saving clause in Illinois

1978(Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Guthrie, 192 Ill. 579 ; Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148 ; Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill. 291 .) This statute embodies no saving clause as to exiting litigation.

1966The court stated that statutes will not be construed so as to give them a retroactive effect unless a legislative intent to the contrary clearly appears, and that when a change in law merely affects the remedy or law of procedure all rights of action will be enforceable under the new procedure without regard as to whether they accrued before or after such change of law unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation. [Citing Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill 591, 114 NE2d 686 ; Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill 291, 83 NE2d 714 .] The court further held that there was no saving

1978(Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Guthrie, 192 Ill. 579 ; Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148 ; Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill. 291 .) This statute embodies no saving clause as to exiting litigation.

1920This court has repeatedly held that the law is well settled that there can be no vested right in any particular 'remedy, method or procedure, and “that while the general rule is that statutes will not be so construed as to give them a retrospective operation unless it clearly appears that such was the legislative intention, still, when the change merely affects the remedy or the law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforcible under the 'new procedure, without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change in the law, and without regard to whether suit had been instituted

1989App. 3d 975, 977 , 510 N.E.2d 1, 2 .) However, when this legislative amendment affects only a remedy or procedure “all rights of actions will be enforceable under the new procedure without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change of law and without regard to whether the suit has been instituted or not, unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation.” Nelson v. Miller (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 378, 382 , 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 ; see also Ogdon v. Gianakos (1953), 415 Ill. 591, 597 , 114 N.E.2d 686, 690 .

1989App. 3d 975, 977 , 510 N.E.2d 1, 2 .) However, when this legislative amendment affects only a remedy or procedure “all rights of actions will be enforceable under the new procedure without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change of law and without regard to whether the suit has been instituted or not, unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation.” Nelson v. Miller (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 378, 382 , 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 ; see also Ogdon v. Gianakos (1953), 415 Ill. 591, 597 , 114 N.E.2d 686, 690 .

1986The Martin opinion further explained that, as set forth in Hogan v. Bleeker (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 181, 187 , 193 N.E.2d 844 ; even changes in procedure or remedy are to be applied only retrospectively when a constitutionally protected vested right is involved.

1980(Hogan v. Bleeker (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 181 .) However, in the absence of a saving clause, an amendatory act may be retroactively applied where the legislature so intended and where the statute affects the remedy or matters of procedure.

1950(People v. Clark, supra; Fairfield v. People, 94 Ill. 244 .) The legislature has the undoubted right to repeal all legislative acts which are not in the nature of a private grant, (citing cases.) The unconditional repeal of a special remedial statute without a saving clause stops all pending actions where the repeal finds them.

1950A retrospective statute affecting vested rights is very generally considered in this country as founded on unconstitutional principles and consequently inoperative and void; but this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes of a retrospective nature not impairing contracts or disturbing absolute vested rights. ( People v. Clark, supra ; Fairfield v. People, 94 Ill. 244 .) The legislature has the undoubted right to repeal all legislative acts which are not in the nature of a private grant. (citing cases.) The unconditional repeal of a special remedial statute without a saving cl

1936If final relief has not been granted before the repeal went into effect, it cannot be after.’ (South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 433 .) ‘If a case is appealed, and pending the appeal the law is changed, the Appellate Court must dispose of the case under the law in force when their decision is rendered.’ (Cooley’s Const. Lim. — 2d ed. — 381, and note.) The effect of the repeal of a statute is to obliterate the statute repealed as completely as if it had never been passed, and it must be considered as a law that never existed, except for the purposes of those actions or suits which were comm

1918(Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9 .) In South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 433 , the court said (p. 438) : “It is well settled that if a statute giving a special remedy is repealed without a saving clause in favor of pending- suits, all suits must stop where the repeal finds them.

2010App. at 411 ("this common law doctrine has been so modified that the property of a dissolved corporation is to be used for the benefit of the creditors and stockholders after dissolution, and generally, by a saving clause, stockholders or creditors may maintain an action for that purpose, and in order to maintain an action it must be filed within the time fixed for such purpose"); Consolidated Coal Co., 274 Ill.

2010App. at 411 (“this common law doctrine has been so modified that the property of a dissolved corporation is to be used for the benefit of the creditors and stockholders after dissolution, and generally, by a saving clause, stockholders or creditors may maintain an action for that purpose, and in order to maintain an action it must be filed within the time fixed for such purpose”); Consolidated Coal Co., 274 Ill.

1996These rules have evolved: "[W]hen a change of law merely affects the remedy or matters of procedure, an amendment will be construed as retroactive so long as that is what the legislature intended, and absent a saving clause as to existing litigation, all rights of action will be enforceable under the new procedure, without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change or whether the action has been instituted, unless this would result in deprivation of a vested, constitutionally protected right.” (Emphasis added.) Moshe, 199 Ill.

1991App. 3d 585, 598 .) “However, in the absence of a saving clause, an amendatory act may be retroactively applied where the legislature so intended and where the statute affects the remedy or matters of procedure” (Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 373, 390 ), unless such a result would deprive a litigant of a vested, constitutionally protected right (Moshe, 199 Ill.

1987Eitel v. Lindheimer (1939), 371 Ill. 367 ; Orlicki v. McCarthy (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 342 ) and, therefore, must have intended the saving clause of Public Acts 1380 and 1381 to have a different effect.

1966The court stated that statutes will not be construed so as to give them a retroactive effect unless a legislative intent to the contrary clearly appears, and that when a change in law merely affects the remedy or law of procedure all rights of action will be enforceable under the new procedure without regard as to whether they accrued before or after such change of law unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation. [Citing Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill 591, 114 NE2d 686 ; Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill 291, 83 NE2d 714 .] The court further held that there was no saving

1979They rely on the following passage from Duquoin Township High School District No. 100 v. Industrial Com. (1928), 329 Ill. 543 , 161 N.E. 108 , as support for their position: “When a change of law merely affects the remedy or the law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforcible under the new procedure without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change of law and without regard to whether suit has been instituted or not, unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation. [Citation.]” 329 Ill. 543, 545-46 .

1979They rely on the following passage from Duquoin Township High School District No. 100 v. Industrial Com. (1928), 329 Ill. 543 , 161 N.E. 108 , as support for their position: “When a change of law merely affects the remedy or the law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforcible under the new procedure without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change of law and without regard to whether suit has been instituted or not, unless there is a saving clause as to existing litigation. [Citation.]” 329 Ill. 543, 545-46 .

1978(Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Guthrie, 192 Ill. 579 ; Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148 ; Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill. 291 .) This statute embodies no saving clause as to exiting litigation.

1957(Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad Co. v. Guthrie, 192 Ill. 579 ; Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148 ; Board of Education v. City of Chicago, 402 Ill. 291 .) This statute embodies no saving clause as to existing litigation.

1973(See Laws of 1971, p. 1217; Laws of 1971, p. 1225; Laws of 1972, p. 1966; Laws of 1972, p. 2266, sec. 60.) This is similar to the factual situation in Board of Education of Waverly Community Unit School District v. Nickell (1951), 410 Ill. 98 , in which amendments to the School Code completely revised the procedure for altering district boundaries without a saving clause for proceedings then pending on appeal.

1973(See Laws of 1971, p. 1217; Laws of 1971, p. 1225; Laws of 1972, p. 1966; Laws of 1972, p. 2266, sec. 60.) This is similar to the factual situation in Board of Education of Waverly Community Unit School District v. Nickell (1951), 410 Ill. 98 , in which amendments to the School Code completely revised the procedure for altering district boundaries without a saving clause for proceedings then pending on appeal.

1938Eaton v. Graham, 11 Ill. 619 ; Vance v. Rankin, 194 Ill. 625 ; Wall v. Chesapeake & O.

1934As stated in Vance v. Rankin, 194 Ill. 625 , the court of review will take judicial notice of said repeal, and “It is well settled that if a statute giving a special remedy is repealed without a saving clause-in favor of pending suits, all suits must stop where the repeal finds them.

1926(Otis Elevator Co. v. Industrial Com. 302 Ill. 90 .) Defendant in error did not have on July 1, 1925, a vested right in the judgment of the Appellate Court, as it was still subject to review by this court.

1926In the case of Otis Elevator Co. v. Indtistrial Com. 302 Ill. 90 , this court held that where a statute confers a vested right such right cannot afterward be altered or amended so as to destroy it, but if a change in the law affects only the remedy or procedure all rights of action are governed thereby, without regard to whether they accrued before or after such change and without regard to whether suit had previously been instituted or not, unless there is a saving clause as to the existing litigation.

1887In People v. Brown, 83 Ill. 95 , and Crook v. People, 106 Ill. 237 , it was held that the reorganization of a city under the general incorporation law was an abrogation of its former charter, and determined the tenure of all officers under it, except such as were within the saving clause of the general law.

1883It was decided by this court in The People v. Brown, 83 Ill. 95 , that the reorganization of a city under the general Incorporation law of 1872 determined the tenure of all officers under its special charter, except such as were within the saving clause of that act.

1888And in McMillan et al. v. McCormick, 117 Ill. 79 , we held that this section was within the saving clause of the 24th section of the same chapter, which provides: “But this section shall not be construed so as to affect any rights or liabilities, or any cause of action, that may have accrued before this act shall take effect.” It was there contended, that mortgages not being specifically named in any preceding limitation act, the case should be governed by Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ill. 256 , and Gridley v. Barnes, 103 id. 216, wherein it was held that the proviso quoted did not apply to cases not sp

1886The saving clause in Sec. 24 is that this section, which is held to mean this act in Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ill. 256 , “ Shall not be construed so as to affect any rights or liabilities, or any causes of action that may have accrued before this act shall take effect;” that is to say, the express repeal of" the Act of Nov. 5, 1849, which was in force when appellant’s rights upon this note accrued, shall leave them in full force as they were under that act. 'In Means v. Harrison, 114 Ill. 248 , 'the Supreme Court noticed that this saving clause is of unusual breadth for such á provision, embracing “

1887That court has held in Means v. Harrison, 114 Ill. 248 , and McMillan v. McCormick, 117 Ill. 79 , that a note dated prior to the passage of the law of 1872, and not yet due when said law was passed, was not governed as to limitations by that law, but by the sixteen-year limitation law of Hovembef *5, 1849, under the saving clause, being Sec. 24 of the act.

1886That section is: “No person shall commence an action or make a sale to foreclose any mortgage, or deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage, unless within ten years after the right of action or right to make such sale accrued. ” The 24tli section of the same act, however, after repealing the several acts in regard to limitations previously in force, concludes thus: “But this section shall not be construed so as to affect any rights or liabilities, or any cause of action, that may have accrued before this act shall take effect. ” (2 Gross’ Stat. 1873, pp. 258, 259.) In the revision of 1874 this

2015People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 24 . ¶ 10 Here, we find that the challenged legislative classification, the amendment’s saving clause, is rationally related to the legislature’s goal of including 17-year-olds within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act.

2015People v. Masterson, 2011 IL 110072, ¶ 24 . -3- ¶ 10 Here, we find that the challenged legislative classification, the amendment’s saving clause, is rationally related to the legislature’s goal of including 17-year-olds within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act.

2015Here, the legislature’s chosen effective date bears a rational relationship to the legislature’s goal of extending the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Juvenile Court Act. ¶ 11 This issue is similar to an issue raised in People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551 (1978).

2015Here, the legislature’s chosen effective date bears a rational relationship to the legislature’s goal of extending the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Juvenile Court Act. ¶ 11 This issue is similar to an issue raised in People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551 (1978).

2015In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 54 .

2015In re Derrico G., 2014 IL 114463, ¶ 54 .