exclusivity clause in Montana

1985Any incident involving a lesser degree of intent or general degree of negligence not pointed specifically and directly at the injured employee is barred by the exclusivity clause as a basis for recovery against the employer outside the Workers' Compensation Act." Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Court, 610 P.2d at 720 .

1985Any incident involving a lesser degree of intent or general degree of negligence not pointed specifically and directly at the injured employee is barred by the exclusivity clause as a basis for recovery against the employer outside the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Court, 610 P.2d at 720 .

2010Wise v. CNH Am., LLC, 2006 MT 194, ¶¶ 9-11 , 333 Mont. 181 , 142 P.3d 774 .

2010Wise v. CNH Am., LLC, 2006 MT 194, ¶¶ 9-11 , 333 Mont. 181 , 142 P.3d 774 .

2003In its current form, the statute states, “[a]n injunction may not be granted... to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced ... other than a contract in writing for the rendition of personal services ... where the promised service is of a special, unique, [or] unusual ... character, which gives it peculiar value....” Construing this new version of the statute in Motown Record Corp. v. Brockert (1984), 160 Cal.App.3d 123, 138 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 574, 584 , the California Court of Appeals stated that for reasons of public policy, a negative covenan

2003In its current form, the statute states, “[a]n injunction may not be granted... to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced ... other than a contract in writing for the rendition of personal services ... where the promised service is of a special, unique, [or] unusual ... character, which gives it peculiar value....” Construing this new version of the statute in Motown Record Corp. v. Brockert (1984), 160 Cal.App.3d 123, 138 , 207 Cal.Rptr. 574, 584 , the California Court of Appeals stated that for reasons of public policy, a negative covenan

2003Given the absence of any relevant Montana case law, we turn to the California and Arizona courts, which have interpreted statutes similar to § 27-19-103(5), MCA, to prevent the enforcement of negative covenants in personal services contracts. ¶17 In Anderson v. Neal Institutes Co. (1918), 37 Cal.App. 174 , 173 P. 779 , the California Court of Appeals construed an early version of § 3423 of the California Civil Code, which provided that “[a]n injunction may not be granted ... to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced ....” In Anderson , the

2003Given the absence of any relevant Montana case law, we turn to the California and Arizona courts, which have interpreted statutes similar to § 27-19-103(5), MCA, to prevent the enforcement of negative covenants in personal services contracts. ¶17 In Anderson v. Neal Institutes Co. (1918), 37 Cal.App. 174 , 173 P. 779 , the California Court of Appeals construed an early version of § 3423 of the California Civil Code, which provided that “[a]n injunction may not be granted ... to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced ....” In Anderson , the

1992In Doney v. Tambouratgis (Cal. 1979), 587 P.2d 1160 , the defendant attempted to raise the exclusivity defense in a motion for nonsuit after the plaintiff’s case-in-chief and again in motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial.

1992The Supreme Court of California rejected a subject matter jurisdiction argument, concluding that the trial court’s common law jurisdiction continued unless and until coverage under the workers’ compensation statute was demonstrated; such coverage could be shown by allegations of fact by plaintiff in the complaint or “by the defendant through setting up the affirmative defense of coverage in responsive pleadings and proceeding to prove the existence of the requisite conditions.” Doney, 587 P.2d at 1164 .

1986In Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters (1980), 187 Mont. 148 , 609 P.2d 257 , we approved an action against an insurer for alleged intentional torts of fraud, conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress, inspite of the exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

1986In Hayes v. Aetna Fire Underwriters (1980), 187 Mont. 148 , 609 P.2d 257 , we approved an action against an insurer for alleged intentional torts of fraud, conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress, inspite of the exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

1986That statement is illustrated by Sitzman v. Schumaker (Mont. 1986), [ 221 Mont. 304 ,] 718 P.2d 657 , 43 St.Rep. 831 , in which we held that an employer who repeatedly hit his employee over the head with a lead pipe could be sued in tort for the damages he inflicted under the intentional act exception to the exclusivity rule.

1986That statement is illustrated by Sitzman v. Schumaker (Mont. 1986), [ 221 Mont. 304 ,] 718 P.2d 657 , 43 St.Rep. 831 , in which we held that an employer who repeatedly hit his employee over the head with a lead pipe could be sued in tort for the damages he inflicted under the intentional act exception to the exclusivity rule.

1980Shelton pointed us to the holding in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc. (1978), W.Va., 246 S.E.2d 907 .

1979Notwithstanding the statement in the footnote in American Motorcycle Ass’n, supra, nevertheless, when the California Code came to consider the case of Associated Const., supra, 150 Cal.Rptr. at 896 , 587 P.2d at 693 , it then decided that comparative fault among joint tortfeasors was applicable as to an employer in spite of the exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

1979Notwithstanding the statement in the footnote in American Motorcycle Ass’n, supra, nevertheless, when the California Code came to consider the case of Associated Const., supra, 150 Cal.Rptr. at 896 , 587 P.2d at 693 , it then decided that comparative fault among joint tortfeasors was applicable as to an employer in spite of the exclusivity clause of the Workers’ Compensation Act.