witness defense in Hawaii

2020In Iosefa, the court held that a witness for the defense should have been allowed to testify that the defendant, who was charged with sexually assaulting a 16-year-old girl, was "a peaceful, non-violent person." Id. at 186, 880 P.2d at 1233 .

2017A Court May Not Restrict a Defendant in Deciding Whether and When to Testify Caselaw of this jurisdiction and of the United States Supreme Court makes clear that a defendant and defense counsel “may not be restricted in deciding whether, and when in the course of presenting his [or her] defense, the accused should take the stand.” Brooks, 406 U.S. at 613 , 92 S.Ct. 1891 .

2014For example, in State v. Diaz, 100 Hawai'i 210 , 58 P.3d 1257 (2002), the defendant sought to call a witness for the defense’s ease-in-ehief who then exercised her constitutional right not to testify pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. 100 Hawai'i at 216 , 58 P.3d at 1263 .

2014For example, in State v. Diaz, 100 Hawai'i 210 , 58 P.3d 1257 (2002), the defendant sought to call a witness for the defense’s ease-in-ehief who then exercised her constitutional right not to testify pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. 100 Hawai'i at 216 , 58 P.3d at 1263 .

2008We are mindful that, under Hawaii Rules of Evidence Rule 611(a), a trial court has discretion in its "reasonable control over the mode and *534 order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” "This discretion is not unlimited, however, and must be balanced against the rights of the parties....” Doe v. Doe, 98 Hawai'i 144 , 155 n. 12, 44 P.3d 1085 , 1096 n. 12 (2002); Addison M.

2008We are mindful that, under Hawaii Rules of Evidence Rule 611(a), a trial court has discretion in its "reasonable control over the mode and *534 order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” "This discretion is not unlimited, however, and must be balanced against the rights of the parties....” Doe v. Doe, 98 Hawai'i 144 , 155 n. 12, 44 P.3d 1085 , 1096 n. 12 (2002); Addison M.

2005In the context of the witness exception adoption, this court said: It is undisputed that the Smiths did not witness the accident nor were they "timely present at the immediate scene of the accident." [ Crabtree v. State Farm Ins., 632 So.2d 736 , 745 n. 19 (La.1994)].

2005In the context of the witness exception adoption, this court said: It is undisputed that the Smiths did not witness the accident nor were they “timely present at the immediate scene of the accident.” [Crabtree v. State Farm Ins., 632 So.2d 736 , 745 n. 19 (La.1994) ].

1980Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra. In Counselman where a witness immunity statute was first examined by the United States Supreme Court, a law merely prohibiting the use of compelled testimony in subsequent criminal prosecutions was deemed an inadequate substitute for the privilege, the Court stating in part: We are clearly of opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States, Section 860 of the Revised Statutes do

1980That transactional immunity was the required minimum for immunity grants was unquestioned and often reaffirmed by the Supreme Court from Brown v. Walker to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and its companion case, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, supra. In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), for example, Justice Frankfurter in recounting the history of witness immunity in the Supreme Court said: Brown v. Walker was the second case to deal with an immunity statute.

1980That transactional immunity was the required minimum for immunity grants was unquestioned and often reaffirmed by the Supreme Court from Brown v. Walker to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and its companion case, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, supra. In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), for example, Justice Frankfurter in recounting the history of witness immunity in the Supreme Court said: Brown v. Walker was the second case to deal with an immunity statute.

1980That transactional immunity was the required minimum for immunity grants was unquestioned and often reaffirmed by the Supreme Court from Brown v. Walker to Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and its companion case, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, supra. In Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), for example, Justice Frankfurter in recounting the history of witness immunity in the Supreme Court said: Brown v. Walker was the second case to deal with an immunity statute.

1953Since the privilege was not claimed by the defendant, the overruling of the objection was not error.” Finally, our own court has ruled on this question in the case of Republic of Hawaii v. Parsons, 10 Hawaii 601 , where it holds that though the court itself frequently advises the witness of his privilege, there is no rule of law that requires the court to apprise the witness of his right not to give self-incriminating evidence and it is not error for the court to fail to do so.

1953In one of the more recent cases, Blau v. United States, 340 U. S. 159 , one paragraph of the syllabus is as follows: “It is immaterial whether answers to the questions asked would have been sufficient standing alone to support a conviction when they would have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution of the witness for violation of (or conspiracy to violate) the Smith Act.” In sustaining a witness’s refusal to answer a question as to whether she knew the officers of the communist party of Colorado or had ever had possession or custody of any of the books or records of

1953Prior decisions of this Court have clearly established that under such circumstances, the Constitution gives a witness the privilege of remaining silent.” Again, in the recent case of Hoffman v. United States, 341 U. S. 479 , in sustaining a witness’s right to refuse to answer questions, the court quotes the Blau case, supra, that the privilege against self incrimination extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a conviction, but to those that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.

1953State v. Kent, 5 N. D. 516 , 67 N. W. 1052 , 35 L.

1953State v. Kent, 5 N. D. 516 , 67 N. W. 1052 , 35 L.