employee claim (Florida) · Go Syfert
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employee claim in Florida

13 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2024 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (12)

CaseFollowedCited
Sierra v. Associated Marine Institutes, Inc.green
fladistctapp · 2003 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Section 768.28(9)(a), Florida Statutes (2023), provides as follows: (9)(a) An officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any of its subdivisions may not be held personally liable in tort or named as a party defendant in any action for any injury or damage 6 Though sovereign immunity may be considered on a motion to dismiss, Verdini, 339 So. 3d at 417, “sovereign immunity generally is an affirmative defense that may justify granting a motion to dismiss only when the complaint itself conclusively establishes its applicability.” City of Miami v. Cruz, 342 So. 3d 741 , 743 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (

11
Kist v. Hubbardgreen
fladistctapp · 2012 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024“In order to adequately assert a cause of action against [defendant] in his personal capacity, [the] complaint must allege one of the identified exceptions to the employee immunity statute[, § 768.28(9)(a).]” Kist v. Hubbard, 93 So. 3d 1100, 1101 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).

11
City of Miami v. FOP, MIAMI LODGE 20green
fla · 1987 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Here, the Employee’s claim alleges the City refused to discuss the grievance in good faith, which is an inherent interference with section 447.401, and “constitut[es] conduct prohibited by Section 447.501(1)(a).” Westfall, 8 F.P.E.R. ¶ 13367 at 648; see also City of Miami v. Fraternal Order of Police, Miami Lodge 20, 511 So. 2d 549, 552 (Fla. 1987) (“[PERC’s] policy of deferral represents a reasonable method for 5 PERC to give effect to all of its statutory duties, particularly the mandatory requirements of section 447.401.” (emphasis added)).

11
Grogan v. Heritage NH, LLCgreen
fladistctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018However, since the Employee’s claim alleges sexual harassment by “a direct supervisor, the employee does not have to prove the fifth element.” Grogan v. Heritage NH, LLC, 126 So. 3d 262, 264 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

11
City of Ocoee v. Trimblegreen
fladistctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017To accept or deny a claim, the E/C must “advise the employee of claim acceptance or denial.” City of Ocoee v. Trimble, 929 So.2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

11
Carlile v. GAME AND FRESH WATER FISH COM'Ngreen
fla · 1977 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012See Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n., 354 So.2d 362, 364-65 (Fla.1977); Sch.

11
University of Cincinnati v. Johnsongreen
scotus · 2000 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.) (an employee may claim protected status under section 1981 for advocacy of minorities even if the employee is not a member of a recognized protected group), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 657 , 148 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988) (a white employee who was not fired because of his race, but who claimed that he was fired because he assisted a black co-employee with the co-employee's EEOC claim, could maintain a section 1981 action against his former employer); Winst

11
Miravalle v. Florida Bargreen
scotus · 2000 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.) (an employee may claim protected status under section 1981 for advocacy of minorities even if the employee is not a member of a recognized protected group), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 657 , 148 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988) (a white employee who was not fired because of his race, but who claimed that he was fired because he assisted a black co-employee with the co-employee's EEOC claim, could maintain a section 1981 action against his former employer); Winst

11
John B. Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, Joseph A. Steger, and Donald C. Harrisongreen
ca6 · 2000 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 2001–2001
1 sentence

2001See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.) (an employee may claim protected status under section 1981 for advocacy of minorities even if the employee is not a member of a recognized protected group), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 657 , 148 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988) (a white employee who was not fired because of his race, but who claimed that he was fired because he assisted a black co-employee with the co-employee's EEOC claim, could maintain a section 1981 action against his former employer); Winst

11
Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Del Aguilagreen
fla · 1982 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
1 sentence

1986On Motion for Rehearing We agree with K-Mart’s contention on rehearing that “in order for an employer to be held vicariously liable in punitive damages for the tort of an employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior, there must be proof of some fault on the part of the principal.” Life Insurance Company of North America v. Del Aguila, 417 So.2d 651, 653 (Fla.1982).

11
State Board of Control v. Clutter Construction Corporationgreen
fladistctapp · 1962 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
1 sentence

1981Id. at 657, 658 . *569 Appellant relies upon the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in State Board of Control v. Clutter Construction Corporation, 139 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1962), in which the court held the contractor was entitled to withdraw his bid for construction of a classroom building where an error of $100,000 on the low side in computation was either due to a malfunction in a computing machine used by an employee or an error by the employee in manipulating it.

11
Graham v. Clydegreen
fla · 1952 · cited in 1 Florida opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
1 sentence

1981Id. at 657, 658 . *569 Appellant relies upon the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in State Board of Control v. Clutter Construction Corporation, 139 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1962), in which the court held the contractor was entitled to withdraw his bid for construction of a classroom building where an error of $100,000 on the low side in computation was either due to a malfunction in a computing machine used by an employee or an error by the employee in manipulating it.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
Femme Coiffure Hair Spa, Inc. v. Josloff Investments, LLC neutral
fladistctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2017In that appeal the employee may challenge the City Manager’s factual determinations, but not, as just explained, the disciplinary penalty imposed by the City Manager. 2 We acknowledge that dictum in City of Miami v. Martinez-Esteve, 125 So. 3d 295 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), indicated that the City may be able to seek review of the Civil Service Board’s actions by way of an appeal to the circuit court’s appellate division.

12017–2017
Dennis Skinner, and Cross-Appellant v. Total Petroleum, Inc., a Michigan Corporation, and Cross-Appellee green
ca10 · 1988
1 sentence

2001See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.) (an employee may claim protected status under section 1981 for advocacy of minorities even if the employee is not a member of a recognized protected group), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 657 , 148 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988) (a white employee who was not fired because of his race, but who claimed that he was fired because he assisted a black co-employee with the co-employee's EEOC claim, could maintain a section 1981 action against his former employer); Winst

12001–2001
David DeMATTEIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee green
ca2 · 1975
1 sentence

2001See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.) (an employee may claim protected status under section 1981 for advocacy of minorities even if the employee is not a member of a recognized protected group), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 657 , 148 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988) (a white employee who was not fired because of his race, but who claimed that he was fired because he assisted a black co-employee with the co-employee's EEOC claim, could maintain a section 1981 action against his former employer); Winst

12001–2001
Tom WINSTON, Plaintiff, and Russ Leone, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LEAR-SIEGLER, INC., a Corporation, Defendant-Appellee green
ca6 · 1977
1 sentence

2001See, e.g., Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561 (6th Cir.) (an employee may claim protected status under section 1981 for advocacy of minorities even if the employee is not a member of a recognized protected group), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 657 , 148 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439 (10th Cir. 1988) (a white employee who was not fired because of his race, but who claimed that he was fired because he assisted a black co-employee with the co-employee's EEOC claim, could maintain a section 1981 action against his former employer); Winst

12001–2001
Avallone v. Bd. of County Com'rs Citrus Cty. green
fla · 1986
1 sentence

1990Appellant argues that a basis for the broad interpretation of the statute is found in Avallone v. Bd. of County Comm’r., 493 So.2d 1002 (Fla.1986).

11990–1990
Mercury Motors Exp., Inc. v. Smith green
fla · 1981
1 sentence

1982In Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1981), which was *653 decided after the district court's decision in the instant case, we held that in order for an employer to be held vicariously liable in punitive damages for the tort of an employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior, there must be proof of some fault on the part of the principal.

11982–1982
State Board of Control v. CLUTTER CONSTRUCTION CO. green
fla · 1962
1 sentence

1981Id. at 657, 658 . *569 Appellant relies upon the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in State Board of Control v. Clutter Construction Corporation, 139 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), cert. denied, 146 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1962), in which the court held the contractor was entitled to withdraw his bid for construction of a classroom building where an error of $100,000 on the low side in computation was either due to a malfunction in a computing machine used by an employee or an error by the employee in manipulating it.

11981–1981
Pinellas Cty. C. Teachrs. Ass'n v. Bd. of Public Instr. of Pinellas Cty. neutral
fla · 1968
1 sentence

1974Section 839.221, F.S.A., or it can obtain an injunction to restrain a strike of its employees as was approved in Pinellas County Classroom Teachers Association, Inc. v. Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas County, Fla.1968, 214 So.2d 34 .

11974–1974
Smith v. Poston Equipment Rentals green
fladistctapp · 1958
1 sentence

1968Further, respondent, citing Smith v. Poston Equipment Rentals, Inc., Fla.App. 1958, 105 So.2d 578 , contends that said case expressly involved the alleged responsibility on the part of the lessor under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the alleged negligent conduct of its employee, and argues therefrom that the immunity of the lessee-employer inures to the benefit of the lessor whether such lessor might otherwise be responsible to the employee under the doctrine of dangerous instrumentality or respondeat superior.

11968–1968

Statutes the citing opinions construe

FL § 768.28 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 103 (1919–2026) OH 62 (1945–2025) MO 53 (1907–2024) TX 47 (1950–2025) IL 44 (1914–2024) NY 37 (1929–2025) CT 27 (1944–2020) MD 26 (1986–2019) TN 26 (1918–2025) WV 24 (1900–2022) PA 23 (1922–2026) IN 18 (1938–2018) NJ 18 (1974–2026) SC 15 (1945–2021) IA 15 (1948–2023) MN 14 (1969–2015) FL 13 (1968–2024) NM 13 (1945–2023) AZ 13 (1927–2026) LA 13 (1983–2026) VA 13 (1967–2024) AL 13 (1925–2017) GA 12 (1938–2010) WI 12 (1975–2024) NE 12 (1980–2025) MA 11 (1953–2013) MI 11 (1913–2024) OK 11 (1936–2016) NC 11 (1970–2018) ID 10 (1962–2021) ME 9 (1978–2022) OR 8 (1978–2020) AK 7 (1961–2010) DE 7 (1971–2024) RI 7 (1972–2014) WA 6 (1956–2021) MT 6 (1928–2017) CO 6 (1988–2005) KS 6 (1920–2026) AR 5 (1989–1997) UT 5 (1943–2021) HI 5 (1982–1998) KY 4 (1961–2024) SD 4 (1992–2008) WY 4 (1982–2019) DC 4 (2001–2015) ND 2 (1937–1963) MS 2 (1994–1998)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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