exclusivity clause in Massachusetts

2004“Common law actions are barred by the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation act where; "the plaintiff is shown to be an employee; his condition is shown to be a ‘personal injury’ within the meaning of the (statute); and the injury is shown to have arisen ‘out of and in the course of... employment.’ “ Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 558 (1996), quoting Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 548-49 (1980).

2003G.L.c. 152, §24; Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 558 (1996); Brown v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 212, 214-15 (1998).

2004“Common law actions are barred by the exclusivity provision of the workers’ compensation act where; "the plaintiff is shown to be an employee; his condition is shown to be a ‘personal injury’ within the meaning of the (statute); and the injury is shown to have arisen ‘out of and in the course of... employment.’ “ Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 558 (1996), quoting Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 548-49 (1980).

1998L. c. 152, § 24, as amended by St. 1991, c. 398, § 43, provides in relevant part that “[a]n employee shall be held to have waived his right of action at common law . . . in respect to an injury that is compensable under this chapter, to recover for personal injuries, if he shall not have given his employer, at the time of his contract of hire, written notice that he claimed such right. ...” See Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381 Mass. 545, 548 (1980).

1998Catalano v. First Essex Savings Bank, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 377, 378-81 (1994), rev. denied 419 Mass. 1101 (claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of personnel actions, whether bona fide or not, barred by the exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act); Mullen v. Ludlow Hosp.

1995“A claim against a fellow worker for the commission of an intentional tort will be barred by the exclusivity clause of the Worker’s Compensation Act, ... if committed within the course of the worker’s employment and in furtherance of the employer’s interest.” Catalano v. First Essex Savings Bank, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 377, 381 (1994), citing O’Connel v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 690-91 (1987).

2003G.L.c. 152, §24; Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 558 (1996); Brown v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 212, 214-15 (1998).

2001In that case, the court held that the exclusivity clause barred plaintiffs action against her employer, 5 but did not automatically immunize the individual attorney from liability for an intentional tort that was “not remotely related to the employer’s interests.” Id., quoting O’Connell v. Chasdi, supra, 400 Mass. at 691 .

2001In that case, the court held that the exclusivity clause barred plaintiffs action against her employer, 5 but did not automatically immunize the individual attorney from liability for an intentional tort that was “not remotely related to the employer’s interests.” Id., quoting O’Connell v. Chasdi, supra, 400 Mass. at 691 .

1995“A claim against a fellow worker for the commission of an intentional tort will be barred by the exclusivity clause of the Worker’s Compensation Act, ... if committed within the course of the worker’s employment and in furtherance of the employer’s interest.” Catalano v. First Essex Savings Bank, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 377, 381 (1994), citing O’Connel v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 690-91 (1987).

1999See also Bertrand v. Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 728 F.2d 568, 572 (1st Cir. 1984) (determining that the plaintiffs emotional distress claim, which arose out of his termination by means of a letter, arose out of and in the course of his employment); Hamilton v. Baystate Medical Educ. and Russian Found., Inc., 866 F.Sup. 51, 56 (D.Mass. 1994) (stating that the exclusivity bar of the Massachusetts workers’ compensation law “applies even where the allegedly injurious actions occur in the course of termination” (citation omitted)), aff'd, 66 F.3d 306 (1995); Lennon v. Walsh, 798 F.

1995Id. at 56 , citing Bertrand v. Quincy Market Cold Storage & Warehouse Co., 728 F.2d 568 (1st Cir. 1984).

1998Soc., 32 Mass.App.Ct. 968, 970 (1992) (rescript opinion) (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of personnel actions, including termination, barred by the exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act), rev. denied 413 Mass. 1103 .

1998Soc., 32 Mass.App.Ct. 968, 970 (1992) (rescript opinion) (claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of personnel actions, including termination, barred by the exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act), rev. denied 413 Mass. 1103 .

1997Co., 670 A.2d 1388, 1390 (Me. 1996) (insurance policy “[o]n its face” imposes no duty to defend against an employee’s tort claim action which is barred by the exclusivity and immunity provisions of the workers’ compensation act); Homes Contr., Inc. v. Georgia Ins.

1997Co., 211 Ga. App. 852, 854 (1994) (insurance policy provides coverage only for claims for benefits due under the workers’ compensation act and imposes no duty to defend against a civil suit for damages).

1996See, e.g., Stamper v. Hiteshew, 797 P.2d 784, 786 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Rogers v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 427, 429 (1993); Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).

1996See, e.g., Stamper v. Hiteshew, 797 P.2d 784, 786 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Rogers v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 427, 429 (1993); Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).

1996See, e.g., Stamper v. Hiteshew, 797 P.2d 784, 786 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Rogers v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 211 Ga. App. 427, 429 (1993); Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).

1992See also, as to the same statutory clause, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (“Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from the ‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger are excluded.