saving clause in New York

1943(Russo v. City of New York, 258 N. Y. 344, 349 .) In the instant case, the Statute of Limitations (Civ.

1940Section 23 of the Civil Practice Act is inapplicable to the infant’s cause of action since, as pointed out in Russo v. City of New York ( 258 N. Y. 344, 349 ), that section “ applies only to cases where without this saving clause the action would be barred by the Statute of Limitations,” and not to a situation where “ because of the disability of infancy, the bar of the statute never became effective.” The cause of action for loss of services must, however, be dismissed since it was not brought within the statutory time.

1926(Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372, 384 ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra, 159 ; The Moses Taylor, 4 Wall. 411, 431 ; Knapp, Stout & Company v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638, 644 .) Except for the reservation the jurisdiction of the Federal courts is “ exclusive,” and nothing in any of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court can be pointed to in support of any theory that there could be substituted for this peculiar jurisdiction of the District Courts and of the State courts administering jurisdiction in cases of maritime torts in accordance with maritime principles,

1921Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 ; Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker, Id. 255 ; and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra. This does not mean, necessarily, a common-law action, but that the remedy might be by any means employed to enforce the rights or redress the injury.

1890To the contrary are Krill v. Brownell, 40 Hun, 72 ; Sutton v. Newton, 15 Abb.

1886To the contrary are Krill v. Brownell, 40 Hun, 72 ; Sutton v. Newton, 15 Abb.

2017Our relatively recent holding in Weinstein v Jenny Craig Operations, Inc . ( 132 AD3d 446 [1st Dept 2015]) does not compel any result to the contrary, despite NY Life's insistence otherwise.

2017Our relatively recent holding in Weinstein v Jenny Craig Operations, Inc. ( 132 AD3d 446 [1st Dept 2015]) does not compel any result to the contrary, despite NY Life’s insistence otherwise.

2017A few months after the Seventh Circuit decided Lewis , the Ninth Circuit also held that the NLRA precludes contracts requiring employees to waive concerted legal claims regarding wages, hours, and terms or conditions of employment ( Morris v Ernst & Young, LLP , 834 F3d 975 [9th Cir 2016], cert granted US , 137 S Ct 809 [2017]).

2017A few months after the Seventh Circuit decided Lewis , the Ninth Circuit also held that the NLRA precludes contracts requiring employees to waive concerted legal claims regarding wages, hours, and terms or conditions of employment (Morris v Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F3d 975 [9th Cir 2016], cert granted 580 US —, 137 S Ct 809 [2017]).

2017The Court held that because the provision at issue is unlawful under section 7 of the NLRA, it was an illegal provision, and therefore met the criteria of the FAA's saving clause for nonenforcement ( Lewis , 823 F3d at 1157 ).

2017The court held that because the provision at issue is unlawful under section 7 of the NLRA, it was an illegal provision, and therefore met the criteria of the FAA’s saving clause for nonenforcement (Lewis, 823 F3d at 1157 ).

2017A few months after the Seventh Circuit decided Lewis , the Ninth Circuit also held that the NLRA precludes contracts requiring employees to waive concerted legal claims regarding wages, hours, and terms or conditions of employment ( Morris v Ernst & Young, LLP , 834 F3d 975 [9th Cir 2016], cert granted US , 137 S Ct 809 [2017]).

2017A few months after the Seventh Circuit decided Lewis , the Ninth Circuit also held that the NLRA precludes contracts requiring employees to waive concerted legal claims regarding wages, hours, and terms or conditions of employment (Morris v Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F3d 975 [9th Cir 2016], cert granted 580 US —, 137 S Ct 809 [2017]).

2011As the Supreme Court has reasoned previously, “the saving clause reflects a congressional determination that occasional nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a system in which juries not only create, but also enforce, safety standards” (Geier, 529 US at 871 ).

1990Auth., 62 NY2d 464, 472 , supra.) Plaintiff concedes that pursuant to the saving clause an urban renewal program can be "governed either by the old law or by the new law, as the municipality sees fit”, but argues that the saving clause limits the option to employ either law to those projects which had not been completed as of the effective date of the new law.

1990(See, Matter of City of Rochester [Maxlene Realty], 35 Misc 2d 974 [city may exercise its newly granted authority under article 15 over the objection of the owner of land condemned under former section 72-k].) The city’s decision to sell the Coliseum site without competitive bidding is, of course, one of those rights and powers.

1987Noncompliance with the condition precedent of service of a notice of claim within 90 days of accrual of the claim against MVAIC is not excused either by difficulty in ascertaining the existence of coverage or by administrative delay in informing a claimant of the fact of noninsurance (see, Matter of Sampson [MVAIC] 55 AD2d 957 ).

1987The delay of over nine months from the serving of the summons and complaint to the forwarding of the summons and complaint to Nationwide did not demonstrate the requisite degree of diligence in investigating the defendant’s insurance coverage to place the plaintiffs within the language of the saving clause of Insurance Law § 5208 (see, Matter of Lloyd [MVAIC], 23 NY2d 478, 482 ).

1981Nichols Herkimer Corp. v Village of Herkimer ( 38 AD2d 456 ), Local Law No. 1 of 1968, if it is found to be prohibitory because of the length of time during which business is restricted, the court should, under the saving clause contained in section 6, limit the language of the local law to regulation of business between the hours of 10:30 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.

1981The two-year limitation of time set out in article 29 of the Convention cannot therefore be construed as a condition precedent, and since the saving clause of CPLR 205 is applicable to this suit which was timely commenced following termination of the action in the Federal court, the second affirmative defense must be stricken.” Thus, while neither discussing the matter nor citing to the decisions in Salamon or Wyman (supra), the Egan court appears to have adopted the Wyman rationale regarding the source of the causes of action governed by the Convention, and, based upon the foregoing, applied

1981The two-year limitation of time set out in article 29 of the Convention cannot therefore be construed as a condition precedent, and since the saving clause of CPLR 205 is applicable to this suit which was timely commenced following termination of the action in the Federal court, the second affirmative defense must be stricken.” Thus, while neither discussing the matter nor citing to the decisions in Salamon or Wyman (supra), the Egan court appears to have adopted the Wyman rationale regarding the source of the causes of action governed by the Convention, and, based upon the foregoing, applied

1977Alpha Portland Cement Co. v Knapp, 230 NY 48, 60 ) * and is consistent as well with the direction by the Court of Appeals that the question of rate be considered and determined here.

1973Burnette v. Davis, 382 U. S. 42 .) Title ZB contains a subdivision b which states that: ‘ ‘ If any numbered paragraph of subdivision a, of this section or any clause, sentence or part of any such numbered paragraph shall be adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to, be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate any other numbered paragraph of subdivision a of this section, but shall be confined in its operation to the numbered paragraph which was directly involved in the controversy or of which a clause, sentence, or part was directly involved in such controversy.” Th

1970(See Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U. S. 239, 246-249 , supra, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 109 ; see, also, Hill, State FELA Actions, 17 Ohio St.