witness defense in Michigan

2023As this Court noted in Daoud v De Leau, 455 Mich 181, 202-203 ; 565 NW2d 639 (1997): Witness immunity is also grounded in the need of the judicial system for testimony from witnesses who, taking their oaths, are free of concern that they themselves will be targeted by the loser for further litigation.

2023As this Court noted in Daoud v De Leau, 455 Mich 181, 202-203 ; 565 NW2d 639 (1997): Witness immunity is also grounded in the need of the judicial system for testimony from witnesses who, taking their oaths, are free of concern that they themselves will be targeted by the loser for further litigation.

2023The privilege should be liberally construed so that participants in judicial proceedings are free to express themselves without fear of retaliation. * * * Witness immunity is also grounded in the need of the judicial system for testimony from witnesses who, taking their oaths, are free of concern that they themselves will be targeted by the loser for further limitation. [Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 134-135 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999) (cleaned up).] This Court has extended quasi-judicial immunity to some other participants in court proceedings.

2023The privilege should be liberally construed so that participants in judicial proceedings are free to express themselves without fear of retaliation. * * * Witness immunity is also grounded in the need of the judicial system for testimony from witnesses who, taking their oaths, are free of concern that they themselves will be targeted by the loser for further limitation. [Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 134-135 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999) (cleaned up).] This Court has extended quasi-judicial immunity to some other participants in court proceedings.

1979In People v Giacalone, 399 Mich 642, 645 ; 250 NW2d 492 (1977), the Court held that prejudice is presumed where a prosecutor calls a witness knowing that the witness will claim a valid privilege not to testify.

1979In People v Giacalone, 399 Mich 642, 645 ; 250 NW2d 492 (1977), the Court held that prejudice is presumed where a prosecutor calls a witness knowing that the witness will claim a valid privilege not to testify.

2020The trial court likened the case to Webb v Texas, 409 US 95 ; 93 S Ct 351 ; 34 L Ed 2d 330 (1972), finding that the prosecutor “occupied a position of immediate power over Hoskins regarding his testimony” and that the prosecutor’s threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that witness off the stand, and allowed [the prosecutor] to have the jury consider [Hoskins’s] preliminary exam testimony (where he implicated the defendants) without also exposing the jury to that witness’ proposed testimony that his previous statements implicating the defend

2020The trial court likened the case to Webb v Texas, 409 US 95 ; 93 S Ct 351 ; 34 L Ed 2d 330 (1972), finding that the prosecutor “occupied a position of immediate power over Hoskins regarding his testimony” and that the prosecutor’s threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that witness off the stand, and allowed [the prosecutor] to have the jury consider [Hoskins’s] preliminary exam testimony (where he implicated the defendants) without also exposing the jury to that witness’ proposed testimony that his previous statements implicating the defend

2018Nor does defendant provide what the unidentified witnesses’ testimonies would have been or how their testimonies would have established, or even assisted, a defense. 1 People v Barber, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 21, 2017 (Docket No. 337287). 2 Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 2004–6, Standard 4. -2- The “failure to call witnesses only constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398 ; 688 NW2d 308 (2004).

2018Nor does defendant provide what the unidentified witnesses’ testimonies would have been or how their testimonies would have established, or even assisted, a defense. 1 People v Barber, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 21, 2017 (Docket No. 337287). 2 Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order 2004–6, Standard 4. -2- The “failure to call witnesses only constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if it deprives the defendant of a substantial defense.” People v Dixon, 263 Mich App 393, 398 ; 688 NW2d 308 (2004).

2017The record is devoid of information regarding whether defense counsel consulted an expert on “memory recollection.” “The mere fact that such an expert was never called as a witness by the defense does not show that one was never consulted or retained.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 279 ; 893 NW2d 140 (2016).

2017The record is devoid of information regarding whether defense counsel consulted an expert on “memory recollection.” “The mere fact that such an expert was never called as a witness by the defense does not show that one was never consulted or retained.” People v Bass, 317 Mich App 241, 279 ; 893 NW2d 140 (2016).

2014See Musser, 494 Mich at 357-358 (noting that, “given ‘the reliability problems created by children’s suggestibility,’ ” this Court “has condemned opinions related to the truthfulness of alleged child-sexual-abuse 10 The trial court, for its part, did not address this evidence when rejecting the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; rather, the only finding it made as to defense counsel’s trial performance was a brief reference to the decision whether to call KD’s stepsister as a witness for the defense. 28 complainants” because the jury in such credibility contests “

2014See Musser, 494 Mich at 357-358 (noting that, “given ‘the reliability problems created by children’s suggestibility,’ ” this Court “has condemned opinions related to the truthfulness of alleged child-sexual-abuse 10 The trial court, for its part, did not address this evidence when rejecting the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; rather, the only finding it made as to defense counsel’s trial performance was a brief reference to the decision whether to call KD’s stepsister as a witness for the defense. 28 complainants” because the jury in such credibility contests “

2025Davis, 250 Mich App at 368 .

2024“A prosecutor ‘is the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’ ” People v Evans, 335 Mich App 76 , 89; 966 NW2d 402 (2020), quoting Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 ; 55 S Ct 629 ; 79 L Ed 1314 (1935).

2024“A prosecutor ‘is the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.’ ” People v Evans, 335 Mich App 76 , 89; 966 NW2d 402 (2020), quoting Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 ; 55 S Ct 629 ; 79 L Ed 1314 (1935).

2023Absent perjury of a character requiring action by the prosecuting attorney, the testimony of a witness is to be weighed by the factfinder in the matter at bar, not by a subsequent jury summoned to determine whether the first lawsuit was tainted[.] [Citations omitted.] As we recounted many years ago in Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260, 265 ; 725 NW2d 470 (2006), a decision affording quasi-judicial immunity to an attorney who made a statement in the context of a written settlement offer, the immunity for witnesses is expansive and should be “liberally construed so that participants in judici

2023Absent perjury of a character requiring action by the prosecuting attorney, the testimony of a witness is to be weighed by the factfinder in the matter at bar, not by a subsequent jury summoned to determine whether the first lawsuit was tainted[.] [Citations omitted.] As we recounted many years ago in Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260, 265 ; 725 NW2d 470 (2006), a decision affording quasi-judicial immunity to an attorney who made a statement in the context of a written settlement offer, the immunity for witnesses is expansive and should be “liberally construed so that participants in judici

2023Absent perjury of a character requiring action by the prosecuting attorney, the testimony of a witness is to be weighed by the factfinder in the matter at bar, not by a subsequent jury summoned to determine whether the first lawsuit was tainted[.] [Citations omitted.] As we recounted many years ago in Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260, 265 ; 725 NW2d 470 (2006), a decision affording quasi-judicial immunity to an attorney who made a statement in the context of a written settlement offer, the immunity for witnesses is expansive and should be “liberally construed so that participants in judici

2023Absent perjury of a character requiring action by the prosecuting attorney, the testimony of a witness is to be weighed by the factfinder in the matter at bar, not by a subsequent jury summoned to determine whether the first lawsuit was tainted[.] [Citations omitted.] As we recounted many years ago in Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260, 265 ; 725 NW2d 470 (2006), a decision affording quasi-judicial immunity to an attorney who made a statement in the context of a written settlement offer, the immunity for witnesses is expansive and should be “liberally construed so that participants in judici

2023Absent perjury of a character requiring action by the prosecuting attorney, the testimony of a witness is to be weighed by the factfinder in the matter at bar, not by a subsequent jury summoned to determine whether the first lawsuit was tainted[.] [Citations omitted.] As we recounted many years ago in Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260, 265 ; 725 NW2d 470 (2006), a decision affording quasi-judicial immunity to an attorney who made a statement in the context of a written settlement offer, the immunity for witnesses is expansive and should be “liberally construed so that participants in judici

2023Absent perjury of a character requiring action by the prosecuting attorney, the testimony of a witness is to be weighed by the factfinder in the matter at bar, not by a subsequent jury summoned to determine whether the first lawsuit was tainted[.] [Citations omitted.] As we recounted many years ago in Oesterle v Wallace, 272 Mich App 260, 265 ; 725 NW2d 470 (2006), a decision affording quasi-judicial immunity to an attorney who made a statement in the context of a written settlement offer, the immunity for witnesses is expansive and should be “liberally construed so that participants in judici

2020Accordingly, [the] defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when defense counsel did not move for the exclusion of Juror No. 119 from the jury. [Dunigan, 299 Mich App at 586-587 .] In the present case, the trial court noted that RS had been sleeping through parts of trial before Sherrod, the only witness for the defense, started testifying.

2019Id.

2019See Boyes-Bogie v. Horvitz , 14 Mass.L.Rptr. 208 , 2001 WL 1771989 (Mass. Super., 2001) (holding that witness immunity did not bar an action *817 against a friendly expert who was negligent in valuing a marital asset); Marrogi v. Howard , 805 So.2d 1118 , 1131, 2001-1106 (La 1/15/02) (holding, in a case in which the friendly expert made numerous errors in estimating the plaintiff's billings and in which summary judgment was granted on the basis of the expert's deposition testimony, that "claims in connection with a retained expert's alleged failure to provide competent litigation support servi

2019See Boyes-Bogie v. Horvitz , 14 Mass.L.Rptr. 208 , 2001 WL 1771989 (Mass. Super., 2001) (holding that witness immunity did not bar an action *817 against a friendly expert who was negligent in valuing a marital asset); Marrogi v. Howard , 805 So.2d 1118 , 1131, 2001-1106 (La 1/15/02) (holding, in a case in which the friendly expert made numerous errors in estimating the plaintiff's billings and in which summary judgment was granted on the basis of the expert's deposition testimony, that "claims in connection with a retained expert's alleged failure to provide competent litigation support servi

2019See Boyes-Bogie v. Horvitz , 14 Mass.L.Rptr. 208 , 2001 WL 1771989 (Mass. Super., 2001) (holding that witness immunity did not bar an action *817 against a friendly expert who was negligent in valuing a marital asset); Marrogi v. Howard , 805 So.2d 1118 , 1131, 2001-1106 (La 1/15/02) (holding, in a case in which the friendly expert made numerous errors in estimating the plaintiff's billings and in which summary judgment was granted on the basis of the expert's deposition testimony, that "claims in connection with a retained expert's alleged failure to provide competent litigation support servi

2019See Boyes-Bogie v. Horvitz , 14 Mass.L.Rptr. 208 , 2001 WL 1771989 (Mass. Super., 2001) (holding that witness immunity did not bar an action *817 against a friendly expert who was negligent in valuing a marital asset); Marrogi v. Howard , 805 So.2d 1118 , 1131, 2001-1106 (La 1/15/02) (holding, in a case in which the friendly expert made numerous errors in estimating the plaintiff's billings and in which summary judgment was granted on the basis of the expert's deposition testimony, that "claims in connection with a retained expert's alleged failure to provide competent litigation support servi

2018The trial court then instructed the witness to truthfully answer the questions from the attorneys, and the witness agreed that she would do so. -6- unpreserved and reviewed for plain error.6 See Jackson, 292 Mich App at 592 , and People v Nash, 244 Mich App 93, 96-97 ; 625 NW2d 87 (2000).

2018The trial court then instructed the witness to truthfully answer the questions from the attorneys, and the witness agreed that she would do so. -6- unpreserved and reviewed for plain error.6 See Jackson, 292 Mich App at 592 , and People v Nash, 244 Mich App 93, 96-97 ; 625 NW2d 87 (2000).

2018The trial court then instructed the witness to truthfully answer the questions from the attorneys, and the witness agreed that she would do so. -6- unpreserved and reviewed for plain error.6 See Jackson, 292 Mich App at 592 , and People v Nash, 244 Mich App 93, 96-97 ; 625 NW2d 87 (2000).

2018I, § 6, cl 1.] This Court first incorporated principles governing the federal clause in Prelesnik v. Esquina , 132 Mich. App. 341 , 347, 347 N.W.2d 226 (1984). 5 Courser's contention that he was not a witness at the hearing is without merit.

2018I, § 6, cl 1.] This Court first incorporated principles governing the federal clause in Prelesnik v. Esquina , 132 Mich. App. 341 , 347, 347 N.W.2d 226 (1984). 5 Courser's contention that he was not a witness at the hearing is without merit.

2008Dragovic, the Oakland County medical examiner, was a witness for the prosecution. 4 See Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749 , 780 n 46; 685 NW2d 391 (2004). 5 Dr. Carl Schmidt, the Wayne County chief medical examiner, was a witness for the defense. 6 Dr. Igor Paul, a professor of biomechanical engineering, was a witness for the defense. 7 Of course, it is possible that defendant did not intentionally push the victim from the deck, but that the victim nonetheless lost her balance and fell during a scuffle with defendant.

2008Dragovic, the Oakland County medical examiner, was a witness for the prosecution. 4 See Gilbert v DaimlerChrysler Corp, 470 Mich 749 , 780 n 46; 685 NW2d 391 (2004). 5 Dr. Carl Schmidt, the Wayne County chief medical examiner, was a witness for the defense. 6 Dr. Igor Paul, a professor of biomechanical engineering, was a witness for the defense. 7 Of course, it is possible that defendant did not intentionally push the victim from the deck, but that the victim nonetheless lost her balance and fell during a scuffle with defendant.

2002People v Schmidt, 183 Mich App 817, 832 ; 455 NW2d 430 (1990). *27 E Rodriguez next argues that the admission of the hearsay statement of codefendant Porter that Rodriguez was “the biggest drug dealer in Oakland County” violated defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, because Porter, who did not testify, was not subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.

2002People v Schmidt, 183 Mich App 817, 832 ; 455 NW2d 430 (1990). *27 E Rodriguez next argues that the admission of the hearsay statement of codefendant Porter that Rodriguez was “the biggest drug dealer in Oakland County” violated defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, because Porter, who did not testify, was not subject to cross-examination concerning the statement.

1999For example, in Starr the defendant was the main witness for the defense, id. at 493 , 577 N.W.2d 673 , while here defendant did not testify. [17] Id. at 500 , 577 N.W.2d 673 . [18] Id. at 501 , 577 N.W.2d 673 : These were legitimate, material, and contested grounds on which to offer the evidence because, in this case, defendant entered a general denial.

1999For example, in Starr the defendant was the main witness for the defense, id. at 493 , 577 N.W.2d 673 , while here defendant did not testify. [17] Id. at 500 , 577 N.W.2d 673 . [18] Id. at 501 , 577 N.W.2d 673 : These were legitimate, material, and contested grounds on which to offer the evidence because, in this case, defendant entered a general denial.

1998In short, as far as I can determine, Commonwealth v DuVal, 453 Pa 205; 307 A2d 229 (1973), is the only court of last resort to hold that the prosecutor commits error calling a witness who has no privilege to refuse to testify.

1998In short, as far as I can determine, Commonwealth v. DuVal, 453 Pa. 205 , 307 A.2d 229 (1973), is the only court of last resort to hold that the prosecutor commits error calling a witness who has no privilege to refuse to testify.