exclusivity requirement in Texas

2013“Neither workers’ compensation coverage nor the exclusivity bar of the workers’ compensation statute hinges on whether notice has been provided to employees.” Id.

2012See, e.g. , Wesby , 199 S.W.3d at 618 (exclusivity provision does not hinge on whether notice has been provided to employee); Blazik , 1998 WL 788848 , at *3 (same); Warnke , 2011 WL 4836199, at *3 (“the exclusivity bar does not hinge on whether notice has been provided to the employee”).

2011See Medina v. Herrera, 927 S.W.2d 597, 601-02 (Tex.1996) (employee’s claim against employer for on-the-job assault was not barred by exclusivity provision under certain limited circumstances).

2011See Medina v. Herrera , 927 S.W.2d 597 , 601–02 (Tex. 1996) (employee’s claim against employer for on-the-job assault was not barred by exclusivity provision under certain limited circumstances).

2009See Stallman , 9 S.W.3d at 249 ; Scott , 959 S.W.2d at 722 .

2009See Stallman, 9 S.W.3d at 249 ; Scott, 959 S.W.2d at 722 .

2009Did the trial court err in finding in effect that the [appellants] claimed the property as their own from 1973 until 2005 contrary to the exclusivity requirement stated by the Texas Supreme Court in Carter v. Holmes[, 131 Tex. 365 , 113 S.W.2d 1225, 1226 (1938)]? 2 .

2009Did the trial court err in finding in effect that the [appellants] claimed the property as their own from 1973 until 2005 contrary to the exclusivity requirement stated by the Texas Supreme Court in Carter v. Holmes[, 131 Tex. 365 , 113 S.W.2d 1225, 1226 (1938)]? 2 .

2003Cf. Terrill v. Tuckness , 985 S.W.2d 97, 110 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1998, no pet.) ("Adverse possession isn't about who uses the property more or for better purposes; it's about whether one party ousts another from his legally held land.

2003Cf. Terrill v. Tuckness, 985 S.W.2d 97, 110 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (“Adverse possession isn’t about who uses the property more or for better purposes; it’s about whether one party ousts another from his legally held land.

2018By conditioning nonparent standing on a finding that the parents have wholly "abdicated" their parental rights to the nonparent, the court of appeals and the dissent would effectively add an exclusivity requirement that is not reflected in the statute's plain language. 9 See Iliff , 339 S.W.3d at 80-81 ("We have no right to engraft upon the statute any conditions or provisions not placed there by the legislature." (citation omitted) ).

2018By conditioning nonparent standing on a finding that the parents have wholly “abdicated” their parental rights to the nonparent, the court of appeals and the dissent would effectively add an exclusivity requirement that is not reflected in the statute’s plain language.9 See Iliff, 339 S.W.3d at 80–81 (“We have no right to engraft upon the statute any conditions or provisions not placed there by the legislature.” (citation omitted)).

2021Instead, the correct analysis considers whether Grandmother “served in a parent-like role” to Child for the relevant time period, which is shown in part by evidence that the “nonparent consistently makes the kinds of day-to-day decisions associated with raising a child.” Id. at 163 ; see also Jasek, 348 S.W.3d at 537 (considering whether nonparent has “actual power or authority to guide or manage” child “without regard to whether they had the legal or constructive power or authority”).

2015See Tipps, 842 S.W.2d at 272 . 5 APF also argues that Landry Marks should be bound to the arbitration clause because it “stepped into the shoes” of ASR by tortiously interfering with the factoring agreement’s exclusivity clause.

2012See, e.g. , Wesby , 199 S.W.3d at 618 (exclusivity provision does not hinge on whether notice has been provided to employee); Blazik , 1998 WL 788848 , at *3 (same); Warnke , 2011 WL 4836199, at *3 (“the exclusivity bar does not hinge on whether notice has been provided to the employee”).

2012See Tarver v. U.S., 785 F.Supp. 607, 611 (S.D.Miss.1991); Buck Kreihs Co. v. Int’l.

2012Co., Inc. v. United States, 651 F.Supp. 276, 278 (E.D.La.1987); see also, e.g., Doyle v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 504 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir.1974) (holding that company “engaged to manage and conduct the business of the Government with respect to the operation of certain Navy tankers” was agent of the United States under exclusivity clause).

2012Co., Inc. v. United States, 651 F.Supp. 276, 278 (E.D.La.1987); see also, e.g., Doyle v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 504 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir.1974) (holding that company “engaged to manage and conduct the business of the Government with respect to the operation of certain Navy tankers” was agent of the United States under exclusivity clause).

2012See Alexander v. Walker, 355 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

2011E.g., HCBeck , 284 S.W.3d at 350 ; Hunt , 290 S.W.3d at 246 ; Funes v. Eldridge Elec.

2011Id. b.

2009See McShan v. Pitts , 554 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 1977, no writ) (stating that possession by a tenant is considered to be the possession of the landlord for purposes of the statute of limitations). [3] Appellants cite the case of Dale v. Stringer for this proposition.

2009See Martinez v. IBP, Inc., 961 S.W.2d 678, 682 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).

2009DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.Supp.2d 641, 644-46 (E.D.Tex.1998) (repeatedly referring to language in the Texas Workers' Compensation Act exempting exemplary-damage gross-negligence suits by certain survivors of deceased workers from the exclusivity rule as a "savings clause”); Callis v. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Corp., 932 F.Supp. 168, 170-71 (S.D.Tex. 996) ("While the Workers' Compensation Act generally provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, it does not prohibit the recovery of exemplary damages under the Wrongful Death Act for gross negligence resulting in death.”). .

2009DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.Supp.2d 641, 644-46 (E.D.Tex.1998) (repeatedly referring to language in the Texas Workers' Compensation Act exempting exemplary-damage gross-negligence suits by certain survivors of deceased workers from the exclusivity rule as a "savings clause"); Callis v. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Corp., 932 F.Supp. 168, 170-71 (S.D.Tex.1996) ("While the Workers' Compensation Act generally provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, it does not prohibit the recovery of exemplary damages under the Wrongful Death Act for gross negligence resulting in death."). [

2009DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.Supp.2d 641, 644-46 (E.D.Tex.1998) (repeatedly referring to language in the Texas Workers' Compensation Act exempting exemplary-damage gross-negligence suits by certain survivors of deceased workers from the exclusivity rule as a "savings clause”); Callis v. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Corp., 932 F.Supp. 168, 170-71 (S.D.Tex. 996) ("While the Workers' Compensation Act generally provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, it does not prohibit the recovery of exemplary damages under the Wrongful Death Act for gross negligence resulting in death.”). .

2009DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.Supp.2d 641, 644-46 (E.D.Tex.1998) (repeatedly referring to language in the Texas Workers' Compensation Act exempting exemplary-damage gross-negligence suits by certain survivors of deceased workers from the exclusivity rule as a "savings clause"); Callis v. Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Corp., 932 F.Supp. 168, 170-71 (S.D.Tex.1996) ("While the Workers' Compensation Act generally provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries, it does not prohibit the recovery of exemplary damages under the Wrongful Death Act for gross negligence resulting in death."). [