employee claim in Pennsylvania

2018It explained as follows: [T]o the extent the Commonwealth Court has refused to apply the VLO Proviso because employees voluntarily accepted early retirement packages or because their jobs were not in danger if they did not accept the package, we reject that analysis which is not supported by the language of the statute requiring an employee’s “acceptance” of the layoff option and the existence of “an available position.” Diehl, 57 A.3d at 1221 (emphasis added).

2018It explained as follows: [T]o the extent the Commonwealth Court has refused to apply the VLO Proviso because employees voluntarily accepted early retirement packages or because their jobs were not in danger if they did not accept the package , we reject that analysis which is not supported by the language of the statute requiring an employee's "acceptance" of the layoff option and the existence of "an available position." Diehl , 57 A.3d at 1221 (emphasis added).

2016“Where a[n appellant] claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a particular witness, we require proof of that witness’s availability to testify, as well an adequate assertion that the substance of the purported testimony would make a difference in the case.” Commonwealth v. Clark, 961 A.2d 80, 90 (Pa. 2008).

2009John’s L.Rev. 1197 (2006); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446-447 , 123 S.Ct. 1673 , 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms the cost of compliance must be respected); Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 , 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 (2002) (finding that the primary reason to exempt small employers from anti discrimination law was to protect small employers from exposure to liability); Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir.1999) (“The purpose [of the minimum employee threshold under Tit

2009John's L.Rev. 1197 (2006); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446-447 , 123 S.Ct. 1673 , 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms the cost of compliance must be respected); Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 , 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 (2002) (finding that the primary reason to exempt small employers from anti discrimination law was to protect small employers from exposure to liability); Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir.1999) ("The purpose [of the minimum employee threshold under Tit

2009John’s L.Rev. 1197 (2006); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446-447 , 123 S.Ct. 1673 , 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms the cost of compliance must be respected); Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 , 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 (2002) (finding that the primary reason to exempt small employers from anti discrimination law was to protect small employers from exposure to liability); Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir.1999) (“The purpose [of the minimum employee threshold under Tit

2009John’s L.Rev. 1197 (2006); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446-447 , 123 S.Ct. 1673 , 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms the cost of compliance must be respected); Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 , 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 (2002) (finding that the primary reason to exempt small employers from anti discrimination law was to protect small employers from exposure to liability); Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir.1999) (“The purpose [of the minimum employee threshold under Tit

2009John’s L.Rev. 1197 (2006); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446-447 , 123 S.Ct. 1673 , 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms the cost of compliance must be respected); Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 , 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 (2002) (finding that the primary reason to exempt small employers from anti discrimination law was to protect small employers from exposure to liability); Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir.1999) (“The purpose [of the minimum employee threshold under Tit

2009John's L.Rev. 1197 (2006); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446-447 , 123 S.Ct. 1673 , 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms the cost of compliance must be respected); Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 , 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 (2002) (finding that the primary reason to exempt small employers from anti discrimination law was to protect small employers from exposure to liability); Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir.1999) ("The purpose [of the minimum employee threshold under Tit

2009John’s L.Rev. 1197 (2006); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446-447 , 123 S.Ct. 1673 , 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms the cost of compliance must be respected); Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 , 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 (2002) (finding that the primary reason to exempt small employers from anti discrimination law was to protect small employers from exposure to liability); Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir.1999) (“The purpose [of the minimum employee threshold under Tit

2009John's L.Rev. 1197 (2006); Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446-447 , 123 S.Ct. 1673 , 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (noting that congressional intent to spare small firms the cost of compliance must be respected); Thibodeau v. Design Group One Architects, LLC, 260 Conn. 691 , 802 A.2d 731, 740-41 (2002) (finding that the primary reason to exempt small employers from anti discrimination law was to protect small employers from exposure to liability); Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir.1999) ("The purpose [of the minimum employee threshold under Tit

1997Cf., Griswold, 658 A.2d at 452-453 (no issue preclusion where there was a clear difference between unemployment issue of "willful misconduct" and civil service commission issue of "just cause"); Morrison, supra (same).

1997Cf, Griswold, 658 A.2d at 452-453 (no issue preclusion where there was a clear difference between unemployment issue of “willful misconduct” and civil service commission issue of “just cause”); Morrison, supra (same).

1994See Scott. “[Allowing an employee to claim equitable estoppel where the law declares that no implied contract exists would simply undercut the rule that an action for wrongful discharge does not exist in an at-will employment relationship.” Ruzicki v. Catholic Cemeteries Assoc. of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, 416 Pa.Superior Ct. 37, 44, 610 A.2d 495, 498 (1992).

1994See Scott. "[A]llowing an employee to claim equitable estoppel where the law declares that no implied contract exists would simply undercut the rule that an action for wrongful discharge does not exist in an at-will employment relationship." Ruzicki v. Catholic Cemeteries Assoc. of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, 416 Pa.Superior Ct. 37, 44, 610 A.2d 495, 498 (1992). *562 In my opinion, Pavonarius v. City of Allentown, 157 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 116, 629 A.2d 204 (1993), is inapposite in this case, because the plaintiff police officer had civil service tenure.

1994In my opinion, Pavonarius v. City of Allentown, 157 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 116, 629 A.2d 204 (1993), is inapposite in this case, because the plaintiff police officer had civil service tenure.

1994See Scott. "[A]llowing an employee to claim equitable estoppel where the law declares that no implied contract exists would simply undercut the rule that an action for wrongful discharge does not exist in an at-will employment relationship." Ruzicki v. Catholic Cemeteries Assoc. of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, 416 Pa.Superior Ct. 37, 44, 610 A.2d 495, 498 (1992). *562 In my opinion, Pavonarius v. City of Allentown, 157 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 116, 629 A.2d 204 (1993), is inapposite in this case, because the plaintiff police officer had civil service tenure.

1987We are thus constrained to find that the Board's decision to assume jurisdiction was not rationally "derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language and context and any other indicia of the parties' intent." Minersville Area School District v. Minersville Area School Service Personnel Association, 102 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 409, 411 , 518 A.2d 874, 875 (1986), citing International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1201, AFL-CIO v. Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia, 500 Pa. 474 , 457 A.2d 1269 (1983).

1987We are thus constrained to find that the Board's decision to assume jurisdiction was not rationally "derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language and context and any other indicia of the parties' intent." Minersville Area School District v. Minersville Area School Service Personnel Association, 102 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 409, 411 , 518 A.2d 874, 875 (1986), citing International Brotherhood of Firemen & Oilers, Local 1201, AFL-CIO v. Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia, 500 Pa. 474 , 457 A.2d 1269 (1983).