128 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mapp v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2019See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). ¶ 14 The only witness at the hearing on the motion to quash, Chicago police officer Hummons, testified that around 3 p.m. on August 11, 2011, while on patrol in an unmarked police car, he and his partner, Officer Nyls Meredith, drove past a house at 6901 East End Avenue, Chicago. 2017See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). ¶9 The only witness at the hearing, Chicago police officer Roderick Hummons, testified that around 3 p.m. on August 11, 2011, while on patrol in an unmarked police car, he and his partner, Officer Nyls Meredith, drove past a house at 6901 East End Avenue, Chicago. | 5 | 5 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2005See People v. Moore, 51 Ill. 2d 79, 83 , 281 N.E.2d 294 (1972) (finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request to call the complainant as the court’s witness in the hearing on the motion to suppress the identification); People v. Agee, 100 Ill. 2005See People v. Moore, 51 Ill. 2d 79, 83 , 281 N.E.2d 294 (1972) (finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request to call the complainant as the court’s witness in the hearing on the motion to suppress the identification); People v. Agee, 100 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). ¶ 14 The only witness at the hearing on the motion to quash, Chicago police officer Hummons, testified that around 3 p.m. on August 11, 2011, while on patrol in an unmarked police car, he and his partner, Officer Nyls Meredith, drove past a house at 6901 East End Avenue, Chicago. 2017See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) and Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963). ¶9 The only witness at the hearing, Chicago police officer Roderick Hummons, testified that around 3 p.m. on August 11, 2011, while on patrol in an unmarked police car, he and his partner, Officer Nyls Meredith, drove past a house at 6901 East End Avenue, Chicago. | 3 | 5 |
People v. Clendeningreen2 sentences2021People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18 (2010). ¶ 36 “[T]he decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant,” and “such decisions will not ordinarily support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 . 2018People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 319 (2010); People v Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 442 (2005). | 3 | 4 |
People v. Petersongreen2 sentences2026For such prejudice, there must be “a reasonable probability of a different result, not merely a possibility.” People v. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d 117, 129-30 (1988). ¶ 25 In addition, there exists a well-established principle that “the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant.” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 (2017). 2026As we have explained, “the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant.” Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 (2017). | 2 | 14 |
People v. Pattersongreen2 sentences2018People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 319 (2010); People v Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 442 (2005). 2018People v. Clendenin, 238 Ill. 2d 302, 319 (2010); People v Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 442 (2005). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Gacygreen2 sentences2026For such prejudice, there must be “a reasonable probability of a different result, not merely a possibility.” People v. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d 117, 129-30 (1988). ¶ 25 In addition, there exists a well-established principle that “the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant.” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 (2017). 2022People v. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d 117, 126 (1988). ¶ 46 The decision of whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant, and such decisions will not ordinarily support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Floresgreen2 sentences2026More pointedly, our supreme court has stated that “defense counsel need not call a witness if he reasonably believes that under the circumstances the individual’s testimony is unreliable.” People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 106 (1989). 2022Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 . - 11 - 2022 IL App (2d) 210406-U The failure to call a witness will not support an ineffectiveness claim where it was reasonable for counsel to believe that the anticipated testimony would have no probative value to guilt or innocence (People v. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 74-75 (1988)), would be unreliable, or would likely harm the defendant’s case (People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66, 106 (1989)). | 2 | 2 |
People v. DeFordgreen2 sentences2019People v. DeFord, 59 Ill. 2018People v. DeFord, 59 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rolandis G.green2 sentences2007In re Rolandis G., 352 Ill. 2007In re Rolandis G., 352 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences2005People v. Coleman , 267 Ill. 2005People v. Coleman, 267 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Guestgreen2 sentences2020However, any lack of investigation is judged against a standard of reasonableness, given “all the circumstances” and “applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 400 (1995). ¶ 57 In addition, “the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant.” Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 . 2018Guest, 166 Ill. 2d at 400 ; Viramontes, 2017 IL App (1st) 160984, ¶ 56 . ¶ 108 In addition, “the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant.” Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 . | 1 | 4 |
The PEOPLE v. Zaccagninigreen2 sentences2016The trial court also told a witness for the defense “ ‘don’t lie’ ” and asked the witness “if he understood the sanctity of an oath and what perjury is.” Id. at 409 . 2015The trial court also told a witness for the defense “ ‘don’t lie’ ” and asked the witness “if he understood the sanctity of an oath and what perjury is.” Id. at 409 . | 1 | 3 |
The PEOPLE v. Santuccigreen2 sentences1992Despite his acknowledgement that the judge’s questions “elicited no new testimony” “about [his] state of mind,” defendant claims that “the court’s interrogation improperly emphasized testimony which pointed to guilt and *** cast *** discredit upon *** a key witness for the defense. ‘The witness had already testified to these facts on direct examination, and the matter was of importance only so far as it affected the credibility of the witness in the minds of the jurors.’ ” (People v. Santucci (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 93, 99 .) However, Santucei is distinguishable from this case because there the cou 1987App. 2d 302, 312-13 , 179 N.E.2d 415, 420 (a personal injury case), People v. Santucci (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 93, 99 , 180 N.E.2d 491, 493-94 (court interrogated each and every witness who testified, in some instances causing reiteration and emphasis on testimony which pointed to defendant’s guilt and, in another, casting discredit upon a key witness for the defense, and also made remarks to defense counsel of a nature as to show impatience, if not hostility, to the manner in which the defense was conducted), and People v. Zaccagnini (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 408, 410 , 194 N.E.2d 286, 287 (conduct of tr | 1 | 3 |
People v. Crawford Distributing Co.green2 sentences1988In Crawford, our supreme court acknowledged that on several occasions it had held “that it is reversible error for the prosecutor to compel a witness to claim his constitutional privilege before the jury when the effect is to suggest by implication or innuendo that the defendant is guilty of a crime. ( 78 Ill. 2d at 74 .) The Crawford court went on to state, however, that “[e]ach case must be decided in light of its own facts and circumstances.” ( 78 Ill. 2d at 74-75 .) Relevant considerations include the prosecutor’s motive in calling the witness and the likelihood of the jury drawing unwarra 1988In Crawford, our supreme court acknowledged that on several occasions it had held “that it is reversible error for the prosecutor to compel a witness to claim his constitutional privilege before the jury when the effect is to suggest by implication or innuendo that the defendant is guilty of a crime. ( 78 Ill. 2d at 74 .) The Crawford court went on to state, however, that “[e]ach case must be decided in light of its own facts and circumstances.” ( 78 Ill. 2d at 74-75 .) Relevant considerations include the prosecutor’s motive in calling the witness and the likelihood of the jury drawing unwarra | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Manninggreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dixongreen1 sentence2026Dixon, 2018 IL App (3d) 150630, ¶ 20 (citing People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 412 (2003)); see also People v. Marbley, 2016 IL App (1st) 141359 , ¶ 19. ¶ 31 Here, postconviction counsel argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an eyewitness identification expert as a witness to challenge the reliability of Williams’ identification. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rissleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Danielsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mabreygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Stoeckergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ashfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McRaegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gachogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Euellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re AWgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Englandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Spicergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilbourn v. Cavalenesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Norman Laverne Wilcoxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miller v. DIST. CT., CITY & CTY. OF DENVERgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bentleyyellow2 sentences2005See People v. Moore, 51 Ill.2d 79, 83 , 281 N.E.2d 294 (1972) (finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request to call the complainant as the court's witness in the hearing on the motion to suppress the identification); People v. Agee, 100 Ill.App.3d 878, 883 , 56 Ill.Dec. 164 , 427 N.E.2d 244 (1981) (finding no error in court's refusal to call identifying witness as the court's witness during suppression hearing); but see People v. Bentley, 11 Ill.App.3d 686, 689 , 297 N.E.2d 282 (1973) (reversing the defendant's conviction and remanding for a new suppression 2005See People v. Moore, 51 Ill.2d 79, 83 , 281 N.E.2d 294 (1972) (finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request to call the complainant as the court's witness in the hearing on the motion to suppress the identification); People v. Agee, 100 Ill.App.3d 878, 883 , 56 Ill.Dec. 164 , 427 N.E.2d 244 (1981) (finding no error in court's refusal to call identifying witness as the court's witness during suppression hearing); but see People v. Bentley, 11 Ill.App.3d 686, 689 , 297 N.E.2d 282 (1973) (reversing the defendant's conviction and remanding for a new suppression | 4 | 4 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Agee
green
2 sentences2005See People v. Moore, 51 Ill. 2d 79, 83 , 281 N.E.2d 294 (1972) (finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request to call the complainant as the court’s witness in the hearing on the motion to suppress the identification); People v. Agee, 100 Ill. 2005See People v. Moore, 51 Ill. 2d 79, 83 , 281 N.E.2d 294 (1972) (finding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a request to call the complainant as the court’s witness in the hearing on the motion to suppress the identification); People v. Agee, 100 Ill. | 4 | 2005–2005 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018Id. ¶ 80 In evaluating defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, we are guided by the well-established principle that the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant. 2018Id. ¶ 80 In evaluating defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, we are guided by the well-established principle that the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant. | 3 | 2017–2018 |
Carle v. People
green
2 sentences1976The supreme court first enunciated the parameters of the court’s witness rule as it applied to criminal cases in Carle v. People, 200 Ill. 494 , 66 N.E. 32 (People v. Moriariy, 33 Ill. 2d 606 , 213 N.E .2d 516): Where the State’s attorney knows that a witness was present at the scene of the [crime], but for some reason, either because he has no confidence in the witness, or for any other reason, he may doubt his veracity or integrity, he is not obligated to call such witness. 1976The supreme court first enunciated the parameters of the court’s witness rule as it applied to criminal cases in Carle v. People, 200 Ill. 494 , 66 N.E. 32 (People v. Moriariy, 33 Ill. 2d 606 , 213 N.E .2d 516): Where the State’s attorney knows that a witness was present at the scene of the [crime], but for some reason, either because he has no confidence in the witness, or for any other reason, he may doubt his veracity or integrity, he is not obligated to call such witness. | 3 | 1928–1976 |
People v. Viramontes
green
2 sentences2018Guest, 166 Ill. 2d at 400 ; Viramontes, 2017 IL App (1st) 160984, ¶ 56 . ¶ 108 In addition, “the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant.” Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 . 2017Guest, 166 Ill. 2d at 400 ; Viramontes, 2017 IL App (1st) 160984, ¶ 56 . ¶ 108 In addition, “the decision whether to call a certain witness for the defense is a matter of trial strategy, left to the discretion of counsel after consultation with the defendant.” Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 80 . | 2 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Chapman
green
2 sentences2006Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 217 . 2006Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 217 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Rosenborgh
green
2 sentences2005Indeed, the circuit court may not only bar a witness from testifying, it may also terminate the hearing in its entirety if "it appears that a pretrial motion is frivolous or imposed for delay." Rosenborgh, 21 Ill.App.3d at 686 , 315 N.E.2d 545 . 2005Indeed, the circuit court may not only bar a witness from testifying, it may also terminate the hearing in its entirety if "it appears that a pretrial motion is frivolous or imposed for delay." Rosenborgh, 21 Ill.App.3d at 686 , 315 N.E.2d 545 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. O'BANNER
green
2 sentences1999O'Banner , 215 Ill. 1999O’Banner, 215 Ill. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
The People v. Moriarity
green
2 sentences1981(See People v. Moriarity (1966), 33 Ill. 2d 606, 615 , 213 N.E.2d 516 .) In order to prevent a miscarriage of justice (i.e., the loss of testimony vital to the factfinder’s search for truth), the court is permitted to call the witness and both parties can cross-examine. 1976The supreme court first enunciated the parameters of the court’s witness rule as it applied to criminal cases in Carle v. People, 200 Ill. 494 , 66 N.E. 32 (People v. Moriariy, 33 Ill. 2d 606 , 213 N.E .2d 516): Where the State’s attorney knows that a witness was present at the scene of the [crime], but for some reason, either because he has no confidence in the witness, or for any other reason, he may doubt his veracity or integrity, he is not obligated to call such witness. | 2 | 1976–1981 |
The People v. Myers
green
2 sentences1979(People v. Myers (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 311 ; People v. Haran (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 229 ; People v. Bennett (1953), 413 Ill. 601 .) However, the act of a prosecutor calling a witness to the stand with advance knowledge that the witness will invoke the fifth amendment may or may not be error. 1978(See People v. Myers (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 311 , 220 N.E.2d 297 .) However, when the witness, as here, subsequently testifies giving evidence highly favorable to the prosecution, any inference prejudicial to the defendant that arose from the claim of the privilege is superseded by the damaging effect to the defendant of the testimony itself. | 2 | 1978–1979 |
Moloney v. . Nelson
green
2 sentences1975(Smith v. Billings (1898), 177 Ill. 446 , 53 N.E. 81 .) The gas company asserts that it had no opportunity to call Griffith as a witness because the hearing was recessed — to allow the master to rule on its accumulated objections — before it presented its defense. 1975However, if a party *614 testified about a conversation heard by a surviving agent and the agent dies before the opposite party has an opportunity to oppose the testimony, the testimony is rendered incompetent. ( Smith v. Billings (1898), 177 Ill. 446 , 53 N.E. 81 .) The gas company asserts that it had no opportunity to call Griffith as a witness because the hearing was recessed to allow the master to rule on its accumulated objections before it presented its defense. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
Smith v. Billings
neutral
2 sentences1975(Smith v. Billings (1898), 177 Ill. 446 , 53 N.E. 81 .) The gas company asserts that it had no opportunity to call Griffith as a witness because the hearing was recessed — to allow the master to rule on its accumulated objections — before it presented its defense. 1975However, if a party *614 testified about a conversation heard by a surviving agent and the agent dies before the opposite party has an opportunity to oppose the testimony, the testimony is rendered incompetent. ( Smith v. Billings (1898), 177 Ill. 446 , 53 N.E. 81 .) The gas company asserts that it had no opportunity to call Griffith as a witness because the hearing was recessed to allow the master to rule on its accumulated objections before it presented its defense. | 2 | 1975–1975 |
People v. Bernstein
green
2 sentences1931(People v. Blevins, 251 Ill. 381 .) In this connection the case of People v. Bernstein, 250 Ill. 63 , cited by the defendant, is not in point, as it holds only that it is improper for the trial judge to conduct a lengthy cross-examination of a witness and states no rule prohibiting such an examination by counsel. 1928While in Carle v. People, 200 Ill. 494 , it was held that under proper circumstances the court could, at the request of an attorney in the case, call a witness as the court’s witness, allowing the witness to be cross-examined by both parties, and this practice has since been recognized in numerous casesjamong them People v. Cleminson, 250 Ill. 135 , People v. Baskin, 254 id. 509, People v. Cardinelli, 297 id. 116, and People v. Dascola, 322 id. 473, this court in People v. Bernstein, 250 Ill. 63 , upon this subject said: “This court, however, has more than once said that the examination of wit | 2 | 1928–1931 |
Brown v. Walker
green
2 sentences1924(People v. Butler Street Foundry Co. supra; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 .) In Regina v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311, Chief Justice Cockburn said: “To entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer. * * * If the fact of the witness being in danger be once made to appear, great latitude should be allowed to him in judging for himself the effect of any particular 1924People v. Butler Street Foundry Co. supra; Brown v. Walker, supra; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 . | 2 | 1909–1924 |
| People v. Boclair green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| City of Lake Forest v. Martinez-Galarza neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Blair green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Parlier green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Coons green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Roddis green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Dupree green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Gaines green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| People v. Trotter green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Murphy green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Henderson green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Girot v. Keith green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Kent neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Buffer green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Anderson v. McHenry Township green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Zurek v. Franklin Park Officers Electoral Board green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Cardamone neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Stechly green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Day v. Schoreck green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Schroeder green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Bond v. Pecaut green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Black green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Pouncy v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Dear v. Chicago Transit Authority neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Hunter v. Sukkar neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| McCormick v. Bucyrus-Erie Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Crespo v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.