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14 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundationgreen2 sentences2005See, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-21 , 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1439 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788, 795 (1971). 2005See, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-21 , 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1439 , 28 L.Ed.2d 788, 795 (1971). | 3 | 3 |
Ex Parte Erggreen1 sentence2024As I have previously noted, " 'the courts are not at liberty … to read into [a statute] and interpolate words which do not appear in the language enacted by the Legislature.' " Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 649 (Ala. 2011) (quoting McCall v. Automatic Voting Mach. | 1 | 1 |
Budget Inn of Daphne, Inc. v. City of Daphnegreen1 sentence2016See Budget Inn of Daphne, Inc. v. City of Daphne, 789 So.2d 154 (Ala.2000)(explaining that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is a judicially created doctrine and not one involving subject-matter jurisdiction). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Blantongreen2 sentences1997Our supreme court noted that, "although many courts, including the federal courts, have dispensed with the mutuality requirement, it remains the law in Alabama." Id. (emphasis added). 1997It is a judicially created doctrine declaring that unless both parties in the second action are bound by the judgment in a previous case, neither party in the second action should be bound, i.e., a nonparty as to the first action may not use the prior judgment as determinative of the same issue in the second action." Jones, 644 So.2d at 886 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Alabama
green
2 sentences2008To continue to apply a judicially created rule this court has recognized *308 as obsolete and unjust is a violation of its integrity." 453 So.2d at 740 . 2007To continue to apply a judicially created rule this court has recognized as obsolete and unjust is a violation of its integrity." 453 So.2d at 740 . | 2 | 2007–2008 |
Waterfront Marine Construction, Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups A, B and C
green
2 sentences2006Allowing a plea of res judicata to be resolved by arbitration defeats the purpose of the judicially created doctrine—to bring an end to the substantive controversy and to protect the parties from relitigating previously decided matters.' " 468 S.E.2d at 903 ." 821 So.2d at 162-64 . 2001Allowing a plea of res judicata to be resolved by arbitration defeats the purpose of the judicially created doctrine — to bring an end to the substantive controversy and to protect the parties from re-litigating previously decided matters." 468 S.E.2d at 903 . 4 Furthermore, the record is devoid of evidence that Merrill Lynch participated in arbitration proceedings as a result of the appellants' complaint before the NASD, other than to file an answer, in which it also asserted its collateral-estoppel defense. | 2 | 2001–2006 |
LEON C. BAKER, PC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
green
1 sentence2006Allowing a plea of res judicata to be resolved by arbitration defeats the purpose of the judicially created doctrine—to bring an end to the substantive controversy and to protect the parties from relitigating previously decided matters.' " 468 S.E.2d at 903 ." 821 So.2d at 162-64 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
cluster 372830
green
1 sentence1997Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 2999 , 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Harris v. Wright
green
1 sentence1997Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 2999 , 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Boerckel v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1997Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 2999 , 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Flores v. United States
green
1 sentence1997Northcross v. Board of Educ. of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 , 100 S.Ct. 2999 , 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Craig v. Larson
green
2 sentences1991The doctrine of complicity is also referred to as the "non-innocent party doctrine" in Craig v. Larson , 432 Mich. 346 , 439 N.W.2d 899 (1989). 1991The doctrine of complicity is also referred to as the "non-innocent party doctrine" in Craig v. Larson , 432 Mich. 346 , 439 N.W.2d 899 (1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Sterenberg v. Sir Loin, Inc.
green
2 sentences1991It is explained as follows in Sterenberg v. Sir Loin, Inc. , 183 Ill. 1991It is explained as follows in Sterenberg v. Sir Loin, Inc., 183 Ill.App.3d 631 [ 131 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Ex Parte Sellers
green
1 sentence1989Id.; cf. O’Grady v. City of Hoover, 519 So.2d 1292 (Ala.1987) (Torbert, C.J., dissenting). . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.
green
2 sentences1984In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. , 315 U.S. 289 , 326 , 62 S.Ct. 581 , 599 , 86 L.Ed. 855 (1942), Justice Frankfurter, of the United States Supreme Court, described the judiciary's responsibility regarding this problem: "It is said that familiar principles would be outraged if Bethlehem were denied recovery on these contracts. 1984In United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. , 315 U.S. 289 , 326 , 62 S.Ct. 581 , 599 , 86 L.Ed. 855 (1942), Justice Frankfurter, of the United States Supreme Court, described the judiciary's responsibility regarding this problem: "It is said that familiar principles would be outraged if Bethlehem were denied recovery on these contracts. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.