exclusivity defense in New York

2022Assoc., LLC , 75 AD3d 594, 594-595 ). "'A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer'" ( Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust , 147 AD3d 1045, 1046 , quoting Batts v IBEX Constr., LLC , 112 AD3d at 766; see Haines v Verazzano of Dutchess, LLC , 130 AD3d 871, 872 ).

2020Assoc., LLC , 75 AD3d 594, 594-595 ). "'A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer'" ( Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust , 147 AD3d 1045, 1046 , quoting Batts v IBEX Constr., LLC , 112 AD3d at 766).

2019A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer ( see Ortega v Noxxen Realty Corp. , 26 AD3d 361, 362 ; Crespo v Pucciarelli , 21 AD3d 1048 ).

2013A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers’ Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiffs employer (see Cappella v Suresky at Hatfield Lane, LLC, 55 AD3d at 522-523 ; Ortega v Noxxen Realty Corp., 26 AD3d 361, 362 [2006]).

2022Assoc., LLC , 75 AD3d 594, 594-595 ). "'A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer'" ( Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust , 147 AD3d 1045, 1046 , quoting Batts v IBEX Constr., LLC , 112 AD3d at 766; see Haines v Verazzano of Dutchess, LLC , 130 AD3d 871, 872 ).

2019Assoc., LLC , 75 AD3d 594, 594-595 ). " A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer'" ( Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust , 147 AD3d 1045, 1046 , quoting Batts v IBEX Constr., LLC , 112 AD3d at 766; see Haines v Verazzano of Dutchess, LLC , 130 AD3d 871, 872 ).

2019Corp. , 103 AD3d at 619).

2017Corp., 103 AD3d at 619).

2013A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers’ Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiffs employer (see Cappella v Suresky at Hatfield Lane, LLC, 55 AD3d at 522-523 ; Ortega v Noxxen Realty Corp., 26 AD3d 361, 362 [2006]).

2013A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers’ Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiffs employer (see Cappella v Suresky at Hatfield Lane, LLC, 55 AD3d at 522-523 ; Ortega v Noxxen Realty Corp., 26 AD3d 361, 362 [2006]).

2003In my view, the statute bars plaintiffs’ action to the extent that defendant’s liability is vicariously derived from DiPizio’s conduct (see Dittert v Oak Tree Farm Dairy, 249 AD2d 355, 356 [1998]; see also Heritage, 59 NY2d at 1019 ; Naso v Lafata, 4 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1958], rearg denied 5 NY2d 861 [1958]; Rose v Gelco Corp., 261 AD2d 381, 382 [1999]).

1993Tool Corp., 51 NY2d, at 159 , supra [rejecting "dual capacity” doctrine which would have permitted employees to sue employers directly in their capacity as property owners or manufacturers]; Heritage v Van Patten, 59 NY2d 1017, 1019 [disallowing suit against coemployee/property owner because work ers’ compensation constitutes the exclusive remedy against a coemployee]).

2022Assoc., LLC , 75 AD3d 594, 594-595 ). "'A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer'" ( Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust , 147 AD3d 1045, 1046 , quoting Batts v IBEX Constr., LLC , 112 AD3d at 766; see Haines v Verazzano of Dutchess, LLC , 130 AD3d 871, 872 ).

2020Assoc., LLC , 75 AD3d 594, 594-595 ). "'A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer'" ( Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust , 147 AD3d 1045, 1046 , quoting Batts v IBEX Constr., LLC , 112 AD3d at 766).

2022Assoc., LLC , 75 AD3d 594, 594-595 ). "'A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer'" ( Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust , 147 AD3d 1045, 1046 , quoting Batts v IBEX Constr., LLC , 112 AD3d at 766; see Haines v Verazzano of Dutchess, LLC , 130 AD3d 871, 872 ).

2020Assoc., LLC , 75 AD3d 594, 594-595 ). "'A defendant moving for summary judgment based on the exclusivity defense of the Workers' Compensation Law under this theory must show, prima facie, that it was the alter ego of the plaintiff's employer'" ( Moses v B & E Lorge Family Trust , 147 AD3d 1045, 1046 , quoting Batts v IBEX Constr., LLC , 112 AD3d at 766).

2020In Ramnarine , this Court found that two companies functioned as a single integrated entity where plaintiff's employer and defendant shared common management, executive officers, a common policy manual, a joint insurance policy, and a combined budget, and the companies issued a combined audited financial statement, held themselves out to the public as an integrated institution, utilized a single human resources department that issued paychecks to all employees , and operated out of the same space ( 281 AD2d at 218 ).

2006(Kudelski v 450 Lexington Venture, 198 AD2d 157 [1st Dept 1993]; see also, Ramnarine v Memorial Ctr. for Cancer & Allied Diseases, 281 AD2d 218 [1st Dept 2001].) The same is true where corporations have lost their separate corporate status due to having become divisions of the same corporation by virtue of a merger.

1999A narrow exception to the exclusivity rule is provided in Business Corporation Law § 623 (k), which authorizes “a dissenting stockholder to bring an ‘appropriate action’ in his individual capacity to remedy unlawful or fraudulent corporate conduct” (Breed v Barton, 54 NY2d 82, 86 ; see also, Schloss Assocs. v Arkwin Indus., 61 NY2d 700 , revg on dissenting opn of Mangano, J., 90 AD2d 149, 158 ).

1995The Court of Appeals has squarely held that where the appraisal proceeding is available, and merely not exercised, the exclusivity rule applies (Schloss Assocs. v Arkwin Indus., 61 NY2d 700 , revg on dissenting opn 90 AD2d 149, 153-162 ).

1999A narrow exception to the exclusivity rule is provided in Business Corporation Law § 623 (k), which authorizes “a dissenting stockholder to bring an ‘appropriate action’ in his individual capacity to remedy unlawful or fraudulent corporate conduct” (Breed v Barton, 54 NY2d 82, 86 ; see also, Schloss Assocs. v Arkwin Indus., 61 NY2d 700 , revg on dissenting opn of Mangano, J., 90 AD2d 149, 158 ).

1995The Court of Appeals has squarely held that where the appraisal proceeding is available, and merely not exercised, the exclusivity rule applies (Schloss Assocs. v Arkwin Indus., 61 NY2d 700 , revg on dissenting opn 90 AD2d 149, 153-162 ).

2026However. the exclusivity bar does not apply where. as here, the complaint alleges that the employer itself committed, directed, or intentionally participated in a deliberate act that produced the injury. 0 'Connor v Midiria, 85 AD2d 896, 896-897 [2d Dept 1981].

2020For example, we have declined to find an alter ego relationship warranting the exclusivity defense where the building owner that employed the plaintiff and the defendant management company had a common principal and the defendant was the managing agent for the plaintiff's employer, pursuant to their contractual agreement ( Kolenovic v 56th Realty, LLC , 139 AD3d 588 [1st Dept 2016]). [FN1] We have also declined to find an alter ego relationship for the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law where the two entities shared common owners and officers, and one ran paint stores on property owned

2020I would reverse the motion court's denial of summary judgment to defendant dismissing plaintiff's common-law negligence claim, since plaintiff failed to rebut defendant's argument, either before the motion court or on appeal, that defendant was an out-of-possession landlord and that plaintiff failed to demonstrate "a significant structural or design defect that is contrary to a specific statutory safety provision" ( Reyes v Morton Williams Associated Supermarkets, Inc ., 50 AD3d 496, 497 [1st Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2018However, in opposition to that prima facie showing, the plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact as to whether the exclusivity clause had been orally modified, whether there was "part performance that [was] unequivocally referable to the oral modification" ( Parker v Navarra , 102 AD3d 935, 936 ; see Rose v Spa Realty Assoc., 42 NY2d 338, 343-344 ; Matter of Latin Events, LLC v Doley, 120 AD3d 501, 502 ; Luft v Luft, 52 AD3d 479, 481 ), and whether Daily News would have been estopped from denying that such a modification occurred ( see Rose v Spa Realty Assoc., 42 NY2d at 344 ).

2018However, in opposition to that prima facie showing, the plaintiffs raised triable issues of fact as to whether the exclusivity clause had been orally modified, whether there was "part performance that [was] unequivocally referable to the oral modification" ( Parker v Navarra , 102 AD3d 935, 936 ; see Rose v Spa Realty Assoc., 42 NY2d 338, 343-344 ; Matter of Latin Events, LLC v Doley, 120 AD3d 501, 502 ; Luft v Luft, 52 AD3d 479, 481 ), and whether Daily News would have been estopped from denying that such a modification occurred ( see Rose v Spa Realty Assoc., 42 NY2d at 344 ).