saving clause in California

2025(Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 6.) Effective January 1, 2025, although the court still must order a minor to pay any victim restitution under section 730.6, subdivision (b), and still may order the minor to pay a fine under section 730.5, “[t]he court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine.” (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(2).) Absent a saving clause, if an amendatory statute lessening punishment “ ‘ “becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final then . . . it, and not the old statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, applies.” ’ ” (People v. Co

2019Shiga urges us to strike the enhancement pursuant to In re Estrada, which held that when the Legislature amends a statute to lessen the punishment, in the absence of a saving clause, “[t]he amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final.” (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745, 747 (Estrada).) However, in Pedro T., the Supreme Court distinguished its earlier holding in Estrada with respect to a Vehicle Code sentencing provision with a sunset clause, expl

2023The Act contains an enforcement mandate, which renders agreements to arbitrate enforceable as a matter of federal law, and a saving clause, which permits invalidation of arbitration clauses on grounds applicable to any contract. ( 9 U.S.C. § 2 ; see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333 , 339–340 (Concepcion); Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1612 , 1621–1622.) The result is an equal-treatment principle: a state court may invalidate an arbitration agreement according to generally applicable contract defenses like unconscionability, but not on the basis of legal rules

2020The court explained that the final phrase of section 2 of the FAA “permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue. [Citations.]” (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 339.) Recently, in OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (201

2019The California Supreme Court in Floyd "conclude[d] that the act's saving clause-which states that '[e]xcept as otherwise provided, the provisions of this act shall become effective July 1, 2001, and its provisions shall be applied prospectively' [citation]-indicates the act was not intended to apply retroactively" to cases not yet final as of the act's effective date. ( Floyd , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 182 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 , 72 P.3d 820 .) The Attorney General concedes that "section 1001.36 has a potentially ameliorative effect," but he argues that section 1001.36 contains "direct language

2019The California Supreme Court in Floyd "conclude[d] that the act's saving clause-which states that '[e]xcept as otherwise provided, the provisions of this act shall become effective July 1, 2001, and its provisions shall be applied prospectively' [citation]-indicates the act was not intended to apply retroactively" to cases not yet final as of the act's effective date. ( Floyd , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 182 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 , 72 P.3d 820 .) The Attorney General concedes that "section 1001.36 has a potentially ameliorative effect," but he argues that section 1001.36 contains "direct language

2023(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [“absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of his appeal”].) III At issue in this case is what constitutes finality for purposes of a juvenile delinquency case.

2022(Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 631; Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 308-309.) As the California Supreme Court has stated, “ ‘ “absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of his appeal.” ’ ” (People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 95 (Wright), quoting People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 .) B.

2025(See, e.g., Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 [“‘It is also a general rule . . . that a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls with the repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute’”]; Southern Service Co. v. Los Angeles County (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1, 12 [“‘The unconditional repeal of a special remedial statute without a saving clause stops all pending actions where the repeal finds them. . . .

2023Perhaps the rule’s most familiar application is in the criminal realm, when our decisions have long recognized that under the common law the repeal of a penal law without a saving clause invalidates all prosecutions under the old law which have not become final as of the effective date of the repeal.” (Mann, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 829 .) 6 The same rule has also been applied to the repeal of a statutory provision designed to ameliorate criminal punishment.

2022(See People v. Flores, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039 [“the amended version of section 1170, subdivision (b) . . . applies retroactively in this case as an ameliorative change in the law applicable to all nonfinal convictions on appeal”]; see also People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793 [“amendments . . . that mitigate punishment by increasing the dollar amount for certain crimes or enhancements should be applied retroactively, in the absence of a saving clause or other indicia of a contrary legislative intent”].) Simmons argues that he “did not admit or stipulate to any circumstances i

2018(See People v. Nasalga , supra , 12 Cal.4th at p. 794 , 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 [even in the absence of a saving clause, "we must look for any other indications of legislative intent"].) In short, the legislative scheme enacted by ordinance No. 185,343 contemplated MMB's that violated Proposition D prior to 2018 would continue to be prosecuted.

2019Independent of a vested right, when the Legislature repeals a statute but intends to provide statutory benefits after the repeal, the Legislature may include a saving clause either in the repealing act or in other legislation at the session of the Legislature effecting the repeal. ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1607-1608, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 [court considered repealing legislation]; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 110, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 [court considered "contemporaneous legislation"].) A saving clause may be express or implied. ( In re P

2019Independent of a vested right, when the Legislature repeals a statute but intends to provide statutory benefits after the repeal, the Legislature may include a saving clause either in the repealing act or in other legislation at the session of the Legislature effecting the repeal. ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1607-1608, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 [court considered repealing legislation]; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 110, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 [court considered "contemporaneous legislation"].) A saving clause may be express or implied. ( In re P

2022(Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty (1901) 134 Cal. 315, 317 .) We conclude that the sunset provision in section 2920.7 eliminated McBride’s rights under that statute absent a saving clause, and that the trial court committed no error on this point.3 3 In her reply brief, McBride argues that the repealed HBOR statutes govern events that occurred before they were repealed, citing for the first time to three federal district court decisions.

2019More than a century ago, our Supreme Court explained: "[W]here a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not reduced to possession, or perfected by final judgment, the repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause." ( Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty (1901) 134 Cal. 315 , 317, 66 P. 322 .) As we discuss, neither situation is present here; C.P. did not have any vested rights at the time of former section 4007.5's repeal, and current section 4007.5 does not contain an ex

2020(Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 304 ; see People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40 , 45.) In Rossi, the Supreme Court held that the repeal of a criminal statute without a saving clause leaves the court without power to proceed against a person charged with a statutory crime.

2018(See Rossi , supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 302 , 134 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 555 P.2d 1313 ; Estrada , supra , 63 Cal.2d at p. 747 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 .) Counsel appears to argue that AUMA preempted Proposition D, but counsel does not explain how AUMA's impact is relevant to ascertaining whether the City Council intended to rely on the saving clause when it enacted the ordinance.

2025(See, e.g., Governing Board v. Mann (1977) 18 Cal.3d 819, 829 [“‘It is also a general rule . . . that a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls with the repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute’”]; Southern Service Co. v. Los Angeles County (1940) 15 Cal.2d 1, 12 [“‘The unconditional repeal of a special remedial statute without a saving clause stops all pending actions where the repeal finds them. . . .

2005To the contrary, as our high court has observed, even where “the words of the . . . statute are not expressly words of repeal without a saving clause, ... tire effect is the same in so far as the application *1025 of the principles is concerned when the legislature by apt expression has withdrawn the right and remedy in particular cases, including all pending actions based thereon.” (Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra, 15 Cal.2d at p. 13 .) The critical point is that “the legislature may take away the right of action itself.” (Ibid.) Our high court thus has alluded to the Legisla

2021(See People v. Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1135 .) It follows that any time prior to entering his no contest plea defendant could have raised the contention that possession of less than an ounce of cannabis in prison was no longer a crime. “[W]hen the Legislature repeals a criminal statute -- or otherwise removes state sanctions from conduct formerly deemed criminal -- its action requires the dismissal of pending criminal proceedings charging such conduct . . . [as] the repeal of a criminal statute without a saving clause terminates all criminal prosecutions not reduced to final judgment.” (P

2021(See People v. Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1135 .) It follows that any time prior to entering his no contest plea defendant could have raised the contention that possession of less than an ounce of cannabis in prison was no longer a crime. “[W]hen the Legislature repeals a criminal statute -- or otherwise removes state sanctions from conduct formerly deemed criminal -- its action requires the dismissal of pending criminal proceedings charging such conduct . . . [as] the repeal of a criminal statute without a saving clause terminates all criminal prosecutions not reduced to final judgment.” (P

2020“When the Legislature has seen fit to repeal a statute making certain acts a crime it is reasonable to assume that in the absence of a saving clause the Legislature would not have desired that anyone should be punished for what, by the repeal, it has now determined is not a crime.” (Sekt, supra, 26 Cal.2d at 20 p. 308.) Here, by contrast, there was no elimination of liability for theft, and thus no implied legislative pardon for Medeiros’s actions.

2007(Id. at pp. 303-304.) The court began its analysis with the general rule that outright repeal of a criminal statute without a saving clause bars prosecution for violations before the repeal. ( Sekt, supra, 26 Cal.2d 297, 304 .) This rule is based on the presumed legislative intent that a repeal is an implied pardon for past offenses.

1978As the court stated in Estate of Taylor, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at page 50: “ ‘Where a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not reduced to possestion, or perfected by final judgment, the repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause.’ (Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty (1901) 134 Cal. 315, 317 [ 66 P. 322 ]; see People v. One 1953 Buick (1962) 57 Cal.2d 358 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 488 , 369 P.2d 16 ].)” Appellants’ argument that their rights were perfected in the decree establi

1978As the court stated in Estate of Taylor, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at page 50: “ ‘Where a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not reduced to possestion, or perfected by final judgment, the repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause.’ (Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty (1901) 134 Cal. 315, 317 [ 66 P. 322 ]; see People v. One 1953 Buick (1962) 57 Cal.2d 358 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 488 , 369 P.2d 16 ].)” Appellants’ argument that their rights were perfected in the decree establi

1933“Did this exclusion, however, prohibit the superior court from trying the present action of which it had jurisdiction when it was commenced? ‘ Constitutions, like statutes, are to be considered prospective and not retrospective in their operation, unless a contrary intention clearly appears.’ (5 Cal. Jur. 561.) ‘While it is the general rule that a cause of action or remedy dependent on statute falls with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute (Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [ 290 Pac. 438 ]; Moss v. Smith, 171

1930While it is the general rule that a cause of action or remedy dependent on statute falls with a repeal of the statute,' even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute (Callet v. Alioto, ante, p. 65 [ 290 Pac. 438 ]; Moss v. Smith, 171 Cal. 777 [ 155 Pac. 90 ]; People v. Bank, of San Luis Obispo, 159 Cal. 65 [Ann.

2019Independent of a vested right, when the Legislature repeals a statute but intends to provide statutory benefits after the repeal, the Legislature may include a saving clause either in the repealing act or in other legislation at the session of the Legislature effecting the repeal. ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1607-1608, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 [court considered repealing legislation]; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 110, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 [court considered "contemporaneous legislation"].) A saving clause may be express or implied. ( In re P

2019Independent of a vested right, when the Legislature repeals a statute but intends to provide statutory benefits after the repeal, the Legislature may include a saving clause either in the repealing act or in other legislation at the session of the Legislature effecting the repeal. ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1607-1608, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 [court considered repealing legislation]; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 110, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 [court considered "contemporaneous legislation"].) A saving clause may be express or implied. ( In re P

2004Co. (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 659, 670-671 [ 102 P.2d 387 ]); “[as] a general rule, ... a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute. [Citations.] The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right ... at any time.” (Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67-68 [ 290 P. 438 ].) Mil acknowledges the numerous cases holding that when a remedial statute is amended or repealed

2004Co. (1940) 38 Cal.App.2d 659, 670-671 [ 102 P.2d 387 ]); “[as] a general rule, ... a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute. [Citations.] The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right ... at any time.” (Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67-68 [ 290 P. 438 ].) Mil acknowledges the numerous cases holding that when a remedial statute is amended or repealed

2022(Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 631; Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 308-309.) As the California Supreme Court has stated, “ ‘ “absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of his appeal.” ’ ” (People v. Wright (2006) 40 Cal.4th 81, 95 (Wright), quoting People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 .) B.

2010The Attorney General relies on section 3 in contending we must presume the amendments to section 4019 were intended to apply prospectively only, absent express legislative intent or a "clear and unavoidable implication" to the contrary. (§ 3 ["No part of [the Penal Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."].) Under section 3, "`[a] new statute is generally presumed to operate prospectively absent an express declaration of retroactivity or a clear and compelling implication that the Legislature intended otherwise. [Citation.]'") ( People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753 [ 68 Cal.

2022“When new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date. [Citation.]” (People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673 .) However, “the presumption does not govern when the statute at issue includes a ‘saving clause’ providing that the amendment should be applied only prospectively. [Citations.]” (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 656 .) The amendment to section 1385 includes precisely such a saving clause, making it prospective only.

2016The Yearwood court disagreed, finding that “[t]he Estrada rule does not apply to the [Reform] Act because section 1170.126 operates as the functional equivalent of a saving clause.” (Yearwood, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 172 .) The court examined the language of section 1170.126, subdivision (b), which provides, “Any person serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment” imposed for a third strike conviction “may file a petition for a recall of sentence.” The court found this phrase was “not ambiguous” and that section 1170.126 “is correctly interpreted to apply to all prisoners serving a

2020The Act makes any such state policy unlawful, for that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal ‘footing,’ directly contrary to the Act’s language and Congress’ intent.” (Id. at p. 281.) The Supreme Court has explained that the saving clause “explicitly retains an external body of [state] law governing revocation.” (Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle (2009) 556 U.S. 624, 630 .) “‘State law,’ therefore, is applicable to determine which contracts are binding . . . and enforceable under” the FAA, “‘if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enfo

2019To begin with, "[a] court may not ... construe [an arbitration] agreement in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law." ( Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483 , 493, fn. 9, 107 S.Ct. 2520 , 96 L.Ed.2d 426 ( Perry ).) Nor may a court apply the unconscionability doctrine "in a fashion that disfavors arbitration" or " 'rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.' " ( Concepcion , supra , 563 U.S. at p. 341, 131 S.Ct. 1740 .) In short, the saving clause

2019The California Supreme Court in Floyd "conclude[d] that the act's saving clause-which states that '[e]xcept as otherwise provided, the provisions of this act shall become effective July 1, 2001, and its provisions shall be applied prospectively' [citation]-indicates the act was not intended to apply retroactively" to cases not yet final as of the act's effective date. ( Floyd , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 182 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 , 72 P.3d 820 .) The Attorney General concedes that "section 1001.36 has a potentially ameliorative effect," but he argues that section 1001.36 contains "direct language

2019The California Supreme Court in Floyd "conclude[d] that the act's saving clause-which states that '[e]xcept as otherwise provided, the provisions of this act shall become effective July 1, 2001, and its provisions shall be applied prospectively' [citation]-indicates the act was not intended to apply retroactively" to cases not yet final as of the act's effective date. ( Floyd , supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 182 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 , 72 P.3d 820 .) The Attorney General concedes that "section 1001.36 has a potentially ameliorative effect," but he argues that section 1001.36 contains "direct language

2022(Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1284 .) The saving clause need not be express.

2009No Saving Clause “When the Legislature repeals a statute but intends to save the rights of litigants in pending actions, it may accomplish that purpose by including an express saving clause in the repealing act.” (Bourquez v. Superior Court (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1284 [ 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 142 ]; see Black’s Law *1608 Diet. (9th ed. 2009) p. 1461 [“A saving clause is generally used in a repealing act to preserve rights and claims that would otherwise be lost.”].) “It is not necessary that there be an express saving clause in order to save rights under a statute.

2016(See People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784 , 793, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 [amendments that mitigate punishment should be applied retroactively "in the absence of a saving clause or other indicia of a contrary legislative intent"].) A law that lessens criminal punishment is not applied retroactively if the enacting legislative body, here the electorate, has "demonstrate[d] its intention [of prospective application] with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate it." ( Ibid. ) *706 "[O]ur interpretation of a ballot initiative is governed by the same rules t

2016(See People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784 , 793, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 88 , 910 P.2d 1380 [amendments that mitigate punishment should be applied retroactively "in the absence of a saving clause or other indicia of a contrary legislative intent"].) A law that lessens criminal punishment is not applied retroactively if the enacting legislative body, here the electorate, has "demonstrate[d] its intention [of prospective application] with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate it." ( Ibid. ) *706 "[O]ur interpretation of a ballot initiative is governed by the same rules t

1933“Did this exclusion, however, prohibit the superior court from trying the present action of which it had jurisdiction when it was commenced? ‘ Constitutions, like statutes, are to be considered prospective and not retrospective in their operation, unless a contrary intention clearly appears.’ (5 Cal. Jur. 561.) ‘While it is the general rule that a cause of action or remedy dependent on statute falls with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute (Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [ 290 Pac. 438 ]; Moss v. Smith, 171

1933“Did this exclusion, however, prohibit the superior court from trying the present action of which it had jurisdiction when it was commenced? ‘ Constitutions, like statutes, are to be considered prospective and not retrospective in their operation, unless a contrary intention clearly appears.’ (5 Cal. Jur. 561.) ‘While it is the general rule that a cause of action or remedy dependent on statute falls with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute (Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 [ 290 Pac. 438 ]; Moss v. Smith, 171

2019Partnership v. Clark (2017) --- U.S. ----, [ 137 S.Ct. 1421 , 1426], 197 L.Ed.2d 806 ( Kindred Nursing ).) As this court has explained, this equal treatment principle mandates that our unconscionability standard "be ... the **722 same for arbitration and nonarbitration agreements" ( Sanchez , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 912 , 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 812 , 353 P.3d 741 ) and that we enforce our unconscionability rules "evenhandedly" ( Sonic II , supra , 57 Cal.4th at p. 1143 , 163 Cal.Rptr.3d 269 , 311 P.3d 184 ).

2015The United States Supreme Court has held: “[Title 9, United States Code, section 2 ] permits arbitration agreements to be declared unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’ This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalided by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue. [Citations.]” (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. ___ , ___ [

2019Independent of a vested right, when the Legislature repeals a statute but intends to provide statutory benefits after the repeal, the Legislature may include a saving clause either in the repealing act or in other legislation at the session of the Legislature effecting the repeal. ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1607-1608, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 [court considered repealing legislation]; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 110, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 [court considered "contemporaneous legislation"].) A saving clause may be express or implied. ( In re P

2019Independent of a vested right, when the Legislature repeals a statute but intends to provide statutory benefits after the repeal, the Legislature may include a saving clause either in the repealing act or in other legislation at the session of the Legislature effecting the repeal. ( Beverly Hilton Hotel , supra , 176 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1607-1608, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 [court considered repealing legislation]; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102 , 110, 145 Cal.Rptr. 674 , 577 P.2d 1014 [court considered "contemporaneous legislation"].) A saving clause may be express or implied. ( In re P