judicially created rule in Georgia

2022We disagree. 17 “Primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine whereby a court of competent jurisdiction may dismiss or stay an action pending a resolution of some portion of the actions by an administrative agency.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F3d 1292 , 1298 (I), n.3 (11th Cir. 2001).

2018See also In re StarNet, Inc. , 355 F.3d 634 , 639 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows a federal court to refer a matter extending beyond the 'conventional experiences of judges' or 'falling within the realm of administrative discretion' to an administrative agency with more specialized experience, expertise, and insight." (citation and punctuation omitted) ); Smith v. GTE Corp. , 236 F.3d 1292 , 1298 (I) n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine whereby a court of competent jurisdiction may dismiss or stay an action pending a resolut

2021Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) (829 SE2d 348) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) (848 SE2d 882) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Assembly.”

2021Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) (829 SE2d 348) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) (848 SE2d 882) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Assembly.”

2021Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) (829 SE2d 348) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) (848 SE2d 882) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Assembly.”

2021Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) ( 829 SE2d 348 ) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) ( 827 SE2d 892 ) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) ( 848 SE2d 882 ) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Asse

2019Prior to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), and as a matter of long-standing common law, the term-of-court rule provided as follows: “In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, . . . a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose 5 was begun during that term.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 , 67 (1) ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914); see Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922) (following Mayer); see also Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (2007)

2019Prior to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), and as a matter of long-standing common law, the term-of-court rule provided as follows: “In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, . . . a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose 5 was begun during that term.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 , 67 (1) ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914); see Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922) (following Mayer); see also Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (2007)

2018See also In re StarNet, Inc. , 355 F.3d 634 , 639 (7th Cir. 2004) ("The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows a federal court to refer a matter extending beyond the 'conventional experiences of judges' or 'falling within the realm of administrative discretion' to an administrative agency with more specialized experience, expertise, and insight." (citation and punctuation omitted) ); Smith v. GTE Corp. , 236 F.3d 1292 , 1298 (I) n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine whereby a court of competent jurisdiction may dismiss or stay an action pending a resolut

2018See also In re StarNet, Inc., 355 F3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows a federal court to refer a matter extending beyond the ‘conventional experiences of judges’ or ‘falling within the realm of administrative discretion’ to an administrative agency with more specialized experience, expertise, and insight.” (citation and punctuation omitted)); Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F3d 1292 , 1298 (I) n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Primary jurisdiction is a judicially created doctrine whereby a court of competent jurisdiction may dismiss or stay an action pending a resolution of

2021Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) (829 SE2d 348) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) (848 SE2d 882) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Assembly.”

2021Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) ( 829 SE2d 348 ) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) ( 827 SE2d 892 ) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) ( 848 SE2d 882 ) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Asse

2020See id. (“This is a judicially created rule, which evolved from the established common law tenet that a court cannot set aside or alter a judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during the original term.” (citations and punctuation omitted)).6 Because the holding in Matthews is contrary to our holdings in McKiernan and Gray, it must be overruled.7 The holding in 5 Withdrawal of a guilty plea before judgment is pronounced is governed by OCGA § 17-7-93 (b). 6 We note, however, that an otherwise proper amended motion does

2015“This is a judicially created rule, which evolved from the established common law tenet that a court cannot set aside or alter a judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during the original term.” (Citations omitted.) McKiernan, 286 Ga. at 757 .

2019Prior to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), and as a matter of long-standing common law, the term-of-court rule provided as follows: “In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, . . . a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose 5 was begun during that term.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 , 67 (1) ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914); see Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922) (following Mayer); see also Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (2007)

2019Prior to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), and as a matter of long-standing common law, the term-of-court rule provided as follows: “In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, . . . a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose 5 was begun during that term.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 , 67 (1) ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914); see Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922) (following Mayer); see also Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (2007)

2019Prior to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), and as a matter of long-standing common law, the term-of-court rule provided as follows: “In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, . . . a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose 5 was begun during that term.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 , 67 (1) ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914); see Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922) (following Mayer); see also Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (2007)

2019Prior to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), and as a matter of long-standing common law, the term-of-court rule provided as follows: “In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, . . . a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose 5 was begun during that term.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 , 67 (1) ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914); see Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922) (following Mayer); see also Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (2007)

2025In the appropriate case, I encourage my colleagues to join me in taking a closer look at this issue so that we may provide clarity on the same.14 13 My doubts in this respect are multiplied by our holdings in Thomas, 308 Ga. at 30 (2) (b), and McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 174 (1) (794 SE2d 118) (2016), where we declined to extend OCGA § 24-8-823’s rule to mere admissions on the basis that the plain language of the statue only applies to confessions.

2025In the appropriate case, I encourage 13 My doubts in this respect are multiplied by our holdings in Thomas, 308 Ga. at 30 (2) (b), and McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 174 (1) ( 794 SE2d 118 ) (2016), where we declined to extend OCGA § 24-8-823’s rule to mere admissions on the basis that the plain language of the statute only applies to confessions.

2025In the appropriate case, I encourage my colleagues to join me in taking a closer look at this issue so that we may provide clarity on the same.14 13 My doubts in this respect are multiplied by our holdings in Thomas, 308 Ga. at 30 (2) (b), and McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 174 (1) (794 SE2d 118) (2016), where we declined to extend OCGA § 24-8-823’s rule to mere admissions on the basis that the plain language of the statue only applies to confessions.

2025In the appropriate case, I encourage my colleagues to join me in taking a closer look at this issue so that we may provide clarity on the same.14 13 My doubts in this respect are multiplied by our holdings in Thomas, 308 Ga. at 30 (2) (b), and McMullen v. State, 300 Ga. 173, 174 (1) (794 SE2d 118) (2016), where we declined to extend OCGA § 24-8-823’s rule to mere admissions on the basis that the plain language of the statue only applies to confessions.

2022It is “a prudential doctrine that permits courts to determine that an otherwise cognizable claim implicates technical and policy questions that should be addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory authority over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial branch.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Astiana, 783 F3d at 760 (II).

2021Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) (829 SE2d 348) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) (848 SE2d 882) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Assembly.”

2021Cf. Duke v. State, 306 Ga. 171, 186 (4) (829 SE2d 348) (2019) (overruling a judicially created rule altering the legislature’s jurisdictional requirements for interlocutory appeals); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) (827 SE2d 892) (2019) (concluding that evidentiary exclusion rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Evidence Code); see also Love v. State, 309 Ga. 833, 842 (4) (848 SE2d 882) (2020) (“[Policy] considerations are best left to be weighed by our General Assembly.”

2021See, e.g., Maxwell, 262 Ga. at 542-543 (3).

2020See White v. State, 302 Ga. 315, 320 (3) ( 806 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (“[A]n amended motion is not a time machine that allows a litigant to change past events.

2020See White v. State, 302 Ga. 315, 320 (3) ( 806 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (“[A]n amended motion is not a time machine that allows a litigant to change past events.

2019See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 259 (4) & nn.3, 4 ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (citing cases involving extreme delays in resolving post-trial, pre-appeal litigation). 43 requirements and could not usurp the exclusive authority vested in trial courts to decide, in the first instance, whether an issue merits interlocutory consideration); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) ( 827 SE2d 892 ) (2019) (concluding that an exclusionary evidence rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Eviden

2019See Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254, 259 (4) & nn.3, 4 ( 811 SE2d 420 ) (2018) (citing cases involving extreme delays in resolving post-trial, pre-appeal litigation). 43 requirements and could not usurp the exclusive authority vested in trial courts to decide, in the first instance, whether an issue merits interlocutory consideration); State v. Orr, 305 Ga. 729, 735-736 (2) ( 827 SE2d 892 ) (2019) (concluding that an exclusionary evidence rule, created by this Court with dubious authority and based on “the Court’s view of good policy,” was abrogated by the legislature’s enactment of the new Eviden

2018See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, Strawberry Lodge #40 v. Entrekin, 314 So2d 663, 671-672 (I) (Ala. 1975); Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. City of Anchorage, 504 P2d 11 Where, as here, an agency order is at issue in a judicially cognizable dispute, the trial court properly may refer especially difficult or technical issues 1027, 1032-1033 (Alaska 1972), overruled on other grounds by City and Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P2d 626 (Alaska 1979); Austin v. Centerpoint Energy Arkla, 226 SW3d 814, 823-824 (Ark. 2006); Farmers Ins.

2017Although our vagueness doctrine is distinct from substantive due process, their histories have disquieting parallels.” (citation omitted)). 17 See supra note 3. 18 See S. States-Bartow Cty., Inc., 331 Ga. App. at 885 (4) (noting that the Court of Appeals was bound by the Supreme Court of Georgia’s transfer order, which held that the trial court did not rule on the constitutionality of a statute despite plaintiff’s challenge to statute on such grounds); Buchan v. Hobby, 288 Ga. App. 478, 479-80 ( 654 SE2d 444 ) (2007) (same). 12 subject to constitutional demands of due process and equal protect

2017Although our vagueness doctrine is distinct from substantive due process, their histories have disquieting parallels.” (citation omitted)). 17 See supra note 3. 18 See S. States-Bartow Cty., Inc., 331 Ga. App. at 885 (4) (noting that the Court of Appeals was bound by the Supreme Court of Georgia’s transfer order, which held that the trial court did not rule on the constitutionality of a statute despite plaintiff’s challenge to statute on such grounds); Buchan v. Hobby, 288 Ga. App. 478, 479-80 ( 654 SE2d 444 ) (2007) (same). 12 subject to constitutional demands of due process and equal protect

2017Although our vagueness doctrine is distinct from substantive due process, their histories have disquieting parallels.” (citation omitted)). 17 See supra note 3. 18 See S. States-Bartow Cty., Inc., 331 Ga. App. at 885 (4) (noting that the Court of Appeals was bound by the Supreme Court of Georgia’s transfer order, which held that the trial court did not rule on the constitutionality of a statute despite plaintiff’s challenge to statute on such grounds); Buchan v. Hobby, 288 Ga. App. 478, 479-80 ( 654 SE2d 444 ) (2007) (same). 12 subject to constitutional demands of due process and equal protect

2014See also Wilmoth v. Henry County, 251 Ga. 643, 643-644 (1) ( 309 SE2d 126 ) (1983) (county’s sovereign immunity barred claims in action for slip and fall at courthouse); Revels v. Tift County, 235 Ga. 333, 335 (5) ( 219 SE2d 445 ) (1975) (same). 8 The public duty doctrine does not act as a judicially created exception to the state’s sovereign immunity.

2014See also Wilmoth v. Henry County, 251 Ga. 643, 643-644 (1) ( 309 SE2d 126 ) (1983) (county’s sovereign immunity barred claims in action for slip and fall at courthouse); Revels v. Tift County, 235 Ga. 333, 335 (5) ( 219 SE2d 445 ) (1975) (same). 8 The public duty doctrine does not act as a judicially created exception to the state’s sovereign immunity.

2014See also Wilmoth v. Henry County, 251 Ga. 643, 643-644 (1) ( 309 SE2d 126 ) (1983) (county’s sovereign immunity barred claims in action for slip and fall at courthouse); Revels v. Tift County, 235 Ga. 333, 335 (5) ( 219 SE2d 445 ) (1975) (same). 8 The public duty doctrine does not act as a judicially created exception to the state’s sovereign immunity.

2012As noted in Palmer v. State, 282 Ga. 466, 468 ( 651 SE2d 86 ) (2007), in enacting OCGA § 17-7-110, the General Assembly rejected the former judicially-created rule that required special demurrers to be filed prior to arraignment, and created a new rule that seeks a more uniform deadline for the filing of pretrial motions in criminal cases.

2012As noted in Palmer v. State, 282 Ga. 466, 468 ( 651 SE2d 86 ) (2007), in enacting OCGA § 17-7-110, the General Assembly rejected the former judicially-created rule that required special demurrers to be filed prior to arraignment, and created a new rule that seeks a more uniform deadline for the filing of pretrial motions in criminal cases.

2010Accord Barlow v. State, 279 Ga. 870 ( 621 SE2d 438 ) (2005).

2010Accord Barlow v. State, 279 Ga. 870 ( 621 SE2d 438 ) (2005).

2009Indemnity Co., 248 Ga. 306, 311-312 , 282 S.E.2d 896 (1981) (Smith, J., dissenting).

2009Indemnity Co., 248 Ga. 306, 311-312 , 282 S.E.2d 896 (1981) (Smith, J., dissenting).