11 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Robson v. Texas Eastern Corp.green1 sentence2023Corp., 833 N.E.2d 461, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Dallman Contractors, LLCgreen1 sentence2016Hall v. Dallman Contractors, LLC, 994 N.E.2d 1220, 1225 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Bruce Ryan v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2015Id. at 6, 9; see also Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind.2014), reh’g denied. [15] Judicial estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position *784 that is inconsistent with one asserted in the same or a previous proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
Gill v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Later, in Gill, this Court stated that "[t]he fact that incarceration during such post-arraignment period may also be required by an order in another case does not render Criminal Rule 4 inapplicable." 267 Ind. at 164 , 368 N.E.2d at 1161 (emphasis added). 2012Later, in Gill, this Court stated that "[t]he fact that incarceration during such post-arraignment period may also be required by an order in another case does not render Criminal Rule 4 inapplicable." 267 Ind. at 164 , 368 N.E.2d at 1161 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 716614green1 sentence2005Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3rd Cir.1996). | 1 | 1 |
McEwen v. Stategreen1 sentence2005While we cited Mullins v. State, 646 N.E.2d 40 (Ind.1995) for the proposition that Indiana code section 9-30-6-15(a) ereated such an exception and provided for the admissibility of breath test evidence, Napier argues that we should have discussed McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 89 (Ind.1998), which determined that when a statute and a judicially created rule both address the admissibility of evidence, and different standards for such admissibility are created, the statute is nullified. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morgan County Hospital v. Upham
green
1 sentence2018Hosp. v. Upham , 884 N.E.2d 275 , 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied . 12 We also decline the Purchasers' request to award appellate attorney fees under Appellate Rule 66(E). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Witte v. Mundy Ex Rel. Mundy
green
1 sentence2018Mundy , 820 N.E.2d 128 , 133 (Ind. 2005). 11 "Judicial estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position that is inconsistent with one asserted in the same or a previous proceeding." Morgan Cty. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Fossey v. State
green
2 sentences2012In Fossey, this Court noted that, in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a judicially-created exception that made Criminal Rule 4 unavailable for a defendant "seeking a trial on a charge pending while he, at the same time, is in jail on another conviction" could not be maintained. 254 Ind. at 179 , 258 N.E.2d at 619 . 2012In Fossey, this Court noted that, in light of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a judicially-created exception that made Criminal Rule 4 unavailable for a defendant "seeking a trial on a charge pending while he, at the same time, is in jail on another conviction" could not be maintained. 254 Ind. at 179 , 258 N.E.2d at 619 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Mullins v. State
green
1 sentence2005While we cited Mullins v. State, 646 N.E.2d 40 (Ind.1995) for the proposition that Indiana code section 9-30-6-15(a) ereated such an exception and provided for the admissibility of breath test evidence, Napier argues that we should have discussed McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 89 (Ind.1998), which determined that when a statute and a judicially created rule both address the admissibility of evidence, and different standards for such admissibility are created, the statute is nullified. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Sidle v. Majors
green
2 sentences1990As stated in Sidle, "[these doctrines of immunity were judicially created and therefore were subject to judicial repeal [or modification] when, in our opinion, they were determined to be no longer compatible in our society." Sidle, 264 Ind. at 216 , 341 N.E.2d at 770 . 1990As stated in Sidle, "[these doctrines of immunity were judicially created and therefore were subject to judicial repeal [or modification] when, in our opinion, they were determined to be no longer compatible in our society." Sidle, 264 Ind. at 216 , 341 N.E.2d at 770 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Vaughan v. Vaughan
green
2 sentences1987Vaughan v. Vaughan (1974), 161 Ind.App. 497 , 316 N.E2d 455; Smith v. Smith (1924), 81 Ind. App. 566 , 142 N.E. 128 , trans. denied. 1987Vaughan v. Vaughan (1974), 161 Ind. App. 497 , 316 N.E.2d 455 ; Smith v. Smith (1924), 81 Ind. App. 566 , 142 N.E. 128 , trans. denied. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Marsillett v. State
green
2 sentences1987First, as we recognized in Marsillett v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 699, 704 ; Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court adheres to a principle of law which has been firmly established. 1987First, as we recognized in Marsillett v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 699 , 704: Under the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court adheres to a principle of law which has been firmly established. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Smith v. Smith
green
2 sentences1987Vaughan v. Vaughan (1974), 161 Ind.App. 497 , 316 N.E2d 455; Smith v. Smith (1924), 81 Ind. App. 566 , 142 N.E. 128 , trans. denied. 1987Vaughan v. Vaughan (1974), 161 Ind.App. 497 , 316 N.E2d 455; Smith v. Smith (1924), 81 Ind. App. 566 , 142 N.E. 128 , trans. denied. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Pettit v. State
green
1 sentence1980For example, in the recent decision of Pettit v. State, (1979) Ind., 396 N.E.2d 126 , the defendant-appellant appealed his conviction of Unlawful Dealing in a Controlled Substance 26 alleging, inter alia, “that evidence of intoxication was introduced at trial” and, therefore, the trial court erred in refusing his tendered instruction on the subject. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Greider v. State
green
1 sentence1980As noted in Greider, 385 N.E.2d at 426 , in order for the defense to operate: “The defendant must have been so intoxicated as to be incapable of entertaining the required specific intent.” 24 Some commentators have criticized the above quoted formulation, suggesting the rule so framed renders the defense illusory in nature; because, to be so intoxicated as to be incapable of entertaining the specific intent would, if literally applied by the trier of fact, require one to be unconscious before he could avail himself of the defense. 25 It would appear, however, as though the Indiana Supreme Cour | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.