exclusivity rule in Illinois

2016To avoid the exclusivity bar of sections 5(a) and 11, a plaintiff must -4- 1-15-1369 prove " 'either that the injury (1) was not accidental (2) did not arise from his or her employment, (3) was not received during the course of employment or (4) was noncompensable under the Act.’ ” Fregeau, 96 Ill. 2d at 483 (quoting Collier, 81 Ill. 2d at 237 ). ¶ 11 Locasto argues that his case falls under the first exception—not accidental.

2014The same is true of any potential claim under the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act. -14- No. 1-12-3219 Under these facts, we hold that the fourth Meerbrey exception applies to allow plaintiff to bring a common-law suit against his employer. ¶ 37 Such an interpretation of compensability is consistent with the purposes of the Act’s exclusivity bar as explained by our supreme court in Collier, 81 Ill. 2d 229 , a case which the Meerbrey court cited with approval.

2014Catholic Bishop, 2011 IL App (1st) 102389, ¶ 30 , 954 N.E.2d 797 (citing Dena Cohen, Exclusiveness in the Law of Prescription, 8 Cardozo L.

2014Catho- lic Bishop, 2011 IL App (1st) 102389, ¶ 30 , 954 N.E.2d 797 (citing Dena Cohen, Exclusiveness in the Law of Prescription, 8 Cardozo L.

2014Indeed, any such statement would be directly contrary to Meerbrey and Collier, which clearly set forth noncompensable injuries as a category separate from injuries that do not arise out of or in the course of employment. ¶ 41 A similar analysis applies to Unger, 107 Ill. 2d 79 , which, like Sjostrom, was decided before the Meerbrey court reaffirmed lack of compensability as a distinct exception to the Act’s exclusivity bar.

2014Indeed, any such statement would be directly contrary to Meerbrey and Collier, which clearly set forth noncompensable injuries as a category separate from injuries that do not arise out of or in the course of employment. ¶ 41 A similar analysis applies to Unger, 107 Ill. 2d 79 , which, like Sjostrom, was decided before the Meerbrey court reaffirmed lack of compensability as a distinct exception to the Act’s exclusivity bar.

2014Catholic Bishop, 2011 IL App (1st) 102389, ¶ 30 , 954 N.E.2d 797 (citing Dena Cohen, Exclusiveness in the Law of Prescription, 8 Cardozo L.

2014Catho- lic Bishop, 2011 IL App (1st) 102389, ¶ 30 , 954 N.E.2d 797 (citing Dena Cohen, Exclusiveness in the Law of Prescription, 8 Cardozo L.

2005Finally, Larson discusses Hughey v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 109 Ill.App.3d 633 , 65 Ill.Dec. 194 , 440 N.E.2d 1049 (1982), which defendant cites as supporting its assertion that "if Clark Refining * * * were [defendant's] agent, [defendant] would be [plaintiffs'] employer and the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation Act would bar their claims." While this proposition is supported by the *860 holding in Villa and the plain language of the Act, the holding in Hughey negatively impacts on defendant's case.

2005Finally, Larson discusses Hughey v. Hoffman Rosner Corp., 109 Ill.

2003That’s my ruling and I would ask the movant’s [sic] to prepare the appropriate orders.” Analysis Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits and exhibits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1005(c) (West 1998); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17 , 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999).

2003That’s my ruling and I would ask the movant’s [sic] to prepare the appropriate orders.” Analysis Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits and exhibits on file, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1005(c) (West 1998); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17 , 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999).

1995Relying on Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 ; Collier v. Wagner Castings Co. (1980), 81 Ill.2d 229 , 41 Ill.Dec. 776 , 408 N.E.2d 198 ; Fregeau v. Gillespie (1983), 96 Ill.2d 479 , 71 Ill.Dec. 716 , 451 N.E.2d 870 , plaintiff asserts that the claimed injuries fall within an exception to the exclusivity rule because the injuries are "not compensable" under the Act.

1995Relying on Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 ; Collier v. Wagner Castings Co. (1980), 81 Ill.2d 229 , 41 Ill.Dec. 776 , 408 N.E.2d 198 ; Fregeau v. Gillespie (1983), 96 Ill.2d 479 , 71 Ill.Dec. 716 , 451 N.E.2d 870 , plaintiff asserts that the claimed injuries fall within an exception to the exclusivity rule because the injuries are "not compensable" under the Act.

1995App. 3d 745 , 520 N.E.2d 932 ; see also Ballweg v. City of Springfield (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 107 , 499 N.E.2d 1373 (plaintiff’s release of joint tortfeasor where plaintiff’s cause of action could have been barred by statute of limitations constituted good-faith settlement).) In these cases, the settlement agreements were upheld even though entitlement to tort recovery against the employers would disappear upon the employers’ assertions of the exclusivity defense.

1988Thus, construing the taxing statutes most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer as required in cases of doubt (Mahon v. Nudelman (1941), 377 Ill. 331, 335 , 36 N.E.2d 550, 552 ), plaintiff’s ready-mix trucks should be excluded from taxation.

1988Thus, construing the taxing statutes most strongly against the government and in favor of the taxpayer as required in cases of doubt (Mahon v. Nudelman (1941), 377 Ill. 331, 335 , 36 N.E.2d 550, 552 ), plaintiff’s ready-mix trucks should be excluded from taxation.

1981(Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Allphin (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 305 , 347 N.E.2d 729 ; Heller v. Fergus Ford, Inc. (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 576 , 322 N.E.2d 441 .) Admittedly, the exclusivity requirement probably causes the taxpayer to be denied an exemption for particular containers of chemicals which ultimately are used on farm animals.

1981(Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Allphin (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 305 , 347 N.E.2d 729 ; Heller v. Fergus Ford, Inc. (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 576 , 322 N.E.2d 441 .) Admittedly, the exclusivity requirement probably causes the taxpayer to be denied an exemption for particular containers of chemicals which ultimately are used on farm animals.

1981(Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Allphin (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 305 , 347 N.E.2d 729 ; Heller v. Fergus Ford, Inc. (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 576 , 322 N.E.2d 441 .) Admittedly, the exclusivity requirement probably causes the taxpayer to be denied an exemption for particular containers of chemicals which ultimately are used on farm animals.

1981(Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Allphin (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 305 , 347 N.E.2d 729 ; Heller v. Fergus Ford, Inc. (1975), 59 Ill. 2d 576 , 322 N.E.2d 441 .) Admittedly, the exclusivity requirement probably causes the taxpayer to be denied an exemption for particular containers of chemicals which ultimately are used on farm animals.