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15 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
LeRoy v. Collinsgreen2 sentences2020Le Roy, 176 Mich at 475 (shared use with the true owner of a disputed property does not establish the exclusivity requirement). 2020Le Roy, 176 Mich at 475 (shared use with the true owner of a disputed property does not establish the exclusivity requirement). | 1 | 1 |
Breuhan v. Plymouth-Canton Community Schoolsgreen2 sentences1989See also Breuhan v Plymouth-Canton Community Schools, 425 Mich 278, 282-283 ; 389 NW2d 85 (1986).] Thus, we shall independently review the exclusivity rule on its merits and in light of its history to determine whether the merc erred in its application of the rule to the circumstances of this case. hi Under § 9 of the pera, MCL 423.209; MSA 17.455(9), public employees enjoy the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining. 1989See also Breuhan v Plymouth-Canton Community Schools, 425 Mich 278, 282-283 ; 389 NW2d 85 (1986).] Thus, we shall independently review the exclusivity rule on its merits and in light of its history to determine whether the merc erred in its application of the rule to the circumstances of this case. hi Under § 9 of the pera, MCL 423.209; MSA 17.455(9), public employees enjoy the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining. | 1 | 1 |
Stine v. Continental Casualty Co.green2 sentences1989Although this Court has observed that an unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals is of no precedential value, see Stine v Continental Casu alty Co, 419 Mich 89, 95, n 2 ; 349 NW2d 127 (1984), it does not necessarily follow that the absence of published precedent as reinforcement for a long-established merc rule deprives that rule of any relevance. 1989Although this Court has observed that an unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals is of no precedential value, see Stine v Continental Casu alty Co, 419 Mich 89, 95, n 2 ; 349 NW2d 127 (1984), it does not necessarily follow that the absence of published precedent as reinforcement for a long-established merc rule deprives that rule of any relevance. | 1 | 1 |
Schoolcraft College Ass'n of Office Personnel v. Schoolcraft Community Collegegreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Schoolcraft Community College v Schoolcraft College Ass’n of Office Personnel/MESPA, 1985 MERC Lab Op 253, 258-259, aff'd 156 Mich App 754 ; 401 NW2d 915 (1986), lv den 428 Mich 895 (1987). 1987See, e.g., Schoolcraft Community College v Schoolcraft College Ass’n of Office Personnel/MESPA, 1985 MERC Lab Op 253, 258-259, aff'd 156 Mich App 754 ; 401 NW2d 915 (1986), lv den 428 Mich 895 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co.green2 sentences1986See Hebert v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 607, 610 ; 281 NW 374 (1938); see also Larson, n 7 supra, § 2.40, p 1-10. [42] Shearer v Homestake Mining Co, 557 F Supp 549, 553 (D SD, 1983), aff'd Shearer v Homestake Mining Co, 727 F2d 707 (CA 8, 1984); Petramalo, "Employer total liability," 1986 ABA National Institute on Workers' Compensation, p 167 ("[i]n most states, common-law suits alleging that the employer has `intentionally' inflicted an injury or illness upon plaintiff employees will not be barred by the exclusivity principle"). 1986Shearer v Homestake Mining Co, 557 F Supp 549, 553 (D SD, 1983) , aff'd Shearer v Homestake Mining Co, 727 F2d 707 (CA 8, 1984) ; Petramalo, "Employer total liability,” 1986 ABA National Institute on Workers’ Compensation, p 167 ("[i]n most states, common-law suits alleging that the employer has 'intentionally’ inflicted an injury or illness upon plaintiff employees will not be barred by the exclusivity principle”). | 1 | 1 |
Hebert v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences1986See Hebert v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 607, 610 ; 281 NW 374 (1938); see also Larson, n 7 supra, § 2.40, p 1-10. [42] Shearer v Homestake Mining Co, 557 F Supp 549, 553 (D SD, 1983), aff'd Shearer v Homestake Mining Co, 727 F2d 707 (CA 8, 1984); Petramalo, "Employer total liability," 1986 ABA National Institute on Workers' Compensation, p 167 ("[i]n most states, common-law suits alleging that the employer has `intentionally' inflicted an injury or illness upon plaintiff employees will not be barred by the exclusivity principle"). 1986See Hebert v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 607, 610 ; 281 NW 374 (1938); see also Larson, n 7 supra, § 2.40, p 1-10. [42] Shearer v Homestake Mining Co, 557 F Supp 549, 553 (D SD, 1983), aff'd Shearer v Homestake Mining Co, 727 F2d 707 (CA 8, 1984); Petramalo, "Employer total liability," 1986 ABA National Institute on Workers' Compensation, p 167 ("[i]n most states, common-law suits alleging that the employer has `intentionally' inflicted an injury or illness upon plaintiff employees will not be barred by the exclusivity principle"). | 1 | 1 |
Pacheco v. Cliftongreen1 sentence1985This is true not only of those injuries occurring prior to plaintiff’s disability but also as to those occurring after his disability.” Pacheco v Clifton, supra, pp 574-575 (emphasis in the original). | 1 | 1 |
Pollock v. Frankenmuth Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences1978See Pollock v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co, 79 Mich App 218 ; 261 NW2d 554 (1977). 1978See Pollock v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co, 79 Mich App 218 ; 261 NW2d 554 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stimson v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences1984Stimson, supra. * * * Further, we are of the opinion that those damages which allegedly resulted from the alleged unlawful discrimination by defendants, particularly those resulting from humiliation, embarrassment, loss of consortium, and lost wages, are compensable in circuit court and should not be barred by the exclusivity clause of WDCA. 1981Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich 356, 358-359 ; 245 NW2d 26 (1976), St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v Littky, 60 Mich App 375, 377-378 ; 230 NW2d 440 (1975), MCL 418.841; MSA 17.237(841).” (Footnotes omitted.) Our analysis begins with a review of Stimson v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 77 Mich App 361 ; 258 *569 NW2d 227 (1977), since that was the first case to discuss the effect of the exclusivity bar of the WDCA in the context of employment discrimination and since defendants place principal reliance on that decision to support their claim that the trial judge erred in denying their mot | 2 | 1981–1984 |
Aft Michigan v. State of Michigan
green
2 sentences2023A valid contract requires the following elements: “(1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.” AFT Mich v Michigan, 497 Mich 197, 235 ; 866 NW2d 782 (2015). 2023A valid contract requires the following elements: “(1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.” AFT Mich v Michigan, 497 Mich 197, 235 ; 866 NW2d 782 (2015). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
City of New Haven v. Town of Torrington
green
2 sentences1996The Attorney General’s exclusivity requirement finds it genesis not in a discussion of Const 1963 or in any discussion of Michigan law, but in a solitary 1945 decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court, New Haven v Town of Torrington, 132 Conn 194; 43 A2d 455 (1945), overruled in part Anderson v Bridgeport, 134 Conn 260; 56 A2d 650 (1947). 1996The Attorney General’s exclusivity requirement finds it genesis not in a discussion of Const 1963 or in any discussion of Michigan law, but in a solitary 1945 decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court, New Haven v Town of Torrington, 132 Conn 194; 43 A2d 455 (1945), overruled in part Anderson v Bridgeport, 134 Conn 260; 56 A2d 650 (1947). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Anderson v. City of Bridgeport
green
2 sentences1996The Attorney General’s exclusivity requirement finds it genesis not in a discussion of Const 1963 or in any discussion of Michigan law, but in a solitary 1945 decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court, New Haven v Town of Torrington, 132 Conn 194; 43 A2d 455 (1945), overruled in part Anderson v Bridgeport, 134 Conn 260; 56 A2d 650 (1947). 1996The Attorney General’s exclusivity requirement finds it genesis not in a discussion of Const 1963 or in any discussion of Michigan law, but in a solitary 1945 decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court, New Haven v Town of Torrington, 132 Conn 194; 43 A2d 455 (1945), overruled in part Anderson v Bridgeport, 134 Conn 260; 56 A2d 650 (1947). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences1996It agreed that intentional injuries are outside the scope of the WDCA, and that "for an intentional injury to escape the exclusivity bar, the plaintiff need not prove that the employer intended the actual injury which occurred." 427 Mich. at 28 , 398 N.W.2d 882 . 1996It agreed that intentional injuries are outside the scope of the WDCA, and that "for an intentional injury to escape the exclusivity bar, the plaintiff need not prove that the employer intended the actual injury which occurred." 427 Mich. at 28 , 398 N.W.2d 882 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Southfield Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Southfield
neutral
2 sentences1989The Court of Appeals concluded that in the absence of "any published opinions rendered by this Court or by our Supreme Court construing pera that would govern the association’s contention,” the exclusivity rule had "no basis in law.” Southfield Police Officers Ass’n v Southfield, 162 Mich App 729, 732-733 ; 413 NW2d 489 (1987). 1989The Court of Appeals concluded that in the absence of "any published opinions rendered by this Court or by our Supreme Court construing pera that would govern the association’s contention,” the exclusivity rule had "no basis in law.” Southfield Police Officers Ass’n v Southfield, 162 Mich App 729, 732-733 ; 413 NW2d 489 (1987). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Bourassa v. ATO CORP.
neutral
2 sentences1984Further support for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the instant cases is found in Bourassa v ATO Corp, 113 Mich App 517 ; 317 NW2d 669 (1982), lv den 414 Mich 966 (1982), where an employee was injured in a fall from allegedly defective scaffolding which was manufac *806 tured by the defendant employer. 1984Further support for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in the instant cases is found in Bourassa v ATO Corp, 113 Mich App 517 ; 317 NW2d 669 (1982), lv den 414 Mich 966 (1982), where an employee was injured in a fall from allegedly defective scaffolding which was manufac *806 tured by the defendant employer. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Ready v. Clark Equipment Co.
neutral
2 sentences1982Ready v Clark Equipment Co, 91 Mich App 474 ; 283 NW2d 650 (1979), Diekevers v SCM Corp, 73 Mich App 78 ; 250 NW2d 548 (1976), Nanasi v General Motors Corp, 56 Mich App 652; 224 NW2d 914 (1974). 1982Ready v Clark Equipment Co, 91 Mich App 474 ; 283 NW2d 650 (1979), Diekevers v SCM Corp, 73 Mich App 78 ; 250 NW2d 548 (1976), Nanasi v General Motors Corp, 56 Mich App 652; 224 NW2d 914 (1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Nanasi v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1982Ready v Clark Equipment Co, 91 Mich App 474 ; 283 NW2d 650 (1979), Diekevers v SCM Corp, 73 Mich App 78 ; 250 NW2d 548 (1976), Nanasi v General Motors Corp, 56 Mich App 652; 224 NW2d 914 (1974). 1982Ready v Clark Equipment Co, 91 Mich App 474 ; 283 NW2d 650 (1979), Diekevers v SCM Corp, 73 Mich App 78 ; 250 NW2d 548 (1976), Nanasi v General Motors Corp, 56 Mich App 652; 224 NW2d 914 (1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Diekevers v. SCM Corp.
green
2 sentences1982Ready v Clark Equipment Co, 91 Mich App 474 ; 283 NW2d 650 (1979), Diekevers v SCM Corp, 73 Mich App 78 ; 250 NW2d 548 (1976), Nanasi v General Motors Corp, 56 Mich App 652; 224 NW2d 914 (1974). 1982Ready v Clark Equipment Co, 91 Mich App 474 ; 283 NW2d 650 (1979), Diekevers v SCM Corp, 73 Mich App 78 ; 250 NW2d 548 (1976), Nanasi v General Motors Corp, 56 Mich App 652; 224 NW2d 914 (1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Szydlowski v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1981Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich 356, 358-359 ; 245 NW2d 26 (1976), St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v Littky, 60 Mich App 375, 377-378 ; 230 NW2d 440 (1975), MCL 418.841; MSA 17.237(841).” (Footnotes omitted.) Our analysis begins with a review of Stimson v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 77 Mich App 361 ; 258 *569 NW2d 227 (1977), since that was the first case to discuss the effect of the exclusivity bar of the WDCA in the context of employment discrimination and since defendants place principal reliance on that decision to support their claim that the trial judge erred in denying their mot 1981Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich 356, 358-359 ; 245 NW2d 26 (1976), St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v Littky, 60 Mich App 375, 377-378 ; 230 NW2d 440 (1975), MCL 418.841; MSA 17.237(841).” (Footnotes omitted.) Our analysis begins with a review of Stimson v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 77 Mich App 361 ; 258 *569 NW2d 227 (1977), since that was the first case to discuss the effect of the exclusivity bar of the WDCA in the context of employment discrimination and since defendants place principal reliance on that decision to support their claim that the trial judge erred in denying their mot | 1 | 1981–1981 |
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Littky
green
2 sentences1981Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich 356, 358-359 ; 245 NW2d 26 (1976), St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v Littky, 60 Mich App 375, 377-378 ; 230 NW2d 440 (1975), MCL 418.841; MSA 17.237(841).” (Footnotes omitted.) Our analysis begins with a review of Stimson v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 77 Mich App 361 ; 258 *569 NW2d 227 (1977), since that was the first case to discuss the effect of the exclusivity bar of the WDCA in the context of employment discrimination and since defendants place principal reliance on that decision to support their claim that the trial judge erred in denying their mot 1981Szydlowski v General Motors Corp, 397 Mich 356, 358-359 ; 245 NW2d 26 (1976), St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co v Littky, 60 Mich App 375, 377-378 ; 230 NW2d 440 (1975), MCL 418.841; MSA 17.237(841).” (Footnotes omitted.) Our analysis begins with a review of Stimson v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 77 Mich App 361 ; 258 *569 NW2d 227 (1977), since that was the first case to discuss the effect of the exclusivity bar of the WDCA in the context of employment discrimination and since defendants place principal reliance on that decision to support their claim that the trial judge erred in denying their mot | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Ottenwess v. Hawkeye Security Insurance
green
2 sentences1980Second, we agree with Judge Allen’s dissent in Ottenwess v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 84 Mich App 292, 302-306 ; 269 NW2d 570 (1978), that the legislative history of the no-fault act discloses an intent to override any prohibitions which the exclusivity clause might make on no-fault recovery from the employer’s insurer. 1980Second, we agree with Judge Allen’s dissent in Ottenwess v Hawkeye-Security Ins Co, 84 Mich App 292, 302-306 ; 269 NW2d 570 (1978), that the legislative history of the no-fault act discloses an intent to override any prohibitions which the exclusivity clause might make on no-fault recovery from the employer’s insurer. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
green
1 sentence1978Plaintiff disagreed and argued that the exclusivity rule of Andrews, supra, did not apply to all employees, but only to those who had rights under a collective bargaining agreement. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.