witness defense in Florida

2026Reynolds Tobacco Co., 388 So. 3d 930 , 931 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“[The] standard of review on a trial court’s 78 evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)); see also Walerowicz v. Armand-Hosang, 248 So. 3d 140, 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“Admission or exclusion of the testimony of a witness in violation of a trial preparation order is within the trial court’s discretion.” (citing Binger, 401 So. 2d at 1313-14 )).

2026Along with prejudice to the opposing party (defined as that involving “surprise in fact”), the three additional factors set forth in Binger when analyzing exclusion of testimonial evidence are: (i) the objecting party’s ability to cure the prejudice or, similarly, his independent knowledge of the existence of the witness; (ii) the calling party’s possible intentional, or bad faith, noncompliance with the pretrial order; and (iii) the possible disruption of the orderly and efficient trial of the case (or other cases). 401 So. 2d at 1314 .

2019See id. at 1020-21 .

2019See id. at 1020-21 .

2018See Lewis v. State , 979 So.2d 1197 , 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ("A trial court has the same ability [as the jury] to determine the believability of a witness.

2018See Lewis v. State, 979 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ("A trial court has the same ability [as the jury] to determine the believability of a witness.

2018See Wall v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 857 So.2d 975 , 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (concluding reversal was required because of remarks by defense counsel regarding why the plaintiffs failed to call their daughter as a witness when defense counsel knew the daughter was estranged); see also Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co. , 778 So.2d 443 , 443-44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

2018See Wall v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 857 So.2d 975 , 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (concluding reversal was required because of remarks by defense counsel regarding why the plaintiffs failed to call their daughter as a witness when defense counsel knew the daughter was estranged); see also Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co. , 778 So.2d 443 , 443-44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

2018See Wall v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 857 So.2d 975 , 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (concluding reversal was required because of remarks by defense counsel regarding why the plaintiffs failed to call their daughter as a witness when defense counsel knew the daughter was estranged); see also Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co. , 778 So.2d 443 , 443-44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

2018See Wall v. Costco Wholesale Corp. , 857 So.2d 975 , 976 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (concluding reversal was required because of remarks by defense counsel regarding why the plaintiffs failed to call their daughter as a witness when defense counsel knew the daughter was estranged); see also Johnnides v. Amoco Oil Co. , 778 So.2d 443 , 443-44 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

2015Section 90.615(1) provides that a court “may call witnesses whom all parties may cross-examine.” The court witness rule was designed for those instances "where a party cannot vouch for the witness’s credibility, yet the witness’s evidence is so important that the interest of justice demands an evidentiary vehicle to have the person testify.” Shere v. State, 579 So.2d 86, 92 (Fla. 1991).

1999See Shere, 579 So.2d at 94 .

2012See United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir.1973) ("Obviously, before excluding a witness, the court must first establish reliably that the witness will claim the privilege and the extent and validity of the claim.”).

1983Faver v. State , at 50 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir.1973)).

2010See id.; State v. Jones, 642 So.2d 804, 805 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

2010See id.; State v. Jones, 642 So.2d 804, 805 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).

2007See Lamarca v. State, 931 So.2d 838, 849 (Fla.2006) (denying ineffective assistance claim for failing to call a witness when defense counsel believed that the testimony would have been incriminating to the defense); Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 428 (Fla.2002) (denying ineffective assistance claim for failing to call witnesses when defense counsel reasonably feared the witnesses would implicate the defendant in the crime).

2006See Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 427-29 (Fla.2002) (denying ineffective assistance claim for failing to call a witness when defense counsel reasonably feared the witness would implicate the defendant in the crime).

1999See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).

1994See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).

2011In Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 , 93 S.Ct. 351 , 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972), the United States Supreme Court found that a trial judge’s threatening remarks directed at a single witness for the defense “effectively drove that witness off the stand, and thus deprived the petitioner of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.” We find cases from other jurisdictions to be persuasive.

2011In Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98 , 93 S.Ct. 351 , 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972), the United States Supreme Court found that a trial judge’s threatening remarks directed at a single witness for the defense “effectively drove that witness off the stand, and thus deprived the petitioner of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.” We find cases from other jurisdictions to be persuasive.

2002Dudley, 405 So.2d at 305-06 ; see also, Robinson v. State, 589 So.2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Aget v. State, 448 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

1991See also Aget v. State, 448 So.2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

1988State v. Jackson, 436 So.2d 985, 986 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); see State v. Adderly, 411 So.2d 981 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Knight v. State, 373 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 385 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1980); see also State v. Mesa, 395 So.2d 242, 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).

1985The problem arises when the state refuses to grant immunity and the defendant claims either (1) the prosecutor is conducting the case in an improper manner by unreasonably refusing to grant the witness immunity in an attempt to distort the fact finding process of the trial; [1] or (2) the witness has relevant exculpatory testimony not available without the grant of immunity due to the witness's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [2] Although the problem of the judiciary's role in the granting of use immunity has been presented to the federal courts on numero

1986The distinction between the two types of immunity was clearly stated in State v. Harris, 425 So.2d 118, 119 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982): "The former [use immunity] simply forbids the testimony given under the immunity grant to be used against the witness in any criminal prosecution of him; the latter [transactional immunity] provides the witness with immunity from prosecution for the matter concerning which his testimony was elicited." Transactional immunity "`not only immunize(s) the witness for any use of his testimony or the fruits thereof in a subsequent trial but it ... also provide(s) absolute im

1985The problem arises when the state refuses to grant immunity and the defendant claims either (1) the prosecutor is conducting the case in an improper manner by unreasonably refusing to grant the witness immunity in an attempt to distort the fact finding process of the trial; [1] or (2) the witness has relevant exculpatory testimony not available without the grant of immunity due to the witness's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. [2] Although the problem of the judiciary's role in the granting of use immunity has been presented to the federal courts on numero

2026Reynolds Tobacco Co., 388 So. 3d 930 , 931 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024) (“[The] standard of review on a trial court’s 78 evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)); see also Walerowicz v. Armand-Hosang, 248 So. 3d 140, 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (“Admission or exclusion of the testimony of a witness in violation of a trial preparation order is within the trial court’s discretion.” (citing Binger, 401 So. 2d at 1313-14 )).

2024See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (“To suggest that failure to cross-examine [a witness at a preliminary hearing] constitutes a waiver of the right of confrontation at a subsequent trial hardly comports with this Court’s definition of a waiver[.]”).

2024Hosps., Inc., 955 So. 2d 1 , 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), reh’g granted id. at 6.

2024Hosps., Inc., 955 So. 2d 1 , 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), reh’g granted id. at 6.

2020As we have stated, “it is the objection/re-objection process . . . that is the decisive element in a juror-objection-preservation analysis.” Matarranz v. State, 133 So. 3d 473, 482 (Fla. 2013).

2018Sharif v. State, 589 So. 2d 960, 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (“The identity of rebuttal witnesses is not excepted from the state’s discovery obligation prescribed in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(b).”).

2017The court should grant the defendant’s motion to continue to secure the presence of a witness if the defense demonstrates: “(1) prior due diligence to obtain the witness’ presence; (2) that substantially favorable testimony would be forthcoming; (3) that the witness was available and willing to testify; and (4) that the denial of the continuance would cause material prejudice.” T.J.M. v. State, 925 So.2d 440, 440 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (citing Jenkins, 872 So.2d at 388 ).

2015See, e.g,, United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 1986) (“The urinalysis laboratory reports bear substantial indicia of reliability.

2014See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 470-72 , 120 S.Ct. 1579 , 146 L.Ed.2d 530 (2000) (holding that an individual sought to be held liable for attorney’s fees after the original plaintiff had been ordered to pay the fees has “the right to contest on the merits his personal liability for” such an award, even when the individual was the president and sole shareholder of the plaintiff, was the “effective controller” of the litigation, and personally appeared as a witness at a hearing).

2014See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 470-72 , 120 S.Ct. 1579 , 146 L.Ed.2d 530 (2000) (holding that an individual sought to be held liable for attorney’s fees after the original plaintiff had been ordered to pay the fees has “the right to contest on the merits his personal liability for” such an award, even when the individual was the president and sole shareholder of the plaintiff, was the “effective controller” of the litigation, and personally appeared as a witness at a hearing).