Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
7 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1939–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Citygreen2 sentences2021See Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank, 861 F.3d 1052 , 1075 n.11 (10th Cir. 2017) (opinion of Bacharach, J.); see also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (‘‘[T]he saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’’); Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74 (“The Court has . . . refused to read general ‘saving’ provisions to tolerate actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility and in ‘frustration-of-purpose’ cases.” (citation omitted)); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 612 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the saving clause i 2021See Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank, 861 F.3d 1052 , 1075 n.11 (10th Cir. 2017) (opinion of Bacharach, J.); see also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (‘‘[T]he saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’’); Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74 (“The Court has . . . refused to read general ‘saving’ provisions to tolerate actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility and in ‘frustration-of-purpose’ cases.” (citation omitted)); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 612 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the saving clause i | 2 | 2 |
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.green2 sentences2021See Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank, 861 F.3d 1052 , 1075 n.11 (10th Cir. 2017) (opinion of Bacharach, J.); see also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (‘‘[T]he saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’’); Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74 (“The Court has . . . refused to read general ‘saving’ provisions to tolerate actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility and in ‘frustration-of-purpose’ cases.” (citation omitted)); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 612 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the saving clause i 2021See Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank, 861 F.3d 1052 , 1075 n.11 (10th Cir. 2017) (opinion of Bacharach, J.); see also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (‘‘[T]he saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’’); Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74 (“The Court has . . . refused to read general ‘saving’ provisions to tolerate actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility and in ‘frustration-of-purpose’ cases.” (citation omitted)); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 612 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the saving clause i | 2 | 2 |
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.green1 sentence1995Having determined that the preemption clause when read in tandem with the saving clause “provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation.” Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (citation and quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwoodgreen2 sentences1995Because we must construe the preemption clause narrowly in light of the presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993), and given the express utilization of the term “common law” in the saving clause, we agree with the analysis of those courts that have held that actions such as this are not preempted. 1995Because we must construe the preemption clause narrowly in light of the presumption against the preemption of state police power regulations, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993), and given the express utilization of the term “common law” in the saving clause, we agree with the analysis of those courts that have held that actions such as this are not preempted. | 1 | 1 |
Gingold v. Audi-Nsu-Auto Union, A.G.green1 sentence1995See, e.g., Gingold, 567 A.2d at 330 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jamesgreen1 sentence1995“It is difficult to imagine broader language.” United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Hardy v. Betzgreen2 sentences1978In other words, 11(b) applies not only to Luv’s alleged conduct, but also to Penthouse’s. *407 This interpretation of the clause accords with Hardy v. Betz, 105 N.H. 169, 175 , 195 A.2d 582, 585 (1963), wherein we recognized that “ ‘[t]he criminal law of a state or nation has no operation or effect beyond its geographical or territorial limits.’ ” Luv’s alleged conduct — sale of obscene material — occurred in New Hampshire. 1978In other words, 11(b) applies not only to Luv’s alleged conduct, but also to Penthouse’s. *407 This interpretation of the clause accords with Hardy v. Betz, 105 N.H. 169, 175 , 195 A.2d 582, 585 (1963), wherein we recognized that “ ‘[t]he criminal law of a state or nation has no operation or effect beyond its geographical or territorial limits.’ ” Luv’s alleged conduct — sale of obscene material — occurred in New Hampshire. | 1 | 1 |
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewartgreen1 sentence1976Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 162 (1920); 73 Am. | 1 | 1 |
Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Co.green1 sentence1939Co. v. Johnson, 151 U. S. 81, 102 , where it was said that since the property was no longer in the custody of the appointing court, there could be no interference with possession; Go bleman v. Railway, 179 U. S. 335, 338, 339 , stating that the saving clause was prompted by the principle that the receiver is not to be interfered with by a state court in the administration and disposal of the property, and that equities are to be adjusted by the appointing court, which must determine the time and manner of payment. | 1 | 1 |
Manhattan Trust Co. v. Chicago Electric Traction Co.green1 sentence1939Co. v. Holbrook, 73 Fed. 112 , holding that all expenses of receivership adjudicated in the state court must be paid out of property sold by the receivers in bulk, where the decree ordering sale provided that the purchasers should pay all liabilities allowed by the receivership court, and that court had never allowed this judgment of the state court and no longer had control of the property or the receivers; Willcox v. Jones, 177 Fed. 870, 875 , holding that by the saving clause “the courts of the United States are clothed with ample power, by injunction, to prevent judgment *140 creditors fro | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wyeth v. Levine
green
2 sentences2021See Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank, 861 F.3d 1052 , 1075 n.11 (10th Cir. 2017) (opinion of Bacharach, J.); see also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (‘‘[T]he saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’’); Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74 (“The Court has . . . refused to read general ‘saving’ provisions to tolerate actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility and in ‘frustration-of-purpose’ cases.” (citation omitted)); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 612 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the saving clause i 2021See Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Federal Reserve Bank, 861 F.3d 1052 , 1075 n.11 (10th Cir. 2017) (opinion of Bacharach, J.); see also Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (‘‘[T]he saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.’’); Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74 (“The Court has . . . refused to read general ‘saving’ provisions to tolerate actual conflict both in cases involving impossibility and in ‘frustration-of-purpose’ cases.” (citation omitted)); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 612 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the saving clause i | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Richardelle
green
1 sentence2005Co., 528 S.W.2d at 284 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Johnson
green
1 sentence1939Co. v. Johnson, 151 U. S. 81, 102 , where it was said that since the property was no longer in the custody of the appointing court, there could be no interference with possession; Go bleman v. Railway, 179 U. S. 335, 338, 339 , stating that the saving clause was prompted by the principle that the receiver is not to be interfered with by a state court in the administration and disposal of the property, and that equities are to be adjusted by the appointing court, which must determine the time and manner of payment. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Investment Registry, Ltd.v. Chicago & M. Electric Ry. Co.
green
1 sentence1939Co. v. Holbrook, 73 Fed. 112 , holding that all expenses of receivership adjudicated in the state court must be paid out of property sold by the receivers in bulk, where the decree ordering sale provided that the purchasers should pay all liabilities allowed by the receivership court, and that court had never allowed this judgment of the state court and no longer had control of the property or the receivers; Willcox v. Jones, 177 Fed. 870, 875 , holding that by the saving clause “the courts of the United States are clothed with ample power, by injunction, to prevent judgment *140 creditors fro | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Palermo Land & Water Co. v. Railroad Commission
neutral
1 sentence1939Co. v. Holbrook, 73 Fed. 112 , holding that all expenses of receivership adjudicated in the state court must be paid out of property sold by the receivers in bulk, where the decree ordering sale provided that the purchasers should pay all liabilities allowed by the receivership court, and that court had never allowed this judgment of the state court and no longer had control of the property or the receivers; Willcox v. Jones, 177 Fed. 870, 875 , holding that by the saving clause “the courts of the United States are clothed with ample power, by injunction, to prevent judgment *140 creditors fro | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Willcox v. Jones
green
1 sentence1939Co. v. Holbrook, 73 Fed. 112 , holding that all expenses of receivership adjudicated in the state court must be paid out of property sold by the receivers in bulk, where the decree ordering sale provided that the purchasers should pay all liabilities allowed by the receivership court, and that court had never allowed this judgment of the state court and no longer had control of the property or the receivers; Willcox v. Jones, 177 Fed. 870, 875 , holding that by the saving clause “the courts of the United States are clothed with ample power, by injunction, to prevent judgment *140 creditors fro | 1 | 1939–1939 |
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Pere Marquette R.
neutral
2 sentences1939Co. v. Company, 263 Fed. 237, 240 , holding that the saving clause merely reserves “jurisdiction over the mode of enforcing collection of such claim ... to properly protect and conserve the receivership property and to adjust the equities”; American &c. 1939Co. v. Company, 263 Fed. 237, 240 , holding that the saving clause merely reserves “jurisdiction over the mode of enforcing collection of such claim ... to properly protect and conserve the receivership property and to adjust the equities”; American &c. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Pere Marquette R.
neutral
1 sentence1939Co. v. Company, 278 Fed. 832 , suggesting that the reserved power includes the right to enjoin collection of a judgment obtained by fraud in a state court; Glickman v. Kirtland, 254 N. Y. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Glickman v. Kirtland
neutral
1 sentence1939Co. v. Company, 278 Fed. 832 , suggesting that the reserved power includes the right to enjoin collection of a judgment obtained by fraud in a state court; Glickman v. Kirtland, 254 N. Y. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Central Trust Co. v. St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1939To a similar effect are Central Trust Co. v. Railway, 41 Fed. 551 ; Dillingham v. Hawk, 60 Fed. 494 , saying that the saving clause applies only to suits interfering with possession, adjustment of equities, distribution; St. 1939To a similar effect are Central Trust Co. v. Railway, 41 Fed. 551 ; Dillingham v. Hawk, 60 Fed. 494 , saying that the saving clause applies only to suits interfering with possession, adjustment of equities, distribution; St. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Dillingham v. Hawk
neutral
2 sentences1939To a similar effect are Central Trust Co. v. Railway, 41 Fed. 551 ; Dillingham v. Hawk, 60 Fed. 494 , saying that the saving clause applies only to suits interfering with possession, adjustment of equities, distribution; St. 1939To a similar effect are Central Trust Co. v. Railway, 41 Fed. 551 ; Dillingham v. Hawk, 60 Fed. 494 , saying that the saving clause applies only to suits interfering with possession, adjustment of equities, distribution; St. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. v. Holbrook
neutral
1 sentence1939Co. v. Holbrook, 73 Fed. 112 , holding that all expenses of receivership adjudicated in the state court must be paid out of property sold by the receivers in bulk, where the decree ordering sale provided that the purchasers should pay all liabilities allowed by the receivership court, and that court had never allowed this judgment of the state court and no longer had control of the property or the receivers; Willcox v. Jones, 177 Fed. 870, 875 , holding that by the saving clause “the courts of the United States are clothed with ample power, by injunction, to prevent judgment *140 creditors fro | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.