judicially created exception (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

judicially created exception in California

303 California opinions name it 3 courts 1955–2026 67 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (54)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Montoyagreen
cal · 2004 · cited in 36 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2026
2 sentences

2026Analysis “In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged.’” (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034 , quoting § 954 [italics in Montoya].) “But a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.” (Ibid.) “When a defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily lesser included offense arising out of the same act or course of conduct, and the evidence supports the verdict on the greater offense, that conviction is controlling, and th

2025“A judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction ‘prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ (People v. Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1034 .) ‘[I]f a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the 10 latter is a lesser included offense within the former.’ (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288 .)” (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227 .) Reed went on to hold that “the accusatory pleading test does not apply in deciding whether multiple conviction of charged offenses is proper. . . .

1336
Pitchess v. Superior Courtred
cal · 1974 · cited in 17 California opinions naming this issue, 1975–2017
2 sentences

2017(See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 , 535, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ["[T]he right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation."].) Under the SCA, the trial court can order the account holder to consent to the disclosure by Facebook under section 2702(b)(3) which allows a provider to divulge the contents of a communication "with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscri

2017(See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 , 535, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ["[T]he right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation."].) Under the SCA, the trial court can order the account holder to consent to the disclosure by Facebook under section 2702(b)(3) which allows a provider to divulge the contents of a communication "with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such communication, or the subscri

1217
People v. Reedgreen
cal · 2006 · cited in 48 California opinions naming this issue, 2007–2025
2 sentences

2025(Pope, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 782 .) In such a case, the defendant “still ‘is convicted’ of those offenses.” (Id. at p. 784.) Thus the Legislature intended 9 There is a judicially created exception to multiple convictions “ ‘based on necessarily included offenses,’ ” which are crimes that “ ‘cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense . . . .’ ” (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227 .) None of the offenses here can properly be considered lesser offenses of each other. 10 In People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896 , the California Supreme Court observed that it “need no

2025(People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226 ; see §§ 954, 654.) However, a judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily (or lesser) included offenses.

1148
People v. Ortegagreen
cal · 1998 · cited in 16 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2024
2 sentences

2024(See, e.g., People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736 [judicially created rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses]; People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692 [“A defendant who commits a battery may not be convicted of both battery and assault, because ‘[a]n assault is a necessary element of battery, and it is impossible to commit battery without assaulting the victim.’ ”].) This judicially created rule, Bogus contends, gave the trial court another basis for striking the lesser section 12022.5 and 12022.53 enhancements, which means that the court did 6 no

2022“In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct. ‘In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions “of any number of the offenses charged.”’” (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226 (Reed).) “A judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction ‘prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]f a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the 4 latter is a

916
McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Districtgreen
cal · 2008 · cited in 15 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2023
2 sentences

2023Legal Principles “[E]quitable tolling . . . allows courts to exercise their inherent equitable powers to excuse parties’ failure to comply with technical deadlines when justice so requires.” (Saint Francis Memorial Hospital v. State Dept. of Public Health (2020) 9 Cal.5th 710 , 730 (Saint Francis I).) Where applicable, the judicially created doctrine “will ‘suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.’ ” (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99 (McDonald).) The doctrine emerged from three lines of

2022“Equitable tolling is a judicially created doctrine that, where applicable, will ‘ “suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.” ’ (McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99 (McDonald).)” (Long v. Forty Niners Football Co., LLC (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 550 , 554–555 (Long).) As with other general equitable principles, the doctrine of equitable tolling “is applied flexibly to ‘ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.’ ” (J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 648, 658 .)

615
In Re Baycol Cases I & IIgreen
cal · 2011 · cited in 6 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2023
2 sentences

2023“Under the one final judgment rule, ‘“an appeal may be taken only from the final judgment in an entire action.”’” (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 756 (Baycol).) The death knell doctrine is a judicially created exception to the one final judgment rule.

2017The March 23rd order dismissing class claims while the PAGA claim remained pending was not an appealable order The death knell doctrine, a judicially created exception to the one final judgment rule, treats an order that dismisses class claims while allowing individual claims to survive as an appealable order. ( In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751 , 757, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 248 P.3d 681 ( Baycol ) [under the "death knell doctrine," when an "order effectively [rings] the death knell for the class claims, [the court] treat[s] it as in essence a final judgment on those claims, which

66
People v. Lopezgreen
cal · 1998 · cited in 14 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2025
2 sentences

2025“A judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction ‘prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ (People v. Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1034 .) ‘[I]f a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the 10 latter is a lesser included offense within the former.’ (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 282, 288 .)” (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1227 .) Reed went on to hold that “the accusatory pleading test does not apply in deciding whether multiple conviction of charged offenses is proper. . . .

2022“In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged.’ [Citations.] But a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.” (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034 .) “Our state high court has 4 The jury was instructed on both imperfect self-defense and heat of passion theories of attempted voluntary manslaughter. 11 long held that multiple convictions may not be based on necessarily included offenses.” (People v. Murphy (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 979,

514
People v. Sandersgreen
cal · 2012 · cited in 12 California opinions naming this issue, 2014–2026
2 sentences

2026Analysis “In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged.’” (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034 , quoting § 954 [italics in Montoya].) “But a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.” (Ibid.) “When a defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily lesser included offense arising out of the same act or course of conduct, and the evidence supports the verdict on the greater offense, that conviction is controlling, and th

2024(See, e.g., People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731, 736 [judicially created rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses]; People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 692 [“A defendant who commits a battery may not be convicted of both battery and assault, because ‘[a]n assault is a necessary element of battery, and it is impossible to commit battery without assaulting the victim.’ ”].) This judicially created rule, Bogus contends, gave the trial court another basis for striking the lesser section 12022.5 and 12022.53 enhancements, which means that the court did 6 no

412
People v. Pearsongreen
cal · 1986 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2022
2 sentences

2019"In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions 'of any number of the offenses charged.' ( § 954, italics added; [citation].) But a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses." ( People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031 , 1034, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 , 94 P.3d 1098 ; accord, People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731 , 736, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 , 288 P.3d 83 ; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351 , 355, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 721 P.2d 595 .) Because section 954 refers both to charging and convic

2019"In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions 'of any number of the offenses charged.' ( § 954, italics added; [citation].) But a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses." ( People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031 , 1034, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 , 94 P.3d 1098 ; accord, People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731 , 736, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 , 288 P.3d 83 ; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351 , 355, 228 Cal.Rptr. 509 , 721 P.2d 595 .) Because section 954 refers both to charging and convic

48
Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego Countyred
cal · 1966 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1974–1988
2 sentences

1985“Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation.” (Pi tchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ].) “Authority for such discovery derives not from statute but from the inherent power of every court to develop rules of procedure aimed at facilitating the administration of criminal justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment of the truth.” (Joe

1985“Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation.” (Pi tchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 522 P.2d 305 ].) “Authority for such discovery derives not from statute but from the inherent power of every court to develop rules of procedure aimed at facilitating the administration of criminal justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment of the truth.” (Joe

44
Wildman v. Government Employees Insurance Co.green
cal · 1957 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1963–1978
2 sentences

1978Co., 48 Cal.2d 31, 39 [ 307 P.2d 359 ]), and we are of the view that a judicially created presumption of prejudice, whether conclusive or rebuttable, is unwarranted (in accord: Allen v. Cheatum, supra, 351 Mich. 585 ). [¶] Margellini v. Pacific Automobile Ins.

1978Co., 48 Cal.2d 31, 39 [ 307 P.2d 359 ]), and we are of the view that a judicially created presumption of prejudice, whether conclusive or rebuttable, is unwarranted (in accord: Allen v. Cheatum, supra, 351 Mich. 585 ). [¶] Margellini v. Pacific Automobile Ins.

44
People v. Hardygreen
cal · 1948 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1983–2022
2 sentences

2022(People v. Hardy (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52, 63 (Hardy); Mathson, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1317 .) As our high court explained, this presumption places a duty on the defendant to produce evidence “raising a reasonable doubt [in the minds of the jury that the defendant acted unconsciously], and not the duty to overcome the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Hardy, at p. 64.) A defendant’s professed inability to recall an event, without more, is insufficient evidence of unconsciousness.

2022(People v. Hardy (1948) 33 Cal.2d 52, 63-64 [ 198 P.2d 865 ].) Although an instruction on this presumption has been approved, it has been highly criticized. [Citations.] [¶] The effect of this presumption is to place on the defendant a burden of producing evidence to dispel the presumption. [Citations.] However, if the defendant produces enough evidence to warrant an instruction on unconsciousness, the rebuttable presumption of consciousness has been dispelled and no instruction on its effect is necessary.

34
In Re Marriage of Zimmermangreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Equitable tolling is a judicially created doctrine that, where applicable, will " 'suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.' " ( McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88 , 99, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 734 , 194 P.3d 1026 ( McDonald ).) "Broadly speaking, the doctrine applies ' "[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one." ' [Citations.] Thus, it may apply where one action stands to lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second action; where a

2019(Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641 ; see also In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 900, 912 [the party invoking equitable tolling bears the burden of proving its applicability].) Long has not done so.

33
People v. Ramirezgreen
cal · 2009 · cited in 11 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2024
2 sentences

2024“In California, a single act or course of conduct can lead to convictions ‘of any number of the offenses charged.’ (§ 954 . . . .) However, a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.” (People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 984 .) When a case “involves the conviction of multiple alternative charged offenses,” we apply the “elements” test to determine whether one offense is necessarily included in another.

2020“In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct. ‘In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions “of any number of the offenses charged.” ’ ” (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226-1227 .) “Section 954 generally permits multiple conviction.” (Id. at p. 1227.) “However, a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.” (People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 984 .) “ ‘In deciding whether mult

211
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc.green
cal · 2000 · cited in 8 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2024
2 sentences

2024Proc., § 1281.)” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 98 (Armendariz), fn. omitted.) One of “such grounds” is the judicially created doctrine of unconscionability, a subject we have distilled as follows: “In the seminal case of Armendariz 24 Cal.4th 83 , our Supreme Court addressed the validity of an arbitration agreement signed by employees, and held that the agreement was contrary to public policy and unlawful.

2024Proc., § 1281.)” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 98 (Armendariz), fn. omitted.) One of “such grounds” is the judicially created doctrine of unconscionability, a subject we have distilled as follows: “In the seminal case of Armendariz 24 Cal.4th 83 , our Supreme Court addressed the validity of an arbitration agreement signed by employees, and held that the agreement was contrary to public policy and unlawful.

28
People v. Sloangreen
cal · 2007 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2025
2 sentences

2023Further, nothing we say here undermines our suggestion in dicta in People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110 that if we were to consider a great bodily injury enhancement as part of the underlying offense for the purpose of either constitutional double jeopardy protections or the judicially created rule 18 In re CABRERA Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. prohibiting multiple convictions for necessarily included offenses, a conviction for willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse with such an enhancement “would effectively establish the elements of . . . battery with serious bodily injury.” (I

2013It prohibits multiple punishment for the same “act or omission.” When section 954 permits multiple conviction, but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple punishment is prohibited. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 116 .) A judicially created exception to the rule permitting multiple convictions prohibits multiple convictions where one is a necessarily included offense.

24
Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchangegreen
cal · 1972 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–2014
2 sentences

1986However, in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ], the Supreme Court announced a judicially created exception to the exclusive WCAB remedy prescribed by section 3602.

1986However, in Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 498 P.2d 1063 ], the Supreme Court announced a judicially created exception to the exclusive WCAB remedy prescribed by section 3602.

24
Hill v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1974 · cited in 4 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–1988
2 sentences

1988“Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation. [Citations.] A defendant’s motion to discover is addressed solely to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery when the interests of justice so demand. [Citations.] Allowing an accused the right to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent

1988“Unlike the statutory development of civil discovery in California, the right of an accused to seek discovery in the course of preparing his defense to a criminal prosecution is a judicially created doctrine evolving in the absence of guiding legislation. [Citations.] A defendant’s motion to discover is addressed solely to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery when the interests of justice so demand. [Citations.] Allowing an accused the right to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent

24
Aleman v. Airtouch Cellulargreen
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017The March 23rd order dismissing class claims while the PAGA claim remained pending was not an appealable order The death knell doctrine, a judicially created exception to the one final judgment rule, treats an order that dismisses class claims while allowing individual claims to survive as an appealable order. ( In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751 , 757, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 248 P.3d 681 ( Baycol ) [under the "death knell doctrine," when an "order effectively [rings] the death knell for the class claims, [the court] treat[s] it as in essence a final judgment on those claims, which

2017The March 23rd order dismissing class claims while the PAGA claim remained pending was not an appealable order The death knell doctrine, a judicially created exception to the one final judgment rule, treats an order that dismisses class claims while allowing individual claims to survive as an appealable order. ( In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751 , 757, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 153 , 248 P.3d 681 ( Baycol ) [under the "death knell doctrine," when an "order effectively [rings] the death knell for the class claims, [the court] treat[s] it as in essence a final judgment on those claims, which

23
Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc.green
cal · 2003 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2015
2 sentences

2015Moreover, section 1284.2 establishes cost-sharing as the default rule in the arbitration context: “Unless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides or the parties to the arbitration otherwise agree, each party to the arbitration shall pay his pro rata share of the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator, together with other expenses of the arbitration incurred or approved by the neutral arbitrator, not including counsel fees or witness fees or other expenses incurred by a party for his own benefit.” The judicially created exception to this rule set forth in Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th

2005The rule is a judicially created exception to Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.2, which provides that the parties to an arbitration agreement do share costs “[ujnless the arbitration agreement otherwise provides or the parties to the arbitration otherwise *508 agree . . . .” 9 We justified our creation of the exception in Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th 83 , by reasoning that section 1284.2 “is a default provision, and the agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim [e.g., a FEHA claim] is implicitly an agreement [by the employer] to abide by the substantive remedial provisions of the statute”

23
Estate of Gelonesegreen
calctapp · 1974 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1994–2000
23
Morgan v. Sundance, Inc.green
scotus · 2022 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
22
People v. Mirandagreen
calctapp · 1994 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2024
22
In Re Yorkgreen
cal · 1995 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
22
People v. Kirvingreen
calctapp · 2014 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2022
22
People v. Fieldsgreen
cal · 1996 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2021
22
People v. Fiugreen
calctapp · 2008 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
22
Bolter v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2001 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2005–2013
22
Patane v. Kiddoogreen
calctapp · 1985 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2008–2009
22
Katzoff v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 1976 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
22
People v. Scottgreen
cal · 1994 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003
22
Chirmside v. Board of Administrationgreen
calctapp · 1983 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1990
22
Bowman v. Bowmangreen
calctapp · 1985 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1990
22
In Re Marriage of Pottergreen
calctapp · 1986 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
22
People v. Milwardgreen
cal · 2011 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2023
2 sentences

2023A. Applicable Law “In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct. ‘In California, a single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions “of any number of the offenses charged.”’” (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226 .) “A judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction ‘prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’” (Id. at p. 1227.) “‘[I]f a crime cannot be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense

2020Code, § 954; People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227 .) Stated differently, “[t]he law prohibits simultaneous convictions for both a greater offense and a lesser offense 11 necessarily included within it, when based on the same conduct.” (People v. Milward (2011) 52 Cal.4th 580, 589 .) When the multiple convictions are for crimes arising from separate acts, however, there is no violation of Penal Code section 954.

13
People v. Wilkinsongreen
cal · 2004 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2016
2 sentences

2006Exclusion of the Immunosciences Mycotoxin Antibody Test and the IBT Blood Serology Test Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously applied the Kelly/Frye test to exclude the results of the Immunosciences mycotoxin antibody test and the IBT blood serology test. “[T]he Kelly/Frye test constitutes a judicially created rule relating to the admissibility of certain types of evidence . . . .” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 845 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420 , 94 P.3d 551 ].) “[UJnder the Kelly-Frye rule the proponent of evidence derived from a new scientific methodology must satisfy thre

2006Exclusion of the Immunosciences Mycotoxin Antibody Test and the IBT Blood Serology Test Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously applied the Kelly/Frye test to exclude the results of the Immunosciences mycotoxin antibody test and the IBT blood serology test. “[T]he Kelly/Frye test constitutes a judicially created rule relating to the admissibility of certain types of evidence . . . .” (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 845 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 420 , 94 P.3d 551 ].) “[UJnder the Kelly-Frye rule the proponent of evidence derived from a new scientific methodology must satisfy thre

13
Green v. Obledogreen
cal · 1981 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015(Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 144.) Nor, respondents claim, can petitioners show the beneficial interest requisite for mandamus.

2015(Green, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 144 .) Nor, respondents 17 Petitioner Marquez did not present J.O.’s BIC to Kaiser or otherwise advise Kaiser that he had Medi-Cal coverage. 42 claim, can petitioners show a beneficial interest requisite for mandamus.

13
In Re Ronald E.green
cal · 1977 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1992
13
FNB Mortgage Corp. v. Pacific General Groupgreen
calctapp · 1999 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2001–2017
12
Juror Number One v. Superior Courtgreen
calctapp · 2012 · cited in 2 California opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
12

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (26)

CaseCitedYears
Waite v. Waite green
cal · 1972
2 sentences

2005The terminable interest rule arose from two cases, Benson v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 355 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 384 P.2d 649 ], and Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 Cal.3d 461 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 492 P.2d 13 ]. “ ‘Briefly stated, this judicially created rule recognize[d] that an interest in a retirement plan traceable to contributions of community funds or to community labor constitutes community property; however, the interest of the nonparticipant spouse does not extend to benefits payable after the death of either spouse.’ [Citation.] There were two distinct aspects to the rule. ‘ “[T]he

2005The terminable interest rule arose from two cases, Benson v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 355 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 384 P.2d 649 ], and Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 Cal.3d 461 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 492 P.2d 13 ]. “ ‘Briefly stated, this judicially created rule recognize[d] that an interest in a retirement plan traceable to contributions of community funds or to community labor constitutes community property; however, the interest of the nonparticipant spouse does not extend to benefits payable after the death of either spouse.’ [Citation.] There were two distinct aspects to the rule. ‘ “[T]he

41983–2005
Benson v. City of Los Angeles green
cal · 1963
2 sentences

2005The terminable interest rule arose from two cases, Benson v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 355 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 384 P.2d 649 ], and Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 Cal.3d 461 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 492 P.2d 13 ]. “ ‘Briefly stated, this judicially created rule recognize[d] that an interest in a retirement plan traceable to contributions of community funds or to community labor constitutes community property; however, the interest of the nonparticipant spouse does not extend to benefits payable after the death of either spouse.’ [Citation.] There were two distinct aspects to the rule. ‘ “[T]he

2005The terminable interest rule arose from two cases, Benson v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 355 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 384 P.2d 649 ], and Waite v. Waite (1972) 6 Cal.3d 461 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 325 , 492 P.2d 13 ]. “ ‘Briefly stated, this judicially created rule recognize[d] that an interest in a retirement plan traceable to contributions of community funds or to community labor constitutes community property; however, the interest of the nonparticipant spouse does not extend to benefits payable after the death of either spouse.’ [Citation.] There were two distinct aspects to the rule. ‘ “[T]he

41983–2005
Allen v. Cheatum green
mich · 1958
2 sentences

1978Co., 48 Cal.2d 31, 39 [ 307 P.2d 359 ]), and we are of the view that a judicially created presumption of prejudice, whether conclusive or rebuttable, is unwarranted (in accord: Allen v. Cheatum, supra, 351 Mich. 585 ). [¶] Margellini v. Pacific Automobile Ins.

1978Co., 48 Cal.2d 31, 39 [ 307 P.2d 359 ]), and we are of the view that a judicially created presumption of prejudice, whether conclusive or rebuttable, is unwarranted (in accord: Allen v. Cheatum, supra, 351 Mich. 585 ). [¶] Margellini v. Pacific Automobile Ins.

41963–1978
People v. Lewis green
cal · 2008
2 sentences

2025Analysis “Although, ordinarily, a defendant ‘may be convicted of any number of offenses charged’ (§ 954), ‘a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ ” (People v. Aranda (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1077, 1089 .) “An offense is necessarily included within another if ‘the statutory elements of the greater offense … include all the elements of the lesser offense….’ ” (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 518 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919 .) False imprisonment—“ ‘the unlawful violation of t

2022“Although, ordinarily, a defendant ‘may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged’ (§ 954), ‘a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ ” (People v. Aranda (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1077, 1089 .) “An offense is necessarily included within another if ‘the statutory elements of the greater offense … include all the elements of the lesser 11. offense ….’ ” (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 518 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919 .) As suggested by their names, simple kidnapping un

32021–2025
People v. Black green
cal · 2014
2 sentences

2025Analysis “Although, ordinarily, a defendant ‘may be convicted of any number of offenses charged’ (§ 954), ‘a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ ” (People v. Aranda (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1077, 1089 .) “An offense is necessarily included within another if ‘the statutory elements of the greater offense … include all the elements of the lesser offense….’ ” (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 518 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919 .) False imprisonment—“ ‘the unlawful violation of t

2022“Although, ordinarily, a defendant ‘may be convicted of any number of the offenses charged’ (§ 954), ‘a judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ ” (People v. Aranda (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1077, 1089 .) “An offense is necessarily included within another if ‘the statutory elements of the greater offense … include all the elements of the lesser 11. offense ….’ ” (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 518 , overruled on other grounds in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919 .) As suggested by their names, simple kidnapping un

32021–2025
People v. Medina green
cal · 2007
2 sentences

2021(People v. Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685, 702 .) When two offenses are charged, and the defendant is convicted of both, we apply the “elements” test to assess whether one is a necessarily included offense of the other and, in turn, whether multiple conviction is proper.

2021(People v. Braslaw (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1247 .) The parties agree that People v. Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685 (Medina) is relevant, if not controlling.

32021–2021
Mills v. Forestex Co. green
calctapp · 2003
2 sentences

2019Equitable tolling is a judicially created doctrine that, where applicable, will " 'suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.' " ( McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88 , 99, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 734 , 194 P.3d 1026 ( McDonald ).) "Broadly speaking, the doctrine applies ' "[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one." ' [Citations.] Thus, it may apply where one action stands to lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second action; where a

2019Equitable tolling is a judicially created doctrine that, where applicable, will " 'suspend or extend a statute of limitations as necessary to ensure fundamental practicality and fairness.' " ( McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88 , 99, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 734 , 194 P.3d 1026 ( McDonald ).) "Broadly speaking, the doctrine applies ' "[w]hen an injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one." ' [Citations.] Thus, it may apply where one action stands to lessen the harm that is the subject of a potential second action; where a

32019–2019
Cates v. Chiang green
calctapp · 2013
22014–2025
People v. Aranda green
cal · 2019
22022–2025
Shadow Traffic Network v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1994
22024–2024
Van Atta v. Scott green
cal · 1980
22023–2023
People v. Mathson green
calctapp · 2012
22022–2022
Privette v. Superior Court green
cal · 1993
22010–2021
Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Ass'n v. McMullin green
calctapp · 2016
22021–2021
Gray1 CPB, LLC v. SCC Acquisitions, Inc. green
calctapp · 2015
22021–2021
Laird v. Blacker green
cal · 1992
22019–2019
Boghos v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London green
cal · 2005
22005–2015
People v. Sylvester C. green
calctapp · 2006
22015–2015
People v. Bradford green
cal · 1997
22015–2015
People v. Birks green
cal · 1998
22015–2015
Federal Trade Commission v. Check Investors, Inc. green
ca3 · 2007
22013–2013
Terri L. Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C. And Kathy Leschensky green
ca7 · 1997
22013–2013
Karen L. Keele, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Norman Paul Wexler, Mitchell Wexler and Wexler and Wexler green
ca7 · 1998
22013–2013
Hoadley v. City & County of San Francisco green
cal · 1875
22002–2007
People v. Patterson green
cal · 1989
22004–2007
Schlick v. Comco Management, Inc. green
calctapp · 1987
21991–1991

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Evidence Code § 452 (13) CA § Cal. Penal Code § 187 (13) USC § 9u.s.c.1 (11) USC § 9u.s.c.2 (11)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 303 (1955–2026) IL 124 (1966–2026) MI 83 (1976–2026) PA 79 (1961–2024) TX 79 (1969–2022) MO 77 (1986–2025) LA 76 (1960–2025) OH 72 (1978–2026) WI 54 (1997–2025) MD 53 (1962–2022) NJ 50 (1976–2026) WA 47 (1973–2025) FL 41 (1983–2024) CO 38 (1983–2025) VA 35 (1974–2026) UT 33 (1981–2023) NM 29 (1978–2023) NY 28 (1959–2024) CT 27 (1994–2024) KS 24 (1983–2022) MA 23 (1976–2019) ME 21 (1977–2025) TN 20 (1981–2024) GA 20 (1981–2025) MS 17 (1979–2024) MN 17 (1985–2024) ID 17 (1966–2026) NH 17 (1965–2020) AZ 15 (1980–2023) RI 15 (1979–2022) OR 14 (1996–2024) AL 14 (1984–2024) WY 13 (1981–2026) IN 11 (1980–2023) DE 10 (1955–2022) AK 9 (1980–2019) OK 9 (1985–2014) VT 8 (1989–2026) WV 8 (1981–2020) AR 7 (1997–2022) KY 7 (2004–2025) IA 7 (1995–2018) VI 7 (2009–2017) MT 6 (1980–2009) NC 6 (1991–2023) NE 4 (1996–2020) DC 4 (1999–2009) NV 4 (1979–2024) SC 4 (1975–2019) SD 3 (1957–1996) ND 2 (2013–2023)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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