judicially created rule in Colorado

2012See Armintrout, 864 P.2d at 578-79 (convictions for multiple offenses arising out of a single transaction may stand if a defendant violates more than one statute, but Double Jeopardy, § 18 — 1— 408(l)(a), and the judicially created rule of merger prohibit a court from imposing multiple punishments for a greater and lesser offense).

1998A. Generally, “[a] court is prohibited from imposing multiple punishments for a greater and lesser included offense by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions/ 5 1 by statute, and by the judicially-created rule of merger. ”Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 578-79 (Colo.1993) (citations & footnote omitted).

2010People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Colo.1998) (citing Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 578-79 (Colo.1993)).

2010People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Colo.1998) (citing Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 578-79 (Colo.1993)).

2024“A co urt abuses its discretion if it misconstrues or misapplies the law or otherwise reaches a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, o r unfair result.” Id. ¶ 11 The judicially created doctrine of “ opening the door ” aims to prevent one party from gaining an “unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that, without being elaborated or placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression.” People v. Murphy , 919 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1996).

2024“A co urt abuses its discretion if it misconstrues or misapplies the law or otherwise reaches a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, o r unfair result.” Id. ¶ 11 The judicially created doctrine of “ opening the door ” aims to prevent one party from gaining an “unfair advantage by the selective presentation of facts that, without being elaborated or placed in context, create an incorrect or misleading impression.” People v. Murphy , 919 P.2d 191, 195 (Colo. 1996).

2021A defendant is deprived of this right only if he is denied "virtually his only means of effectively testing significant prosecution evidence." Krutsinger v. People , 219 P.3d 1054, 1062 ( Colo. 2009 ) . ¶63 A trial court may exclude defense evidence without infringing a defendant 's Sixth Amendment rights , so long as the exclusion serves a legitimate purpose and is proportionate to the ends it is asserted to promote.

2021A defendant is deprived of this right only if he is denied “virtually his only means of effectively testing significant prosecution evidence.” Krutsinger v. People, 219 P.3d 1054, 1062 (Colo. 2009). ¶63 A trial court may exclude defense evidence without infringing a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, so long as the exclusion serves a legitimate purpose and is proportionate to the ends it is asserted to promote.

2009Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 578 (Colo.1993); People v. Delci, 109 P.3d 1035, 1036 (Colo.App.2004); People v. Ramirez, 18 P.3d 822, 830 (Colo.App.2000).

2004People v. Martinez, 32 P.3d 520 (Colo.App.2001); see People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030 (Colo.1998); People v. Ramirez, 18 P.3d 822, 830 (Colo.App.2000).

1996See Board of County Commissioners v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc., 830 P.2d 1045 (Colo.1992).

1992See Board of County Commissioners v. Bowen/Edwards Associates, Inc., 830 P.2d 1045 (Colo.1992).

2021Given that defendants may not use their express Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege as both a sword and a shield, surely they may not exploit a judicially created rule to similarly thwart the truthseeking process of a criminal trial. ¶62 The trial court 's ruling likewise did not infringe on Johnson's Sixth Amendment guarantee of "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." Holmes v. South Carolina , 547 U.S. 319 , 324 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ( 2006 ) ( quoting Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 ( 1986 ) ) .

2021Given that defendants may not use their express Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege as both a sword and a shield, surely they may not exploit a judicially created rule to similarly thwart the truthseeking process of a criminal trial. 13 ¶62 The trial court’s ruling likewise did not infringe on Johnson’s Sixth Amendment guarantee of “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).

2021Given that defendants may not use their express Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege as both a sword and a shield, surely they may not exploit a judicially created rule to similarly thwart the truthseeking process of a criminal trial. ¶62 The trial court 's ruling likewise did not infringe on Johnson's Sixth Amendment guarantee of "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." Holmes v. South Carolina , 547 U.S. 319 , 324 , 126 S.Ct. 1727 , 164 L.Ed.2d 503 ( 2006 ) ( quoting Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683 , 690 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 , 90 L.Ed.2d 636 ( 1986 ) ) .

2021Given that defendants may not use their express Fifth Amendment constitutional privilege as both a sword and a shield, surely they may not exploit a judicially created rule to similarly thwart the truthseeking process of a criminal trial. 13 ¶62 The trial court’s ruling likewise did not infringe on Johnson’s Sixth Amendment guarantee of “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).

2001People v. Leske, 957 P.2d 1030 (Colo.1998); People v. Henderson, 810 P.2d 1058 (Colo.1991); see § 18-1-408(1)(a), C.R.S.2000 (defendant "may not be convicted of more than one offense if ... [one offense is included in the other.. ..") In Colorado, judicial merger has been analyzed under double jeopardy principles, but regardless of whether double jeopardy or merger principles are invoked, an identical analysis has been employed to determine whether a lesser offense is included within a greater offense.

1993E.g., People v. Henderson, 810 P.2d 1058, 1061 (Colo.1991); Boulies, 770 P.2d at 1282 ; Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d at 245 .

1994People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235 (Colo.1983).

1993E.g., People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 245 (Colo.1983).

2020The statute does not contain an exception, and we eschew creating one out of thin air because “an exception not expressly made by the legislature should not be read into a statute by the courts.” Dikeou v. Dikeou, 928 P.2d 1286 , 1293 n.4 (Colo. 1996); see In re Marriage of Chalat, 112 P.3d 47, 57 (Colo. 2005)(“Straining the statute to read otherwise would ignore its plain language . . . and read in a judicially created exception that the General Assembly did not include.”).

2015Merger ¶237        Marko argues, the People concede, and we agree that defendant’s attempted sexual assault convictions must be vacated under the doctrine of merger. 9 ¶238        “The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions and the judicially created rule of merger bar multiple punishments for greater and lesser included offenses.†People v. Harlan , 8 P.3d 448, 478 (Colo. 2000), overruled on other grounds by People v. Miller , 113 P.3d 743 (Colo. 2005).

2015The Banks emphasize that "insofar as the provisions and purposes of [the CSA] parallel those of the federal enactments, such federal authorities are highly persuasive." Lowery, 192 Colo. at 129-30 , 556 P.2d at 1204 ; see also § 11-51-101(8). 139 The only case the district court and the Banks cited that actually discusses statutory securities fraud claims in the context of governmental immunity addresses "the judicially created doctrine of tort immunity for municipalities." Woods v. Homes & Structures of Pittsburg, Kan., Inc., 489 F.Supp. 1270, 1296 (D.

2012See Lyons P'ship, L.P., 243 F.3d at 798 ("Separation of powers principles thus preclude us from applying the judicially created doctrine of lach-es to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of limitations."); Ivani Contracting Corp., 103 F.3d at 260 ; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 235 (refusing to apply laches to the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief and prospective injunctive relief because "under our tripartite system of government, [the wisdom of a three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement] is committed to the discretion of t

2012See Lyons P'ship, L.P., 243 F.3d at 798 ("Separation of powers principles thus preclude us from applying the judicially created doctrine of lach-es to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely filed under an express statute of limitations."); Ivani Contracting Corp., 103 F.3d at 260 ; see also Chirco, 474 F.3d at 235 (refusing to apply laches to the plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief and prospective injunctive relief because "under our tripartite system of government, [the wisdom of a three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement] is committed to the discretion of t