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19 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1890–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Riewe v. Arnesengreen1 sentence2024Evid. 616.; see also Riewe v. Arnesen, 381 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Minn. App. 1986) (concluding cross-examination disclosing insurance, and relationship with insurer, was relevant to proving bias or prejudice of the witness under rule 411), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Helterbridlegreen1 sentence2017See State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn. 1980) (explaining in dicta that effective cross-examination, persuasive argument by defense counsel, proper jury instructions, and the requirement of jury unanimity are additional safeguards to ensure the reliability of eyewitness identification without the need to admit expert testimony regarding the reliability of the identification). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Moralesgreen1 sentence2016Eliciting C.B.’s testimony McGinnis argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he elicited testimony from C.B., knowing that he would assert his Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. “[When] the prosecution calls a witness for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant in the minds of the jury, knowing that the witness will claim immunity, reversible error results, regardless of actual prejudice.” State v. Morales, 788 N.W.2d 737, 753 (Minn. 2010) (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bjornsongreen1 sentence2016Evid. 103(a)(2) (providing that “[i]n case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked); State v. Bjornson, 378 N.W.2d 4, 10 (Minn. App. 1985) (rejecting an appellant’s claim that district court erred in restricting cross- examination of a witness where defense counsel did not make an offer of proof), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Turnipseedgreen1 sentence2015See id. at 311-12 (upholding denial of motion for a continuance to subpoena a witness when defense counsel could have subpoenaed the witness earlier). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Haynesgreen1 sentence2015See State v. Haynes, 725 N.W.2d 524, 530-31 (Minn. 2007) (holding that evidence of lying to police while a juvenile was admissible to impeach a witness under rule 608(b)). | 1 | 1 |
Namet v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Under the first theory of error — the bad-faith theory — reversible error results, regardless of actual prejudice, “where the prosecution calls a witness for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant in the minds of the jury, knowing that the witness will claim immunity.” Mitchell , 268 Minn, at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 130 ; see also Namet, 373 U.S. at 186 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 . 2010Under the first theory of error — the bad-faith theory — reversible error results, regardless of actual prejudice, “where the prosecution calls a witness for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant in the minds of the jury, knowing that the witness will claim immunity.” Mitchell , 268 Minn, at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 130 ; see also Namet, 373 U.S. at 186 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Zahngreen1 sentence2009State v. Zahn, 562 N.W.2d 737, 740 (N.D.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Dirkswagergreen2 sentences1997Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Minn.1982). 1997Johnson v. Dirkswager, 315 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Minn.1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clarkgreen1 sentence1988State v. Clark, 296 N.W.2d 359, 368 (Minn.1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ellert
green
2 sentences1985Cf. State v. Ellert, 301 N.W.2d 320 (Minn.1981) (affirming an assault conviction in a case in which the victim testified at trial as a witness for the defense rather than for the state). 1984Cf. State v. Ellert, 301 N.W.2d 320 (Minn.1981) (affirming an assault conviction in a case in which the victim testified at trial as a witness for the defense rather than for the state). | 2 | 1984–1985 |
State v. Nunez
green
1 sentence2025As explained below, we decline to extend the holding in Mitchell to the circumstances presented here, because prosecutors and defendants are not similarly situated in at least two critical ways and jury, since undue weight may be given by a jury to the claim of privilege and due to the impossibility of cross-examination as to its assertion.”); State v. Nunez, 506 A.2d 1295 , 1298–99 (N.J. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Regan
green
1 sentence2015Washington allows a prosecutor to call a defense attorney as a witness when the defense attorney’s testimony “is both necessary and unobtainable from other sources.” Id. at 788 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Peirce
green
2 sentences2015We reasoned that allowing the defense to offer a witness immunity would be an “impermissible intrusion into prosecutorial discretion which must remain with the executive branch,” and that granting such a request would be “vulnerable to manipulation and abuse by codefendants and others with a common interest in evading guilt.” 5 Id. 2015We reasoned that allowing the defense to offer a witness immunity would be an “impermissible intrusion into prosecutorial discretion which must remain with the executive branch,” and that granting such a request would be “vulnerable to manipulation and abuse by codefendants and others with a common interest in evading guilt.” 5 Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences2010In Mitchell , a defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the State’s direct examination of a co-conspirator who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to answer questions was prejudicial error because the State “knew that the witness would claim immunity and that the only purpose of calling him was to discredit defendant with the jury.” 268 Minn, at 515, 130 N.W.2d at 130 . 2010Under the first theory of error — the bad-faith theory — reversible error results, regardless of actual prejudice, “where the prosecution calls a witness for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant in the minds of the jury, knowing that the witness will claim immunity.” Mitchell , 268 Minn, at 517, 130 N.W.2d at 130 ; see also Namet, 373 U.S. at 186 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Black
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Thompson v. Barnes
green
1 sentence1987Id. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences1973Facts similar to those in the instant case were faced in State v. Brown, 221 La. 394 , 59 So. 2d 431 (1952). 1973Facts similar to those in the instant case were faced in State v. Brown, 221 La. 394 , 59 So. 2d 431 (1952). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
State v. Thaden
green
2 sentences1936The rule to which we adhere is best stated by quoting from Justice Mitchell in State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 255 , 45 N. W. 447 , 448: “After consideration of the question, and an examination of the authorities, our conclusion is that the best practical rule is that laid down in some of the English cases, and adopted and followed by Chief Justice Cockburn, in Reg. v. Boyes, * * * ‘that to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reaso 1936The rule to which we adhere is best stated by quoting from Justice Mitchell in State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 255 , 45 N. W. 447 , 448: “After consideration of the question, and an examination of the authorities, our conclusion is that the best practical rule is that laid down in some of the English cases, and adopted and followed by Chief Justice Cockburn, in Reg. v. Boyes, * * * ‘that to entitle a party called as a witness to the privilege of silence, the court must see, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is reaso | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Chamberlain v. Willson & Prescott
green
1 sentence1890The following are a few of the leading eases treating of this subject: 1 Burr’s Trial, 255 ; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 254 ; Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120 ; Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140 ; Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Vt. 491 ; Janvrin v. Scammon, 29 N. H. 280; Fries v. Brugler, 7 Halst. 79, ( 21 Am. | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Kirschner v. State
neutral
1 sentence1890The following are a few of the leading eases treating of this subject: 1 Burr’s Trial, 255 ; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 254 ; Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120 ; Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140 ; Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Vt. 491 ; Janvrin v. Scammon, 29 N. H. 280; Fries v. Brugler, 7 Halst. 79, ( 21 Am. | 1 | 1890–1890 |
People v. Mather
green
1 sentence1890The following are a few of the leading eases treating of this subject: 1 Burr’s Trial, 255 ; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 254 ; Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120 ; Kirschner v. State, 9 Wis. 140 ; Chamberlain v. Willson, 12 Vt. 491 ; Janvrin v. Scammon, 29 N. H. 280; Fries v. Brugler, 7 Halst. 79, ( 21 Am. | 1 | 1890–1890 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.