by the

1933It did not state any due date and was, therefore, payable on demand, Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480, 485 , with a stipulation against foreclosure of the mortgaged property and insurance on the mortgaged property were paid “promptly.” The stipulation was not, as in Eberich v. Solomon, 112 Conn. 498, 503 , 152 Atl. 823 , an acceleration clause whereby the maturity of a debt due at some future time is accelerated at the option of a creditor because of the nonperformance of some act, but rather an agreement not to enforce an obligation due on demand as long as certain acts were performed by the

1933It did not state any due date and was, therefore, payable on demand, Raymond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 480, 485 , with a stipulation against foreclosure of the mortgaged property and insurance on the mortgaged property were paid “promptly.” The stipulation was not, as in Eberich v. Solomon, 112 Conn. 498, 503 , 152 Atl. 823 , an acceleration clause whereby the maturity of a debt due at some future time is accelerated at the option of a creditor because of the nonperformance of some act, but rather an agreement not to enforce an obligation due on demand as long as certain acts were performed by the