judicially created exception in Michigan

2004Co., 454 Mich. 263 , 562 N.W.2d 648 (1997); Lothian v. Detroit, 414 Mich. 160 , 324 N.W.2d9 (1982). [2] 254 Mich.App. 608 , 658 N.W.2d 494 (2003). [3] In its application for leave to appeal, plaintiff alleged only the following assignment of error: The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred reversibly by concluding that an appellee can invoke the judicially created doctrine of equitable estoppel to circumvent enforcement of the statute of frauds with respect to an undisputed oral agreement that by its terms could not be performed within one year from the making of the agreement. [4] 468 Mi

2004Co., 454 Mich. 263 , 562 N.W.2d 648 (1997); Lothian v. Detroit, 414 Mich. 160 , 324 N.W.2d9 (1982). [2] 254 Mich.App. 608 , 658 N.W.2d 494 (2003). [3] In its application for leave to appeal, plaintiff alleged only the following assignment of error: The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred reversibly by concluding that an appellee can invoke the judicially created doctrine of equitable estoppel to circumvent enforcement of the statute of frauds with respect to an undisputed oral agreement that by its terms could not be performed within one year from the making of the agreement. [4] 468 Mi

2020It is a judicially created principle that originated with Socony Vacuum Oil Co v Marvin, 313 Mich 528, 546 ; 21 NW2d 841 (1946), in which our Supreme Court stated: One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

2020It is a judicially created principle that originated with Socony Vacuum Oil Co v Marvin, 313 Mich 528, 546 ; 21 NW2d 841 (1946), in which our Supreme Court stated: One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.

1991The sudden-emergency doctrine is a judicially created principle which was defined by our Supreme Court in Socony Vacuum Oil Co v Marvin, 313 Mich 528, 546 ; 21 NW2d 841 (1946): *681 One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. [Quoting Huddy on Automobiles (8th ed

1991The sudden-emergency doctrine is a judicially created principle which was defined by our Supreme Court in Socony Vacuum Oil Co v Marvin, 313 Mich 528, 546 ; 21 NW2d 841 (1946): *681 One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. [Quoting Huddy on Automobiles (8th ed

2026“The sudden-emergency doctrine is a judicially created principle.” Vsetula v Whitmyer, 187 Mich App 675, 680 ; 468 NW2d 53 (1991).

2026“The sudden-emergency doctrine is a judicially created principle.” Vsetula v Whitmyer, 187 Mich App 675, 680 ; 468 NW2d 53 (1991).

2025“The economic-loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that bars all tort remedies where the suit is between an aggrieved buyer and a nonperformance seller, the injury consists of damage to the goods themselves, and the only losses alleged are economic.” Sullivan Indus, Inc v Double Seal Glass Co, Inc, 192 Mich App 333, 339 ; 480 NW2d 623 (1992).

2025“The economic-loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that bars all tort remedies where the suit is between an aggrieved buyer and a nonperformance seller, the injury consists of damage to the goods themselves, and the only losses alleged are economic.” Sullivan Indus, Inc v Double Seal Glass Co, Inc, 192 Mich App 333, 339 ; 480 NW2d 623 (1992).

2025This Court has taken a broad approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, -5- could have raised but did not. [Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 121 ; 680 NW2d 386 (2004) (citation omitted).] The “doctrine of res judicata is a judicially created doctrine that serves to relieve parties of the cost and aggravation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent decisions.” Adam

2021This Court has taken a broad approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, could have raised but did not. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.] [T]he doctrine of res judicata is a judicially created doctrine that serves to relieve parties of the cost and aggravation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent decisions.” Adam v Bell, 311 Mich App 528, 531 ; 879 NW2d 8

2020Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc, 460 Mich at 380 .

2016“Importantly, res judicata is intended to ‘promote fairness, not lighten the loads of the state court by precluding suits whenever possible.”’ Id., quoting Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 383 ; 596 NW2d 153 (1999).

2020The judicially created rule is not designed to act as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party. -3- Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 . “[T]he proper focus is on the deterrent effect on law enforcement officers, if any.” People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 539 ; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). * * * “[A]pplicaiton of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 , “that is, ‘where its deterrence benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs,” ’ ” Hudson, supra at 2163 , quoting Pennsyl

2020The judicially created rule is not designed to act as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party. -3- Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 . “[T]he proper focus is on the deterrent effect on law enforcement officers, if any.” People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 539 ; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). * * * “[A]pplicaiton of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 , “that is, ‘where its deterrence benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs,” ’ ” Hudson, supra at 2163 , quoting Pennsyl

2020The judicially created rule is not designed to act as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party. -3- Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 . “[T]he proper focus is on the deterrent effect on law enforcement officers, if any.” People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 539 ; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). * * * “[A]pplicaiton of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 , “that is, ‘where its deterrence benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs,” ’ ” Hudson, supra at 2163 , quoting Pennsyl

2020The judicially created rule is not designed to act as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party. -3- Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 . “[T]he proper focus is on the deterrent effect on law enforcement officers, if any.” People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 539 ; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). * * * “[A]pplicaiton of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 , “that is, ‘where its deterrence benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs,” ’ ” Hudson, supra at 2163 , quoting Pennsyl

2017People v Hill, 299 Mich App 402, 412 ; 829 NW2d 908 (2013), citing Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 236 ; 131 S Ct 2419 ; 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011).

2017People v Hill, 299 Mich App 402, 412 ; 829 NW2d 908 (2013), citing Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 236 ; 131 S Ct 2419 ; 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011).

2025The doctrine “bars tort recovery and limits remedies to those available under the Uniform Commercial Code [(UCC), MCL 440.1101 et seq.,] where a claim for damages arises out of the commercial sale of goods and losses incurred are purely economic.” Neibarger v Universal Coops, Inc, 439 Mich 512, 515 ; 486 NW2d 612 (1992).

2025The doctrine “bars tort recovery and limits remedies to those available under the Uniform Commercial Code [(UCC), MCL 440.1101 et seq.,] where a claim for damages arises out of the commercial sale of goods and losses incurred are purely economic.” Neibarger v Universal Coops, Inc, 439 Mich 512, 515 ; 486 NW2d 612 (1992).

2020The judicially created rule is not designed to act as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party. -3- Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 . “[T]he proper focus is on the deterrent effect on law enforcement officers, if any.” People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 539 ; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). * * * “[A]pplicaiton of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 , “that is, ‘where its deterrence benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs,” ’ ” Hudson, supra at 2163 , quoting Pennsyl

2020The judicially created rule is not designed to act as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party. -3- Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 . “[T]he proper focus is on the deterrent effect on law enforcement officers, if any.” People v Goldston, 470 Mich 523, 539 ; 682 NW2d 479 (2004). * * * “[A]pplicaiton of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,” Calandra, supra at 348 ; 94 S Ct 613 , “that is, ‘where its deterrence benefits outweigh its “substantial social costs,” ’ ” Hudson, supra at 2163 , quoting Pennsyl

2019Aetna Mortgage Co v Dembs, 13 Mich App 686, 691 ; 164 NW2d 771 (1968), citing Wardell v Williams, 62 Mich 50, 60 ; 28 NW 796 (1886). -6- “Promissory estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that was developed as an equitable remedy applicable in common-law contract actions.” Crown Technology Park v D&N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich App 538 , 548 n 4; 619 NW2d 66 (2000).

2019Aetna Mortgage Co v Dembs, 13 Mich App 686, 691 ; 164 NW2d 771 (1968), citing Wardell v Williams, 62 Mich 50, 60 ; 28 NW 796 (1886). -6- “Promissory estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that was developed as an equitable remedy applicable in common-law contract actions.” Crown Technology Park v D&N Bank, FSB, 242 Mich App 538 , 548 n 4; 619 NW2d 66 (2000).

2018The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied to statutes of limitation, was outlined in Doe v Racette, 313 Mich App 105, 108-109 ; 880 NW2d 332 (2015): -9- Equitable estoppel is a judicially created exception to the general rule which provides that statutes of limitation run without interruption[.] It is essentially a doctrine of waiver that extends the applicable period for filing a lawsuit by precluding the defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a bar. [A]bsent intentional or negligent conduct designed to induce a plaintiff to refrain from bringing a timely action, Michigan c

2018The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied to statutes of limitation, was outlined in Doe v Racette, 313 Mich App 105, 108-109 ; 880 NW2d 332 (2015): -9- Equitable estoppel is a judicially created exception to the general rule which provides that statutes of limitation run without interruption[.] It is essentially a doctrine of waiver that extends the applicable period for filing a lawsuit by precluding the defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a bar. [A]bsent intentional or negligent conduct designed to induce a plaintiff to refrain from bringing a timely action, Michigan c

2018The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied to statutes of limitation, was outlined in Doe v Racette, 313 Mich App 105, 108-109 ; 880 NW2d 332 (2015): -9- Equitable estoppel is a judicially created exception to the general rule which provides that statutes of limitation run without interruption[.] It is essentially a doctrine of waiver that extends the applicable period for filing a lawsuit by precluding the defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a bar. [A]bsent intentional or negligent conduct designed to induce a plaintiff to refrain from bringing a timely action, Michigan c

2018The doctrine of equitable estoppel, as applied to statutes of limitation, was outlined in Doe v Racette, 313 Mich App 105, 108-109 ; 880 NW2d 332 (2015): -9- Equitable estoppel is a judicially created exception to the general rule which provides that statutes of limitation run without interruption[.] It is essentially a doctrine of waiver that extends the applicable period for filing a lawsuit by precluding the defendant from raising the statute of limitations as a bar. [A]bsent intentional or negligent conduct designed to induce a plaintiff to refrain from bringing a timely action, Michigan c

2017People v Hill, 299 Mich App 402, 412 ; 829 NW2d 908 (2013), citing Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 236 ; 131 S Ct 2419 ; 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011).

2017People v Hill, 299 Mich App 402, 412 ; 829 NW2d 908 (2013), citing Davis v United States, 564 US 229, 236 ; 131 S Ct 2419 ; 180 L Ed 2d 285 (2011).

2017James v Alberts, 464 Mich 12, 14 ; 626 NW2d 158 (2001); Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White Pine Wireless, LLC, 281 Mich App 364, 371 ; 761 NW2d 353 (2008).

2017James v Alberts, 464 Mich 12, 14 ; 626 NW2d 158 (2001); Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White Pine Wireless, LLC, 281 Mich App 364, 371 ; 761 NW2d 353 (2008).

2017James v Alberts, 464 Mich 12, 14 ; 626 NW2d 158 (2001); Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White Pine Wireless, LLC, 281 Mich App 364, 371 ; 761 NW2d 353 (2008).

2017James v Alberts, 464 Mich 12, 14 ; 626 NW2d 158 (2001); Johnson Family Ltd Partnership v White Pine Wireless, LLC, 281 Mich App 364, 371 ; 761 NW2d 353 (2008).

2017Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an inflexible condition precedent to judicial consideration, however, and will not be required if review of the agency's final decision would not provide an adequate remedy, i.e., if it would run counter to the policies which underlie the doctrine. [Citations omitted; see also L & L Wine, 274 Mich App at 362 ; Citizens for Common Sense, 243 Mich App at 52-53 .] A judicially created exception to the exhaustion requirement arises when an appeal to the administrative agency would be futile.

2017Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an inflexible condition precedent to judicial consideration, however, and will not be required if review of the agency's final decision would not provide an adequate remedy, i.e., if it would run counter to the policies which underlie the doctrine. [Citations omitted; see also L & L Wine, 274 Mich App at 362 ; Citizens for Common Sense, 243 Mich App at 52-53 .] A judicially created exception to the exhaustion requirement arises when an appeal to the administrative agency would be futile.

2016I am persuaded, however, as the majority recognizes, that the judicially-created doctrine that has become known as the “innocent third party rule” is indeed part and parcel of the “easily ascertainable rule” that the Supreme Court abrogated in Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547 ; 817 NW2d 562 (2012).

2016I am persuaded, however, as the majority recognizes, that the judicially created doctrine known as the “innocent-third-party rule” is indeed part and parcel of the “easily ascertainable rule” that the Supreme Court abrogated in Titan Ins Co v Hyten, 491 Mich 547 ; 817 NW2d 562 (2012).

2007“There is a judicially created exception to the exhaustion requirement for cases where appeal to the administrative agency would be futile.” Manor House Apartments v City of Warren, 204 Mich App 603, 605 ; 516 NW2d 530 (1994).

2007“There is a judicially created exception to the exhaustion requirement for cases where appeal to the administrative agency would be futile.” Manor House Apartments v City of Warren, 204 Mich App 603, 605 ; 516 NW2d 530 (1994).

2007Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitu tional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ ” Id., quoting Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 217 ; 80 S Ct 1437 ; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (I960). 18 The judicially created rule is not designed to act as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party.

2007Its purpose is to deter — to compel respect for the constitu tional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ ” Id., quoting Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 217 ; 80 S Ct 1437 ; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (I960). 18 The judicially created rule is not designed to act as a personal constitutional right of the aggrieved party.

2004Co., 454 Mich. 263 , 562 N.W.2d 648 (1997); Lothian v. Detroit, 414 Mich. 160 , 324 N.W.2d9 (1982). [2] 254 Mich.App. 608 , 658 N.W.2d 494 (2003). [3] In its application for leave to appeal, plaintiff alleged only the following assignment of error: The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred reversibly by concluding that an appellee can invoke the judicially created doctrine of equitable estoppel to circumvent enforcement of the statute of frauds with respect to an undisputed oral agreement that by its terms could not be performed within one year from the making of the agreement. [4] 468 Mi

1997I believe there were genuine issues of material fact as to the estoppel issue. m In Lothian v Detroit, 414 Mich 160, 176 ; 324 NW2d 9 (1982), this Court emphasized that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is a judicially created exception to the general rule that statutes of limitation run without interruption.

1988This Court has held that three factors must be considered in determining whether a judicially created rule of law should be applied retroactively. [1] the purpose of the new rule, [2]the general reliance on the old rule, and [3] the eifect on the administration of justice. [People v Nixon, 421 Mich 79, 85 ; 364 NW2d 593 (1984).] I believe that the defendants’ reliance on the old rule outweighs other considerations favoring retroactive application.

1988This Court has held that three factors must be considered in determining whether a judicially created rule of law should be applied retroactively. [1] the purpose of the new rule, [2]the general reliance on the old rule, and [3] the eifect on the administration of justice. [People v Nixon, 421 Mich 79, 85 ; 364 NW2d 593 (1984).] I believe that the defendants’ reliance on the old rule outweighs other considerations favoring retroactive application.

1985We therefore conclude that plaintiff’s claim against the state is barred by governmental immunity, except to the extent plaintiff has pled a valid claim of intentional nuisance, a judicially created exception to governmental immunity._ In Rosario v City of Lansing, 403 Mich 124 ; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149 ; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), five justices of the Supreme Court agreed that claims of nuisance per se and intentional nuisance in fact 3 are not barred by governmental immunity.

1985We therefore conclude that plaintiff’s claim against the state is barred by governmental immunity, except to the extent plaintiff has pled a valid claim of intentional nuisance, a judicially created exception to governmental immunity._ In Rosario v City of Lansing, 403 Mich 124 ; 268 NW2d 230 (1978), and Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149 ; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), five justices of the Supreme Court agreed that claims of nuisance per se and intentional nuisance in fact 3 are not barred by governmental immunity.

2025This Court has taken a broad approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, -5- could have raised but did not. [Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 121 ; 680 NW2d 386 (2004) (citation omitted).] The “doctrine of res judicata is a judicially created doctrine that serves to relieve parties of the cost and aggravation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent decisions.” Adam

2025This Court has taken a broad approach to the doctrine of res judicata, holding that it bars not only claims already litigated, but also every claim arising from the same transaction that the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, -5- could have raised but did not. [Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 121 ; 680 NW2d 386 (2004) (citation omitted).] The “doctrine of res judicata is a judicially created doctrine that serves to relieve parties of the cost and aggravation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and encourage reliance on adjudication by preventing inconsistent decisions.” Adam