saving clause in Connecticut

2000“Under § 13a-149, the plaintiff must provide statutory notice within ninety days of the accident in order for an action to lie for damages caused by a defective highway that the town must maintain. ‘[T]he notice which the statute prescribes comprehends five essential elements: (a) written notice of the injury; (b) a general description of that injury; (c) the cause; (d) the time [and date], and (e) the place thereof.’ Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577, 579 , 182 A. 225 (1935).” Pratt v. Old Saybrook, supra, 225 Conn. 180 . “[I]t is not without significance that the legislature provided a lib

2000“Under § 13a-149, the plaintiff must provide statutory notice within ninety days of the accident in order for an action to lie for damages caused by a defective highway that the town must maintain. ‘[T]he notice which the statute prescribes comprehends five essential elements: (a) written notice of the injury; (b) a general description of that injury; (c) the cause; (d) the time [and date], and (e) the place thereof.’ Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577, 579 , 182 A. 225 (1935).” Pratt v. Old Saybrook, supra, 225 Conn. 180 . “[I]t is not without significance that the legislature provided a lib

2000"While the saving clause will excuse inaccuracies in the content of the notice, however, it will not excuse a complete absence of notice." Bassin v. Stamford , 26 Conn. App. 534 , 538 , 602 A.2d 1044 (1992), citing Nicholaus v. Bridgeport , 117 Conn. 398 , 401 , 167 A. 826 (1933).

2000"While the saving clause will excuse inaccuracies in the content of the notice, however, it will not excuse a complete absence of notice." Bassin v. Stamford , 26 Conn. App. 534 , 538 , 602 A.2d 1044 (1992), citing Nicholaus v. Bridgeport , 117 Conn. 398 , 401 , 167 A. 826 (1933).

1992Section 13a-149 also contains a saving clause that provides that notice given under the statute will not be invalidated because of inaccuracies in its content as long as there was no intent to mislead the municipality or the municipality is not in fact misled.” Giannitti v. Stamford, 25 Conn. App. 67, 75 , 593 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 918 , 597 A.2d 333 (1991).

1992Section 13a-149 also contains a saving clause that provides that notice given under the statute will not be invalidated because of inaccuracies in its content as long as there was no intent to mislead the municipality or the municipality is not in fact misled.” Giannitti v. Stamford, 25 Conn. App. 67, 75 , 593 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 918 , 597 A.2d 333 (1991).

1992Section 13a-149 contains a saving clause which provides that "notice given under the statute will not be invalidated because of inaccuracies in its content as long as there was no intent to mislead the municipality or the municipality is not in fact misled." As pointed out in Giannitti v. Stamford, 25 Conn. App. 67 , 75-76 , 593 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 918 , 597 A.2d 333 (1991), these are two separate requirements, either one of which may be satisfied.

1992Section 13a-149 also contains a saving clause that provides that notice given under the statute will not be invalidated because of inaccuracies in its content as long as there was no intent to mislead the municipality or the municipality is not in fact misled.” Giannitti v. Stamford, 25 Conn. App. 67, 75 , 593 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 918 , 597 A.2d 333 (1991).

2014In effect they attach to every act repealing a statute within their purview a saving clause such as that sug- gested in State v. Daley, [ 29 Conn. 272 (1860)], under which the repealed statute still remains in full effect as regards any matter covered by it.’’ Simborski v. Wheeler, supra, 199 .

1936In effect they attach to every act repealing a statute within their purview a saving clause such as that suggested in State v. Daley, supra, under which the repealed statute still remains in full effect as regards any matter covered by it.

2008See Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 92-95 , 546 A.2d 1380 (1988) (recognizing that, if court had adopted common-law “year and a day rule,” rule was abrogated by Penal Code and saving clause of that code would preclude court from readopting that rule); see also State v. Guess, 244 Conn. 761, 778-79 , 715 A.2d 643 (1998) (determining that rule being considered was not inconsistent with Penal Code and therefore court not barred from adopting rule under saving clause); State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 44-45 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993) (same).

2008See Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 92-95 , 546 A.2d 1380 (1988) (recognizing that, if court had adopted common-law “year and a day rule,” rule was abrogated by Penal Code and saving clause of that code would preclude court from readopting that rule); see also State v. Guess, 244 Conn. 761, 778-79 , 715 A.2d 643 (1998) (determining that rule being considered was not inconsistent with Penal Code and therefore court not barred from adopting rule under saving clause); State v. Walton, 227 Conn. 32, 44-45 , 630 A.2d 990 (1993) (same).

2000"While the saving clause will excuse inaccuracies in the content of the notice, however, it will not excuse a complete absence of notice." Bassin v. Stamford , 26 Conn. App. 534 , 538 , 602 A.2d 1044 (1992), citing Nicholaus v. Bridgeport , 117 Conn. 398 , 401 , 167 A. 826 (1933).

2000"While the saving clause will excuse inaccuracies in the content of the notice, however, it will not excuse a complete absence of notice." Bassin v. Stamford , 26 Conn. App. 534 , 538 , 602 A.2d 1044 (1992), citing Nicholaus v. Bridgeport , 117 Conn. 398 , 401 , 167 A. 826 (1933).

1995Since there has not been a complete absence of notice; Bassin v. Stamford , supra, 26 Conn. App. 538 ; and Durso provided Sherman with a notice pinpointing the accident in front of 20 Wanzer Hill Road, in addition to the original notice, the application of the saving clause, relative to the location of the accident contained in the notices, is a question of fact for the jury. 7 Shapiro v. Hartford , 4 Conn. App. 315 , 317-18 , 494 A.2d 590 (1985) (whether saving clause of section 13a-149 applies with regard to its misleading nature, is a question of fact for the jury).

1995Since there has not been a complete absence of notice; Bassin v. Stamford , supra, 26 Conn. App. 538 ; and Durso provided Sherman with a notice pinpointing the accident in front of 20 Wanzer Hill Road, in addition to the original notice, the application of the saving clause, relative to the location of the accident contained in the notices, is a question of fact for the jury. 7 Shapiro v. Hartford , 4 Conn. App. 315 , 317-18 , 494 A.2d 590 (1985) (whether saving clause of section 13a-149 applies with regard to its misleading nature, is a question of fact for the jury).

1992Section 13a-149 contains a saving clause which provides that "notice given under the statute will not be invalidated because of inaccuracies in its content as long as there was no intent to mislead the municipality or the municipality is not in fact misled." As pointed out in Giannitti v. Stamford, 25 Conn. App. 67 , 75-76 , 593 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 918 , 597 A.2d 333 (1991), these are two separate requirements, either one of which may be satisfied.

1992Section 13a-149 also contains a saving clause that provides that notice given under the statute will not be invalidated because of inaccuracies in its content as long as there was no intent to mislead the municipality or the municipality is not in fact misled.” Giannitti v. Stamford, 25 Conn. App. 67, 75 , 593 A.2d 140 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 918 , 597 A.2d 333 (1991).

1992While the saving clause may "obviate inaccuracies in the description of an injury;" Flynn v. First National Bank Trust Co., 131 Conn. 430 , 434 , 40 A.2d 770 (1944); Main v. North Stonington, supra, 713 ; where a notice fails to give any description whatsoever of the injury claimed, the saving clause cannot "avail to validate it." Dunn v. Ives, supra, 114 .

1992While the saving clause may "obviate inaccuracies in the description of an injury;" Flynn v. First National Bank Trust Co., 131 Conn. 430 , 434 , 40 A.2d 770 (1944); Main v. North Stonington, supra, 713 ; where a notice fails to give any description whatsoever of the injury claimed, the saving clause cannot "avail to validate it." Dunn v. Ives, supra, 114 .

2026In so concluding, the court relied on Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144 , 3 A.2d 839 (1939), in which our Supreme Court stated that “a right of action in tort, not existing at common law but depending wholly upon statutory authority and not reduced to judgment before repeal of the statute upon which it rests, or a right to utilize a defense similarly dependent upon statute, is lost by and upon repeal without a saving clause.” Id., 149 .

2026In so concluding, the court relied on Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144 , 3 A.2d 839 (1939), in which our Supreme Court stated that “a right of action in tort, not existing at common law but depending wholly upon statutory authority and not reduced to judgment before repeal of the statute upon which it rests, or a right to utilize a defense similarly dependent upon statute, is lost by and upon repeal without a saving clause.” Id., 149 .

2023A necessary corollary to this is that the municipal highway notice requirement should be liberally construed since it, unlike § 13a-144, does contain a saving clause.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salemme v. Sey- mour, 262 Conn. 787 , 796 n.7, 817 A.2d 636 (2003).

2023A necessary corollary to this is that the municipal highway notice requirement should be liberally construed since it, unlike § 13a-144, does contain a saving clause.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Salemme v. Sey- mour, 262 Conn. 787 , 796 n.7, 817 A.2d 636 (2003).

2008Because, "[w]ith codification, the courts are, in general, confined to interpreting and applying the [c]ode, and changes require action by the codifying entity, in this case, the Judges of the Superior Court"; State v. Sawyer, supra, 279 Conn. at 374 , 904 A.2d 101 ( Borden, *97 J., concurring and dissenting); this provision was added to the code to temper this necessary loss of flexibility that previously was part of the common-law process.

2008Because, "[w]ith codification, the courts are, in general, confined to interpreting and applying the [c]ode, and changes require action by the codifying entity, in this case, the Judges of the Superior Court"; State v. Sawyer, supra, 279 Conn. at 374 , 904 A.2d 101 ( Borden, *97 J., concurring and dissenting); this provision was added to the code to temper this necessary loss of flexibility that previously was part of the common-law process.

2000Id., 560, citing Schaap v. Meriden , CT Page 8023 139 Conn. 254 , 93 A.2d 152 (1953), and Greenberg v. Waterbury , 117 Conn. 67 , 167 A. 83 (1933).

2000Id., 560, citing Schaap v. Meriden , CT Page 8023 139 Conn. 254 , 93 A.2d 152 (1953), and Greenberg v. Waterbury , 117 Conn. 67 , 167 A. 83 (1933).

2000Id., 560, citing Schaap v. Meriden , CT Page 8023 139 Conn. 254 , 93 A.2d 152 (1953), and Greenberg v. Waterbury , 117 Conn. 67 , 167 A. 83 (1933).

2000Id., 560, citing Schaap v. Meriden , CT Page 8023 139 Conn. 254 , 93 A.2d 152 (1953), and Greenberg v. Waterbury , 117 Conn. 67 , 167 A. 83 (1933).

1994Under the deemer clause, an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be `deemed' an insurance company, an insurer, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of state laws `purporting to regulate' insurance companies or insurance contracts." FMC Corp. v. Holliday, supra, 498 U.S. at 58 .

1993B The measure of damage under Connecticut General Statutes Section 52-560 is based on the value of the trees removed or the dimunition [diminution] of the land resulting from the destruction of the trees, Maldonado v. Connecticut Light and Power Co., 31 Conn. Sup. 536 (1974), pp. 539 and 540.

1992In his affidavit, the plaintiff's president also states that "the police and fire departments were involved," and "the next day . . . the Town had already cut off the offending branches." Even if a police report was in fact given to the Town Clerk, it "is not notice that a claim will be made against the city." Murray v. City of Milford, 380 F.2d 468 , 473 (2nd Cir. 1967).

1991In Shapiro v. Hartford, 4 Conn. App. 315, 317-18 , 494 A.2d 590 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 810 , 499 A.2d 61 (1985), we applied the word “or,” as it is used in the saving clause of § 13a-149, to allow for it to be read in the disjunctive requiring proof of either the intent to mislead or the fact that the city was misled.

1991In Shapiro v. Hartford, 4 Conn. App. 315, 317-18 , 494 A.2d 590 , cert. denied, 197 Conn. 810 , 499 A.2d 61 (1985), we applied the word “or,” as it is used in the saving clause of § 13a-149, to allow for it to be read in the disjunctive requiring proof of either the intent to mislead or the fact that the city was misled.

1991Essex Leasing, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 Conn. 595, 602-603 , 539 A.2d 101 (1988); In this case, the statute is clear in its use of the word “or.” When the defendant’s counsel conceded that any flaw in the notice was not made with the intent to mislead, it was he and not the court who removed the issue from the case and allowed the notice to be saved because it met one of the requirements of the saving clause.

1991Essex Leasing, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 206 Conn. 595, 602-603 , 539 A.2d 101 (1988); In this case, the statute is clear in its use of the word “or.” When the defendant’s counsel conceded that any flaw in the notice was not made with the intent to mislead, it was he and not the court who removed the issue from the case and allowed the notice to be saved because it met one of the requirements of the saving clause.

1988“The usual function of a saving clause is to preserve something from immediate interference . . . .” Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 162 , 40 S. Ct. 438 , 64 L.

1988“The usual function of a saving clause is to preserve something from immediate interference . . . .” Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 162 , 40 S. Ct. 438 , 64 L.

1988Lastly, although a majority of states retain the common law “year and a day” rule; State v. Minster, 302 Md. 240, 246-47 , 486 A.2d 1197 (1985); annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 1323 , 1325 (1974); it is in decline throughout the United States.

1988Lastly, although a majority of states retain the common law “year and a day” rule; State v. Minster, 302 Md. 240, 246-47 , 486 A.2d 1197 (1985); annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 1323 , 1325 (1974); it is in decline throughout the United States.