exclusivity exception in Idaho

2024While the evidence suggests that it was Johnson’s negligence that resulted in the boom crane being raised into the power line, “negligence—no matter how gross—is insufficient to trigger the exclusivity exception under section 72-209(3).” Marek, 161 Idaho at 220 , 384 P.3d at 984 .

2022This definition has not changed in the meantime. 11 I.C. § 72-209(3) (emphasis added). 6 “The employee bears the burden of showing that the exception applies.” Gomez, 166 Idaho at 256, 457 P.3d at 908. “[N]egligence—no matter how gross—is insufficient to trigger the exclusivity exception under section 72-209(3).” Id. at 257-58, 457 P.3d at 909-10 (quoting Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 220 , 384 P.3d 975, 984 (2016)).

2016Marek, slip op. at 11 (“Absent evidence that [the employer] specifically intended to harm [the Appellants] or that [the employer] had actual knowledge that the stope and would collapse, the district court did not err in granting [the employer] summary judgment.”); see DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 179 , 795 P.2d at 878 ; Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757–58, 760 P.2d at 1173–74; cf. Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9 , 121 P.3d at 940 (2005) (holding that the exclusivity exception applied where it was alleged that the employer knew it was hazardous to enter the cyanide-laced tank). 3 The plan called for the implantatio

2016Marek, slip op. at 11 (“Absent evidence that [the employer] specifically intended to harm [the Appellants] or that [the employer] had actual knowledge that the stope and would collapse, the district court did not err in granting [the employer] summary judgment.”); see DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 179 , 795 P.2d at 878 ; Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757–58, 760 P.2d at 1173–74; cf. Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9 , 121 P.3d at 940 (2005) (holding that the exclusivity exception applied where it was alleged that the employer knew it was hazardous to enter the cyanide-laced tank). 3 The plan called for the implantatio

2016Marek, slip op. at 11 (“Absent evidence that [the employer] specifically intended to harm [the Appellants] or that [the employer] had actual knowledge that the stope and would collapse, the district court did not err in granting [the employer] summary judgment.”); see DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 179 , 795 P.2d at 878 ; Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757–58, 760 P.2d at 1173–74; cf. Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9 , 121 P.3d at 940 (2005) (holding that the exclusivity exception applied where it was alleged that the employer knew it was hazardous to enter the cyanide-laced tank). 3 The plan called for the implantatio

2016Marek, slip op. at 11 (“Absent evidence that [the employer] specifically intended to harm [the Appellants] or that [the employer] had actual knowledge that the stope and would collapse, the district court did not err in granting [the employer] summary judgment.”); see DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 179 , 795 P.2d at 878 ; Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757–58, 760 P.2d at 1173–74; cf. Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 9 , 121 P.3d at 940 (2005) (holding that the exclusivity exception applied where it was alleged that the employer knew it was hazardous to enter the cyanide-laced tank). 3 The plan called for the implantatio

2016We held that the exclusivity exception in section 72-209(3) did not apply, noting that none “of the defendants knew that it was asbestos until the test results from the laboratory were received.” Id. at 179 , 795 P.2d at 878 .

2016We held that the exclusivity exception in section 72-209(3) did not apply, noting that none “of the defendants knew that it was asbestos until the test results from the laboratory were received.” Id. at 179 , 795 P.2d at 878 .

2026However, “negligence—no matter how gross—is insufficient to trigger the exclusivity exception under section 72-209(3).” Hickman, 174 Idaho at 1058, 554 P.3d at 109 (citation omitted) (discussing the version of section 72-209(3) that existed prior to its 2020 amendment).