79 Ohio opinions name it 4 courts 1905–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Popegreen2 sentences2025Even if Thompson had invoked the plain-error doctrine, the assignment of error is without merit. {¶92} “Operability of a firearm may be established by an operability report or testimony of a witness who had test-fired the weapon, but it also may be established by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Pope, 2019-Ohio-3599, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). “[E]vidence that a gun was loaded combined with the submission of that gun into evidence is sufficient to prove operability.” State v. Allah, 2015-Ohio-5060, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Dickerson, 2015-Ohio-938 , ¶ 36 (11th Dist.). 2022Hamilton No. C-180587, 2019-Ohio-3599 , ¶ 7 (“Operability of a firearm may be established by an operability report or testimony of a witness who had test-fired the weapon, but it also may be established by circumstantial evidence.”). {¶53} The State may establish that a firearm was operable “by the testimony of lay witnesses who were in a position to observe the instrument and the circumstances surrounding the crime.” In re C.M., 3d Dist. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Waddyred2 sentences2023State v. Waddy, 63 Ohio St.3d 424, 434 , 588 N.E.2d 819 (1992), superseded by state constitutional amendment on other grounds. 1999Appellant cites State v. Waddy (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 424 , where the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of such an order is to prevent a witness from hearing other witnesses, which would allow them to "tailor their own testimony accordingly." Appellant maintains that in violating the separation order, Cibor was able to tailor her own testimony accordingly and, therefore, should not have been able to testify. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Bradleygreen2 sentences2006State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144 , 538 N.E.2d 373 . {¶ 81} Moreover, counsel were not ineffective in stipulating that Dr. Bergman “would be qualified as an expert and she would testify in accordance with her report.” The state would have likely called Dr. Bergman as a witness if the defense had not agreed to stipulate. 2006State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d at 144 , 538 N.E.2d 373 . {¶ 81} Moreover, counsel were not ineffective in stipulating that Dr. Bergman “would be qualified as an expert and she would testify in accordance with her report.” The state would have likely called Dr. Bergman as a witness if the defense had not agreed to stipulate. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Motzgreen1 sentence2025See Motz, 2020-Ohio-4356, at ¶ 22 (12th Dist.) (the defendant’s rights to due process were not violated where the defendant had the opportunity to confront the witness and challenge the basis for his termination from the treatment program). {¶31} Rogers’ second assignment of error is without merit. {¶32} In her third assignment of error, Rogers contends she was denied treatment for her kidney stone condition and, thus, she was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. {¶33} The United States Supreme Court has held “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes | 1 | 1 |
Estelle v. Gamblegreen1 sentence2025See Motz, 2020-Ohio-4356, at ¶ 22 (12th Dist.) (the defendant’s rights to due process were not violated where the defendant had the opportunity to confront the witness and challenge the basis for his termination from the treatment program). {¶31} Rogers’ second assignment of error is without merit. {¶32} In her third assignment of error, Rogers contends she was denied treatment for her kidney stone condition and, thus, she was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. {¶33} The United States Supreme Court has held “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes | 1 | 1 |
State v. Allahgreen1 sentence2025Even if Thompson had invoked the plain-error doctrine, the assignment of error is without merit. {¶92} “Operability of a firearm may be established by an operability report or testimony of a witness who had test-fired the weapon, but it also may be established by circumstantial evidence.” State v. Pope, 2019-Ohio-3599, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). “[E]vidence that a gun was loaded combined with the submission of that gun into evidence is sufficient to prove operability.” State v. Allah, 2015-Ohio-5060, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Dickerson, 2015-Ohio-938 , ¶ 36 (11th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Gregg v. Georgiagreen1 sentence2025See Motz, 2020-Ohio-4356, at ¶ 22 (12th Dist.) (the defendant’s rights to due process were not violated where the defendant had the opportunity to confront the witness and challenge the basis for his termination from the treatment program). {¶31} Rogers’ second assignment of error is without merit. {¶32} In her third assignment of error, Rogers contends she was denied treatment for her kidney stone condition and, thus, she was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. {¶33} The United States Supreme Court has held “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes | 1 | 1 |
In re L.S.green1 sentence2025See In re L.S., 2018-Ohio-4758, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.) (“Constitutional issues apparent at the time of the trial are waived unless brought to the attention of the trial court.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. DeWittgreen1 sentence2025“Furthermore, the court has held that the preferred sanction for a separation order violation ‘is simply to allow the transgression to reflect upon the witness’s credibility.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting State v. DeWitt, 2010-Ohio-4777, ¶ 62 (7th Dist.). {¶39} Susan has not demonstrated that Dr. Williams’s testimony materially prejudiced her, or that the trial court abused its discretion by not excluding his testimony. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Blankenshipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Knappgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Lakewood v. Papadelisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Trocodarogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vinci v. Ceraologreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Granito
green
2 sentences2020Dinsio at 466 , citing Commonwealth v. Granito, 326 Mass. 494, 499 , 95 N.E.2d 539 (Mass. 1950), (“The possibility that a witness may claim the privilege does not prohibit the prosecutor from asking questions.”). 2020Dinsio at 466 , citing Commonwealth v. Granito, 326 Mass. 494, 499 , 95 N.E.2d 539 (Mass. 1950), (“The possibility that a witness may claim the privilege does not prohibit the prosecutor from asking questions.”). | 4 | 1964–2020 |
State v. Jenks
red
2 sentences2020State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). {¶27} Appellant was convicted of intimidation of a witness in violation of R.C. 2921.04(A), which provides: (A) No person shall knowingly attempt to intimidate or hinder the victim of a crime or delinquent act in the filing or prosecution of criminal charges or a delinquent child action or proceeding, and no person shall knowingly attempt to intimidate a witness to a criminal or delinquent act by reason of the person being a witness to that act. {¶28} Subsection (B) of R.C. 2921.04, which Appellant was 2020State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259 , 574 N.E.2d 492 , paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). {¶27} Appellant was convicted of intimidation of a witness in violation of R.C. 2921.04(A), which provides: (A) No person shall knowingly attempt to intimidate or hinder the victim of a crime or delinquent act in the filing or prosecution of criminal charges or a delinquent child action or proceeding, and no person shall knowingly attempt to intimidate a witness to a criminal or delinquent act by reason of the person being a witness to that act. {¶28} Subsection (B) of R.C. 2921.04, which Appellant was | 3 | 2013–2020 |
Willitzer v. McCloud
green
2 sentences2000On March 24, 1999, appellee DiDomenico filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that he was protected from civil liability under the doctrine of witness immunity in Willitzer v. McCloud (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 447 , 453 N.E.2d 693 at the syllabus. 2000On March 24, 1999, appellee DiDomenico filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that he was protected from civil liability under the doctrine of witness immunity in Willitzer v. McCloud (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 447 , 453 N.E.2d 693 at the syllabus. | 3 | 2000–2013 |
State v. Malone
green
2 sentences2012"The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307 . {¶7} Appellant was convicted of intimidation of a witness in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B) which stated the following in effect at the time of the offense: {¶8} "No person, knowingly and by force or by unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, shall attempt to influence, intim 2011The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” Thompkins at 387 , quoting State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 , 20 OBR 215, 485 N.E.2d 717 . {¶ 19} Davis was convicted of intimidation of a witness in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B), which states: “No person, knowingly and by force or by unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder the victim of a crime in the filing or prosecution of criminal charges or an attorney or wi | 3 | 2011–2012 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2017THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S LINE OF QUESTIONING REGARDING PATROLMAN JONES' EMPLOYMENT STATUS.” I. {¶11} In the first assignment of error, Appellant maintains his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call Amanda Richter, Appellant's wife and the passenger in the vehicle, as a witness for the defense to corroborate his claim he did not perform field sobriety tests. {¶12} The standard for reviewing claims for ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L. 2017THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED HARMFUL ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S LINE OF QUESTIONING REGARDING PATROLMAN JONES' EMPLOYMENT STATUS.” I. {¶11} In the first assignment of error, Appellant maintains his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call Amanda Richter, Appellant's wife and the passenger in the vehicle, as a witness for the defense to corroborate his claim he did not perform field sobriety tests. {¶12} The standard for reviewing claims for ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L. | 2 | 2005–2017 |
State v. Biehl, Unpublished Decision (12-8-2004)
green
2 sentences2014Summit No. 22054, 2004-Ohio-6532, ¶ 14 . 4 {¶8} Officer Kolek was the sole witness at the hearing. 2014Summit No. 22054, 2004-Ohio-6532, ¶ 14 . 4 {¶8} Officer Kolek was the sole witness at the hearing. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
City of Columbus v. Coopee
green
2 sentences2013“Dinsio does not preclude questioning which may elicit the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, but merely repeated questioning where reassertion of the privilege is assured.” (Emphasis sic.) Columbus v. Cooper, 49 Ohio St.3d 42, 45 , 550 N.E.2d 937 (1990). {¶25} Anderson relies on federal precedents for the proposition that reversible error may occur where, “based upon a concept of prosecutorial misconduct, * * * the Government makes a conscious and flagrant attempt to build its case out of inferences arising from use of the testimonial privilege,” or “inferences from a witness’ refusa 2007We disagree with appellant. {¶ 9} In State v. Dinsio (1964), 176 Ohio St. 460 , 200 N.E.2d 467 , at the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court wrote: "In a criminal case, where a claim of a witness that he can not be compelled to testify as a witness because of the privilege of immunity from self-incrimination is properly established, it is error prejudicial to the defendant for the court to permit counsel for the state, by continued questioning of the witness, which questions go unanswered, to get before the jury innuendoes and inferences of facts, conditions and circumstances which the state could | 2 | 2007–2013 |
Arizona v. Youngblood
green
1 sentence2026Diallo asserted six claims for postconviction relief, three of which are relevant to the present appeal: (1) the state concealed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the state destroyed the concealed evidence in bad faith, violating Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); and (3) the state knowingly elicited false testimony from a trial witness in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and No. 25AP-616 5 State v. Iacona, 2001-Ohio-1292 .1 Specifically, he asserted that there had been a third Blink camera at the back of his house and t | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Napue v. Illinois
green
1 sentence2026Diallo asserted six claims for postconviction relief, three of which are relevant to the present appeal: (1) the state concealed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the state destroyed the concealed evidence in bad faith, violating Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); and (3) the state knowingly elicited false testimony from a trial witness in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and No. 25AP-616 5 State v. Iacona, 2001-Ohio-1292 .1 Specifically, he asserted that there had been a third Blink camera at the back of his house and t | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
1 sentence2026Diallo asserted six claims for postconviction relief, three of which are relevant to the present appeal: (1) the state concealed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the state destroyed the concealed evidence in bad faith, violating Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); and (3) the state knowingly elicited false testimony from a trial witness in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and No. 25AP-616 5 State v. Iacona, 2001-Ohio-1292 .1 Specifically, he asserted that there had been a third Blink camera at the back of his house and t | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Iacona
green
1 sentence2026Diallo asserted six claims for postconviction relief, three of which are relevant to the present appeal: (1) the state concealed exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the state destroyed the concealed evidence in bad faith, violating Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988); and (3) the state knowingly elicited false testimony from a trial witness in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and No. 25AP-616 5 State v. Iacona, 2001-Ohio-1292 .1 Specifically, he asserted that there had been a third Blink camera at the back of his house and t | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Maurer
green
2 sentences2025“In the context of excluding a witness for a violation of a separation order, we must find whether the witness’s exclusion prejudiced the defendant.” Id., citing Smith at 142 . 2025“In the context of excluding a witness for a violation of a separation order, we must find whether the witness’s exclusion prejudiced the defendant.” Id., citing Smith at 142 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2023Smith, 49 Ohio St.3d at 142 , 551 N.E.2d 190 ; State v. Nichols, 4th Dist. 2023Smith, 49 Ohio St.3d at 142 , 551 N.E.2d 190 ; State v. Nichols, 4th Dist. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In re C.M.
neutral
2 sentences2022Allen No. 1-21-31, 2022-Ohio-240 , ¶ 40, quoting Murphy at syllabus. -31- Case No. 8-21-35 This may include, for example, testimony that a gunshot was heard or that shell casings or bullet holes were found. 2022Allen No. 1-21-31, 2022-Ohio-240 , ¶ 40, quoting Murphy at syllabus. -31- Case No. 8-21-35 This may include, for example, testimony that a gunshot was heard or that shell casings or bullet holes were found. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2022State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493 , 2003-Ohio-4396 , 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 107 , citing Strickland at 687 . {¶ 10} Marshall first claims trial counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to object, seek a limiting instruction, or move for a mistrial when a witness for the defense testified that Marshall had been incarcerated for a time in Texas. 2022State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493 , 2003-Ohio-4396 , 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 107 , citing Strickland at 687 . {¶ 10} Marshall first claims trial counsel was ineffective when counsel failed to object, seek a limiting instruction, or move for a mistrial when a witness for the defense testified that Marshall had been incarcerated for a time in Texas. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Lortz, 23762 (6-25-2008)
green
1 sentence2021Summit No. 23762, 2008-Ohio-3108, ¶ 34 . {¶34} According to Mr. Runk, he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his wife should have been called to testify as a witness for the defense. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Thompkins
red
2 sentences2019R.C. 2923.11(B)(2); Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 678 N.E.2d 541 , at paragraph one of the syllabus, construing and applying R.C. 2923.11(B)(1) and (2). 2019R.C. 2923.11(B)(2); Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 678 N.E.2d 541 , at paragraph one of the syllabus, construing and applying R.C. 2923.11(B)(1) and (2). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Columbus v. Horton
neutral
1 sentence2019Franklin No. 13AP-966, 2014-Ohio-4584, ¶ 13 . {¶24} Raybould was operating his vehicle in Portage County, Ohio at approximately two in the morning on a Saturday when he was pulled over by Lee. {¶25} Lee was the only witness at the hearing. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Burger v. Buck, 2008-P-0041 (11-21-2008)
neutral
1 sentence2017Portage No. 2008-P-0041, 2008-Ohio-6061 , 2008 WL 4964670 ,fn. 2, citing 2001 H.B. 279, section 3. 8 Thus, the language in Sigg relied upon by the Baers is consistent with not only the current execution requirements of R.C. 5301.01(A), but is also consistent with the clear legislative intent not to invalidate recordable instruments and transactions pertaining to real property that fail to comply with the witness requirement in former R.C. 5301.01. {¶ 40} The Baers also cite to several cases which they claim support their contention that the lease is a valid contract *1167 between the parties, | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Williams
neutral
1 sentence2017Summit No. 25879, 2011-Ohio-6141, ¶ 15 , citing R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). {¶5} In his petition, Mr. Russell alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not calling an officer as a witness at the hearing on his motion to suppress. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Adams (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Birt
green
1 sentence2016We initially note that Ward’s reliance upon Birt was misplaced; Birt was charged with intimidating a witness in violation of R.C. 2921.04(B), and the version thereof in effect at the time proscribed in part intimidation of a witness “ ‘involved in a criminal action or proceeding.’ ” Birt, 2013-Ohio-1379, at ¶ 18 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Lytle green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Clayton green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Bridgeman green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Boston green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Beavers neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Namet v. United States green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Noling green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Dixon, Ca2007-01-012 (10-1-2007) green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Issa green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Noling green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Musgrove v. Musgrove green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Heard v. Sharp green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Jackson v. Virginia red | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Otte green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Otte green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Colorado v. Spring green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.