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28 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1960–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Millison v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.green2 sentences2019The intentional wrong exception to the exclusivity bar under the WCA was analyzed by our Supreme Court in Millison , 101 N.J. at 181 -82 , 501 A.2d 505 , where the Court found an employer fraudulently concealed employees were suffering from asbestos-related diseases (thereby delaying treatment and aggravating their existing illnesses). 2019The intentional wrong exception to the exclusivity bar under the WCA was analyzed by our Supreme Court in Millison , 101 N.J. at 181 -82 , 501 A.2d 505 , where the Court found an employer fraudulently concealed employees were suffering from asbestos-related diseases (thereby delaying treatment and aggravating their existing illnesses). | 1 | 9 |
Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp.green2 sentences2019More recently, in Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp. , 210 N.J. 449 , 474, 45 A.3d 965 (2012), our Supreme Court held the WCA's exclusivity bar applied, even though the workplace accident produced an OSHA citation for a "willful" violation of OSHA safety rules. 2019More recently, in Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp. , 210 N.J. 449 , 474, 45 A.3d 965 (2012), our Supreme Court held the WCA's exclusivity bar applied, even though the workplace accident produced an OSHA citation for a "willful" violation of OSHA safety rules. | 1 | 4 |
Basil v. Wolfgreen2 sentences2019Super. 482, 490 (App. Div. 2011) ("The statute's exclusivity bar also prohibits an injured employee's legal action to recover for injuries caused by a fellow employee") (citing Basil v. Wolf, 193 N.J. 38 , 54 n.7 (2007)). 2018Super. 482, 490 (App. Div. 2011) ("The statute's exclusivity bar also prohibits an injured employee's legal action to recover for injuries caused by a fellow employee.") (citing Basil v. Wolf, 193 N.J. 38, 53 (2007)). | 1 | 3 |
Pingry Corp. v. Township of Hillsidegreen2 sentences2015The court determined that the amendment was not intended to “extend exemption to eases of permanent partial occupancy of buildings for business or other non-charitable purposes.” Rather, the court interpreted the 1913 amendment to “avoid claims that such exemption would be forfeited notwithstanding the actual bona fide use of the entire building for benevolent purposes, if occasional use were made of it for other purposes----” However, in Pingry Corp. v. Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 462 , 217 A.2d 868 (1965) the Court determined that “in 1913 the word ‘exclusively’ was deleted [as to the use of the 2015The court determined that the amendment was not intended to “extend exemption to eases of permanent partial occupancy of buildings for business or other non-charitable purposes.” Rather, the court interpreted the 1913 amendment to “avoid claims that such exemption would be forfeited notwithstanding the actual bona fide use of the entire building for benevolent purposes, if occasional use were made of it for other purposes----” However, in Pingry Corp. v. Hillside, 46 N.J. 457, 462 , 217 A.2d 868 (1965) the Court determined that “in 1913 the word ‘exclusively’ was deleted [as to the use of the | 1 | 2 |
Plaza v. Flakgreen1 sentence2026Plaza v. Flak, the seminal prescriptive-easement case in New Jersey, makes clear that shared use of the disputed property with the record owner does not defeat a prescriptive-easement claim. 7 N.J. at 220 ("[T]he general rule to A-3984-23 7 be drawn from the authorities is that where adjoining proprietors lay out a way or alley between their lands, each devoting some portion of this premises to that purpose, and such area is used for the prescriptive period by the respective owners or their successors in title, neither can obstruct or close that portion of the area which is within the boundary | 1 | 1 |
Bioletti v. Sindonigreen1 sentence2026Super. 448 , 454 n.4 (App. Div. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 186 N.J. 78 (2006) (per curiam) (explaining the exclusivity requirement as used in the prescriptive easement context "means only that the user have acted independently of the rights claimed by others, such as the general public"); Bioletti v. Sindoni, 135 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
RANDOLPH TOWN v. County of Morrisgreen1 sentence2026See Randolph Town Ctr., L.P., v. Cnty. of Morris, 374 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
McDaniel v. Man Wai Leegreen1 sentence2025See Barone v. Harra, 77 N.J. 276, 278 (1978) (reiterating that the Act "precludes tort actions against fellow employees for compensable injuries occurring while both persons are in the same employ, except for intentional wrongs"); see also McDaniel, 419 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Barone v. Harragreen1 sentence2025See Barone v. Harra, 77 N.J. 276, 278 (1978) (reiterating that the Act "precludes tort actions against fellow employees for compensable injuries occurring while both persons are in the same employ, except for intentional wrongs"); see also McDaniel, 419 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Beseler Co. v. O'Gorman & Younggreen1 sentence2021With that as a backdrop, the policy endorsement excludes coverage of "any and all intentional wrongs within the exception allowed by N.J.S.A. 34:15- 8." The endorsement specifies that the exclusion "includ[es] but [is] not limited to, bodily injury caused or aggravated by an intentional wrong committed by you or your employees or bodily injury resulting from an act or omission by you or your employees, which is substantially certain to result in injury." O'Gorman & Young, Inc., 380 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Borough of Hamburg v. Trustees of the Presbyterygreen1 sentence2020“When determining whether a property is actually used for a tax-exempt purpose, the Tax Court evaluates whether the property is ‘reasonably necessary’ for such tax-exempt purposes.” Borough of Hamburg v. Trs. of Presbytery of Newton, 28 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Yatesgreen1 sentence2018A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend under Rule 4:9-1 is "best left to the sound discretion of the trial court in light of the factual situation existing at the time each motion is made." Fisher v. Yates, 270 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Van Dunk v. Reckson Associatesgreen2 sentences2012The Act’s exclusivity analysis should not shift into an amorphous “percentage of the risk” analysis. *473 Moreover, we must note that the Appellate Division’s analysis credited an argument that this employer disregarded plaintiffs safety “to increase defendant’s profit and productivity,” Van Dunk, supra, 415 N.J.Super. at 503 , 2 A.3d 456 , but the record lacks substantial support for that conclusion. 2012The Act’s exclusivity analysis should not shift into an amorphous “percentage of the risk” analysis. *473 Moreover, we must note that the Appellate Division’s analysis credited an argument that this employer disregarded plaintiffs safety “to increase defendant’s profit and productivity,” Van Dunk, supra, 415 N.J.Super. at 503 , 2 A.3d 456 , but the record lacks substantial support for that conclusion. | 1 | 1 |
| McGovern v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Feld v. Kantrowitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Laidlow v. Hariton MacH. Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., Millison, 101 N.J. at 177-84 ; Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 617 ; Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Constr. 2021And to establish the requisite intentional wrong to surmount the exclusivity bar, a plaintiff must show two things: first, the employer knew its "actions [were] substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee," and second, "the resulting injury and the circumstances of its infliction on the worker must be (a) more than a fact of life of industrial employment and (b) plainly beyond anything the Legislature intended the Workers' Compensation Act to immunize." Laidlow, 170 N.J. at 617 . | 5 | 2003–2021 |
Randolph Town Center, L.P. v. County of Morris
green
1 sentence2026Super. 448 , 454 n.4 (App. Div. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 186 N.J. 78 (2006) (per curiam) (explaining the exclusivity requirement as used in the prescriptive easement context "means only that the user have acted independently of the rights claimed by others, such as the general public"); Bioletti v. Sindoni, 135 N.J. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Hunterdon Medical Center v. Township of Readington
green
1 sentence2020Ctr., 195 N.J. at 561 n.9 (citing L. 1983, c. 224, § 1, which deleted the exclusivity requirement by legislative amendment). 13 in this appeal centers on the second of these three requirements -- whether the property was “actually used” for the exempt purpose at the pertinent times. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Merchants Express Money Order Co. v. Sun National Bank
green
1 sentence2019Super. 556 , 563, 866 A.2d 189 (App. Div. 2005) ). *139 Bove argues he presented sufficient evidence that defendants acted with intent to commit battery and fraud, which acts should have allowed him to "vault" the exclusivity bar under the WCA. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bauer v. Nesbitt
green
1 sentence2019In Bauer, the Court applied the exclusivity provision of the Act to the negligent-supervision claim even though the Inn "never served [Nesbitt] any beverage other than a Coke." Id. at 614 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Masone v. Levine
green
1 sentence2019Super. 181 , 193, 887 A.2d 1191 (App. Div. 2005) ). *147 Governed by these standards, and mindful of Bove's failure to marshal proofs sufficient to vault the exclusivity bar under the WCA, we reverse the sanctions imposed on Bove's counsel. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences2016State v. Morrison, 223 N.J. 553 , 127 A.3d 699 (2015). 2016State v. Morrison, 223 N.J. 553 , 127 A.3d 699 (2015). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Washington Camp No. 23 v. Board of Equalization of Taxes
neutral
2 sentences2015In Wash. Camp. v. Bd. of Equalization of Taxes, 87 N.J.L. 53 , 93 A. 856 (Sup.Ct.1915), while acknowledging that the 1913 statute eliminated the exclusivity requirement, the court nonetheless ruled that the non-eharitable use of part of the subject building destroyed the exemption for the building as a whole. 2015In Wash. Camp. v. Bd. of Equalization of Taxes, 87 N.J.L. 53 , 93 A. 856 (Sup.Ct.1915), while acknowledging that the 1913 statute eliminated the exclusivity requirement, the court nonetheless ruled that the non-eharitable use of part of the subject building destroyed the exemption for the building as a whole. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wunschel v. City of Jersey City
green
1 sentence2013The trial court rejected that Kristiansen controlled because both it and Wunschel v. City of Jersey City, 96 N.J. 651 (1984), on which Kristiansen relied, involved situations, unlike this one, in which there was no dispute that the deceased worker was an employee covered by the Act. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Kristiansen v. Morgan
green
2 sentences2013The Court in Kristiansen held that, although the Superior Court and the Division have concurrent jurisdiction to decide an exclusivity defense, primary jurisdiction is in the Division where, as here, "no issue has been raised that the Division cannot decide in a manner that is binding on all the interested parties." Kristiansen, supra, 153 N.J. at 311 . 2013The Court in Kristiansen held that, although the Superior Court and the Division have concurrent jurisdiction to decide an exclusivity defense, primary jurisdiction is in the Division where, as here, "no issue has been raised that the Division cannot decide in a manner that is binding on all the interested parties." Kristiansen, supra, 153 N.J. at 311 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Young v. Schering Corp.
green
2 sentences2003Thus, "[p]arallel claims based on those rights, privileges and remedies are waived because they represent multiple or duplicative claims based on retaliatory discharge." Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 29 , 660 A. 2d 1153 (1995). 2003Thus, "[p]arallel claims based on those rights, privileges and remedies are waived because they represent multiple or duplicative claims based on retaliatory discharge." Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 29 , 660 A. 2d 1153 (1995). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products
green
2 sentences2003Without that element, the circumstances here would be less compelling than those found in Mull, supra, in which we concluded that a lack of deception was not fatal to the worker’s Law Division claim because of other factors unique to that case. 176 N.J. at 391 , 823 A.2d at 786 . 2003Without that element, the circumstances here would be less compelling than those found in Mull, supra, in which we concluded that a lack of deception was not fatal to the worker’s Law Division claim because of other factors unique to that case. 176 N.J. at 391 , 823 A.2d at 786 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bryan v. Jeffers
green
2 sentences2002We also identified the precedents underlying the Appellate Division’s ruling: Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 523-24 , 248 A.2d 129 (App.Div.1968) certif. den., 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A.2d 157 (1969) (intentional wrong in compensation statute means “deliberate intention” and is not equatable with gross negligence or similar concepts importing constructive intent); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. 2002We also identified the precedents underlying the Appellate Division’s ruling: Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 523-24 , 248 A.2d 129 (App.Div.1968) certif. den., 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A.2d 157 (1969) (intentional wrong in compensation statute means “deliberate intention” and is not equatable with gross negligence or similar concepts importing constructive intent); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Gould v. Winokur
green
1 sentence2002We also identified the precedents underlying the Appellate Division’s ruling: Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 523-24 , 248 A.2d 129 (App.Div.1968) certif. den., 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A.2d 157 (1969) (intentional wrong in compensation statute means “deliberate intention” and is not equatable with gross negligence or similar concepts importing constructive intent); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Bryan v. Jeffers
green
1 sentence2002We also identified the precedents underlying the Appellate Division’s ruling: Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J.Super. 522, 523-24 , 248 A.2d 129 (App.Div.1968) certif. den., 53 N.J. 581 , 252 A.2d 157 (1969) (intentional wrong in compensation statute means “deliberate intention” and is not equatable with gross negligence or similar concepts importing constructive intent); Arcell v. Ashland Chem. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Billy v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp.
green
2 sentences2001For purposes of the Act's exclusivity bar, defendant NEC-East "remains an employer in [its] relations with [its] employees as to all matters arising from and connected with their employment." Billy v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., supra, 432 N.Y.S. 2d at 883 , 412 N.E. 2d 934 . 2001For purposes of the Act's exclusivity bar, defendant NEC-East "remains an employer in [its] relations with [its] employees as to all matters arising from and connected with their employment." Billy v. Consolidated Machine Tool Corp., supra, 432 N.Y.S. 2d at 883 , 412 N.E. 2d 934 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Schmidt v. Smith green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Schmidt v. Smith
green
2 sentences2000Schmidt v. Smith, 294 N.J.Super. 569, 584 , 684 A. 2d 66 (App.Div. 1996), aff'd, 155 N.J. 44 , 713 A. 2d 1014 (1998). 2000Schmidt v. Smith, 294 N.J.Super. 569, 584 , 684 A. 2d 66 (App.Div. 1996), aff'd, 155 N.J. 44 , 713 A. 2d 1014 (1998). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Marinelli v. Mitts & Merrill green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Bustamante v. Tuliano green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Matter of Assignment of Exposures green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Tirrell v. Navistar Intern., Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.