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8 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Warnergreen2 sentences2021FOR THE COURT: Associate Justice requirement that a kidnapping be independently significant was a judicially created doctrine that did not affect the elements of the crime, but simply added a legal barrier to the charging process, its implementation was best left to the trial judge. 626 A.2d 205, 208 (R.I. 1993). 2021FOR THE COURT: Associate Justice requirement that a kidnapping be independently significant was a judicially created doctrine that did not affect the elements of the crime, but simply added a legal barrier to the charging process, its implementation was best left to the trial judge. 626 A.2d 205, 208 (R.I. 1993). | 2 | 2 |
Hagins v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Similarly, in Hagins v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of independent significance, “which acts as a check upon over-zealous use of th[e kidnapping] charge,” was a matter of law for the court to decide. 639 A.2d 612, 617 (D.C. 1994). 2021Similarly, in Hagins v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled that the doctrine of independent significance, “which acts as a check upon over-zealous use of th[e kidnapping] charge,” was a matter of law for the court to decide. 639 A.2d 612, 617 (D.C. 1994). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Westgreen2 sentences2026See id. at 144-45 , 557 A.2d at 876 (listing cases and summarizing that “[t]he statutory mandate is fulfilled when reasonable efforts are made to allow an arrestee to consult privately with counsel”). 2026See id. at 144-45 , 557 A.2d at 876 (listing cases and summarizing that “[t]he statutory mandate is fulfilled when reasonable efforts are made to allow an arrestee to consult privately with counsel”). | 1 | 1 |
Herring v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018The exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule "designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect." Herring v. United States , 555 U.S. 135 , 139-40, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (quotation omitted). 2018The exclusionary rule is a judicially created rule "designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect." Herring v. United States , 555 U.S. 135 , 139-40, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Whitney v. City of Worcestergreen2 sentences1997Cf. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1215 (Mass. 1977) (person who has been run over by city truck can hardly be expected to appreciate fine nicety of distinction between various functions in which truck driver may have been engaged). 1997Cf. Whitney v. City of Worcester, 373 Mass. 208 , 366 N.E.2d 1210, 1215 (1977) (person who has been run over by city truck can hardly be expected to appreciate fine nicety of distinction between various functions in which truck driver may have been engaged). | 1 | 1 |
Zaleskie v. Joycegreen2 sentences1996Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 F.2d 1162 , 1168 (Cal. 1978); see also Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 154-55 , 333 A.2d 110, 113 (1975) (one reason to adopt strict products liability is to respond to problems of availability of proof). 1996Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 F.2d 1162 , 1168 (Cal. 1978); see also Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 154-55 , 333 A.2d 110, 113 (1975) (one reason to adopt strict products liability is to respond to problems of availability of proof). | 1 | 1 |
Daly v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences1996Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 , 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 386 , 575 P.2d 1162, 1168 (1978); see also Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 154-55 , 333 A.2d 110, 113 (1975) (one reason to adopt strict products liability is to respond to problems of availability of proof). 1996Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725 , 144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 386 , 575 P.2d 1162, 1168 (1978); see also Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 154-55 , 333 A.2d 110, 113 (1975) (one reason to adopt strict products liability is to respond to problems of availability of proof). | 1 | 1 |
Libercent v. Aldrichgreen2 sentences1994Murray, 155 Vt. at 626 , 587 A.2d at 978 ; Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 80 , 539 A.2d 981, 984 (1987). 1994Murray, 155 Vt. at 626 , 587 A.2d at 978 ; Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 80 , 539 A.2d 981, 984 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shoregreen1 sentence1989See generally Wright, Miller & Cooper, supra, § 4403; Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Murray v. White
green
2 sentences1994Murray, 155 Vt. at 626 , 587 A.2d at 978 ; Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 80 , 539 A.2d 981, 984 (1987). 1994Murray, 155 Vt. at 626 , 587 A.2d at 978 ; Libercent v. Aldrich, 149 Vt. 76, 80 , 539 A.2d 981, 984 (1987). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.