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19 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1952–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gordon v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2021Comm’n, 23 Ariz. App. 457, 459 (1975) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of a subpoena is to obtain the presence of a witness at the hearing,” adding that “[o]nce that witness is present, barring any sort of privilege, generally, either party may call him to testify”); Garcia v. Indus. 2021Comm’n, 23 Ariz. App. 457, 459 (1975) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of a subpoena is to obtain the presence of a witness at the hearing,” adding that “[o]nce that witness is present, barring any sort of privilege, generally, either party may call him to testify”); Garcia v. Indus. | 2 | 2 |
Garcia v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2021Comm’n, 20 Ariz. App. 243, 246 (1973) (“[T]here is nothing to prevent a party from presenting witnesses who are willing to appear and testify without being subpoenaed.”). 2021Comm’n, 20 Ariz. App. 243, 246 (1973) (“[T]here is nothing to prevent a party from presenting witnesses who are willing to appear and testify without being subpoenaed.”). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Superior Court, Pima Countygreen2 sentences1988The purpose of immunity statutes is to assist prosecutors in apprehending criminals “by inducing them or their confederates to turn state’s evidence and tell on each other or to place at the disposal of the prosecuting attorney evidence which constitutional provisions granting a witness the privilege of refusing to testify against himself make unavailable.” Smith v. Superior Court, Pima County, 17 Ariz.App. 79, 81 , 495 P.2d 519, 521 (1972). 1988The purpose of immunity statutes is to assist prosecutors in apprehending criminals “by inducing them or their confederates to turn state’s evidence and tell on each other or to place at the disposal of the prosecuting attorney evidence which constitutional provisions granting a witness the privilege of refusing to testify against himself make unavailable.” Smith v. Superior Court, Pima County, 17 Ariz.App. 79, 81 , 495 P.2d 519, 521 (1972). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Rienhardtgreen2 sentences2016Gonzalez was sentenced to five years in prison for conspiracy to commit possession of dangerous drugs for sale (with 194 days of presentence incarceration credit) and a concurrent year for criminal trespass (with 293 days of presentence incarceration credit). ¶4 We have jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).2 1 We view the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” State v. R 2016Gonzalez was sentenced to five years in prison for conspiracy to commit possession of dangerous drugs for sale (with 194 days of presentence incarceration credit) and a concurrent year for criminal trespass (with 293 days of presentence incarceration credit). ¶4 We have jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).2 1 We view the facts “in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, and resolve all reasonable inferences against the defendant.” State v. R | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vaughngreen2 sentences2014See State v. Vaughn, 217 Ariz. 518 , 519 n.2, ¶ 2, 176 P.3d 716 , 717 n.2 (App. 2008). 2 STATE v. SPINELLI Decision of the Court the State entered into evidence a signed “Review and Acknowledge Directive” that instructed Spinelli to enroll in domestic violence counseling. 2014See State v. Vaughn, 217 Ariz. 518 , 519 n.2, ¶ 2, 176 P.3d 716 , 717 n.2 (App. 2008). 2 STATE v. SPINELLI Decision of the Court the State entered into evidence a signed “Review and Acknowledge Directive” that instructed Spinelli to enroll in domestic violence counseling. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Velazquezgreen2 sentences2008Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 311, ¶ 47 , 166 P.3d at 102 . ¶ 29 “The state’s refusal to grant a particular witness immunity does not violate a defendant’s right to due process absent ... a showing that the witness would present clearly exculpatory evidence and that the state has no strong interest in withholding immunity.” State v. Doody, 187 Ariz. 363, 376 , 930 P.2d 440, 453 (App.1996). 2008Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 311, ¶ 47 , 166 P.3d at 102 . ¶ 29 “The state’s refusal to grant a particular witness immunity does not violate a defendant’s right to due process absent ... a showing that the witness would present clearly exculpatory evidence and that the state has no strong interest in withholding immunity.” State v. Doody, 187 Ariz. 363, 376 , 930 P.2d 440, 453 (App.1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Doodygreen2 sentences2008Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 311, ¶ 47 , 166 P.3d at 102 . ¶ 29 “The state’s refusal to grant a particular witness immunity does not violate a defendant’s right to due process absent ... a showing that the witness would present clearly exculpatory evidence and that the state has no strong interest in withholding immunity.” State v. Doody, 187 Ariz. 363, 376 , 930 P.2d 440, 453 (App.1996). 2008Velazquez, 216 Ariz. at 311, ¶ 47 , 166 P.3d at 102 . ¶ 29 “The state’s refusal to grant a particular witness immunity does not violate a defendant’s right to due process absent ... a showing that the witness would present clearly exculpatory evidence and that the state has no strong interest in withholding immunity.” State v. Doody, 187 Ariz. 363, 376 , 930 P.2d 440, 453 (App.1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Axleygreen2 sentences1996State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 388 , 646 P.2d 268, 273 (1982). 1996State v. Axley, 132 Ariz. 383, 388 , 646 P.2d 268, 273 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wieseler v. Prins
green
2 sentences1991Wieseler v. Prins, 167 Ariz. 223 , 805 P.2d 1044 (App. 1990). 1991Wieseler v. Prins, 167 Ariz. 223 , 805 P.2d 1044 (App. 1990). | 2 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Blair William Guthrie
green
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Green Acres Trust v. London
green
2 sentences1985Since a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate only if plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any facts susceptible of proof under the claims stated, and dismissal based on the doctrine of witness privilege is appropriate only if ‘the facts establishing the occasion for the privilege appear in the pleadings,’ Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 613 , 688 P.2d 617 (1984), the Appellees’ reliance on outside facts is improper. 1985Since a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate only if plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any facts susceptible of proof under the claims stated, and dismissal based on the doctrine of witness privilege is appropriate only if ‘the facts establishing the occasion for the privilege appear in the pleadings,’ Green Acres Trust v. London, 141 Ariz. 609, 613 , 688 P.2d 617 (1984), the Appellees’ reliance on outside facts is improper. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Gallegos
green
2 sentences1979In State v. Gallegos, 99 Ariz. 168 , 407 P.2d 752 (1965), the response of a witness to defense counsel’s question clearly implicated defendant as a marijuana peddler. 1979In State v. Gallegos, 99 Ariz. 168 , 407 P.2d 752 (1965), the response of a witness to defense counsel’s question clearly implicated defendant as a marijuana peddler. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Gortarez
green
2 sentences1979There, we discussed the problem of inadmissible but responsive testimony elicited by defense counsel: In State v. Gortarez, 96 Ariz. 206 , 393 P.2d 670 , we held that where otherwise inadmissible testimony was given and was called for by the question of defense counsel, it would not be considered as reversible error even if prejudicial. . 1979There, we discussed the problem of inadmissible but responsive testimony elicited by defense counsel: In State v. Gortarez, 96 Ariz. 206 , 393 P.2d 670 , we held that where otherwise inadmissible testimony was given and was called for by the question of defense counsel, it would not be considered as reversible error even if prejudicial. . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
California v. Green
red
2 sentences1979It is provided in 17 A.R.S., Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 19.3.c(l)(i), that prior testimony is admissible if the party against whom the former testimony is offered was given “the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he now has * * The Supreme Court, in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) suggested that a witness’ preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible had the witness been unavailable at trial because, among other reasons, counsel had every opportunity to cross-examine 1979It is provided in 17 A.R.S., Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 19.3.c(l)(i), that prior testimony is admissible if the party against whom the former testimony is offered was given “the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he now has * * The Supreme Court, in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) suggested that a witness’ preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible had the witness been unavailable at trial because, among other reasons, counsel had every opportunity to cross-examine | 1 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Rincon-Pineda
green
2 sentences1976Zeisel, supra, table 41, p. 143.) The likelihood of the trial turning on a credibility contest between the accused and his accuser was as great in a case of non-sexual assault as in a case of rape. * * * And it was the defendant in a narcotics case rather than a rape case who was most likely to appear as the only witness for the defense.” [footnote omitted] People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.3d at 879 , 123 Cal.Rptr. at 129-31 , 538 P.2d at 257-59 . 1976Zeisel, supra, table 41, p. 143.) The likelihood of the trial turning on a credibility contest between the accused and his accuser was as great in a case of non-sexual assault as in a case of rape. * * * And it was the defendant in a narcotics case rather than a rape case who was most likely to appear as the only witness for the defense.” [footnote omitted] People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.3d at 879 , 123 Cal.Rptr. at 129-31 , 538 P.2d at 257-59 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
United States v. Maloney
green
1 sentence1976We believe the following statement in Maloney, supra, applies here: “It is further premature because there would still be a question of the propriety of calling the United States Attorney as a witness for the defense. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Melton v. Slonsky
green
2 sentences1973Thereafter, in Melton v. Slonsky, 19 Ariz.App. 65 , 504 P.2d 1288 (1973), we refused to extend this absolute privilege defense so as to include a witness in a hearing before the Arizona State Liquor Board, but we did hold that such a witness was entitled to assert a qualified privilege defense. 1973Thereafter, in Melton v. Slonsky, 19 Ariz.App. 65 , 504 P.2d 1288 (1973), we refused to extend this absolute privilege defense so as to include a witness in a hearing before the Arizona State Liquor Board, but we did hold that such a witness was entitled to assert a qualified privilege defense. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Robert J. Fletcher v. United States
green
2 sentences1966In Fletcher v. United States, 1964, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 137 , 332 F.2d 724 , a conviction, was reversed .because the prosecutor put a witness on the stand, knowing that the witness would claim;his privilege against self-incrimination, and proceeded to ask a series of questions which the witness declined to answer. 1966In Fletcher v. United States, 1964, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 137 , 332 F.2d 724 , a conviction, was reversed .because the prosecutor put a witness on the stand, knowing that the witness would claim;his privilege against self-incrimination, and proceeded to ask a series of questions which the witness declined to answer. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Heike v. United States
green
2 sentences1952That Congress did not intend, or by the statutes in issue provide, that, in addition, the witness must claim his privilege, seems clear. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.) In construing the same statute Justice Holmes in Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 , 33 S.Ct. 226, 228 , 57 L.Ed. 450 said: “ * * * When the statute speaks of testimony concerning a matter it means concerning it in a substantial way, just as the constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law. 1952That Congress did not intend, or by the statutes in issue provide, that, in addition, the witness must claim his privilege, seems clear. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied.) In construing the same statute Justice Holmes in Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 , 33 S.Ct. 226, 228 , 57 L.Ed. 450 said: “ * * * When the statute speaks of testimony concerning a matter it means concerning it in a substantial way, just as the constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.