saving clause in Oklahoma

1961In Norris v. Cross, 25 Okl. 287 , 105 P. 1000, 1007 , referring to Constitution, Article V, Section 58, this Court said: "The word `enactment,' as used in the saving clause, is synonymous with the word `act.' It is to be noted that the language of this clause excepts only `enactments,' and not `enactments or parts of enactments,' putting in force the initiative and referendum provisions of the Constitution.

1961In Norris v. Cross, 25 Okl. 287 , 105 P. 1000, 1007 , referring to Constitution, Article V, Section 58, this Court said: "The word `enactment,' as used in the saving clause, is synonymous with the word `act.' It is to be noted that the language of this clause excepts only `enactments,' and not `enactments or parts of enactments,' putting in force the initiative and referendum provisions of the Constitution.

1994This is seen in French v. Tenneco Oil Co., 725 P.2d 275 (Okla.1986), where we stated: “ ‘[T]he provision is construed as giving the lessee a fixed period of time within which to resume production or commence additional drilling or reworking operations in order to avoid termination of the lease ... ’ Restoration of production in paying quantities within that period obviates the need to drill ...” 725 P.2d at 277 (quoting Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970) (Emphasis in original).

1994This is seen in French v. Tenneco Oil Co., 725 P.2d 275 (Okla.1986), where we stated: “ ‘[T]he provision is construed as giving the lessee a fixed period of time within which to resume production or commence additional drilling or reworking operations in order to avoid termination of the lease ... ’ Restoration of production in paying quantities within that period obviates the need to drill ...” 725 P.2d at 277 (quoting Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970) (Emphasis in original).

1994This is seen in French v. Tenneco Oil Co., 725 P.2d 275 (Okla.1986), where we stated: “ ‘[T]he provision is construed as giving the lessee a fixed period of time within which to resume production or commence additional drilling or reworking operations in order to avoid termination of the lease ... ’ Restoration of production in paying quantities within that period obviates the need to drill ...” 725 P.2d at 277 (quoting Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970) (Emphasis in original).

1994This is seen in French v. Tenneco Oil Co., 725 P.2d 275 (Okla.1986), where we stated: “ ‘[T]he provision is construed as giving the lessee a fixed period of time within which to resume production or commence additional drilling or reworking operations in order to avoid termination of the lease ... ’ Restoration of production in paying quantities within that period obviates the need to drill ...” 725 P.2d at 277 (quoting Greer v. Salmon, 82 N.M. 245 , 479 P.2d 294 (1970) (Emphasis in original).

1983Owens v. Luckett, 192 Okl. 685 , 139 P.2d 806 (1943).

1983Owens v. Luckett, 192 Okl. 685 , 139 P.2d 806 (1943).

1966Fry v. *511 Wolfe, 106 Old. 289, 234 P. 191 .

1959Roberts v. Ledgerwood, supra [ 134 Okl. 152 , 272 P. 448 ].

1959Roberts v. Ledgerwood, supra [ 134 Okl. 152 , 272 P. 448 ].

1958In People v. Lowell, 250 Mich. 349 , 230 N.W. 202, 204 , the court said: “It is plain from the authorities in this state and elsewhere that the effect of an act amending a specific section of a former act, in the absence of a saving clause, is to strike the former section from the law, obliterate it entirely, and substitute the new section in its place.

1958In People v. Lowell, 250 Mich. 349 , 230 N.W. 202, 204 , the court said: “It is plain from the authorities in this state and elsewhere that the effect of an act amending a specific section of a former act, in the absence of a saving clause, is to strike the former section from the law, obliterate it entirely, and substitute the new section in its place.

1948In Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okla. 135 , 265 P. 647 , construing an oil and gas lease containing a provision almost identical with the provision above quoted, we held that if the lessee had in good faith commenced the drilling of such well prior to the expiration of the lease, he was entitled to drill and complete such well regardless of the date of the expiration of the lease.

1948In Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okla. 135 , 265 P. 647 , construing an oil and gas lease containing a provision almost identical with the provision above quoted, we held that if the lessee had in good faith commenced the drilling of such well prior to the expiration of the lease, he was entitled to drill and complete such well regardless of the date of the expiration of the lease.

1945Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 , 53 S. Ct. 145 , reproduced with notes in 85 A.L.R. 254 , Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the U. S. Supreme Court on the question of the right of a court to give prospective effect only to its overruling decisions, says: “ . . .

1945Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 , 53 S. Ct. 145 , reproduced with notes in 85 A.L.R. 254 , Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking for the U. S. Supreme Court on the question of the right of a court to give prospective effect only to its overruling decisions, says: “ . . .

1935Rogers v. Fidelity Savings Bank, 172 Fed. 735 ; Kline v. Groeschner, 280 Mo. 599 , 219 S. W. 648 ; Karnes v. American F. Ins.

1935Rogers v. Fidelity Savings Bank, 172 Fed. 735 ; Kline v. Groeschner, 280 Mo. 599 , 219 S. W. 648 ; Karnes v. American F. Ins.

1935Rogers v. Fidelity Savings Bank, 172 Fed. 735 ; Kline v. Groeschner, 280 Mo. 599 , 219 S. W. 648 ; Karnes v. American F. Ins.

1935S. 1921, and may be brought as a new action within one year from the time the appeal was dismissed.” Referring to the provisions of section 190, supra, the court, in, the body of the opinion, said: “The saving clause should be given a liberal construction so as to cover all cases which may come within its terms by intendment.” Counsel for defendant cites Blair v. Craddock, 87 Kan. 102 , 123 P. 862 , and confidently asserts that said case is squarely in point.

1935S. 1921, and may be brought as a new action within one year from the time the appeal was dismissed.” Referring to the provisions of section 190, supra, the court, in, the body of the opinion, said: “The saving clause should be given a liberal construction so as to cover all cases which may come within its terms by intendment.” Counsel for defendant cites Blair v. Craddock, 87 Kan. 102 , 123 P. 862 , and confidently asserts that said case is squarely in point.

1935In the case of Mahoney v. Estep et al., 171 Okla. 101 , 38 P. (2d) 537 , decided November 13, 1934, this court condemned another similar resale tax deed, held also by Annie G.

1935In the case of Mahoney v. Estep et al., 171 Okla. 101 , 38 P. (2d) 537 , decided November 13, 1934, this court condemned another similar resale tax deed, held also by Annie G.

1931There being a total want and failure of testimony to prove the essential elements of the commencement of an action in Oklahoma county, the plaintiff must be held to have failed to show facts sufficient to toll the statute and to warrant a holding that the commencement of the action in Atoka county after the expiration of one year from the publication of said articles was within the saving clause of the statute, Montgomery v. Hogan, 76 Okla. 243 , 185 P. 81 ; Blakeney v. Francis, 105 Okla. 11 , 231 P. 464 .

1931There being a total want and failure of testimony to prove the essential elements of the commencement of an action in Oklahoma county, the plaintiff must be held to have failed to show facts sufficient to toll the statute and to warrant a holding that the commencement of the action in Atoka county after the expiration of one year from the publication of said articles was within the saving clause of the statute, Montgomery v. Hogan, 76 Okla. 243 , 185 P. 81 ; Blakeney v. Francis, 105 Okla. 11 , 231 P. 464 .

1931There being a total want and failure of testimony to prove the essential elements of the commencement of an action in Oklahoma county, the plaintiff must be held to have failed to show facts sufficient to toll the statute and to warrant a holding that the commencement of the action in Atoka county after the expiration of one year from the publication of said articles was within the saving clause of the statute, Montgomery v. Hogan, 76 Okla. 243 , 185 P. 81 ; Blakeney v. Francis, 105 Okla. 11 , 231 P. 464 .

1931There being a total want and failure of testimony to prove the essential elements of the commencement of an action in Oklahoma county, the plaintiff must be held to have failed to show facts sufficient to toll the statute and to warrant a holding that the commencement of the action in Atoka county after the expiration of one year from the publication of said articles was within the saving clause of the statute, Montgomery v. Hogan, 76 Okla. 243 , 185 P. 81 ; Blakeney v. Francis, 105 Okla. 11 , 231 P. 464 .

1930See, also, McWhirt v. McKee, 6 Kan. 419 ; Hall v. Hurd, 40 Kan. 374 , 19 Pac. 802 ; Gilmore v. Gilmore, 270 Fed. 260 ; Phillips v. Central of Ga. R.

1930See, also, McWhirt v. McKee, 6 Kan. 419 ; Hall v. Hurd, 40 Kan. 374 , 19 Pac. 802 ; Gilmore v. Gilmore, 270 Fed. 260 ; Phillips v. Central of Ga. R.

1917In Wood on Limitations (4tli Ed.) see. 238, the general doctrine is announced" that: “Persons who have not attained the age of majority are infants, and in those states where infancy is within the saving clause of the statute, the statute does not run against him or her even though he or she has á guardian who might sue the clause in question.” In Stewart v. Sims, 112 Tenn. 296 , 79 S. W. 385 , it is stated: “But we have a ease where the guardian has been removed from office, and who had thereafter no right to retain the custody of the ward’s estate; his duty being, as he was directed by the c

1916Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 , 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L.

1916In Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan. (311) 190, where it was contended by the plaintiff that a “tax deed was not prima facie evidence of anything prior to its own execution, because he claims that the laws under which the deed was executed have been repealed without any saving clause^ and because none of the subsequent laws making tax deeds prima facie evidence of all proceedings antecedent to the execution of such deeds have any retrospective operation,” the court said: “Section 113 of this new act contains a saving clause which reads as follows: ‘All proceedings, titles, etc., not completed at the

1915“If at the time the prosecution in which the recognizance herein was executed was commenced a statute had been in force authorizing it, and before trial that statute had been repealed without a saving clause of pending prosecutions, such repeal would operate as a dismissal of pending proceedings” (Sprigs v. State, 2 Ind. 75).

1910The rule seems to be that the repeal of a statute giving jurisdiction takes away the authority to proceed in pending cases unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause. 1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 285; Lamb v. Schlotter et al., 54 Cal. 319 ; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. 506, 19 L.

1910The rule seems to be that the repeal of a statute giving jurisdiction takes away the authority to proceed in pending cases unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause. 1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 285; Lamb v. Schlotter et al., 54 Cal. 319 ; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. 506, 19 L.

1910Ed. 264 ; Railroad Company v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398 , 25 L.

1910Ed. 264 ; Railroad Company v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398 , 25 L.

1910The rule seems to be that the repeal of a statute giving jurisdiction takes away the authority to proceed in pending cases unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause. 1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 285; Lamb v. Schlotter et al., 54 Cal. 319 ; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. 506, 19 L.