witness claim in Maryland

1991“It has long been held that, under most circumstances, it is improper for a prosecutor to require a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury when ... the prosecutor knows or has reason to anticipate that the witness will assert the privilege in front of the jury.” Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 174 , 567 A.2d 118 (1989), citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 , 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305 , 206 A.2d 250 (1965); Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878 (D.

1991“It has long been held that, under most circumstances, it is improper for a prosecutor to require a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury when ... the prosecutor knows or has reason to anticipate that the witness will assert the privilege in front of the jury.” Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 174 , 567 A.2d 118 (1989), citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 , 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305 , 206 A.2d 250 (1965); Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878 (D.

1980The Supreme Court reversed Webb’s conviction holding that "the judge’s threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that witness off the stand, and thus deprived the petitioner of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 409 U.S. at 98 .

1980The Supreme Court reversed Webb’s conviction holding that "the judge’s threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that witness off the stand, and thus deprived the petitioner of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 409 U.S. at 98 .

1998In Odyniec, 322 Md. 520 , 588 A.2d 786 , this Court held that the witness privilege extended to statements made by a physician while medically examining the claimant in a personal injury action.

1998In Odyniec, 322 Md. 520 , 588 A.2d 786 , this Court held that the witness privilege extended to statements made by a physician while medically examining the claimant in a personal injury action.

1991“It has long been held that, under most circumstances, it is improper for a prosecutor to require a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury when ... the prosecutor knows or has reason to anticipate that the witness will assert the privilege in front of the jury.” Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 174 , 567 A.2d 118 (1989), citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 , 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305 , 206 A.2d 250 (1965); Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878 (D.

1989Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 , 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305 , 206 A.2d 250 (1965); Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878 (D.C.App.1977); People v. Giacalone, 399 Mich. 642 , 250 N.W.2d 492 (1977).

1991“It has long been held that, under most circumstances, it is improper for a prosecutor to require a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury when ... the prosecutor knows or has reason to anticipate that the witness will assert the privilege in front of the jury.” Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 174 , 567 A.2d 118 (1989), citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 , 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305 , 206 A.2d 250 (1965); Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878 (D.

1989Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 , 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305 , 206 A.2d 250 (1965); Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878 (D.C.App.1977); People v. Giacalone, 399 Mich. 642 , 250 N.W.2d 492 (1977).

1987The trial judge must constantly be alert to make certain that the probative value of the inquiry outweighs its potential prejudice to the witness and that the inquiry does not stem primarily from a desire to harass or embarrass the witness. *503 298 Md. at 180 , 468 A.2d 319 .

1987The trial judge must constantly be alert to make certain that the probative value of the inquiry outweighs its potential prejudice to the witness and that the inquiry does not stem primarily from a desire to harass or embarrass the witness. *503 298 Md. at 180 , 468 A.2d 319 .

1991“It has long been held that, under most circumstances, it is improper for a prosecutor to require a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury when ... the prosecutor knows or has reason to anticipate that the witness will assert the privilege in front of the jury.” Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 174 , 567 A.2d 118 (1989), citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 , 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305 , 206 A.2d 250 (1965); Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878 (D.

1991“It has long been held that, under most circumstances, it is improper for a prosecutor to require a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury when ... the prosecutor knows or has reason to anticipate that the witness will assert the privilege in front of the jury.” Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 174 , 567 A.2d 118 (1989), citing Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179 , 83 S.Ct. 1151 , 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963); Vandegrift v. State, 237 Md. 305 , 206 A.2d 250 (1965); Busby v. State, 412 So.2d 837 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Burkley v. United States, 373 A.2d 878 (D.

1969As to the first question, the Court said: “* * * Every person is presumed to know the law; hence, [Comes], once he got before the grand jury whether by subpoena or otherwise, presumptively knew that he was subject to contempt proceedings and imprisonment, if he refused to answer questions relative to the bribery laws.” 237 Md. at 278 , and quoted Sullivan v. Sullivan, 234 Md. 67 , 197 A. 2d 910 (1964): “Acquiescence to or assent to what one cannot prevent does not amount to a voluntary agreement thereto.” at 73.

1968The Court concluded its opinion in State v. Comes, supra, by saying, p, 282: “In making this ruling, we are not to be understood as intimating that no witness, who appears before a grand jury and testifies, may not do so ‘voluntarily’.

2020The Second Circuit approvingly quoted jury instructions, which borrowed most of the following language from Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437, 443 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964): “[W]hile a witness violates no law by claiming the . . . privilege against self-incrimination [before] a grand jury, one who bribes, threatens, [or] coerces a witness to claim it or advises with corrupt motive a witness to take it, can and does obstruct or influence the administration of justice.” Cioffi, 493 F.2d at 1119 .

2020In Cioffi, id., the Second Circuit concluded that there was “ample evidence that the [defendant] endeavored to influence the” borrower.

2020The Second Circuit approvingly quoted jury instructions, which borrowed most of the following language from Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437, 443 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964): “[W]hile a witness violates no law by claiming the . . . privilege against self-incrimination [before] a grand jury, one who bribes, threatens, [or] coerces a witness to claim it or advises with corrupt motive a witness to take it, can and does obstruct or influence the administration of justice.” Cioffi, 493 F.2d at 1119 .

2018On direct, Brown reaffirmed the truth of the statements she had made at the time of her naturalization, elaborating that she had "never taught or advocated the overthrow of the existing government or belonged to any organization that did so advocate ...." Id. at 150 , 78 S.Ct. 622 .

2018On direct, Brown reaffirmed the truth of the statements she had made at the time of her naturalization, elaborating that she had "never taught or advocated the overthrow of the existing government or belonged to any organization that did so advocate ...." Id. at 150 , 78 S.Ct. 622 .

2017Dawson, 503 U.S. at 164 , 112 S.Ct. 1093 .

2015For example, in Divver , the Court of Appeals found that a delay of 12 months and 16 days for a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol was “of uniquely inordinate length for a relatively run-of-the-mill District Court case” that “presented little, if any, complexity” because the sole witness for the State was a police officer and the sole witness for the defense was the accused. 356 Md. at 390-391 , 739 A.2d 71 .

2015For example, in Divver , the Court of Appeals found that a delay of 12 months and 16 days for a charge of driving under the influence of alcohol was “of uniquely inordinate length for a relatively run-of-the-mill District Court case” that “presented little, if any, complexity” because the sole witness for the State was a police officer and the sole witness for the defense was the accused. 356 Md. at 390-391 , 739 A.2d 71 .

2015In contrast, in Glover , the Court found that a delay of 14 months “was not an inordinate delay for a murder case involving complex DNA evidence.” 368 Md. at 224 , 792 A.2d 1160 .

2015In contrast, in Glover , the Court found that a delay of 14 months “was not an inordinate delay for a murder case involving complex DNA evidence.” 368 Md. at 224 , 792 A.2d 1160 .

2012Id. at 506 , 490 A.2d 286 .

2012Id. at 506 , 490 A.2d 286 .

2010Id. [7] On October 12, 2010, the Court of Appeals is scheduled to hear argument on another case involving the scope of voir dire.

2010Id. .

2005Id. at 247 , 528 A.2d 1271 .

2005Id. at 247 , 528 A.2d 1271 .

2004Because a witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment gives rise to “a natural, indeed almost inevitable, inference ... as to what would have been his answer if he had not refused,” a prosecutor who knows in advance that the witness will claim the privilege “is charged with notice of the probable effect [of that claim] on the jury’s mind.” Id.

2004Because a witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment gives rise to "a natural, indeed almost inevitable, inference ... as to what would have been his answer if he had not refused," a prosecutor who knows in advance that the witness will claim the privilege "is charged with notice of the probable effect [of that claim] on the jury's mind." Id.

2001This is of no help to Gray, as the issue of witness immunity has not been raised on appeal. *513 Also unavailing to Gray are People v. Thomas, supra, 51 N.Y.2d 466 , 434 N.Y.S.2d 941 , 415 N.E.2d 931 , and two additional New York cases that he cites.

2001This is of no help to Gray, as the issue of witness immunity has not been raised on appeal. *513 Also unavailing to Gray are People v. Thomas, supra, 51 N.Y.2d 466 , 434 N.Y.S.2d 941 , 415 N.E.2d 931 , and two additional New York cases that he cites.

2000Id. (footnotes omitted).

2000Id. (footnotes omitted).

2000Although the proposed test in this case, to be sure, was not as extreme as the one attempted in Soles v. State, 16 Md.App. 656, 671 , 299 A.2d 502 (1973), our observations in affirming the decision of the trial judge not to permit such a test in that case are equally pertinent here: To thwart in-court identification, the appellant attempted a bold gambit less out of the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy than out of Dumas’s Corsican Brothers or Dickens’s Tale of Two Cities.

2000Although the proposed test in this case, to be sure, was not as extreme as the one attempted in Soles v. State, 16 Md.App. 656, 671 , 299 A.2d 502 (1973), our observations in affirming the decision of the trial judge not to permit such a test in that case are equally pertinent here: To thwart in-court identification, the appellant attempted a bold gambit less out of the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy than out of Dumas’s Corsican Brothers or Dickens’s Tale of Two Cities.

1999On reconsideration, the California court added, as a caveat to its per se rule excluding the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness, that "when it is the defendant himself—not merely a defense witness—who submits to pretrial hypnosis, the experience will not render his testimony inadmissible if he elects to take the stand," noting, presciently, that the exception was to "avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused to testify in his own behalf." 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 723 P.2d at 1384 . [9] Judge Chasanow, in dissent, argues that a Collins rule should not apply when the witness is a

1999On reconsideration, the California court added, as a caveat to its per se rule excluding the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness, that "when it is the defendant himself—not merely a defense witness—who submits to pretrial hypnosis, the experience will not render his testimony inadmissible if he elects to take the stand," noting, presciently, that the exception was to "avoid impairing the fundamental right of an accused to testify in his own behalf." 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 723 P.2d at 1384 . [9] Judge Chasanow, in dissent, argues that a Collins rule should not apply when the witness is a