saving clause in Montana

2002The bank cites First Nat’l Bank of Plains v. Barto (1925), 72 Mont. 437 , 233 P. 963 (overruled on other grounds by Continental Supply Co. v. Abell (1933), 95 Mont. 148, 166 , 24 P.2d 133, 138 ), for the proposition that “when a statute... is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had never existed.” Barto, 72 Mont. at 437 , 233 P. at 964 .

2002The bank cites First Nat’l Bank of Plains v. Barto (1925), 72 Mont. 437 , 233 P. 963 (overruled on other grounds by Continental Supply Co. v. Abell (1933), 95 Mont. 148, 166 , 24 P.2d 133, 138 ), for the proposition that “when a statute... is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had never existed.” Barto, 72 Mont. at 437 , 233 P. at 964 .

2002The bank cites First Nat’l Bank of Plains v. Barto (1925), 72 Mont. 437 , 233 P. 963 (overruled on other grounds by Continental Supply Co. v. Abell (1933), 95 Mont. 148, 166 , 24 P.2d 133, 138 ), for the proposition that “when a statute... is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had never existed.” Barto, 72 Mont. at 437 , 233 P. at 964 .

2002The bank cites First Nat’l Bank of Plains v. Barto (1925), 72 Mont. 437 , 233 P. 963 (overruled on other grounds by Continental Supply Co. v. Abell (1933), 95 Mont. 148, 166 , 24 P.2d 133, 138 ), for the proposition that “when a statute... is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had never existed.” Barto, 72 Mont. at 437 , 233 P. at 964 .

1996Fourth Judicial District, 417 P.2d at 112 .

1996Fourth Judicial District, 417 P.2d at 112 .

1966There the Illinois Supreme Court quoting from Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 597 , 114 N.E.2d 686 , stated: “The law applicable in the State of Illinois is that there is no vested right in any particular remedy or method of procedure, and that, while generally statutes will not be construed to give them a retroactive operation unless it clearly appears that such was the legislative intent, nevertheless, when a change of law merely affects the remedy or law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforceable under the new procedure without regard to whether they accrued before or after suc

1966There the Illinois Supreme Court quoting from Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 597 , 114 N.E.2d 686 , stated: “The law applicable in the State of Illinois is that there is no vested right in any particular remedy or method of procedure, and that, while generally statutes will not be construed to give them a retroactive operation unless it clearly appears that such was the legislative intent, nevertheless, when a change of law merely affects the remedy or law of procedure, all rights of action will be enforceable under the new procedure without regard to whether they accrued before or after suc

1942Veeder v. State Board of Education, 97 Mont. 121 , 33 Pac. (2d) 516 ; Barbour v. State Board of Education, 92 Mont. 321 , 13 Pac. (2d) 225 ; and Geboski v. Montana Armory Board, supra.) Section 18 of the Act contains what is commonly known as a saving clause, which provides that it is the intention of the legislature that if one part of the Act shall be declared unconstitutional, the rest should stand.

1942Veeder v. State Board of Education, 97 Mont. 121 , 33 Pac. (2d) 516 ; Barbour v. State Board of Education, 92 Mont. 321 , 13 Pac. (2d) 225 ; and Geboski v. Montana Armory Board, supra.) Section 18 of the Act contains what is commonly known as a saving clause, which provides that it is the intention of the legislature that if one part of the Act shall be declared unconstitutional, the rest should stand.

1942Veeder v. State Board of Education, 97 Mont. 121 , 33 Pac. (2d) 516 ; Barbour v. State Board of Education, 92 Mont. 321 , 13 Pac. (2d) 225 ; and Geboski v. Montana Armory Board, supra.) Section 18 of the Act contains what is commonly known as a saving clause, which provides that it is the intention of the legislature that if one part of the Act shall be declared unconstitutional, the rest should stand.

1942Veeder v. State Board of Education, 97 Mont. 121 , 33 Pac. (2d) 516 ; Barbour v. State Board of Education, 92 Mont. 321 , 13 Pac. (2d) 225 ; and Geboski v. Montana Armory Board, supra.) Section 18 of the Act contains what is commonly known as a saving clause, which provides that it is the intention of the legislature that if one part of the Act shall be declared unconstitutional, the rest should stand.

1933Co. , 133 Wis. 183 , 113 N.W. 384 , in considering a similar statute, the supreme court *Page 156 of Wisconsin also recognized the general rule that a penal statute destroyed an unenforced right in the absence of an express saving clause, but again in that case we find the right held to have been preserved by reason of a special saving statute very similar to the one considered by the Colorado supreme court in the Cavanaugh Case , and it is again significant to note that the legislature of Wisconsin, in enacting such a saving clause, took pains to use express language as to penalties, forfeitu

1933Co. , 133 Wis. 183 , 113 N.W. 384 , in considering a similar statute, the supreme court *Page 156 of Wisconsin also recognized the general rule that a penal statute destroyed an unenforced right in the absence of an express saving clause, but again in that case we find the right held to have been preserved by reason of a special saving statute very similar to the one considered by the Colorado supreme court in the Cavanaugh Case , and it is again significant to note that the legislature of Wisconsin, in enacting such a saving clause, took pains to use express language as to penalties, forfeitu

1925(Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223 , 207 Pac. 116 .) The general rule, applicable here is that, when a statute of this character is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had. never existed. (1 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 382; Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294 , 37 N. E. 1031 ; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205 , 54 L.

1925(Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223 , 207 Pac. 116 .) The general rule, applicable here is that, when a statute of this character is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had. never existed. (1 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 382; Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294 , 37 N. E. 1031 ; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205 , 54 L.

1925(Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223 , 207 Pac. 116 .) The general rule, applicable here is that, when a statute of this character is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had. never existed. (1 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 382; Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294 , 37 N. E. 1031 ; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205 , 54 L.

1925(Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223 , 207 Pac. 116 .) The general rule, applicable here is that, when a statute of this character is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had. never existed. (1 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 382; Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294 , 37 N. E. 1031 ; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205 , 54 L.

1925Ed. 1001 , 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621 [see, also, Rose’s U. S. Notes]; Mahoney v. State, 5 Wyo. 520 , 63 Am.

1925(Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223 , 207 Pac. 116 .) The general rule, applicable here is that, when a statute of this character is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had. never existed. (1 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 382; Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294 , 37 N. E. 1031 ; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205 , 54 L.

1925(Continental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete Co., 63 Mont. 223 , 207 Pac. 116 .) The general rule, applicable here is that, when a statute of this character is repealed without a saving clause, it must be considered, except as to proceedings past and closed, as if it had. never existed. (1 Lewis’ Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 382; Holcomb v. Boynton, 151 Ill. 294 , 37 N. E. 1031 ; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U. S. 205 , 54 L.

1922Jacobson v. Board, 47 Mont. 531 , 134 Pac. 291 (construing statutes and their amendments authorizing the creation of new counties), it was held that where an amendafoiy Act changes the very basis of a right, or affects jurisdiction, and provision is not made for a saving clause, proceedings initiated under the old law may not be completed under the new.

1922Jacobson v. Board, 47 Mont. 531 , 134 Pac. 291 (construing statutes and their amendments authorizing the creation of new counties), it was held that where an amendafoiy Act changes the very basis of a right, or affects jurisdiction, and provision is not made for a saving clause, proceedings initiated under the old law may not be completed under the new.

1898Defendant relies upon Attorney General v. Borough of Anglesea, (N. J.), 33 Atl.