judicially created rule in Maine

1985In several recent decisions, this Court has indicated its willingness, should the proper occasion arise, to re-examine “the judicially created rule of punitive damages ... in light of modern considerations and authorities.” Braley v. Berkshire Mutual Insurance Co., 440 A.2d 359 , 361 n. 4 (Me.1982); see, e.g., Hanover Insurance Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156 , 158 n. 2 (Me.1983); Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 594 , 595 n. 2 (Me.1983).

1983See Braley v. Berkshire Mutual Insurance Company, 440 A.2d 359 , 361 n. 4 (Me.1982).

2025The judicially created exception to the final judgment rule simply does not apply because, as we held in In re L.R., we lack authority to override section 4006’s express limitation on interlocutory appeals of child protection orders and “cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature.” 2014 ME 95, ¶¶ 5, 9 , 97 A.3d 602 . [¶15] Our determination that section 4006’s plain, unambiguous language strictly limits appeals from orders in child protection proceedings and our express recognition of the Legislature’s prerogative to do so ordinarily would suffice to settle the question present

2025The judicially created exception to the final judgment rule simply does not apply because, as we held in In re L.R., we lack authority to override section 4006’s express limitation on interlocutory appeals of child protection orders and “cannot substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature.” 2014 ME 95, ¶¶ 5, 9 , 97 A.3d 602 . [¶15] Our determination that section 4006’s plain, unambiguous language strictly limits appeals from orders in child protection proceedings and our express recognition of the Legislature’s prerogative to do so ordinarily would suffice to settle the question present

2021Servs. v. Lowatchie, 569 A.2d 197, 199 (Me. 1990) (quotation marks omitted).

2014See Bell v. Walton, 2004 ME 146, ¶ 11 , 861 A.2d 687 (“Mindful that [the statutory provision] is unambiguous ... there is no apparent reason to engraft a judicially created doctrine ... upon the statutory scheme.”). [¶ 18] Bearing these principles in mind, the record will only support a finding that the association failed to comply with the statutory requirement that it send notice of the initial meeting to all owners of parcels benefited by the private road.

2014See Bell v. Walton, 2004 ME 146, ¶ 11 , 861 A.2d 687 (“Mindful that [the statutory provision] is unambiguous ... there is no apparent reason to engraft a judicially created doctrine ... upon the statutory scheme.”). [¶ 18] Bearing these principles in mind, the record will only support a finding that the association failed to comply with the statutory requirement that it send notice of the initial meeting to all owners of parcels benefited by the private road.

2008An appeal from an interlocutory order is “eligible for immediate review only if [it falls] within a judicially-created exception to the final judgment rule, including one of the three, well-established exceptions: the ‘death knell’ exception, the judicial economy exception, or the collateral order exception.” Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123, ¶ 8 , 908 A.2d 1214, 1217 . [¶ 13] The Markheims contend that the order denying their motion to disqualify fits within the “death knell” exception.

2008An appeal from an interlocutory order is “eligible for immediate review only if [it falls] within a judicially-created exception to the final judgment rule, including one of the three, well-established exceptions: the ‘death knell’ exception, the judicial economy exception, or the collateral order exception.” Passalaqua v. Passalaqua, 2006 ME 123, ¶ 8 , 908 A.2d 1214, 1217 . [¶ 13] The Markheims contend that the order denying their motion to disqualify fits within the “death knell” exception.

2008Thermos Co. v. Spence, 1999 ME 129, ¶ 15 , 735 A.2d 484, 488 (citing Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449 , 104 A. 815 (1918)); see generally Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23 cmt. a, reporter’s notes (2000).

2008Thermos Co. v. Spence, 1999 ME 129, ¶ 15 , 735 A.2d 484, 488 (citing Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449 , 104 A. 815 (1918)); see generally Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 23 cmt. a, reporter’s notes (2000).

2006See IHT Corp. v. Paragon Cutlery Co., Inc., 2002 ME 68, ¶ 5 , 794 A.2d 651, 652 (holding denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction not immediately appealable). [¶ 8] Kelly concedes that the orders appealed from are interlocutory and are eligible for immediate review only if they fall within a judicially created exception to the final judgment rule, including one of the three, well-established exceptions: the “death knell” exception, the judicial economy exception, or the collateral order exception. [¶ 9] The “death knell” exception allows an immediate appeal from an interlo

2006See IHT Corp. v. Paragon Cutlery Co., Inc., 2002 ME 68, ¶ 5 , 794 A.2d 651, 652 (holding denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction not immediately appealable). [¶ 8] Kelly concedes that the orders appealed from are interlocutory and are eligible for immediate review only if they fall within a judicially created exception to the final judgment rule, including one of the three, well-established exceptions: the “death knell” exception, the judicial economy exception, or the collateral order exception. [¶ 9] The “death knell” exception allows an immediate appeal from an interlo

2006See IHT Corp. v. Paragon Cutlery Co., Inc., 2002 ME 68, ¶ 5 , 794 A.2d 651, 652 (holding denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction not immediately appealable). [¶ 8] Kelly concedes that the orders appealed from are interlocutory and are eligible for immediate review only if they fall within a judicially created exception to the final judgment rule, including one of the three, well-established exceptions: the “death knell” exception, the judicial economy exception, or the collateral order exception. [¶ 9] The “death knell” exception allows an immediate appeal from an interlo

2006See IHT Corp. v. Paragon Cutlery Co., Inc., 2002 ME 68, ¶ 5 , 794 A.2d 651, 652 (holding denial of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction not immediately appealable). [¶ 8] Kelly concedes that the orders appealed from are interlocutory and are eligible for immediate review only if they fall within a judicially created exception to the final judgment rule, including one of the three, well-established exceptions: the “death knell” exception, the judicial economy exception, or the collateral order exception. [¶ 9] The “death knell” exception allows an immediate appeal from an interlo

2003See, e.g., Williams, 113 F.3d at 1300 (stating that the district court’s discretion “must be guided by the statutory presumption that fees should be awarded to successful plaintiffs absent unusual situations”); Love v. Deal, 5 F.3d 1406, 1410 (11th Cir.1993) (stating that “[b]ecause the special circumstances exception is a judicially created concept, we have held that it should be construed narrowly so as not to interfere with the congressional purposes behind the fee award statute[ ]”); Hatfield v. Hayes, 877 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir.1989) *961 (stating that “[b]ecause the language of § 1988 do

2003See, e.g., Williams, 113 F.3d at 1300 (stating that the district court’s discretion “must be guided by the statutory presumption that fees should be awarded to successful plaintiffs absent unusual situations”); Love v. Deal, 5 F.3d 1406, 1410 (11th Cir.1993) (stating that “[b]ecause the special circumstances exception is a judicially created concept, we have held that it should be construed narrowly so as not to interfere with the congressional purposes behind the fee award statute[ ]”); Hatfield v. Hayes, 877 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir.1989) *961 (stating that “[b]ecause the language of § 1988 do

2003Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 170 F.Supp.2d 1, 6 (D.D.C.2001)). [¶ 19] Determining what facts will give rise to a special circumstances exception has proven no easy task.

2003See, e.g., Williams, 113 F.3d at 1300 (stating that the district court’s discretion “must be guided by the statutory presumption that fees should be awarded to successful plaintiffs absent unusual situations”); Love v. Deal, 5 F.3d 1406, 1410 (11th Cir.1993) (stating that “[b]ecause the special circumstances exception is a judicially created concept, we have held that it should be construed narrowly so as not to interfere with the congressional purposes behind the fee award statute[ ]”); Hatfield v. Hayes, 877 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir.1989) *961 (stating that “[b]ecause the language of § 1988 do

2003In Riley v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 639 A.2d 626, 628 (Me.1994), we reaffirmed the existence of the judicially-created presumption that, "absent any pending action or proceeding and absent any legislative statement to the contrary, the Legislature intends that procedural changes apply to preexisting, inchoate interests and that substantive changes do not.” We cautioned, however, that this substantive/procedural distinction does not apply to the determination of the legislative intent of an amendment applied to proceedings that were pending when the amendment was enacted.

2003Actions and proceedings pending at the time of the passage, amendment or repeal of an Act or ordinance are not affected thereby. [7] In Riley v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 639 A.2d 626, 628 (Me.1994), we reaffirmed the existence of the judicially-created presumption that, "absent any pending action or proceeding and absent any legislative statement to the contrary, the Legislature intends that procedural changes apply to preexisting, inchoate interests and that substantive changes do not." We cautioned, however, that this substantive/procedural distinction does not apply to the determination of th

2000See State v. Maine State Employees Ass’n, 482 A.2d 461, 463-64 (Me.1984); Fidelity & Cas.

1992Dillingham v. Andover Wood Products, Inc., 483 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Me.1984). 1 Folsom maintains that the plain language of the statute provides that a change in earning capacity must be proved by comparative medical evidence in any subsequent petition for review.

1992Dillingham v. Andover Wood Products, Inc., 483 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Me.1984). [1] Folsom maintains that the plain language of the statute provides that a change in earning capacity must be proved by comparative medical evidence in any subsequent petition for review.

1985In several recent decisions, this Court has indicated its willingness, should the proper occasion arise, to re-examine “the judicially created rule of punitive damages ... in light of modern considerations and authorities.” Braley v. Berkshire Mutual Insurance Co., 440 A.2d 359 , 361 n. 4 (Me.1982); see, e.g., Hanover Insurance Co. v. Hayward, 464 A.2d 156 , 158 n. 2 (Me.1983); Oliver v. Martin, 460 A.2d 594 , 595 n. 2 (Me.1983).

1984Mechanic Falls Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 381 A.2d 1080, 1087 (Me.1977); Department of Mental Health & Corrections v. Bowman, 308 A.2d 586, 587 (1973).

1984Mechanic Falls Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 381 A.2d 1080, 1087 (Me.1977); Department of Mental Health & Corrections v. Bowman, 308 A.2d 586, 587 (1973).

1980Accord: Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22-23 , 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972); Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 370-71 , 173 N.W.2d 416, 418-19 (1969); Rupert v. Sti enne, 90 Nev. 397, 399-400 , 528 P.2d 1013, 1014-15 (1974); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482 , 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 603-04 , 506 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Ct.App.1973); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349 , 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1 (R.I.1978) and Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183 , 500 P.2d 771 (1972).

1980Accord: Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 22-23 , 284 N.E.2d 794, 797 (1972); Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1979); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 370-71 , 173 N.W.2d 416, 418-19 (1969); Rupert v. Sti enne, 90 Nev. 397, 399-400 , 528 P.2d 1013, 1014-15 (1974); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482 , 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 603-04 , 506 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Ct.App.1973); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349 , 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1 (R.I.1978) and Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183 , 500 P.2d 771 (1972).