employee claim in New Jersey

2020In Lehmann, the Court determined an employee states a claim for hostile work environment when the employee alleges "severe or pervasive" discriminatory conduct that "create[s] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 132 N.J. at 592 .

2007This Court in Lehmann, supra, held that an employee states a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment under the LAD when the victim alleges “severe or pervasive” discriminatory conduct that “create[s] an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.” 132 N.J. at 592 , 626 A.2d 445 .

2024Consistent with its purpose, the WPL provides that "officers and managers of an employing corporation [are] personally liable if that corporation fails to pay wages to an employee in violation of the statute." Ibid.

2016Under Monell, "[a] municipality can only be held liable for constitutional violations committed by an employee when the violation resulted from an official municipal 'policy or custom.'" Stomel v. City of Camden, 383 N.J.

2016Super. 615, 627 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 371 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S. Ct. 1083 , 148 L.

2016Super. 615, 627 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 371 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S. Ct. 1083 , 148 L.

2016Super. 615, 627 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 371 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146 , 121 S. Ct. 1083 , 148 L.

2008In evaluating whether alleged incidents of discrimination constitute a continuing violation, a court should consider three factors: (i) subject matter — whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination; (ii) frequency; and (iii) permanence — whether the nature of the violations should trigger an employee's awareness of the need to assert her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. [ Bolinger, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 307 , 749 A. 2d 857 (citations omitted).] In Charlton v. Paramus Board of Educat

2008In evaluating whether alleged incidents of discrimination constitute a continuing violation, a court should consider three factors: (i) subject matter — whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination; (ii) frequency; and (iii) permanence — whether the nature of the violations should trigger an employee's awareness of the need to assert her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. [ Bolinger, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 307 , 749 A. 2d 857 (citations omitted).] In Charlton v. Paramus Board of Educat

2008In evaluating whether alleged incidents of discrimination constitute a continuing violation, a court should consider three factors: (i) subject matter — whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination; (ii) frequency; and (iii) permanence — whether the nature of the violations should trigger an employee's awareness of the need to assert her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. [ Bolinger, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 307 , 749 A. 2d 857 (citations omitted).] In Charlton v. Paramus Board of Educat

2008In evaluating whether alleged incidents of discrimination constitute a continuing violation, a court should consider three factors: (i) subject matter — whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination; (ii) frequency; and (iii) permanence — whether the nature of the violations should trigger an employee's awareness of the need to assert her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate. [ Bolinger, supra, 330 N.J.Super. at 307 , 749 A. 2d 857 (citations omitted).] In Charlton v. Paramus Board of Educat

2008The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiff's retaliation claim on the ground that the allegedly retaliatory action "had no impact on any employment relationship that [the plaintiff] had, or might have in the future." Id. at 389 .

2006Although the grounds for the State denying indemnification under N.J.S.A. 59:10-2 “parallel ] the first two exceptions to the defense provision, listed in N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2,” Chasin, supra, 159 N.J. at 432 , 732 A.2d 457 , the determination whether the State has a duty to indemnify an employee for defense costs may be significantly different in some cases than a determination of the Attorney General’s duty under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 and -2 to provide representation.

2006Although the grounds for the State denying indemnification under N.J.S.A. 59:10-2 “parallel ] the first two exceptions to the defense provision, listed in N.J.S.A. 59:10A-2,” Chasin, supra, 159 N.J. at 432 , 732 A.2d 457 , the determination whether the State has a duty to indemnify an employee for defense costs may be significantly different in some cases than a determination of the Attorney General’s duty under N.J.S.A. 59:10A-1 and -2 to provide representation.

2006A municipality can only be held liable for constitutional violations committed by an employee when the violation resulted from an official municipal "policy or custom." Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 371 , 749 A. 2d 336 (citing Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 694 , 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38 , 56 L.Ed. 2d at 638 ).

2006A municipality can only be held liable for constitutional violations committed by an employee when the violation resulted from an official municipal "policy or custom." Schneider, supra, 163 N.J. at 371 , 749 A. 2d 336 (citing Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at 694 , 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38 , 56 L.Ed. 2d at 638 ).

1995Twenty-five years ago, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 57 N.J. 174 , 270 A.2d 625 (1970), this Court extended coverage to an automobile dealer’s employee who drove a customer’s car when the dealer had permitted the employee to test drive the car in connection with certain repairs.

1995Twenty-five years ago, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 57 N.J. 174 , 270 A.2d 625 (1970), this Court extended coverage to an automobile dealer’s employee who drove a customer’s car when the dealer had permitted the employee to test drive the car in connection with certain repairs.

1994Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 540 , 170 A. 2d 241 (1961).

1994Eule v. Eule Motor Sales, 34 N.J. 537, 540 , 170 A. 2d 241 (1961).

1993Also, the enforceability of such a provision must be construed in accordance with "the reasonable expectations of the employees." Woolley, 99 N.J. at 298 , 491 A. 2d 1257 . [ 258 N.J.

1993Also, the enforceability of such a provision must be construed in accordance with "the reasonable expectations of the employees." Woolley, 99 N.J. at 298 , 491 A. 2d 1257 . [ 258 N.J.

1993In Gilbert, supra, it was specifically noted that in order for an employee to state a claim for an employer's violation of its oral or written policy on termination: It is enough that the employee reasonably believes that a particular personnel policy has been established and is applied consistently and uniformly to each employee.

1993Also, the enforceability of such a provision must be construed in accordance with "the reasonable expectations of the employees." Woolley, 99 N.J. at 298 , 491 A. 2d 1257 . [ 258 N.J.

1991Ibid.; State Supervisory Employee Ass'n, 78 N.J. at 90-91 , 393 A. 2d 233 ; Bd. of Educ.

1991Ibid.; State Supervisory Employee Ass'n, 78 N.J. at 90-91 , 393 A. 2d 233 ; Bd. of Educ.

1991Defendant finds solace in the original phraseology of Suter , which could be interpreted as limiting the employee exception to "an employee engaged at his assigned task on a plant machine." 81 N.J. at 167 , 406 A. 2d 140 . [7] This language has given rise to at least two issues: First, is there a limitation to industrial machinery in a plant?

1991Defendant finds solace in the original phraseology of Suter , which could be interpreted as limiting the employee exception to "an employee engaged at his assigned task on a plant machine." 81 N.J. at 167 , 406 A. 2d 140 . [7] This language has given rise to at least two issues: First, is there a limitation to industrial machinery in a plant?

1984Super. 153 (App.Div. 1982), the court, citing Pierce , said: "The task of a court is to distinguish between public policy and the employee's own values; the latter would not entitle the employee to immunity from discharge[.]" Id. at 156 .

1974NOTES [1] The counterclaim was stricken on motion on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. 121 N.J.