saving clause in Arkansas

1899Hershy v. Latham, 42 Ark. 305 .

1896Hershy v. Latham, 42 Ark. 305 ; Stull v. Harris, 51 Ark. 297 .

2006Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 , 162 , 40 S.Ct. 438 , 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920) (stating that "[t]he usual function of a saving clause is to preserve something from immediate interference — not to create").

2006Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 , 162 , 40 S.Ct. 438 , 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920) (stating that "[t]he usual function of a saving clause is to preserve something from immediate interference — not to create").

1957This saving clause does not apply, however, to mere changes in procedure, Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Kincannon, 202 Ark. 216 , 150 S. W. 2d 968 ; so we point out that the submission of the case upon special interrogatories will not be mandatory upon a retrial, this being a matter of procedure only.

1957This saving clause does not apply, however, to mere changes in procedure, Fort Smith Gas Co. v. Kincannon, 202 Ark. 216 , 150 S. W. 2d 968 ; so we point out that the submission of the case upon special interrogatories will not be mandatory upon a retrial, this being a matter of procedure only.

1944Woodward v. Campbell, 39 Ark. 580 ; Neil v. Rozier, supra. “All the world must take notice of the statute granting to a minor the privilege of redemption from a sale for taxes. ’.’ And in Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 , Chief Justice Hart said: “Our statute authorizes the sale'of land delinquent for nonpayment of taxes, and it also contains a saving clause, granting to minors the right to redeem the land from the tax sale within two years after the expiration of their disabilities as minors.

1944Woodward v. Campbell, 39 Ark. 580 ; Neil v. Rozier, supra. “All the world must take notice of the statute granting to a minor the privilege of redemption from a sale for taxes. ’.’ And in Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 , Chief Justice Hart said: “Our statute authorizes the sale'of land delinquent for nonpayment of taxes, and it also contains a saving clause, granting to minors the right to redeem the land from the tax sale within two years after the expiration of their disabilities as minors.

1944Woodward v. Campbell, 39 Ark. 580 ; Neil v. Rozier, supra. “All the world must take notice of the statute granting to a minor the privilege of redemption from a sale for taxes. ’.’ And in Hisey v. Sloan, 180 Ark. 797 , 22 S. W. 2d 1005 , Chief Justice Hart said: “Our statute authorizes the sale'of land delinquent for nonpayment of taxes, and it also contains a saving clause, granting to minors the right to redeem the land from the tax sale within two years after the expiration of their disabilities as minors.

1941The opinion in the case of Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669 , 101 S.W.2d 961 , is in point upon this subject.

1941The opinion in the case of Roberson v. Roberson, 193 Ark. 669 , 101 S.W.2d 961 , is in point upon this subject.

1937(Citing cases.)” A vehicle act of the state of California was amended at the 1929 session of the General Assembly of that state by the addition of a section numbered 1413/4, which denied the right of recovery to guests riding in any vehicle on the public highways of that state, and provided that if the injury resulted in death that “.neither the estate nor the legal representatives or heirs of such guest should have any right of recovery.” It was held by the Supreme Court of that state in the case of Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 , 290 Pac. 438 , that this act did not prevent a recovery on a c

1937(Citing cases.)” A vehicle act of the state of California was amended at the 1929 session of the General Assembly of that state by the addition of a section numbered 1413/4, which denied the right of recovery to guests riding in any vehicle on the public highways of that state, and provided that if the injury resulted in death that “.neither the estate nor the legal representatives or heirs of such guest should have any right of recovery.” It was held by the Supreme Court of that state in the case of Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 , 290 Pac. 438 , that this act did not prevent a recovery on a c

1937(Citing cases.)” A vehicle act of the state of California was amended at the 1929 session of the General Assembly of that state by the addition of a section numbered 1413/4, which denied the right of recovery to guests riding in any vehicle on the public highways of that state, and provided that if the injury resulted in death that “.neither the estate nor the legal representatives or heirs of such guest should have any right of recovery.” It was held by the Supreme Court of that state in the case of Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 , 290 Pac. 438 , that this act did not prevent a recovery on a c

1937(Citing cases.)” A vehicle act of the state of California was amended at the 1929 session of the General Assembly of that state by the addition of a section numbered 1413/4, which denied the right of recovery to guests riding in any vehicle on the public highways of that state, and provided that if the injury resulted in death that “.neither the estate nor the legal representatives or heirs of such guest should have any right of recovery.” It was held by the Supreme Court of that state in the case of Callet v. Alioto, 210 Cal. 65 , 290 Pac. 438 , that this act did not prevent a recovery on a c

1937In Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty, 134 Cal. 315, 317 , 66 P. 322, 323 , the court stated the rule as follows: ‘It is a rule of almost universal application that where a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not reduced to possession or perfected by final judgment, the repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause.’ This rule has been consistently and continuously adhered to since said date.

1937In Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty, 134 Cal. 315, 317 , 66 P. 322, 323 , the court stated the rule as follows: ‘It is a rule of almost universal application that where a right is created solely by a statute, and is dependent upon the statute alone, and such right is still inchoate, and not reduced to possession or perfected by final judgment, the repeal of the statute destroys the remedy, unless the repealing statute contains a saving clause.’ This rule has been consistently and continuously adhered to since said date.

1923I think the most serious question in the case is whether or not this saving clause, when construed according to the principles of Snetzer v. Gregg, 129 Ark. 542 , adopts' a different' rule of constitutional construction for acts held void in part than that laid down in Patterson v. Temple, supra. I think, however, that the sound rule is that, while this section is some indication of the legislative intention, it is merely declaratory of the rule heretofore laid down by this court on the same subject, and which is a rule of constitutional law.

1923If the saving clause in section 20 is merely declaratory of the rule of constitutional construction already adopted by this court, then this clause is governed also in this respect by the ease of Patterson v. Temple, supra.

1923State v. Bancroft (Wis.) 134 N. W. 330 , 38 L.

1923I think the most serious question in the case is whether or not this saving clause, when construed according to the principles of Snetzer v. Gregg, 129 Ark. 542 , adopts' a different' rule of constitutional construction for acts held void in part than that laid down in Patterson v. Temple, supra. I think, however, that the sound rule is that, while this section is some indication of the legislative intention, it is merely declaratory of the rule heretofore laid down by this court on the same subject, and which is a rule of constitutional law.

1920Nelson v. Cowling, 89 Ark. 334 ; Collier v. Smith, 132 Ark. 309 , and Hogg v. Nichols, 134 Ark. 280 .

1920Nelson v. Cowling, 89 Ark. 334 ; Collier v. Smith, 132 Ark. 309 , and Hogg v. Nichols, 134 Ark. 280 .

1920Nelson v. Cowling, 89 Ark. 334 ; Collier v. Smith, 132 Ark. 309 , and Hogg v. Nichols, 134 Ark. 280 .

1919The leading cases construing this section of the statute are: Gibbons v. Moore, 98 Ark. 501 ; Crawford v. McDonald, 84 Ark. 415 ; Seldon v. Dudley E.

1919The leading cases construing this section of the statute are: Gibbons v. Moore, 98 Ark. 501 ; Crawford v. McDonald, 84 Ark. 415 ; Seldon v. Dudley E.

1914Kessinger v. Wilson, 53 Ark. 400 ; Griffin v. Dunn, supra. Being a married woman at and from the time of her father’s death to now, she was not bound to assert her right sooner, there being a saving clause for married women in the seven years’ -statute of limitations, section 5056.

1914Kessinger v. Wilson, 53 Ark. 400 ; Griffin v. Dunn, supra. Being a married woman at and from the time of her father’s death to now, she was not bound to assert her right sooner, there being a saving clause for married women in the seven years’ -statute of limitations, section 5056.

1886In South Carolina v. Galliard, 101 U. S., 433 , the court says: “ It is well settled that if a statute giving special remedy is repealed without a saving clause in favor of pending suits, all suits must stop where the repeal finds them.