Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
24 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1845–1998 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pilot Life Insurance v. Dedeauxgreen2 sentences1989In regard to this, Justice O'Connor wrote that the Court first took "what guidance was available from a 'common-sense view' of the language of the saving clause itself." 481 U.S. at 48 , 107 S.Ct. 1553 ( "any law of any State which regulates insurance" ). 1989"Second," she wrote, "we made use of the case law interpreting the phrase 'business of insurance' under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. , in interpreting the saving clause"; and, she noted that in doing so the Court used these criteria: " ' [F]irst , whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second , whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third , whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry.' " 481 U.S. at 48 -49 , 107 S.Ct. at 155 | 1 | 2 |
cluster 382199green1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1 |
cluster 392847green1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1 |
Dennis C. Sours v. General Motors Corporationgreen1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1 |
Holly Shipp v. General Motors Corporationgreen2 sentences1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 1989Such compliance with "minimum safety standards does not exempt or immunize a manufacturer from common law strict liability." Shipp, 750 F.2d at 418 . | 1 | 1 |
Hughes v. Ford Motor Co.green1 sentence1989As Professor Miller summarizes, "The savings clause, it is argued, represents Congress'[s] intent that compliance with Federal safety standards does not protect automobile manufacturers from liability for defects relating to matters not covered by the federal standards." Airbag Preemption Controversy, supra, at 915 (citing Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F.Supp. 76, 78 (D.Conn. 1987); Cox v. Baltimore County, supra ; and Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn.App.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2905 , 101 L.Ed.2d 937 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Wickstrom Ex Rel. Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc.green1 sentence1989As Professor Miller summarizes, "The savings clause, it is argued, represents Congress'[s] intent that compliance with Federal safety standards does not protect automobile manufacturers from liability for defects relating to matters not covered by the federal standards." Airbag Preemption Controversy, supra, at 915 (citing Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F.Supp. 76, 78 (D.Conn. 1987); Cox v. Baltimore County, supra ; and Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn.App.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2905 , 101 L.Ed.2d 937 (1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Lindsey v. State Department of Pensions & Securitygreen1 sentence1986See, Brady v. State Pilotage Commission , 485 So.2d 1179 (Ala.Civ.App. 1985). | 1 | 1 |
Hardman v. Personnel Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences1985"In the absence of any saving clause, a new law changing a rule of practice is generally regarded as applicable to all cases then pending." 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes § 354 (1974) (footnote omitted); see Hardman v. Personnel Board , 100 R.I. 145 , 211 A.2d 660 (1965). 1985"In the absence of any saving clause, a new law changing a rule of practice is generally regarded as applicable to all cases then pending." 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes § 354 (1974) (footnote omitted); see Hardman v. Personnel Board , 100 R.I. 145 , 211 A.2d 660 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
| Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989We have observed in the past that the express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, and designed to 'establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.' Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. , 451 U.S. 504 , 523 , 101 S.Ct. 1895 , 1906 , 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981). 1989We have observed in the past that the express pre-emption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive, and designed to 'establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.' Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. , 451 U.S. 504 , 523 , 101 S.Ct. 1895 , 1906 , 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981). | 2 | 1984–1989 |
Howell v. Hair
green
2 sentences1853Again; it is insisted that the cases of Howell v. Hair, 15 Ala. 194 , and Newcombe v. Leavitt, 22 Ala. 631 , are decisive of the question under consideration in favor of the ruling of the court below. 1850Neither will the court imply a saving or an exception restrictive of its operation and which is not found in the statute. — Howell v. Hair, 15 Ala. 194 . | 2 | 1850–1853 |
CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood
green
2 sentences1998Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 662 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 . 1998Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 662 , 113 S.Ct. 1732 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Tucker v. Nichols
green
1 sentence1989Moreover, our decision in Tucker v. Nichols , 431 So.2d 1263 (Ala. 1983), interpreted this saving clause broadly in order to avoid finding it unconstitutional. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Retail Clerks International Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn
green
2 sentences1989"Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation: " 'Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .' § 514(a), as set-forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (pre-emption clause). " '. . . .' ". . . . " '[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional in 1989"Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation: " 'Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .' § 514(a), as set-forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (pre-emption clause). " '. . . .' ". . . . " '[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional in | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Cox v. Baltimore County
green
1 sentence1989As Professor Miller summarizes, "The savings clause, it is argued, represents Congress'[s] intent that compliance with Federal safety standards does not protect automobile manufacturers from liability for defects relating to matters not covered by the federal standards." Airbag Preemption Controversy, supra, at 915 (citing Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F.Supp. 76, 78 (D.Conn. 1987); Cox v. Baltimore County, supra ; and Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn.App.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2905 , 101 L.Ed.2d 937 (1988)). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
green
2 sentences1989Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 , 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 (1963). [6] *943 Nor is the Wood court's assertion that the saving clause was meant to preserve common law warranty claims persuasive. 1989Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 , 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 (1963). [6] *943 Nor is the Wood court's assertion that the saving clause was meant to preserve common law warranty claims persuasive. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
cluster 497073
green
2 sentences1989However, the Alabama law of bad faith appears to us to have the same roots 'in the general principles of . . . tort and contract law' as was the case in Dedeaux . " 833 F.2d at 281 . 3 In Farlow v. Union Cent. 1989However, the Alabama law of bad faith appears to us to have the same roots `in the general principles of ... tort and contract law' as was the case in Dedeaux." 833 F.2d at 281 . [3] In Farlow v. Union Cent. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Patricia M. Wood v. General Motors Corporation
green
2 sentences1989In Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir.1988), the First Circuit Court of Appeals discusses the state of the common law in 1966 concerning products liability and actions similar to the one now before this Court. 1989Thus when Congress inserted the savings clause, it did not contemplate that lawsuits would be brought with the potential to give rise to the current dilemma." 865 F.2d at 406 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Santor v. a & M KARAGHEUSIAN, INC.
red
2 sentences1989Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 , 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 (1963). [6] *943 Nor is the Wood court's assertion that the saving clause was meant to preserve common law warranty claims persuasive. 1989Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52 , 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57 , 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 , 377 P.2d 897 (1963). [6] *943 Nor is the Wood court's assertion that the saving clause was meant to preserve common law warranty claims persuasive. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Malone v. White Motor Corp.
green
2 sentences1989"Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation: " 'Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .' § 514(a), as set-forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (pre-emption clause). " '. . . .' ". . . . " '[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional in 1989"Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation: " 'Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .' § 514(a), as set-forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (pre-emption clause). " '. . . .' ". . . . " '[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional in | 1 | 1989–1989 |
General Motors Corp. v. Edwards
green
1 sentence1989On appeal, the Schwartzes argue that, in light of this Court's decision in General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176 (Ala.1985), and the saving clause, the trial *930 court erred in precluding air bag/passive restraint claims because Congress neither expressly nor impliedly preempted such claims. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Union Labor Life Insurance v. Pireno
green
2 sentences1989Co. v. Pireno , 458 U.S. 119 , 129 , 102 S.Ct. 3002 , 3008 , 73 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982) (emphasis in original). 1989Co. v. Pireno , 458 U.S. 119 , 129 , 102 S.Ct. 3002 , 3008 , 73 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982) (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey
green
1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Marschak v. Kirkland
green
1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
LeClair v. Saunders
green
1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
H. L. Moore Drug Exchange v. Lilly
green
1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Turoso v. Cleveland Municipal Court
green
1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Shelley v. City of Los Angeles
neutral
1 sentence1989As Professor Miller summarizes, "The savings clause, it is argued, represents Congress'[s] intent that compliance with Federal safety standards does not protect automobile manufacturers from liability for defects relating to matters not covered by the federal standards." Airbag Preemption Controversy, supra, at 915 (citing Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677 F.Supp. 76, 78 (D.Conn. 1987); Cox v. Baltimore County, supra ; and Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn.App.1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2905 , 101 L.Ed.2d 937 (1988)). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck
green
2 sentences1989"Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation: " 'Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .' § 514(a), as set-forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (pre-emption clause). " '. . . .' ". . . . " '[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional in 1989"Congress capped off the massive undertaking of ERISA with three provisions relating to the pre-emptive effect of the federal legislation: " 'Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section [the saving clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .' § 514(a), as set-forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a) (pre-emption clause). " '. . . .' ". . . . " '[T]he question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional in | 1 | 1989–1989 |
The J.W. Copeland Co. v. Brown
green
1 sentence1989See, e.g., Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (where injury was caused by collapse of automobile's roof, fact that manufacturer complied with the only safety standard pertinent did not preclude plaintiff's recovery); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (6th Cir.1983) (alleged compliance with FMVSS 216, promulgated after subject automobile was manufactured, not a defense); Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656-57 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 , 103 S.Ct. 177 , 74 L.Ed.2d 145 (1982) (although manufacturer complied with FMVSS 209 | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| cluster 349214 green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Finney v. Speed neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Monroe v. Simmons green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Funk v. Wingert green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Seybold v. Magnolia Land Co. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Carlson v. Erickson neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Jones v. Dimmick green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Blake v. State ex rel. Going green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Timmerman v. Stout neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| State ex rel. Clarke v. Carter neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| State ex rel. Crumpton v. Montgomery green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| State Ex Rel. Harmon v. Murphy neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Ex Parte Elmore neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| King v. State neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Clemmons v. State neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Lee v. Hester neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Carling v. Wilson green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Manning v. Carter neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
| Terry v. Rich neutral | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.