6 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Walgreen Company v. Sara Creek Property Company, B v. A/K/A Sara Creek Beta, and Phar-Mor Corporationgreen2 sentences2005Co., 966 F.2d 273, 274 (7th Cir.1992) ("Such an exclusivity clause, common in shopping-center leases, is occasionally challenged on antitrust grounds, ... but that is an issue for another day ..."). . 2005Co., 966 F.2d 273, 274 (7th Cir.1992) ("Such an exclusivity clause, common in shopping-center leases, is occasionally challenged on antitrust grounds,... but that is an issue for another day ..."). [6] We summarily affirm the Court of Appeals on all issues not addressed in this opinion. | 1 | 1 |
Herrell v. Caseygreen1 sentence1998Herrell v. Casey, 609 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McQuade v. Draw Tite, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001However, the supreme court emphatically concluded "there is little likelihood that equity will ever require us to pierce the corporate veil to protect the same party who erected it." Id. (emphasis added). - Because corporate parents are not covered under the language of the exclusivity clause, and any uncertainty as to the clause's applicability calls for a narrow construction of the statute in favor of the employee, the supreme court found no statutory basis for the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the corporate parent. 2001Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
McQuade v. Draw Tite, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995II A The standard the Court of Appeals applied in considering the validity of plaintiff's claim was "whether the parent and subsidiary companies are distinct and separately operated corporations which have made significant and continuing efforts to maintain separate entities." McQuade, 638 N.E.2d at 821 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Verhaar v. Consumers Power Co.
green
1 sentence1995Id. 7 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Rosander v. Copco Steel & Engineering Co.
green
2 sentences1992Corp. (1991), Ind.App., 573 N.E.2d 452 , similarly precluded a spouse's loss of consortium claim against the injured spouse's employer because the injured spouse was prevented by the exclusivity clause of the Worker's Compensation Act, IND.CODE § 22-8-2-6, from adjudicating the issue of fault: "Construing § 6 as no bar to loss of consortium actions would upend [the intent of the legislature to create a no-fault system for workplace injuries], because the loss of consortium action would nee-essarily inject the question of fault-although a loss of consortium action is to some degree independent 1992The Nelsons rely on Rosander, supra, to support their contention that Marianne may continue with her loss of consortium claim despite the judgment against Wesley. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Greene v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
green
1 sentence1992Corp. (1991), Ind.App., 573 N.E.2d 452 , similarly precluded a spouse's loss of consortium claim against the injured spouse's employer because the injured spouse was prevented by the exclusivity clause of the Worker's Compensation Act, IND.CODE § 22-8-2-6, from adjudicating the issue of fault: "Construing § 6 as no bar to loss of consortium actions would upend [the intent of the legislature to create a no-fault system for workplace injuries], because the loss of consortium action would nee-essarily inject the question of fault-although a loss of consortium action is to some degree independent | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Evans v. Yankeetown Dock Corp.
green
1 sentence1989Evans, 491 N.E.2d 969 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co.
green
2 sentences1989Seaton v. United States Rubber Co. (1945), 223 Ind. 404 , 61 N.E.2d 177 , and Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93 , 26 N.E.2d 399 . 1989Seaton v. United States Rubber Co. (1945), 223 Ind. 404 , 61 N.E.2d 177 , and Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93 , 26 N.E.2d 399 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Seaton v. United States Rubber Co.
green
2 sentences1989Seaton v. United States Rubber Co. (1945), 223 Ind. 404 , 61 N.E.2d 177 , and Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93 , 26 N.E.2d 399 . 1989Seaton v. United States Rubber Co. (1945), 223 Ind. 404 , 61 N.E.2d 177 , and Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93 , 26 N.E.2d 399 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.