12 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1875–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2017State v. Brown, 321 A.2d 478, 483 (Me. 1974) ("A party seeking to question a witness may not claim that the court prevented relevant questioning or intimidated witnesses into silence by virtue of the fact that the court advised such witnesses of their constitutional rights."). 1990The procedure for granting transactional immunity is as follows: [i]n any criminal proceeding before a court or grand jury ... if a person refuses to answer questions or produce evidence of any kind on the ground that he may be incriminated thereby, and if the prosecuting attorney, in writing, and with the written approval of the Attorney General, requests the court to order that person to answer the questions or produce the evidence and the court after notice to the witness and hearing shall so order, unless it finds to do so would be clearly contrary to the public interest, that person shall | 1 | 2 |
State of Maine v. Abdirahmon A. Abdullahigreen2 sentences2025Schlosser’s defense that the drugs he possessed were for personal use only.” Noting that his case had been pending for almost one year and that he had repeatedly requested a speedy trial, Schlosser also challenges the court’s offered remedy of a continuance, arguing, “Requiring that Schlosser give up his trial date . . . because the State chose to wait until the home stretch of the case to decide that it needed an expert would be fundamentally unfair, and [it would] undermine Schlosser’s speedy trial rights.” 17 [¶31] Here, the court astutely identified two relevant issues: first, it can be di 2025Schlosser’s defense that the drugs he possessed were for personal use only.” Noting that his case had been pending for almost one year and that he had repeatedly requested a speedy trial, Schlosser also challenges the court’s offered remedy of a continuance, arguing, “Requiring that Schlosser give up his trial date . . . because the State chose to wait until the home stretch of the case to decide that it needed an expert would be fundamentally unfair, and [it would] undermine Schlosser’s speedy trial rights.” 17 [¶31] Here, the court astutely identified two relevant issues: first, it can be di | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pickeringgreen1 sentence2022We disagree. [¶27] “[T]he sequestration of witnesses is wholly discretionary.” State v. Pickering, 491 A.2d 560, 563 (Me. 1985) (explaining that the main goal is to prevent a witness from hearing testimony “so as to be able to conform his own testimony to that given by the other” (quotation marks omitted)); see M.R. | 1 | 1 |
Picard v. Brennangreen2 sentences2018Counts I, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XII, IXX [sic], XX, and XXV against Justice Walker are also barred by judicial immunity pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 811 l(l)(B) and by the witness privilege provided by Dunbar, thus his Motion to Dismiss as to 25 This in itself is problematic because a "defendant is . .. entitled to know precisely what statement is attributed to him , .. . [and] the words must be proved strictly as alleged." Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 835 (Me. 1973) (citations and quotations omitted). 2018Counts I, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XII, IXX [sic], XX, and XXV against Justice Walker are also barred by judicial immunity pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 811 l(l)(B) and by the witness privilege provided by Dunbar, thus his Motion to Dismiss as to 25 This in itself is problematic because a "defendant is . .. entitled to know precisely what statement is attributed to him , .. . [and] the words must be proved strictly as alleged." Picard v. Brennan, 307 A.2d 833, 835 (Me. 1973) (citations and quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Perkinsgreen1 sentence1978See State v. Perkins, supra. We do not reach the issue, whether there was abuse of discretion in the trial Justice’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, because the defendant-appellant failed to lay the foundation for a ruling by the Court below and for a decision by this Court. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State of Maine v. Matthew A. Dennis
green
1 sentence2025Schlosser’s defense that the drugs he possessed were for personal use only.” Noting that his case had been pending for almost one year and that he had repeatedly requested a speedy trial, Schlosser also challenges the court’s offered remedy of a continuance, arguing, “Requiring that Schlosser give up his trial date . . . because the State chose to wait until the home stretch of the case to decide that it needed an expert would be fundamentally unfair, and [it would] undermine Schlosser’s speedy trial rights.” 17 [¶31] Here, the court astutely identified two relevant issues: first, it can be di | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Silva
green
2 sentences2025Schlosser’s defense that the drugs he possessed were for personal use only.” Noting that his case had been pending for almost one year and that he had repeatedly requested a speedy trial, Schlosser also challenges the court’s offered remedy of a continuance, arguing, “Requiring that Schlosser give up his trial date . . . because the State chose to wait until the home stretch of the case to decide that it needed an expert would be fundamentally unfair, and [it would] undermine Schlosser’s speedy trial rights.” 17 [¶31] Here, the court astutely identified two relevant issues: first, it can be di 2025Schlosser’s defense that the drugs he possessed were for personal use only.” Noting that his case had been pending for almost one year and that he had repeatedly requested a speedy trial, Schlosser also challenges the court’s offered remedy of a continuance, arguing, “Requiring that Schlosser give up his trial date . . . because the State chose to wait until the home stretch of the case to decide that it needed an expert would be fundamentally unfair, and [it would] undermine Schlosser’s speedy trial rights.” 17 [¶31] Here, the court astutely identified two relevant issues: first, it can be di | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Smith v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2025Cf. Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 . 802-03 (2024) (“A State may not introduce the testimonial out-of-court statements of a forensic analyst at trial, unless she is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior chance to cross-examine her. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Eaton
green
1 sentence1974State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489 (1974); State v. Eaton, Me., 309 A.2d 334 (1974); State v. Norton, 151 Me. 178 , 116 A.2d 635 (1955); State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218 , 100 A.2d 234 (1953). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Norton
green
2 sentences1974State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489 (1974); State v. Eaton, Me., 309 A.2d 334 (1974); State v. Norton, 151 Me. 178 , 116 A.2d 635 (1955); State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218 , 100 A.2d 234 (1953). 1974State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489 (1974); State v. Eaton, Me., 309 A.2d 334 (1974); State v. Norton, 151 Me. 178 , 116 A.2d 635 (1955); State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218 , 100 A.2d 234 (1953). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Northup
green
1 sentence1974State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489 (1974); State v. Eaton, Me., 309 A.2d 334 (1974); State v. Norton, 151 Me. 178 , 116 A.2d 635 (1955); State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218 , 100 A.2d 234 (1953). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
State v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences1974State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489 (1974); State v. Eaton, Me., 309 A.2d 334 (1974); State v. Norton, 151 Me. 178 , 116 A.2d 635 (1955); State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218 , 100 A.2d 234 (1953). 1974State v. Northup, Me., 318 A.2d 489 (1974); State v. Eaton, Me., 309 A.2d 334 (1974); State v. Norton, 151 Me. 178 , 116 A.2d 635 (1955); State v. Hamilton, 149 Me. 218 , 100 A.2d 234 (1953). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Jennings v. Rooney
green
1 sentence1963“How far the cross-examination of a witness may be deemed helpful and relevant to the issue being tried, as well as to what extent the accuracy, veracity or credibility of witnesses may be tested, must be left largely to the sound discretion of the presiding judge, and is not open to revision, unless it is shown that such discretion has been exercised in a way that results in the prejudice of a party to the cause by reason either of too narrow restriction or too great breadth of inquiry.----” Jennings v. Rooney, 183 Mass. 577, 579 . *482 “ ‘It is a well established rule, that the evidence offe | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Whitehead
green
1 sentence1963The circumstances thus placed in requisition the exercise of a sound discretion by the presiding Justice. “----How far or how long counsel may proceed with a witness to test memory or to show lack of veracity, bias, prejudice, etc., is a matter of the court’s discretion - - - -" State v. Whitehead, 151 Me. 135, 141 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Kingsbury
green
2 sentences1961In State v. Kingsbury, 58 Me. 238 , at page 242, the Court said: "The government may propose to contradict a witness in defense, and may call testimony for that purpose. 1961In State v. Kingsbury, 58 Me. 238, at 242 , the court said: “The government may propose to contradict a witness in defense, and may call testimony for that purpose. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Miller v. West
green
1 sentence1956Ayers v. Russell, 3 N. Y., Supp. 338; Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 151 and Miller v. West, 165 Md. 245 (dictum), were decided upon the issue of ordinary or reasonable care of the physician without cognizance of the witness privilege. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Williams v. LeBar
neutral
1 sentence1956Ayers v. Russell, 3 N. Y., Supp. 338; Williams v. LeBar, 141 Pa. 149 , 151 and Miller v. West, 165 Md. 245 (dictum), were decided upon the issue of ordinary or reasonable care of the physician without cognizance of the witness privilege. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Hegan v. Eighth Avenue Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1875Hence the case cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error (Lohman v. The People, 1 N. Y., 380 ,) does not apply in this case. | 1 | 1875–1875 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.