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8 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1912–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Henry Clay Westgreen1 sentence2025A participating prosecutor should not be called as a witness “unless all other sources of possible testimony have been exhausted.” United States v. West, 680 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding that the prosecutor should not have been permitted to testify where there was no showing that no other individuals were available to testify). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Leigh Raymond Tamuragreen1 sentence2025Because of this unique role in the administration of justice, calling the managing prosecutor in a case as a witness for the defense - 12 - in that same case has been “universally condemned” by the federal courts and is “permitted only if required by a compelling need.” United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring “extraordinary circumstances” and a “compelling and legitimate” need for the prosecutor’s testimony).7 When other witnesses are available, there is not a “compelling need.” United States v. Ro | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Walter Bryan Robersongreen1 sentence2025Because of this unique role in the administration of justice, calling the managing prosecutor in a case as a witness for the defense - 12 - in that same case has been “universally condemned” by the federal courts and is “permitted only if required by a compelling need.” United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring “extraordinary circumstances” and a “compelling and legitimate” need for the prosecutor’s testimony).7 When other witnesses are available, there is not a “compelling need.” United States v. Ro | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wilson Torresgreen1 sentence2025A participating prosecutor should not be called as a witness “unless all other sources of possible testimony have been exhausted.” United States v. West, 680 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Torres, 503 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974) (concluding that the prosecutor should not have been permitted to testify where there was no showing that no other individuals were available to testify). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Harvey Birdman, United States of America v. William Richmangreen1 sentence2025Because of this unique role in the administration of justice, calling the managing prosecutor in a case as a witness for the defense - 12 - in that same case has been “universally condemned” by the federal courts and is “permitted only if required by a compelling need.” United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1982); see United States v. Birdman, 602 F.2d 547, 552-53 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring “extraordinary circumstances” and a “compelling and legitimate” need for the prosecutor’s testimony).7 When other witnesses are available, there is not a “compelling need.” United States v. Ro | 1 | 1 |
Bullion Hollow Enterprises, Inc. v. Lanegreen1 sentence2023Bullion Hollow Enters. v. Lane, 14 Va. App. 725, 729 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Proffittgreen1 sentence2019The appellate court must “examin[e] the excluded evidence in light of the entire record.” Commonwealth v. Proffitt, 292 Va. 626, 642 (2016). -9- Previous Acts of Violence / Reputation Evidence1 At trial, Sheryah Phillips, the victim’s sister, was also called as a witness for the defense. | 1 | 1 |
Elder v. Hollandgreen2 sentences2011Although we have discussed absolute privilege in the judicial context on numerous occasions, see, e.g., Lindeman, 268 Va. at 538 , 604 S.E.2d at 58-59 (declining to extend absolute privilege to mere potential litigation); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 22 , 155 S.E.2d 369, 374-75 (1967) (holding that a communication made by a witness at a hearing before the Superintendent of the State Police was not entitled to an absolute privilege because the safeguards that surround a judicial proceeding were not present), we have never done so in the legislative context. 2011Although we have discussed absolute privilege in the judicial context on numerous occasions, see, e.g., Lindeman, 268 Va. at 538 , 604 S.E.2d at 58-59 (declining to extend absolute privilege to mere potential litigation); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 22 , 155 S.E.2d 369, 374-75 (1967) (holding that a communication made by a witness at a hearing before the Superintendent of the State Police was not entitled to an absolute privilege because the safeguards that surround a judicial proceeding were not present), we have never done so in the legislative context. | 1 | 1 |
Lindeman v. Lesnickgreen2 sentences2011Although we have discussed absolute privilege in the judicial context on numerous occasions, see, e.g., Lindeman, 268 Va. at 538 , 604 S.E.2d at 58-59 (declining to extend absolute privilege to mere potential litigation); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 22 , 155 S.E.2d 369, 374-75 (1967) (holding that a communication made by a witness at a hearing before the Superintendent of the State Police was not entitled to an absolute privilege because the safeguards that surround a judicial proceeding were not present), we have never done so in the legislative context. 2011Although we have discussed absolute privilege in the judicial context on numerous occasions, see, e.g., Lindeman, 268 Va. at 538 , 604 S.E.2d at 58-59 (declining to extend absolute privilege to mere potential litigation); Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 22 , 155 S.E.2d 369, 374-75 (1967) (holding that a communication made by a witness at a hearing before the Superintendent of the State Police was not entitled to an absolute privilege because the safeguards that surround a judicial proceeding were not present), we have never done so in the legislative context. | 1 | 1 |
Griffett v. Ryangreen1 sentence2009Griffett v. Ryan, 247 Va. 465, 473 (1994) (“The article that is used during cross-examination, not the author, must be recognized by the witness as standard and authoritative in the field.”). | 1 | 1 |
Garner v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1987Cf. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657-658 (1911). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kastigar v. United States
green
2 sentences1993Kastigar Hearing The question for decision in Kastigar was “whether the [prosecution] may compel testimony from an unwilling witness, who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, by conferring on the witness immunity from use of the compelled testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings, as well as immunity from use of evidence derived from the testimony.” 406 U.S. at 442 . 1993The witness in Kastigar contended that “the scope of immunity provided by the federal witness immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 , is not coextensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, and therefore is not sufficient to supplant the privilege and compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.” 406 U.S. at 448 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counselman v. Hitchcock
green
2 sentences1912Ed. 652 , 26 Sup. Ct. 370, which construes Art. 5 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which is, in effect, identical with the provision in the Virginia Bill of Rights, it was held that “The right of a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination, afforded by U. S. Const., 5th Amend., when examined concerning an alleged violation of the anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, is taken away by the proviso to the act of February 25, 1903, that no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or th 1912Ed. 652 , 26 Sup. Ct. 370, which construes Art. 5 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which is, in effect, identical with the provision in the Virginia Bill of Rights, it was held that “The right of a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination, afforded by U. S. Const., 5th Amend., when examined concerning an alleged violation of the anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, is taken away by the proviso to the act of February 25, 1903, that no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or th | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.