exclusivity bar in Georgia

2026In its orders addressing the Six Flags Defendants’ and Hendricks’s motions to dismiss, the state court stated: “For the reasons stated, and based upon the authorities relied upon, by [the defendants] in support of their motion[s], the [c]ourt finds that the [c]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims which are barred by the exclusive remedy provided by [the Act].” In its motion to dismiss, the Six Flags Defendants primarily relied on two cases to argue that the exclusive remedy provision of the Act is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby placing the burden o

2026In its orders addressing the Six Flags Defendants’ and Hendricks’s motions to dismiss, the state court stated: “For the reasons stated, and based upon the authorities relied upon, by [the defendants] in support of their motion[s], the [c]ourt finds that the [c]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims which are barred by the exclusive remedy provided by [the Act].” In its motion to dismiss, the Six Flags Defendants primarily relied on two cases to argue that the exclusive remedy provision of the Act is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby placing the burden o

2026See also OCGA § 9-11-12 (h)(3) (“Whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). 9 Kellogg, 253 Ga. App. at 192 (1), quoting Whitlock v. Barrett, 158 Ga. App. 100, 103 ( 279 SE2d 244 ) (1981). 10 350 Ga. App. 195 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019). 5 is) in making the same determination.11 Suffice it to say, for stare decisis12 to be respected, the precedent at issue must have at least some basis in law.13 11 See Scriven, 350 Ga. App. at 199 n.4 (noting that “[w]e have held that the application

2026See also OCGA § 9-11-12 (h)(3) (“Whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). 9 Kellogg, 253 Ga. App. at 192 (1), quoting Whitlock v. Barrett, 158 Ga. App. 100, 103 ( 279 SE2d 244 ) (1981). 10 350 Ga. App. 195 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019). 5 is) in making the same determination.11 Suffice it to say, for stare decisis12 to be respected, the precedent at issue must have at least some basis in law.13 11 See Scriven, 350 Ga. App. at 199 n.4 (noting that “[w]e have held that the application

2024See also, e.g., SASS Group, 315 Ga. at 900 (explaining that our determination of the meaning of the exclusivity requirement in Paragraph V “is further confirmed by the context of other language in Paragraph V and other parts of the same section of the Constitution”). 15 sovereign immunity under Paragraph V.9 We now turn to the 9 In support of its conclusion, the trial court cited Donaldson v. Department of Transportation, 262 Ga. 49 ( 414 SE2d 638 ) (1992); Brantley County Development Partners, LLC v. Brantley County, 540 FSupp.3d 1291 (S.D.

2024See also, e.g., SASS Group, 315 Ga. at 900 (explaining that our determination of the meaning of the exclusivity requirement in Paragraph V “is further confirmed by the context of other language in Paragraph V and other parts of the same section of the Constitution”). 15 sovereign immunity under Paragraph V.9 We now turn to the 9 In support of its conclusion, the trial court cited Donaldson v. Department of Transportation, 262 Ga. 49 (414 SE2d 638) (1992); Brantley County Development Partners, LLC v. Brantley County, 540 FSupp3d 1291 (S.D.

2023See also Stephens v. Reid, 189 Ga. 372, 379 (1, 2) ( 6 SE2d 728 ) (1939) (in interpreting an amendment of the constitution, we look to “the language and arrangement of the article, section and paragraph,” as well as “the object to be secured, and . . . extrinsic matters [such] as the circumstances attending its ratification, the sense in which it was understood by contemporaries, and its relation to other parts of the constitution”).

2023See also Stephens v. Reid, 189 Ga. 372, 379 (1, 2) ( 6 SE2d 728 ) (1939) (in interpreting an amendment of the constitution, we look to “the language and arrangement of the article, section and paragraph,” as well as “the object to be secured, and . . . extrinsic matters [such] as the circumstances attending its ratification, the sense in which it was understood by contemporaries, and its relation to other parts of the constitution”).

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026Fewer than the required numbers of judges, however, voted in favor of considering this case en banc. the burden on Plaintiff to disprove the bar.2 For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s orders and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.3 A motion brought under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1) “asserts the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Douglas County v. Hamilton State Bank, 340 Ga. App. 801, 801 ( 798 SE2d 509 ) (2017) (punctuation omitted).

2026Fewer than the required numbers of judges, however, voted in favor of considering this case en banc. the burden on Plaintiff to disprove the bar.2 For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s orders and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.3 A motion brought under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1) “asserts the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Douglas County v. Hamilton State Bank, 340 Ga. App. 801, 801 ( 798 SE2d 509 ) (2017) (punctuation omitted).

2026See also OCGA § 9-11-12 (h)(3) (“Whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). 9 Kellogg, 253 Ga. App. at 192 (1), quoting Whitlock v. Barrett, 158 Ga. App. 100, 103 ( 279 SE2d 244 ) (1981). 10 350 Ga. App. 195 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019). 5 is) in making the same determination.11 Suffice it to say, for stare decisis12 to be respected, the precedent at issue must have at least some basis in law.13 11 See Scriven, 350 Ga. App. at 199 n.4 (noting that “[w]e have held that the application

2026See also OCGA § 9-11-12 (h)(3) (“Whenever it appears, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). 9 Kellogg, 253 Ga. App. at 192 (1), quoting Whitlock v. Barrett, 158 Ga. App. 100, 103 ( 279 SE2d 244 ) (1981). 10 350 Ga. App. 195 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019). 5 is) in making the same determination.11 Suffice it to say, for stare decisis12 to be respected, the precedent at issue must have at least some basis in law.13 11 See Scriven, 350 Ga. App. at 199 n.4 (noting that “[w]e have held that the application

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026See, e.g., Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566, 578 (3)(e) ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012) (reversing grant of summary judgment to defendant employer on the ground that the Act’s exclusive remedy provision barred tort action, where genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the co-worker was acting in the course of his employment when he injured the plaintiff); Lindsey v. Winn Dixie Stores, 186 Ga. App. 867, 868 (1) ( 368 SE2d 813 ) (1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where evidence did not establish as a matter of law the existence of any causal relationship between the plaintiff’s perfor

2026In Mullinax v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., in reference to the exclusivity bar of the Act, this Court explicitly stated that “this tort immunity is an affirmative defense.” 354 Ga. App. 186 , 189(1)(a) ( 840 SE2d 666 ) (2020) (citing Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 604 (2) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015)).

2026In Mullinax v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., in reference to the exclusivity bar of the Act, this Court explicitly stated that “this tort immunity is an affirmative defense.” 354 Ga. App. 186 , 189(1)(a) ( 840 SE2d 666 ) (2020) (citing Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 604 (2) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015)).

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2024See also, e.g., SASS Group, 315 Ga. at 900 (explaining that our determination of the meaning of the exclusivity requirement in Paragraph V “is further confirmed by the context of other language in Paragraph V and other parts of the same section of the Constitution”). 15 sovereign immunity under Paragraph V.9 We now turn to the 9 In support of its conclusion, the trial court cited Donaldson v. Department of Transportation, 262 Ga. 49 (414 SE2d 638) (1992); Brantley County Development Partners, LLC v. Brantley County, 540 FSupp3d 1291 (S.D.

2024See also, e.g., SASS Group, 315 Ga. at 900 (explaining that our determination of the meaning of the exclusivity requirement in Paragraph V “is further confirmed by the context of other language in Paragraph V and other parts of the same section of the Constitution”). 15 sovereign immunity under Paragraph V.9 We now turn to the 9 In support of its conclusion, the trial court cited Donaldson v. Department of Transportation, 262 Ga. 49 (414 SE2d 638) (1992); Brantley County Development Partners, LLC v. Brantley County, 540 FSupp3d 1291 (S.D.

2024The parties do not dispute this fact on appeal. 9 could have otherwise been brought on their own without relying on Paragraph V’s waiver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lovell, 318 Ga. at 50 (2) (a).2 See also id. at 53 (2) (b) (complaints against the Secretary of State and county boards of elections and their individual members were properly dismissed due to failure to comply with Paragraph V’s exclusivity requirement); SASS Group, 315 Ga. at 897-905 (II) (dismissing lawsuit filed against the State of Georgia and county district attorney in her individual capacity when the lawsuit sough

2024The parties do not dispute this fact on appeal. 9 could have otherwise been brought on their own without relying on Paragraph V’s waiver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Lovell, 318 Ga. at 50 (2) (a).2 See also id. at 53 (2) (b) (complaints against the Secretary of State and county boards of elections and their individual members were properly dismissed due to failure to comply with Paragraph V’s exclusivity requirement); SASS Group, 315 Ga. at 897-905 (II) (dismissing lawsuit filed against the State of Georgia and county district attorney in her individual capacity when the lawsuit sough

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2024Servs., LLC v. Scriven, 350 Ga. App. 195, 199, n.4 ( 828 SE2d 423 ) (2019) (citing Kellogg, supra, for the proposition that “the application of the exclusivity bar is akin to an issue of the trial court’s subject[-]matter jurisdiction”). 9 Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888 ( 288 SE2d 601 ) (1982). 10 Smith v. Ellis, 291 Ga. 566 ( 731 SE2d 731 ) (2012); Johnson v. Hensel Phelps Const. Co., 250 Ga. 83 ( 295 SE2d 841 ) (1982). 4 maintained the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction because her claims fell outside of the WCA.11 Suffice it to say, this Court may refuse to review issues not raise

2023But “action” is ordinarily and more commonly used to mean a case or lawsuit, and other contextual clues within the Constitution confirm that to be the case with respect to the specific provision at issue here. (b) Our determination that the exclusivity requirement in Paragraph V relates to lawsuits rather than claims is further confirmed by the context of other language in Paragraph V and other parts of the same section of the Constitution. “[W]hen we determine the meaning of a particular word or phrase in a constitutional provision or statute, we consider text in context, not in isolation.” E

2019Therefore, even if the relevant event was the auto accident, we would conclude that the exclusivity bar applies. 8 delay in medical treatment occurred in the scope of employment); U. S. Asbestos v. Hammock, 140 Ga. App. 378, 378-379 (1) ( 231 SE2d 792 ) (1976) (for purposes of workers’ compensation claim, date of accident was date on which employee became unable to work due to aggravation of pre-existing condition).

2019Therefore, even if the relevant event was the auto accident, we would conclude that the exclusivity bar applies. 8 delay in medical treatment occurred in the scope of employment); U. S. Asbestos v. Hammock, 140 Ga. App. 378, 378-379 (1) ( 231 SE2d 792 ) (1976) (for purposes of workers’ compensation claim, date of accident was date on which employee became unable to work due to aggravation of pre-existing condition).

2016Applying the exclusivity rule of workers’ compensation to preclude any and all tort liability effectively would abrogate this policy.” Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 552 So.2d 1099, 1104 (Fla. 1989).

2005Thus, the plain language of the agreement makes clear that the parties did not intend to create and simultaneously delete RadioShack’s rental obligation should Buford-Clairmont breach the exclusivity provision. “[A] contract must be interpreted to give the greatest effect possible to all provisions rather than to leave any part of the contract unreasonable or having no effect.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Sofran Peachtree City, LLC v. Peachtree City Holdings, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 46, 50 ( 550 SE2d 429 ) (2001). 3.

2005Thus, the plain language of the agreement makes clear that the parties did not intend to create and simultaneously delete RadioShack’s rental obligation should Buford-Clairmont breach the exclusivity provision. “[A] contract must be interpreted to give the greatest effect possible to all provisions rather than to leave any part of the contract unreasonable or having no effect.” (Citation and footnote omitted.) Sofran Peachtree City, LLC v. Peachtree City Holdings, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 46, 50 ( 550 SE2d 429 ) (2001). 3.

2005See Market Place Shopping Center v. Basic Business Alternatives, 213 Ga. App. 722, 722-723 (1) ( 445 SE2d 824 ) (1994) (where lessee operated a deli and lessor agreed to not lease space to another deli, lease’s use of the term “deli” was not ambiguous, and lease restriction was not an invalid restraint on trade).

2005See Market Place Shopping Center v. Basic Business Alternatives, 213 Ga. App. 722, 722-723 (1) ( 445 SE2d 824 ) (1994) (where lessee operated a deli and lessor agreed to not lease space to another deli, lease’s use of the term “deli” was not ambiguous, and lease restriction was not an invalid restraint on trade).