exclusivity rule in California

2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f

2012The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.” (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16 [ 276 Cal.Rptr. 303 , 801 P.2d 1054 ].) There are, however, limited statutory exceptions to the exclusivity rule that authorize the injured worker to seek to augment the workers’ compensation benefits by bringing an action at law for damages against the employer.

2023(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160 (Cole).) This is so even if the conduct could be characterized as “manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance.” (Ibid.) However, conduct in which an employer or employee steps out of its proper role, or conduct of questionable relationship to the employment, is not encompassed within the compensation bargain and is not subject to the exclusivity rule. ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 713, 717–718, 722–723.) As already discussed, the conditions of compensation are not present as Sadeg

2016Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 821 , quoting Fermino v. Fedco, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 701, 717 .) And "normal employer actions causing injury would not fall outside the scope of the exclusivity rule merely by attributing to the employer a sinister 15 intention." (Fermino, at p. 717.)5 Lomeli has not demonstrated on appeal that triable issues of material facts exist as to the reasonableness of Costco's investigation or interrogation, including as to her detention within the manager's office, so as to preclude summary judgment on her intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.

2023(Hart v. National Mortgage & Land Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1432 (Hart).) Where the employer ratifies the assailant’s conduct, the exclusivity doctrine does not apply.

2016In the Supreme Court’s view, reviewing and disciplining employees was a normal part of the employment relationship and could not be brought outside the exclusivity rule by a showing that the employer intentionally caused harm through it. ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 712-713.) To hold otherwise would create too large an exception to the exclusivity rule, because “an employer or supervisor is generally in a position that gives him power to damage the *627 employee’s interests through ordinary acts of discipline, and must often act with the recognition that such acts will cause the employee

2023(Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160 (Cole).) This is so even if the conduct could be characterized as “manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance.” (Ibid.) However, conduct in which an employer or employee steps out of its proper role, or conduct of questionable relationship to the employment, is not encompassed within the compensation bargain and is not subject to the exclusivity rule. ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 713, 717–718, 722–723.) As already discussed, the conditions of compensation are not present as Sadeg

2016(Fermino, supra, at p. 712, fn. 3 .) In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 308 , 729 P.2d 743 ], the Supreme Court considered whether a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress fell within the exclusivity rule.

2003(Ibid.; Vacanti, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 812-814; Livitsanos v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 752-753 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 , 828 P.2d 1195 ] (Livitsanos).) 2 If the plaintiff’s claim comes within the conditions of compensation—i.e., if it is a claim for personal injury or death arising out of the course and scope of employment—one reaches the second step in the exclusivity analysis, which is to determine whether the acts or motives giving rise to the injury constitute “ ‘a risk reasonably encompassed within the compensation bargain.’ (Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16 .)” (Vacanti, supra, 2

2003(Ibid.; Vacanti, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 812-814; Livitsanos v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 752-753 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 , 828 P.2d 1195 ] (Livitsanos).) 2 If the plaintiff’s claim comes within the conditions of compensation—i.e., if it is a claim for personal injury or death arising out of the course and scope of employment—one reaches the second step in the exclusivity analysis, which is to determine whether the acts or motives giving rise to the injury constitute “ ‘a risk reasonably encompassed within the compensation bargain.’ (Shoemaker, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 16 .)” (Vacanti, supra, 2

2016Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 474-476 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 612 P.2d 948 ], held that the exclusivity rule did not bar an action for fraudulent concealment where the employer willfully withheld information from the employee’s physician about the employee’s asbestos-related illness. ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 710-712.) In 1982, the Legislature ratified some of the case law by adding to Labor Code section 3602 the exception for willful assault and an exception for fraudulent concealment of an injury.

2016Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court (1980) 27 Cal.3d 465, 474-476 [ 165 Cal.Rptr. 858 , 612 P.2d 948 ], held that the exclusivity rule did not bar an action for fraudulent concealment where the employer willfully withheld information from the employee’s physician about the employee’s asbestos-related illness. ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 710-712.) In 1982, the Legislature ratified some of the case law by adding to Labor Code section 3602 the exception for willful assault and an exception for fraudulent concealment of an injury.

2026Where the alleged injury is ‘collateral to or derivative of’ an injury compensable by the exclusive remedies of the WCA, a cause of action predicated on that injury may be subject to the exclusivity bar.” (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 811 .) “If the alleged injury falls within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions, then courts consider whether the alleged acts or motives that establish the elements of the cause of action fall outside the risks encompassed within the compensation bargain. ‘[I]n some exceptional circumstances the employer is not free from liability at law for his inte

2026Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800 , 812–813 (Vacanti).) An exception to the exclusivity rule allows an employee to file “an action at law for damages . . . [w]here the employee’s injury is aggravated by the employer’s fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury and its connection with the employment, in which case the employer’s liability shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by the aggravation.” (Lab.

2025Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91 , upon which Padron relies, is inapposite because the plaintiff there had not alleged in her complaint any facts suggesting she was employed by the defendant, and the defendant did not assert the exclusivity defense until moving for a nonsuit, unquestionably resulting in unfair prejudice.

2025Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91 , upon which Padron relies, is inapposite because the plaintiff there had not alleged in her complaint any facts suggesting she was employed by the defendant, and the defendant did not assert the exclusivity defense until moving for a nonsuit, unquestionably resulting in unfair prejudice.

1996Instead, the court noted, “normal *751 employer actions causing injury would not fall outside the scope of the exclusivity rule merely by attributing to the employer a sinister intention. [Citation.] Conversely .... actions by employers that have no proper place in the employment relationship may not be made into a ‘normal’ part of the employment relationship merely by means of artful terminology ....[*][] What matters, then, is not the label that might be affixed to the employer conduct, but whether the conduct itself, concretely, is of the kind that is within the compensation bargain.” (Id.

1996Instead, the court noted, “normal *751 employer actions causing injury would not fall outside the scope of the exclusivity rule merely by attributing to the employer a sinister intention. [Citation.] Conversely .... actions by employers that have no proper place in the employment relationship may not be made into a ‘normal’ part of the employment relationship merely by means of artful terminology ....[*][] What matters, then, is not the label that might be affixed to the employer conduct, but whether the conduct itself, concretely, is of the kind that is within the compensation bargain.” (Id.

2010(Ibid.; Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 488, 501 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 677 ].) Moreover, the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule applies only if the risks resulting in the injury were encompassed within the “compensation bargain.” (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 811-812.) The exclusivity rule is based on the “presumed ‘compensation bargain’ ” in which the employer assumes liability for injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault, and compensation is relatively swift, in exchange for limitations on the amount of liability.

2010(Ibid.; Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 488, 501 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 677 ].) Moreover, the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule applies only if the risks resulting in the injury were encompassed within the “compensation bargain.” (Vacanti, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 811-812.) The exclusivity rule is based on the “presumed ‘compensation bargain’ ” in which the employer assumes liability for injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault, and compensation is relatively swift, in exchange for limitations on the amount of liability.

2001For example, we have held that conduct "having a `questionable' relationship to the employment" is not protected by the exclusivity rule. ( Cole, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 161 , 233 Cal.Rptr. 308 , 729 P.2d 743 ; see also Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 760, 779 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ( Magliulo ).) We have also stated that conduct going "beyond the normal role of an insurer in a compensation scheme intended to protect the worker" is exempt from exclusivity. ( Unruh, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 630 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ; see also Marsh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 11 , 259 Cal.Rp

2001For example, we have held that conduct "having a `questionable' relationship to the employment" is not protected by the exclusivity rule. ( Cole, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 161 , 233 Cal.Rptr. 308 , 729 P.2d 743 ; see also Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 760, 779 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ( Magliulo ).) We have also stated that conduct going "beyond the normal role of an insurer in a compensation scheme intended to protect the worker" is exempt from exclusivity. ( Unruh, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 630 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ; see also Marsh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 11 , 259 Cal.Rp

2015LRLO contends it asserted an affirmative defense based on a general statutory exemption and further contends workers' compensation exclusivity "is put at issue, and need not be alleged as an affirmative defense, if the complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating that the conditions of coverage are present and alleges no facts that would establish an exception to the exclusivity rule or negate the conditions of coverage." (Singh v. Southland Stone, USA, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 338, 366 (Singh).) LRLO contends plaintiffs' complaint alleges facts bringing it within the conditions of cove

2014“An employer’s intentional misconduct in connection with actions that are a normal part of the employment relationship, such as demotions and criticism of work practices, resulting in emotional injury is considered to be encompassed within the compensation bargain, even if the misconduct could be characterized as ‘manifestly unfair, outrageous, harassment, or intended to cause emotional disturbance.’ [Citation.] Workers’ compensation ordinarily provides the exclusive remedy for such an injury. [Citations.] Conduct in which an employer steps out of its ‘“proper role”’ as an employer or conduct

2016(Compare, Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1363 ["where a plaintiff can allege that she suffered emotional distress because of a pattern of continuing violations that were discriminatory, her cause of action for infliction of emotional distress will not be barred by the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation laws"] & Fretland v. County of Humboldt (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1492 ["emotional distress claims are not barred by the exclusivity rule to the extent they seek emotional distress damages for the alleged work-related injury discrimination"].)

2015As the California Supreme Court has made clear, for the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine to apply, the “risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1008 .) “Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 .) “The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. . . . [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological da

2015“There are, however, limited statutory exceptions to the exclusivity rule . . . . [Citations.] One such exception is found in section 4558, the „power press exception.‟ Section 4558 authorizes an injured worker to bring a civil action for tort damages against his or her employer where the injuries were „proximately caused by the employer‟s knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation guard on a power 4 press,‟ where the „manufacturer [had] designed, installed, required or otherwise provided by specification for the attachment of the guards and conveyed knowledge of t

2014The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.’ [Citation.] [f] There are, however, limited statutory exceptions to the exclusivity rule that authorize the injured worker to seek to augment the workers’ compensation benefits by bringing an action at law for damages against the employer. [Citations.] One such exception is found in section 4558, the ‘power press exception.’ Section 4558 authorizes an inju

2026The court explained, “Employer status is not material to determining whether [Dr. O’Meara] is covered by the WCA’s exclusivity bar.” The court again cited to Marsh, noting that in that case: 6 “[T]he California Supreme Court rejected the argument that a determination as to whether a defendant may invoke the WCA’s exclusivity protections should depend upon the defendant’s status as opposed to the nature of the defendant’s actions. [Citation.] Toward that end, the WCA applies to [Dr. O’Meara] as the WCA ‘covers all disputes over the payment of compensation to injured employees, regardless of wha

2001For example, we have held that conduct "having a `questionable' relationship to the employment" is not protected by the exclusivity rule. ( Cole, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 161 , 233 Cal.Rptr. 308 , 729 P.2d 743 ; see also Magliulo v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 760, 779 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 621 ( Magliulo ).) We have also stated that conduct going "beyond the normal role of an insurer in a compensation scheme intended to protect the worker" is exempt from exclusivity. ( Unruh, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 630 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ; see also Marsh, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 11 , 259 Cal.Rp

2024Code, § 3600, subd. (a).) Labor Code section 3601, subdivision (a)(1) establishes an exception to the exclusivity rule permitting a cause of action for assault and battery against an employee “[w]hen the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical act of aggression of the other employee.” But Labor Code section 3601, subdivision (b) “unambiguously prohibits imposing civil liability on an employer 13 for one employee’s assault and battery of another.”8 (Fretland v. County of Humboldt (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1487 .) Courts have recognized, however, that “an e

2016(Compare, Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1363 ["where a plaintiff can allege that she suffered emotional distress because of a pattern of continuing violations that were discriminatory, her cause of action for infliction of emotional distress will not be barred by the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation laws"] & Fretland v. County of Humboldt (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1492 ["emotional distress claims are not barred by the exclusivity rule to the extent they seek emotional distress damages for the alleged work-related injury discrimination"].)

2016Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ], held that a workers’ compensation insurer, standing in the shoes of the employer, was not shielded by the exclusivity rule from an action for fraud.

2016Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 630 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ], held that a workers’ compensation insurer, standing in the shoes of the employer, was not shielded by the exclusivity rule from an action for fraud.

2015As the California Supreme Court has made clear, for the workers’ compensation exclusivity doctrine to apply, the “risk of injury must be inherent in the workplace.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1008 .) “Neither discrimination nor harassment is a normal incident of employment.” (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 288 .) “The Legislature . . . did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. . . . [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological da

2013A cause 14 of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers‟ compensation law. [Citations.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices. [Citations.] [¶] Thus, a claim for emotional and psychological damage, arising out of employment, is not barred where the distress is engendered by an employer‟s illegal discriminatory practices.” (Accardi v. Superior Court (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 341, 352 , disapproved on other grounds in Richards v. CH2

2012That decision holds that under the language of the power press exception of section 4558, an injured employee is not permitted to bring an action at law on causes of action that require a lesser showing than that required to establish all the elements of the power press exception under section 4558, because “[i]f such action cannot be brought on its own where the facts fail to establish all the elements of the power press exception under section 4558, it follows that individual causes of action against an employer [(such as negligence or products liability)] which do not meet the [stricter pro

1993Since plaintiff was injured during the course and scope of his employment, in order to proceed against Flowmaster, he must place himself within a recognized exception to the rule that the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law bar a civil action for damages against his employer. (§ 3600; Behrens v. Fayette Manufacturing Co. (1992) 4 Cal. App.4th 1567, 1572 [ 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 264 ]; Robomatic, Inc. v. Vetco Offshore (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 270, 274 [ 275 Cal. Rptr. 70 ]; Pichon v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 488, 494 [ 260 Cal. Rptr. 677 ].) His suit for

2026We disagree. 36 “As a general rule, an employee who sustains an industrial injury ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment’ is limited to recovery under the workers’ compensation system.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1001 , quoting Labor Code, § 3600, subd. (a).) The limited exceptions to this exclusivity rule are narrowly construed.

2025Workers’ Compensation Principles “As a general rule, an employee who sustains an industrial injury ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment’ is limited to recovery under the workers’ compensation system.” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1001 .) “The underlying premise behind this” rule, which we refer to as the exclusivity defense, is that “ ‘the employer assumes liability for industrial personal injury or death without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability.

2026An injured employee obtains “relatively swift and certain compensation in return for the surrender of the right to bring tort actions for his employer’s failure to provide a safe place of employment.” (Ibid.) “Workers’ compensation is the sole remedy for an employee injured by the employer’s failure to provide a safe workplace.” (Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1408, 1412 (Spratley).) “The exclusivity rule applies even where the employer’s misconduct is serious, 3 “The exception for conduct that ‘contravenes fundamental public policy’ is aimed at permitting a Tamen

2017A cause of action for such a claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law. [Citation.] The Legislature, however, did not intend that an employer be allowed to raise the exclusivity rule for the purpose of deflecting a claim of discriminatory practices." ( Accardi, supra , 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 352 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 292 .) The Accardi plaintiff "allege[d] that she suffered emotional distress because of the pattern of continuing violations which were discriminatory; her cause of action for emotional distress is founded upon actions that are outside the normal

2010(Jones v. Kaiser Industries Corp. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 552, 560 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 737 P.2d 771 ] (Jones); Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 268, 277 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 637 P.2d 266 ].) The 1982 amendments to Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (a), however, abrogated much of the dual capacity doctrine. ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 719-720; see Jones, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 561.) Section 3602, subdivision (a), as amended, reiterates the exclusivity rule and states, in relevant part, “the fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity

2010(Jones v. Kaiser Industries Corp. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 552, 560 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 568 , 737 P.2d 771 ] (Jones); Bell v. Industrial Vangas, Inc. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 268, 277 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 30 , 637 P.2d 266 ].) The 1982 amendments to Labor Code section 3602, subdivision (a), however, abrogated much of the dual capacity doctrine. ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 719-720; see Jones, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 561.) Section 3602, subdivision (a), as amended, reiterates the exclusivity rule and states, in relevant part, “the fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity

2016Application of Relevant Principles “Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (hereinafter the Act), all employees are automatically entitled to recover benefits for injuries ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment.’ [Citations.]” ( Privette, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 696-697.) Recovery under the Act “‘is the exclusive remedy against an employer for injury or death of an employee.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 697.) The Act’s exclusivity clause, however, “does not preclude the employee from suing anyone else whose conduct was a proximate cause of the injury.” (Ibid. citing Lab.

2004But the exclusivity clause does not preclude the employee from suing anyone else whose conduct was a proximate cause of the injury.” (Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, 697 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 72 , 854 P.2d 721 ].) Further, as the majority also recognizes, this rule permits the employee to sue the parent company of the employee’s employer for its own independent acts of negligence or other misconduct.

2012Consequently, derivative claims of dependent family members, such as spouse’s claim for loss of consortium here, remain barred under the workers’ compensation law’s exclusivity rule. {Snyder, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 997 .) *290 Conclusion That portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeal denying the petition for writ of mandate to overturn the trial court’s order overruling the demurrer to the loss of consortium claim is reversed, and the matter remanded to the Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

2001Where the alleged injury is "collateral to or derivative of an injury compensable by the exclusive remedies of the WCA, a cause of action predicated on that injury may be subject to the exclusivity bar. ( Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 991, 997 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 476 , 945 P.2d 781 ( Snyder ).) Otherwise, the cause of action is not barred.

2026An injured employee obtains “relatively swift and certain compensation in return for the surrender of the right to bring tort actions for his employer’s failure to provide a safe place of employment.” (Ibid.) “Workers’ compensation is the sole remedy for an employee injured by the employer’s failure to provide a safe workplace.” (Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1408, 1412 (Spratley).) “The exclusivity rule applies even where the employer’s misconduct is serious, 3 “The exception for conduct that ‘contravenes fundamental public policy’ is aimed at permitting a Tamen

2001(Id. at p. 161; see also Ramey v. General Petroleum Corp. (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 386, 402-403 [ 343 P.2d 787 ] [fraud claim against employer that conspired with third party to conceal from employee right to sue third party did not arise out of the employment; nor was it proximately caused by the employment].) TWI relies heavily on Spratley v. Winchell Donut House, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1408 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 121 ], to support assertion that Lenk’s emotional distress damages are barred by the exclusivity doctrine.

2023Corp. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 632, 638 (Melendrez); King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1046 .) Ordinarily, an employee’s rights against the employer for on-the- job injuries lie solely under the workers’ compensation law—i.e., when the “conditions of compensation” are present (§ 3600), the employer is immune from civil damages liability because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s “exclusive remedy.” (§§ 3600–3602.) In addition, to prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity f

2001The employee is afforded relatively swift and certain payment of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of industrial injury without having to prove fault but, in exchange, gives up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.'" ( Fermino, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 708, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18 , 872 P.2d 559 , quoting Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16 , 276 Cal.Rptr. 303 , 801 P.2d 1054 .) To prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against coemployees, who in turn would seek indemnity from their employers, the Legisl