saving clause in Nebraska

2015Laws, L.B. 998, § 13. 5 Id., § 20. 6 Legislative Journal, 103d Leg., 2d Sess. 1490 (Apr. 9, 2014). - 1007 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 291 Nebraska R eports STATE v. DUNCAN Cite as 291 Neb. 1003 [2,3] Generally, if the Legislature amends a criminal statute by mitigating the punishment after the commission of a pro- hibited act but before final judgment, the punishment is that provided by the amendatory act unless the Legislature specifi- cally provided otherwise.7 We sometimes refer to this rule as the “Randolph doctrine,” after its progenitor.8 If a defendant appeals his or her sentence, then t

1996See, Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424 , 255 N.W. 551 (1934); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251 , 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994) (aff’d sub nom.

1996See, Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424 , 255 N.W. 551 (1934); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251 , 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994) (aff’d sub nom.

1990Redell, supra at 180-81 , 113 N.W. at 1054-55 .

1960See, Laws 1903, c. 73, § 242, p. 479; Whiff in v. Higginbotham, 80 Neb. 468 , 114 N. W. 599 .

1960See, Laws 1903, c. 73, § 242, p. 479; Whiff in v. Higginbotham, 80 Neb. 468 , 114 N. W. 599 .

1950Such general statutes have been enacted in nearly all of the states as well as by congress.’ In Thompson v. West, 59 Nebr., 677, recently decided in this court, it is held first: ‘In the absence of a general saving clause, the repeal of a statute will not affect a suit previously brought to enforce a right founded thereon or accrued thereunder.’ ” In Lower v. State, 109 Neb. 590 , 191 N. W. 674 , this court said: “However, we do not find it necessary to decide that question in view of the provisions * * * cited by the attorney general, commonly known as the ‘general saving clause act.’ ” The o

1950Such general statutes have been enacted in nearly all of the states as well as by congress.’ In Thompson v. West, 59 Nebr., 677, recently decided in this court, it is held first: ‘In the absence of a general saving clause, the repeal of a statute will not affect a suit previously brought to enforce a right founded thereon or accrued thereunder.’ ” In Lower v. State, 109 Neb. 590 , 191 N. W. 674 , this court said: “However, we do not find it necessary to decide that question in view of the provisions * * * cited by the attorney general, commonly known as the ‘general saving clause act.’ ” The o

1950Spillman v. Security State Bank, 116 Neb. 223 , 216 N. W. 803 , this court said: “Further, section 39, ch. 191, Laws 1923, involved in this case, was repealed, without a saving clause, by section 18, ch. 30, Laws 1925, which became effective April 1st of that year.

1950Spillman v. Security State Bank, 116 Neb. 223 , 216 N. W. 803 , this court said: “Further, section 39, ch. 191, Laws 1923, involved in this case, was repealed, without a saving clause, by section 18, ch. 30, Laws 1925, which became effective April 1st of that year.

1939In Luikart v. Paine, 126 Neb. 251 , 253 N. W. 86 , it was said (p. 253) : “Stockholders’ double liability in banking corporations is contractual obligation and by construction constitutional provisions in effect at the time of purchase of corporate stock are material parts thereof.” Practically all courts which have had occasion to pass upon the liability of stockholders in banks regard this liability as being contractual. 7 Am.

1939In Luikart v. Paine, 126 Neb. 251 , 253 N. W. 86 , it was said (p. 253) : “Stockholders’ double liability in banking corporations is contractual obligation and by construction constitutional provisions in effect at the time of purchase of corporate stock are material parts thereof.” Practically all courts which have had occasion to pass upon the liability of stockholders in banks regard this liability as being contractual. 7 Am.

1939This court has recently had this same question before it, and on June 2, 1939, released the opinion in Department of Banking v. Foe, ante, p. 422, 286 N. W. 264 , in which we held: “The repeal of a constitutional provision, imposing double liability on corporate stockholders of an insolvent bank, not containing a saving clause, does not affect the obligation of such stockholders as to liabilities incurred by the banking institution prior to such repeal.

1936Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424 , 255 N. W. 551 ; State v. Price, 129 Neb. 433 , 261 N. W. 894 .

1936Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424 , 255 N. W. 551 ; State v. Price, 129 Neb. 433 , 261 N. W. 894 .

1935Also, in Searle v. Yensen, 118 Neb. 835 , this court said: “Sections 3 and 4, ch. 108, Laws 1927, are unconstitutional, as an attempt to impose upon the courts the performance of non judicial duties, and an unlawful delegation of legislative power; and such sections being a part of the inducement for the enactment, the entire act must fall.” In Moeller, McPherrin & Judd v. Smith, 127 Neb. 424 , this court announced the rule aa follows: “When sections of a legislative act are unconstitutional, and such sections were an inducement to the passage of an act in its entirety, then the entire act is

1934Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 , said: “A declaration in a statute that it shall be conclusively presumed the legislature would- have passed the statute without any part of it found invalid by the courts, provides a rule which may aid in determining the legislative intent, but is not an inexorable command.” When sections of a legislative act are unconstitutional, and such sections were an inducement to the passage of an act in its entirety, then the entire act is void, notwithstanding a saving clause therein.

1934Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286 , said: “A declaration in a statute that it shall be conclusively presumed the legislature would- have passed the statute without any part of it found invalid by the courts, provides a rule which may aid in determining the legislative intent, but is not an inexorable command.” When sections of a legislative act are unconstitutional, and such sections were an inducement to the passage of an act in its entirety, then the entire act is void, notwithstanding a saving clause therein.

1880The act “ to provide for the organization, government, and powers of cities and villages,” approved March 1, 1879, which took effect “ from and after the first day of September, 1879” [Laws 1879, 193], repealed the act approved March 1, 1871, without a saving clause as to the ordinances then in existence, and the attorneys for the petitioner now insist that such ordinances thereupon ceased to exist, although the new act continues in force the power of the city council to pass ordinances “ to restrain, prohibit, and suppress * * * houses of prostitution,” etc. The case differs from that of The