witness hearing in New Jersey

2017The right to anonymity of informants, however, is "not absolute." Milligan, supra , 71 N.J. at 383 , 365 A .2d 914 .

2017The right to anonymity of informants, however, is "not absolute." Milligan, supra , 71 N.J. at 383 , 365 A .2d 914 .

1996Id. at 375 , 316 A. 2d 439 ; State v. Johnson, 223 N.J.

1996Id. at 375 , 316 A. 2d 439 ; State v. Johnson, 223 N.J.

2024Finally, the court made prong one and prong two findings pursuant to Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J.

2023However, defendant's argument is misplaced because he was convicted based upon corroborated observations "that [he] was under the influence [of alcohol, Percocet and Lunesta] while he operated a motor vehicle." Bealor, 187 N.J. at 574 .

2016The failure of the court to discuss the detective's neglect to warn the witness that the suspect might not be the perpetrator and he should not feel compelled to make an identification is particularly concerning in light of the other system failures in this showup.11 The central point of Henderson is the recognition that suggestive identification procedures can skew a witness's report of his opportunity to view the crime, his degree of attention, and, most importantly perhaps, his level of certainty at the time of the identification. 208 N.J. at 286 .

2013Id. at 576 , 25 A.3d 1140 .

2013Id. at 576 , 25 A.3d 1140 .

2013As the Appellate Division explained in Judge, supra, [u]nlike the smell of alcohol emanating from the passenger compartment of a stopped motor vehicle, or even on the breath of the driver, both of which might be lawful, using or possessing marijuana in a motor vehicle in New Jersey is a per se violation of the laws of this State Thus, the smell of burnt marijuana under the total circumstances created a heightened and reasonable suspicion that an offense was being committed. [275 N.J.Super. at 202, 645 A.2d 1224 .] The testimony of the sole witness at the hearing was largely uncontested.

2012Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 300 , 696 A.2d 556 (1997).

2012Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 300 , 696 A.2d 556 (1997).

2010In this context, the additional prejudice inherent in the opportunity to observe the witness a second time is not as apparent as it is when compared with a conventional "read back." The direction provided in Michaels , which was extended to the replaying of out-of-court-statements that have been videotaped in Burr, supra, 195 N.J. at 134-35 , 948 A. 2d 627 , is that the trial judge should consider whether to satisfy a jury's request for a "playback of videotaped testimony by offering a reading of the transcript of the testimony." 264 N.J.Super. at 644 , 625 A. 2d 489 .

2010In this context, the additional prejudice inherent in the opportunity to observe the witness a second time is not as apparent as it is when compared with a conventional "read back." The direction provided in Michaels , which was extended to the replaying of out-of-court-statements that have been videotaped in Burr, supra, 195 N.J. at 134-35 , 948 A. 2d 627 , is that the trial judge should consider whether to satisfy a jury's request for a "playback of videotaped testimony by offering a reading of the transcript of the testimony." 264 N.J.Super. at 644 , 625 A. 2d 489 .

2010In this context, the additional prejudice inherent in the opportunity to observe the witness a second time is not as apparent as it is when compared with a conventional "read back." The direction provided in Michaels , which was extended to the replaying of out-of-court-statements that have been videotaped in Burr, supra, 195 N.J. at 134-35 , 948 A. 2d 627 , is that the trial judge should consider whether to satisfy a jury's request for a "playback of videotaped testimony by offering a reading of the transcript of the testimony." 264 N.J.Super. at 644 , 625 A. 2d 489 .

2010In this context, the additional prejudice inherent in the opportunity to observe the witness a second time is not as apparent as it is when compared with a conventional "read back." The direction provided in Michaels , which was extended to the replaying of out-of-court-statements that have been videotaped in Burr, supra, 195 N.J. at 134-35 , 948 A. 2d 627 , is that the trial judge should consider whether to satisfy a jury's request for a "playback of videotaped testimony by offering a reading of the transcript of the testimony." 264 N.J.Super. at 644 , 625 A. 2d 489 .

2007That follows because the general waiver provision of N.J.R.E. 530 provides that “[t]he failure of a witness to claim a right or privilege with respect to one question shall not operate as a waiver with respect to any other question.” Similarly, in Maressa, supra, we applied the narrow waiver provision contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.3b to civil cases and held that “publication of privileged information constitutes a waiver only as to that specific information.” 89 N.J. at 195 , 445 A.2d 376 .

2007That follows because the general waiver provision of N.J.R.E. 530 provides that “[t]he failure of a witness to claim a right or privilege with respect to one question shall not operate as a waiver with respect to any other question.” Similarly, in Maressa, supra, we applied the narrow waiver provision contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-21.3b to civil cases and held that “publication of privileged information constitutes a waiver only as to that specific information.” 89 N.J. at 195 , 445 A.2d 376 .

2006Thus, on this record, only Dr. Zeiguer meets the specific witness requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30b, and we disagree with the implication in In re Commitment of J.P., 339 N.J.Super. 443, 460 , 772 A. 2d 54 (App.Div.2001), that any "mental health professional" may meet this requirement.

2006We have previously indicated that "[t]he psychiatrist is the only person with the training as well as the knowledge from personal interviews with the committee, or potential committee, to determine if commitment is necessary, the level of treatment needed, and when recovery occurs." J.H.M., supra, 367 N.J.Super. at 610 , 845 A. 2d 139 .

2006We have previously indicated that "[t]he psychiatrist is the only person with the training as well as the knowledge from personal interviews with the committee, or potential committee, to determine if commitment is necessary, the level of treatment needed, and when recovery occurs." J.H.M., supra, 367 N.J.Super. at 610 , 845 A. 2d 139 .

2006Thus, on this record, only Dr. Zeiguer meets the specific witness requirement of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30b, and we disagree with the implication in In re Commitment of J.P., 339 N.J.Super. 443, 460 , 772 A. 2d 54 (App.Div.2001), that any "mental health professional" may meet this requirement.

2003A court must "balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense and contest the State's charges." State v. Salley, supra, 264 N.J.Super. at 98 , 624 A. 2d 42 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 628 , 1 L.Ed. 2d 639, 646 (1957)).

2003A court must "balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense and contest the State's charges." State v. Salley, supra, 264 N.J.Super. at 98 , 624 A. 2d 42 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 , 77 S.Ct. 623, 628 , 1 L.Ed. 2d 639, 646 (1957)).

1999Neither additional direct testimony nor cross-examination elicited an explanation why approximately 100 of the approximate 200 employees residing outside the City were not notified of the City’s intention to terminate their employment. 8 Ill The primary witness for the defense was Glenn Grant, the City’s Business Administrator. 9 Grant testified to the City’s efforts to enforce the residency ordinance following the decision in Trainor v. City of Newark, 145 N.J.Super. 466 , 368 A.2d 381 (App.Div.1976), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 255 , 377 A.2d 661 (1977).

1999Neither additional direct testimony nor cross-examination elicited an explanation why approximately 100 of the approximate 200 employees residing outside the City were not notified of the City’s intention to terminate their employment. 8 Ill The primary witness for the defense was Glenn Grant, the City’s Business Administrator. 9 Grant testified to the City’s efforts to enforce the residency ordinance following the decision in Trainor v. City of Newark, 145 N.J.Super. 466 , 368 A.2d 381 (App.Div.1976), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 255 , 377 A.2d 661 (1977).

1999Neither additional direct testimony nor cross-examination elicited an explanation why approximately 100 of the approximate 200 employees residing outside the City were not notified of the City’s intention to terminate their employment. 8 Ill The primary witness for the defense was Glenn Grant, the City’s Business Administrator. 9 Grant testified to the City’s efforts to enforce the residency ordinance following the decision in Trainor v. City of Newark, 145 N.J.Super. 466 , 368 A.2d 381 (App.Div.1976), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 255 , 377 A.2d 661 (1977).

1999Neither additional direct testimony nor cross-examination elicited an explanation why approximately 100 of the approximate 200 employees residing outside the City were not notified of the City’s intention to terminate their employment. 8 Ill The primary witness for the defense was Glenn Grant, the City’s Business Administrator. 9 Grant testified to the City’s efforts to enforce the residency ordinance following the decision in Trainor v. City of Newark, 145 N.J.Super. 466 , 368 A.2d 381 (App.Div.1976), certif. denied, 74 N.J. 255 , 377 A.2d 661 (1977).

1999Id. at 587 , 392 A. 2d 590 .

1999Id. at 587 , 392 A. 2d 590 .

1996Id. at 375 , 316 A. 2d 439 ; State v. Johnson, 223 N.J.

1994Super. 98,107 , 601 A.2d 223 (App.Div. 1991), the court observed that with knowledge of the true identity of a witness the defense could impeach the credibility of that witness in way other than simply the use of a criminal record, citing Evidence Rules 20 (regarding extrinsic evidence), 22 (regarding prior statements and character evidence), and 47 (regarding opinion or reputation testimony and character evidence).

1992It is this variation which serves as a contributing factor in the courts of Texas decisions to disallow offers of evidence concerning probation revocation in efforts to discredit a defendant who takes the stand. 3 See generally Hernandez v. State, 599 S. W.2d 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), which held it was error to permit impeachment of a witness with a violation of the terms of probation.