judicially created doctrine in Washington

47 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 7 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

Case	Followed	Cited
Roller v. Rollergreen wash · 1905 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 2 sentences 2014See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (1905) (father raped daughter). 2014See, e.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242 , 79 P. 788 (1905) (father raped daughter).	2	2
City of Seattle v. Patugreen wash · 2002 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007Id. at 286 , 581 P.2d 579 . ¶ 24 Clearly, the FDD is a judicially created doctrine that cannot assume the authority to repeal a constitutional mandate. [14] 1156 See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wash.2d 717, 722 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) ("Because the invited error doctrine is a judicially created prudential doctrine, it is not an absolute bar to review of fundamental constitutional rights."). 2007*Id. at 286 . ¶24 Clearly, the FDD is a judicially created doctrine that cannot assume the authority to repeal a constitutional mandate. 14 See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 722 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (“Because the invited error doctrine is a judicially created prudential doctrine, it is not an absolute bar to review of fundamental constitutional rights.”).	2	2
City of Seattle v. Patugreen wash · 2002 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007Id. at 286 , 581 P.2d 579 . ¶ 24 Clearly, the FDD is a judicially created doctrine that cannot assume the authority to repeal a constitutional mandate. [14] 1156 See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wash.2d 717, 722 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) ("Because the invited error doctrine is a judicially created prudential doctrine, it is not an absolute bar to review of fundamental constitutional rights."). 2007*Id. at 286 . ¶24 Clearly, the FDD is a judicially created doctrine that cannot assume the authority to repeal a constitutional mandate. 14 See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 722 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (“Because the invited error doctrine is a judicially created prudential doctrine, it is not an absolute bar to review of fundamental constitutional rights.”).	2	2
State v. Dodgengreen washctapp · 1996 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2014–2017 2 sentences 2017App. 487,492 , 915 P.2d 531 (1996) ("The corpus delicti rule is a judicially created rule of evidence, not a constitutional sufficiency of the evidence requirement."). 2014The rule "is a judicially created rule of evidence, not a constitutional sufficiency of the evidence requirement, and a defendant must make a proper objection to the trial court to preserve the issue." Dodqen, 81 Wn.	1	2
State v. Sweetgreen wash · 1978 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 2 sentences 2007Id. at 286 , 581 P.2d 579 . ¶ 24 Clearly, the FDD is a judicially created doctrine that cannot assume the authority to repeal a constitutional mandate. [14] 1156 See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wash.2d 717, 722 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) ("Because the invited error doctrine is a judicially created prudential doctrine, it is not an absolute bar to review of fundamental constitutional rights."). 2007*Id. at 286 . ¶24 Clearly, the FDD is a judicially created doctrine that cannot assume the authority to repeal a constitutional mandate. 14 See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 722 , 58 P.3d 273 (2002) (“Because the invited error doctrine is a judicially created prudential doctrine, it is not an absolute bar to review of fundamental constitutional rights.”).	1	2
State Of Washington v. Zaida Cardenas-floresgreen washctapp · 2016 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017See Cardenas-Flores, 194 Wn.	1	1
State v. Grogangreen washctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015App. 761 , 763-64, 887 P.2d 911 (1995)). 44 See Brockob. 159 Wn.2d at 320 ; see also State v. Groqan. 158 Wn.	1	1
Vasquez v. Hawthornegreen wash · 2001 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 1 sentence 2012Vasquez, 145 Wn.2d at 109 (Alexander, C.J., concurring); William A. Reppy, Jr., Choice of Law Problems Arising When Unmarried Cohabitants Change Domicile, 55 SMU L.	1	1
In Re the Detention Swansongreen wash · 1990 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999 1 sentence 1999See In re Detention of Swanson, 115 Wash.2d 21, 27 , 804 P.2d 1 (1990) (had Legislature intended initial detention period to be measured in days rather than hours, it would have said so).	1	1
John C. Shimman, Cross-Appellant v. John Frank, Cross-Appelleesgreen ca6 · 1980 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995	1	1
State v. Cookgreen washctapp · 1988 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991	1	1
Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.green wash · 1969 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (29)

Case	Cited	Years
In re Kelly green washctapp · 2012 2 sentences 2023“The CIR doctrine is a judicially created doctrine used to resolve the property distribution issues that arise when unmarried people separate after living in a marital-like relationship and acquiring what would have been community property had they been married.” Matter of Kelly, 170 Wn. 2023“The [committed intimate relationship] doctrine is a judicially created doctrine used to resolve the property distribution issues that arise when unmarried people 8 No. 84215-3-I/9 separate after living in a marital-like relationship and acquiring what would have been community property had they been married.” In re Kelly & Moesslang, 170 Wn.	6	2017–2023
State v. CDW green washctapp · 1995 2 sentences 2016State v. C.D.W., 76 Wn. 2015App. at 492 (The corpus delicti rule "is a judicially created rule of evidence, not a constitutional sufficiency of the evidence requirement, and a defendant must make [a] proper objection to the trial court to preserve the issue.") (citing State v.C.D.W.. 76 Wn.	4	1996–2016
Harlow v. Fitzgerald green scotus · 1982 2 sentences 2024But the judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages under § 1983 if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S. Ct. 2727 , 73 L. 2024But the judicially created doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages under § 1983 if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S. Ct. 2727 , 73 L.	3	1991–2024
Martin v. Dematic green wash · 2014 2 sentences 2021Martin, 182 Wn.2d at 288 . 2016Martin, 182 Wn.2d at 288 .	3	2016–2021
State v. Barnes green washctapp · 1997 2 sentences 2015State v. Barnes, 85 Wn. 2015State v. Barnes, 85 Wn.	3	2015–2015
State v. Chenoweth green wash · 2007 2 sentences 2010State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wash.2d 454 , 472 n. 14, 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (stating that the "federal exclusionary rule is a judicially-created prophylactic measure" and that "the state exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated"). 2010State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454 , 472 n.14, 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (stating that the “federal exclusionary rule is a judicially-created prophylactic measure” and that “the state exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated”).	2	2010–2010
State v. Chenoweth green wash · 2007 2 sentences 2010State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wash.2d 454 , 472 n. 14, 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (stating that the "federal exclusionary rule is a judicially-created prophylactic measure" and that "the state exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated"). 2010State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wn.2d 454 , 472 n.14, 158 P.3d 595 (2007) (stating that the “federal exclusionary rule is a judicially-created prophylactic measure” and that “the state exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated”).	2	2010–2010
State v. Dupard green wash · 1980 2 sentences 1997Dupard, 93 Wn.2d at 272 . 1997Dupard, 93 Wash.2d at 272 , 609 P.2d 961 .	2	1997–1997
Twelker v. Shannon & Wilson, Inc. green wash · 1977 2 sentences 1997Twelker, 88 Wn.2d at 476 . 1997Twelker, 88 Wash.2d at 476 , 564 P.2d 1131 .	2	1997–1997
Dana's Housekeeping, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industries green washctapp · 1995 2 sentences 1995Collateral estoppel is "a judicially created doctrine which promotes fairness by preventing relitigation of particular issues." Dana's Housekeeping, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 76 Wash.App. 600, 612 , 886 P.2d 1147 , review denied, 127 Wash.2d 1007 , 898 P.2d 307 (1995). 1995Collateral estoppel is "a judicially created doctrine which promotes fairness by preventing relitigation of particular issues." Dana's Housekeeping, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 76 Wash.App. 600, 612 , 886 P.2d 1147 , review denied, 127 Wash.2d 1007 , 898 P.2d 307 (1995).	2	1995–1995
McNeal v. Allen green wash · 1980 2 sentences 2025McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265, 267 , 621 P.2d 1285 (1980). “[A]ttorneys and law firms have absolute immunity from liability for acts arising out of representing their clients.” Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wn. 2025McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265, 267 , 621 P.2d 1285 (1980). “[A]ttorneys and law firms have absolute immunity from liability for acts arising out of representing their clients.” Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wn.	1	2025–2025
Jeckle v. Crotty green washctapp · 2004 1 sentence 2025McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265, 267 , 621 P.2d 1285 (1980). “[A]ttorneys and law firms have absolute immunity from liability for acts arising out of representing their clients.” Jeckle v. Crotty, 120 Wn.	1	2025–2025
Owen v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad green wash · 2005 1 sentence 2023Co., 153 Wn.2d 780, 789 , 108 P.3d 1220 (2005). 7 No. 84426-1-I/8 Litigation Privilege Generally The “litigation privilege”5 is a judicially created privilege that protects participants—including attorneys, parties, and witnesses—in a judicial proceeding against civil liability for statements they make in the course of that proceeding.	1	2023–2023
Owen v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe RR Co. green wash · 2005 1 sentence 2023Co., 153 Wn.2d 780, 789 , 108 P.3d 1220 (2005). 7 No. 84426-1-I/8 Litigation Privilege Generally The “litigation privilege”5 is a judicially created privilege that protects participants—including attorneys, parties, and witnesses—in a judicial proceeding against civil liability for statements they make in the course of that proceeding.	1	2023–2023
Melter v. Melter green washctapp · 2012 1 sentence 2019A contestant bears the burden of establishing that he falls within the exception to the general rule that no contest provisions are enforceable. 12 No. 35845-3-III In re Estate of Primiani In concluding that Mr. Primiani did not demonstrate good faith and probable cause, the trial court looked to Dean v. Jordan, 194 Wash. 661 , 79 P.2d 331 (1938), “which is often relied upon as the earliest formulation of circumstances giving rise to concern [about undue influence], and their effect on the parties’ proofs.” Melter, 167 Wn.	1	2019–2019
Dean v. Jordan green wash · 1938 2 sentences 2019A contestant bears the burden of establishing that he falls within the exception to the general rule that no contest provisions are enforceable. 12 No. 35845-3-III In re Estate of Primiani In concluding that Mr. Primiani did not demonstrate good faith and probable cause, the trial court looked to Dean v. Jordan, 194 Wash. 661 , 79 P.2d 331 (1938), “which is often relied upon as the earliest formulation of circumstances giving rise to concern [about undue influence], and their effect on the parties’ proofs.” Melter, 167 Wn. 2019A contestant bears the burden of establishing that he falls within the exception to the general rule that no contest provisions are enforceable. 12 No. 35845-3-III In re Estate of Primiani In concluding that Mr. Primiani did not demonstrate good faith and probable cause, the trial court looked to Dean v. Jordan, 194 Wash. 661 , 79 P.2d 331 (1938), “which is often relied upon as the earliest formulation of circumstances giving rise to concern [about undue influence], and their effect on the parties’ proofs.” Melter, 167 Wn.	1	2019–2019
State v. Brockob green wash · 2006 1 sentence 2015App. 761 , 763-64, 887 P.2d 911 (1995)). 44 See Brockob. 159 Wn.2d at 320 ; see also State v. Groqan. 158 Wn.	1	2015–2015
State v. Lown neutral washctapp · 2003 1 sentence 2013App. at 883 ; similarly, Lown addressed whether a court commissioner properly applied “the judicially created exception for a ‘de minimis’ violation” of conditions of a deferred disposition. 116 Wn.	1	2013–2013
Corbin v. Madison green washctapp · 1974 1 sentence 2012Corbin v. Madison, 12 Wn.	1	2012–2012
Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Department green wash · 1992 2 sentences 1999Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash.2d 178, 191 , 829 P.2d 1061 (1992) (issue not briefed deemed waived). [1] RCW 71.05.020(15) defines "mental disorder" as "any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions...." [2] Of course, the majority fails to define the parameters of this judicially created exception or to explain why substantial compliance is applicable only if "unique circumstances" are present. [3] Had the Legislature intended to create an exception to the signature requirement, it would 1999Kadoranian v. Bellingham Police Dep't, 119 Wash.2d 178, 191 , 829 P.2d 1061 (1992) (issue not briefed deemed waived). [1] RCW 71.05.020(15) defines "mental disorder" as "any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions...." [2] Of course, the majority fails to define the parameters of this judicially created exception or to explain why substantial compliance is applicable only if "unique circumstances" are present. [3] Had the Legislature intended to create an exception to the signature requirement, it would	1	1999–1999
Hanson v. City of Snohomish green wash · 1993 2 sentences 1995Its purpose is "to promote the policy of ending disputes, to promote judicial economy and to prevent harassment of and inconvenience to litigants." Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wash.2d 552, 561 , 852 P.2d 295 (1993) (footnote omitted). 1995Its purpose is "to promote the policy of ending disputes, to promote judicial economy and to prevent harassment of and inconvenience to litigants." Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wash.2d 552, 561 , 852 P.2d 295 (1993) (footnote omitted).	1	1995–1995
Reeves v. John Davis & Co. green wash · 1931	1	1989–1989
Cornell v. Edsen green wash · 1914	1	1989–1989
Buell v. City of Bremerton green wash · 1972	1	1982–1982
Smith v. Skagit County green wash · 1969	1	1982–1982
Hawkins v. United States green scotus · 1958	1	1980–1980
Bordeaux v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. green wash · 1967	1	1974–1974
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad green scotus · 1943	1	1973–1973
Johnston v. Karjala neutral wash · 1933	1	1973–1973

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 42u.s.c.1983 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.040 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.020 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.31.100 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.505 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.36.021 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 303 (1955–2026) IL 124 (1966–2026) MI 83 (1976–2026) PA 79 (1961–2024) TX 79 (1969–2022) MO 77 (1986–2025) LA 76 (1960–2025) OH 72 (1978–2026) WI 54 (1997–2025) MD 53 (1962–2022) NJ 50 (1976–2026) WA 47 (1973–2025) FL 41 (1983–2024) CO 38 (1983–2025) VA 35 (1974–2026) UT 33 (1981–2023) NM 29 (1978–2023) NY 28 (1959–2024) CT 27 (1994–2024) KS 24 (1983–2022) MA 23 (1976–2019) ME 21 (1977–2025) TN 20 (1981–2024) GA 20 (1981–2025) MS 17 (1979–2024) MN 17 (1985–2024) ID 17 (1966–2026) NH 17 (1965–2020) AZ 15 (1980–2023) RI 15 (1979–2022) OR 14 (1996–2024) AL 14 (1984–2024) WY 13 (1981–2026) IN 11 (1980–2023) DE 10 (1955–2022) AK 9 (1980–2019) OK 9 (1985–2014) VT 8 (1989–2026) WV 8 (1981–2020) AR 7 (1997–2022) KY 7 (2004–2025) IA 7 (1995–2018) VI 7 (2009–2017) MT 6 (1980–2009) NC 6 (1991–2023) NE 4 (1996–2020) DC 4 (1999–2009) NV 4 (1979–2024) SC 4 (1975–2019) SD 3 (1957–1996) ND 2 (2013–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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