8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Manitowoc Co. v. City of Sturgeon Baygreen2 sentences1992Compare Manitowoc Co. v. City of Sturgeon Bay, 122 Wis. 2d 406, 414 , 362 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Ct. App. 1984) (five percent use of property for nonexempt purpose is incidental to exempt purpose and consistent with exclusivity requirement for property tax exemption in sec. 70.11(27), Stats.). 1992Compare Manitowoc Co. v. City of Sturgeon Bay, 122 Wis. 2d 406, 414 , 362 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Ct. App. 1984) (five percent use of property for nonexempt purpose is incidental to exempt purpose and consistent with exclusivity requirement for property tax exemption in sec. 70.11(27), Stats.). | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. First National Bank of Wisconsin Rapids v. M & I Peoples Bank of Colomagreen1 sentence2008See First Nat'l Bank, 82 Wis. 2d at 545 n.11. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2010The court of appeals recognized that the detainer does not trigger sentence credit because it does not carry any custodial mandate; it is a notice that the person is wanted elsewhere. [14] The court of appeals also distinguished the Rohl case, which involved consecutive sentences, as not applicable to the instant case, which involves concurrent sentences. [15] ¶ 34 The court of appeals correctly concluded that none of these three cases supports the proposition that a person detained in jail in another state is not "in custody in connection with" a Wisconsin *524 charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.1 2010The court of appeals recognized that the detainer does not trigger sentence credit because it does not carry any custodial mandate; it is a notice that the person is wanted elsewhere. [14] The court of appeals also distinguished the Rohl case, which involved consecutive sentences, as not applicable to the instant case, which involves concurrent sentences. [15] ¶ 34 The court of appeals correctly concluded that none of these three cases supports the proposition that a person detained in jail in another state is not "in custody in connection with" a Wisconsin *524 charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.1 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Beets
green
2 sentences2010The court of appeals recognized that the detainer does not trigger sentence credit because it does not carry any custodial mandate; it is a notice that the person is wanted elsewhere. [14] The court of appeals also distinguished the Rohl case, which involved consecutive sentences, as not applicable to the instant case, which involves concurrent sentences. [15] ¶ 34 The court of appeals correctly concluded that none of these three cases supports the proposition that a person detained in jail in another state is not "in custody in connection with" a Wisconsin *524 charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.1 2010The court of appeals recognized that the detainer does not trigger sentence credit because it does not carry any custodial mandate; it is a notice that the person is wanted elsewhere. [14] The court of appeals also distinguished the Rohl case, which involved consecutive sentences, as not applicable to the instant case, which involves concurrent sentences. [15] ¶ 34 The court of appeals correctly concluded that none of these three cases supports the proposition that a person detained in jail in another state is not "in custody in connection with" a Wisconsin *524 charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.1 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Ward
green
2 sentences2010The court of appeals recognized that the detainer does not trigger sentence credit because it does not carry any custodial mandate; it is a notice that the person is wanted elsewhere. [14] The court of appeals also distinguished the Rohl case, which involved consecutive sentences, as not applicable to the instant case, which involves concurrent sentences. [15] ¶ 34 The court of appeals correctly concluded that none of these three cases supports the proposition that a person detained in jail in another state is not "in custody in connection with" a Wisconsin *524 charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.1 2010The court of appeals recognized that the detainer does not trigger sentence credit because it does not carry any custodial mandate; it is a notice that the person is wanted elsewhere. [14] The court of appeals also distinguished the Rohl case, which involved consecutive sentences, as not applicable to the instant case, which involves concurrent sentences. [15] ¶ 34 The court of appeals correctly concluded that none of these three cases supports the proposition that a person detained in jail in another state is not "in custody in connection with" a Wisconsin *524 charge under Wis. Stat. § 973.1 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lentz v. Young
green
1 sentence2004Id. at 468 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Nodell Investment Corp. v. City of Glendale
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 422 , 254 N.W.2d at 314 . 1995Id. at 422 , 254 N.W.2d at 314 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Meyer v. Briggs
green
2 sentences1991That court resorted to prior criminal law cases and relied upon Meyer v. Briggs, 18 Wis. 2d 628, 630 , 119 N.W.2d 354 (1963), which defined an assault as an "attempt, coupled with apparent and real present ability, to do bodily harm to another." Accordingly, the court of appeals, consistent with the undisputed fact that there was no present ability on the part of Little to do bodily harm to Jenson, concluded there was no assault and, hence, there was no exception from the exclusivity requirement. 1991That court resorted to prior criminal law cases and relied upon Meyer v. Briggs, 18 Wis. 2d 628, 630 , 119 N.W.2d 354 (1963), which defined an assault as an "attempt, coupled with apparent and real present ability, to do bodily harm to another." Accordingly, the court of appeals, consistent with the undisputed fact that there was no present ability on the part of Little to do bodily harm to Jenson, concluded there was no assault and, hence, there was no exception from the exclusivity requirement. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1991In Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 266 Wis. 81, 82 , 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954), a physical ejection from the plant is referred to as an "assault." In Allied Mfg., Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 45 Wis. 2d 563, 566 , 173 N.W.2d 690 (1970), a fatal stabbing is referred to as an "assault." While we do not quarrel with the result reached by the court of appeals, concluding that the conduct in this case was not an assault, the acceptance of the court of appeals reasoning and the definition employed would result in not excepting from the exclusivity rule an assault and battery — a result that the legisla 1991In Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 266 Wis. 81, 82 , 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954), a physical ejection from the plant is referred to as an "assault." In Allied Mfg., Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 45 Wis. 2d 563, 566 , 173 N.W.2d 690 (1970), a fatal stabbing is referred to as an "assault." While we do not quarrel with the result reached by the court of appeals, concluding that the conduct in this case was not an assault, the acceptance of the court of appeals reasoning and the definition employed would result in not excepting from the exclusivity rule an assault and battery — a result that the legisla | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Allied Manufacturing, Inc. v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
green
2 sentences1991In Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 266 Wis. 81, 82 , 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954), a physical ejection from the plant is referred to as an "assault." In Allied Mfg., Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 45 Wis. 2d 563, 566 , 173 N.W.2d 690 (1970), a fatal stabbing is referred to as an "assault." While we do not quarrel with the result reached by the court of appeals, concluding that the conduct in this case was not an assault, the acceptance of the court of appeals reasoning and the definition employed would result in not excepting from the exclusivity rule an assault and battery — a result that the legisla 1991In Nash-Kelvinator Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 266 Wis. 81, 82 , 62 N.W.2d 567 (1954), a physical ejection from the plant is referred to as an "assault." In Allied Mfg., Inc. v. ILHR Dept., 45 Wis. 2d 563, 566 , 173 N.W.2d 690 (1970), a fatal stabbing is referred to as an "assault." While we do not quarrel with the result reached by the court of appeals, concluding that the conduct in this case was not an assault, the acceptance of the court of appeals reasoning and the definition employed would result in not excepting from the exclusivity rule an assault and battery — a result that the legisla | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co.
red
2 sentences1984In 1979, however, the court carved out an exception to the exclusivity principle by holding that sec. 102.03(2), did not bar the plaintiff from maintaining a tort action for bad faith denial of compensation benefits. 2 See Coleman *133 v. American Universal Insurance Company, 86 Wis. 2d 615 , 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979). 1984In 1979, however, the court carved out an exception to the exclusivity principle by holding that sec. 102.03(2), did not bar the plaintiff from maintaining a tort action for bad faith denial of compensation benefits. 2 See Coleman *133 v. American Universal Insurance Company, 86 Wis. 2d 615 , 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.