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15 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Stategreen2 sentences2011El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. State, 123 Ariz. 219, 223 , 599 P.2d 175, 179 (1979). 2011El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. State, 123 Ariz. 219, 223 , 599 P.2d 175, 179 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Gibbsgreen2 sentences2023In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403 , 407 ¶ 8 (App. 2011). 2023See Smith v. CIGNA HealthPlan of Ariz., 203 Ariz. 173 , 179 ¶ 21 (App. 2002); In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403 , 407 ¶ 8 (App. 2011). 7 NORWOOD v. MOORE Decision of the Court ¶28 Both components of reason (2) are present here. | 1 | 2 |
Galloway v. Vanderpoolgreen2 sentences2017Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252 , 256 ¶ 16, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003). 2017Galloway v. Vanderpool, 205 Ariz. 252 , 256 ¶ 16, 69 P.3d 23, 27 (2003). | 1 | 2 |
Parsons v. Bekins Freightgreen2 sentences1987A judicially created exception was first recognized by the Arizona Supreme Court *193 in Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz. 130 , 493 P.2d 913 (1972) (the Industrial Commission could excuse an untimely hearing request if there was a meritorious excuse, the delay was not excessive, and the effect was nonprejudicial to the carrier). 1987A judicially created exception was first recognized by the Arizona Supreme Court *193 in Parsons v. Bekins Freight, 108 Ariz. 130 , 493 P.2d 913 (1972) (the Industrial Commission could excuse an untimely hearing request if there was a meritorious excuse, the delay was not excessive, and the effect was nonprejudicial to the carrier). | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. Cigna HealthPlangreen1 sentence2023See Smith v. CIGNA HealthPlan of Ariz., 203 Ariz. 173 , 179 ¶ 21 (App. 2002); In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz. 403 , 407 ¶ 8 (App. 2011). 7 NORWOOD v. MOORE Decision of the Court ¶28 Both components of reason (2) are present here. | 1 | 1 |
Footbridge Limited Trust v. Countrywide Financial Corp.green1 sentence2011Corp., 770 F.Supp.2d 618, 625 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (holding American Pipe tolling does not apply to statutes of repose and characterizing it as equitable tolling in that it “is a judicially-created rule premised on traditional equitable considerations of fairness, judicial economy, and needless multiplicity of suits” (quotation omitted)). 2 IV ¶ 22 We do not believe that characterizing American Pipe tolling as either equitable or legal provides a sound basis for deciding whether to apply the doctrine to a statute of *127 repose. | 1 | 1 |
Bouldin v. Turekgreen2 sentences2002Under a judicially created exception to § 1-244, a statute does not have an impermissible retroactive effect if it is “‘merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.’” Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 8 , 7 P.3d 94, ¶ 8 , quoting Bouldin v. Turek, 125 Ariz. 77, 78 , 607 P.2d 954, 956 (1979). 2002Under a judicially created exception to § 1-244, a statute does not have an impermissible retroactive effect if it is “‘merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.’” Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 8 , 7 P.3d 94, ¶ 8 , quoting Bouldin v. Turek, 125 Ariz. 77, 78 , 607 P.2d 954, 956 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Baby Boy Doegreen2 sentences2000In re Baby Boy Doe, 123 Idaho 464 , 849 P.2d 925, 932 (1993). ¶ 16 Third, ICWA’s legislative history supports our decision not to impose an existing Indian family requirement. 2000In re Baby Boy Doe, 123 Idaho 464 , 849 P.2d 925, 932 (1993). ¶ 16 Third, ICWA’s legislative history supports our decision not to impose an existing Indian family requirement. | 1 | 1 |
State, in Interest of Dacgreen1 sentence2000See In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993, 1000 (Utah App.1997); see also In re Elliott, 218 Mich.App. 196 , 554 N.W.2d 32, 34 (1996) (interest “in long-term tribal survival”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Elliottgreen2 sentences2000See In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993, 1000 (Utah App.1997); see also In re Elliott, 218 Mich.App. 196 , 554 N.W.2d 32, 34 (1996) (interest “in long-term tribal survival”). 2000See In re D.A.C., 933 P.2d 993, 1000 (Utah App.1997); see also In re Elliott, 218 Mich.App. 196 , 554 N.W.2d 32, 34 (1996) (interest “in long-term tribal survival”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Clouse Ex Rel. Clouse v. State
green
1 sentence2023Clouse v. State, 199 Ariz. 196 , 201 ¶ 18 (2001). ¶27 A plaintiff could sue a city-defendant for negligence in 1912, but governmental immunity would ultimately bar the plaintiff’s recovery as a matter of law. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Madsen Ex Rel. Corbin v. Western American Mortgage Co.
green
2 sentences2013The CFA, by contrast, is a legislative enactment. 3 The Legislature drafted the CFA “broadly,” Madsen, 143 Ariz. at 618 , 694 P.2d at 1232 , and expressly provided that CFA claims can be brought in addition to seeking other remedies. 2013The CFA, by contrast, is a legislative enactment. 3 The Legislature drafted the CFA “broadly,” Madsen, 143 Ariz. at 618 , 694 P.2d at 1232 , and expressly provided that CFA claims can be brought in addition to seeking other remedies. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re Shane B.
green
2 sentences2002Under a judicially created exception to § 1-244, a statute does not have an impermissible retroactive effect if it is “‘merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.’” Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 8 , 7 P.3d 94, ¶ 8 , quoting Bouldin v. Turek, 125 Ariz. 77, 78 , 607 P.2d 954, 956 (1979). 2002Under a judicially created exception to § 1-244, a statute does not have an impermissible retroactive effect if it is “‘merely procedural and does not affect an earlier established substantive right.’” Shane B., 198 Ariz. 85, ¶ 8 , 7 P.3d 94, ¶ 8 , quoting Bouldin v. Turek, 125 Ariz. 77, 78 , 607 P.2d 954, 956 (1979). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Montana v. United States
green
2 sentences1989The United States Supreme Court has stated: We have previously recognized that the judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the claim or is-sue____ “Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.” Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 , 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897 , 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) quoting Montena v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 , 99 S.Ct. 1989The United States Supreme Court has stated: We have previously recognized that the judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the claim or is-sue____ “Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.” Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 , 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897 , 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) quoting Montena v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 , 99 S.Ct. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.
green
2 sentences1989The United States Supreme Court has stated: We have previously recognized that the judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the claim or is-sue____ “Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.” Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 , 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897 , 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) quoting Montena v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 , 99 S.Ct. 1989The United States Supreme Court has stated: We have previously recognized that the judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted did not have a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the claim or is-sue____ “Redetermination of issues is warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior litigation.” Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-81 , 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897 , 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) quoting Montena v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 , 99 S.Ct. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Schade Transfer & Storage Co. v. Alabam Freight Lines
neutral
2 sentences1980Its origin appears to be Schade Transfer and Storage Co., Inc. v. Alabama Freight Lines, 75 Ariz. 201 , 254 P.2d 800 (1953). 1980Its origin appears to be Schade Transfer and Storage Co., Inc. v. Alabama Freight Lines, 75 Ariz. 201 , 254 P.2d 800 (1953). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.