12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1938–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Judicial Complaint, In Re:green1 sentence2010See also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) ("[i]t is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim"); Camden County, supra, 271 Ga. at 665 (1), 523 S.E.2d 291 ("[d]ue process entitles the employee to a... hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy"); Atlanta City School Dist., supra, 266 Ga. at 218 , 466 S.E.2d 588 | 1 | 1 |
Camden County v. Haddockgreen2 sentences2010See also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) ("[i]t is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim"); Camden County, supra, 271 Ga. at 665 (1), 523 S.E.2d 291 ("[d]ue process entitles the employee to a... hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy"); Atlanta City School Dist., supra, 266 Ga. at 218 , 466 S.E.2d 588 2010See also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) ("[i]t is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim"); Camden County, supra, 271 Ga. at 665 (1), 523 S.E.2d 291 ("[d]ue process entitles the employee to a... hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy"); Atlanta City School Dist., supra, 266 Ga. at 218 , 466 S.E.2d 588 | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Chatham Countygreen2 sentences2010See also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) ("[i]t is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim"); Camden County, supra, 271 Ga. at 665 (1), 523 S.E.2d 291 ("[d]ue process entitles the employee to a... hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy"); Atlanta City School Dist., supra, 266 Ga. at 218 , 466 S.E.2d 588 2010See also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) ("[i]t is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim"); Camden County, supra, 271 Ga. at 665 (1), 523 S.E.2d 291 ("[d]ue process entitles the employee to a... hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy"); Atlanta City School Dist., supra, 266 Ga. at 218 , 466 S.E.2d 588 | 1 | 1 |
Peoples v. Guthriegreen2 sentences2007Center, 273 Ga. App. 355, 357 (3) ( 615 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer medical center where administrator’s allegedly defamatory statement was intracorporate); see also Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 266 Ga. App. 515, 519-520 (2) ( 597 SE2d 571 ) (2004) (granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the absence of evidence that the employee hearing the allegedly defamatory statement was not authorized to receive the information). 6 Peoples v. Guthrie, 199 Ga. App. 119, 121-122 (2) ( 404 SE2d 442 ) (1991) (affirming judgment n.o.v. to defendant, and explaining t 2007Center, 273 Ga. App. 355, 357 (3) ( 615 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer medical center where administrator’s allegedly defamatory statement was intracorporate); see also Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 266 Ga. App. 515, 519-520 (2) ( 597 SE2d 571 ) (2004) (granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the absence of evidence that the employee hearing the allegedly defamatory statement was not authorized to receive the information). 6 Peoples v. Guthrie, 199 Ga. App. 119, 121-122 (2) ( 404 SE2d 442 ) (1991) (affirming judgment n.o.v. to defendant, and explaining t | 1 | 1 |
Galardi v. Steele-Inmangreen2 sentences2007Center, 273 Ga. App. 355, 357 (3) ( 615 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer medical center where administrator’s allegedly defamatory statement was intracorporate); see also Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 266 Ga. App. 515, 519-520 (2) ( 597 SE2d 571 ) (2004) (granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the absence of evidence that the employee hearing the allegedly defamatory statement was not authorized to receive the information). 6 Peoples v. Guthrie, 199 Ga. App. 119, 121-122 (2) ( 404 SE2d 442 ) (1991) (affirming judgment n.o.v. to defendant, and explaining t 2007Center, 273 Ga. App. 355, 357 (3) ( 615 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer medical center where administrator’s allegedly defamatory statement was intracorporate); see also Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 266 Ga. App. 515, 519-520 (2) ( 597 SE2d 571 ) (2004) (granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the absence of evidence that the employee hearing the allegedly defamatory statement was not authorized to receive the information). 6 Peoples v. Guthrie, 199 Ga. App. 119, 121-122 (2) ( 404 SE2d 442 ) (1991) (affirming judgment n.o.v. to defendant, and explaining t | 1 | 1 |
Atlanta Multispecialty Surgical Associates, LLC v. DeKalb Medical Center, Inc.green2 sentences2007Center, 273 Ga. App. 355, 357 (3) ( 615 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer medical center where administrator’s allegedly defamatory statement was intracorporate); see also Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 266 Ga. App. 515, 519-520 (2) ( 597 SE2d 571 ) (2004) (granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the absence of evidence that the employee hearing the allegedly defamatory statement was not authorized to receive the information). 6 Peoples v. Guthrie, 199 Ga. App. 119, 121-122 (2) ( 404 SE2d 442 ) (1991) (affirming judgment n.o.v. to defendant, and explaining t 2007Center, 273 Ga. App. 355, 357 (3) ( 615 SE2d 166 ) (2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment to employer medical center where administrator’s allegedly defamatory statement was intracorporate); see also Galardi v. Steele-Inman, 266 Ga. App. 515, 519-520 (2) ( 597 SE2d 571 ) (2004) (granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict in the absence of evidence that the employee hearing the allegedly defamatory statement was not authorized to receive the information). 6 Peoples v. Guthrie, 199 Ga. App. 119, 121-122 (2) ( 404 SE2d 442 ) (1991) (affirming judgment n.o.v. to defendant, and explaining t | 1 | 1 |
Fuller v. Kolbgreen2 sentences1992Fuller v. Kolb, 238 Ga. 602, 604 ( 234 SE2d 517 ). (c) Each covenant relied upon by appellants provides: “The running of the post-termination [two-year, three-year, or four-year] period shall be tolled and suspended while RVP is in violation of this covenant.” Inasmuch as the “termination of the agreement” referred to in these covenants is not necessarily the same thing as the “termination of the RVP’s employment,” this “post-termination” period cannot be ascertained or determined at any time; and a provision that such undeterminable period is further tolled while the employee is in violation 1992Fuller v. Kolb, 238 Ga. 602, 604 ( 234 SE2d 517 ). (c) Each covenant relied upon by appellants provides: “The running of the post-termination [two-year, three-year, or four-year] period shall be tolled and suspended while RVP is in violation of this covenant.” Inasmuch as the “termination of the agreement” referred to in these covenants is not necessarily the same thing as the “termination of the RVP’s employment,” this “post-termination” period cannot be ascertained or determined at any time; and a provision that such undeterminable period is further tolled while the employee is in violation | 1 | 1 |
Whirlpool Corp. v. Hurlbutgreen2 sentences1989In actions for injuries arising from the negligence of the employer in failing to comply with the duties imposed by Code Section 34-7-20, in order that the employee may recover it must appear that the employer knew or ought to have known ... of the defects or danger in the machinery supplied; and it must also appear that the employee injured did not know and had not equal means of knowing such fact and by the exercise of ordinary care could not have known thereof.” Consequently, “ ‘[i]n an action by a servant against a master for alleged failure of duty On the part of the latter in not giving 1989In actions for injuries arising from the negligence of the employer in failing to comply with the duties imposed by Code Section 34-7-20, in order that the employee may recover it must appear that the employer knew or ought to have known ... of the defects or danger in the machinery supplied; and it must also appear that the employee injured did not know and had not equal means of knowing such fact and by the exercise of ordinary care could not have known thereof.” Consequently, “ ‘[i]n an action by a servant against a master for alleged failure of duty On the part of the latter in not giving | 1 | 1 |
Pike v. Maryland Casualty Co.green2 sentences1980Co., 107 Ga. App. 49, 51 ( 129 SE2d 78 ). 1980Co., 107 Ga. App. 49, 51 ( 129 SE2d 78 ). | 1 | 1 |
Parks v. Maryland Casualty Co.green2 sentences1979Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 724 ( 26 SE2d 562 ) (1943). 2. 1979Co., 69 Ga. App. 720, 724 ( 26 SE2d 562 ) (1943). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Braden v. Haas, Howell & Doddgreen2 sentences1977Defendants’ request No. 10 reads: "I charge you that an employee has a privilege to take legal and proper actions to induce his employer not to enter into a contract where the purpose of the employee in taking such actions is to protect the best interests of the employer.” They cite Braden v. Haas, Howell & Dodd, 56 Ga. App. 342, 346 ( 192 SE 508 ) (1937). 1977Defendants’ request No. 10 reads: "I charge you that an employee has a privilege to take legal and proper actions to induce his employer not to enter into a contract where the purpose of the employee in taking such actions is to protect the best interests of the employer.” They cite Braden v. Haas, Howell & Dodd, 56 Ga. App. 342, 346 ( 192 SE 508 ) (1937). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences1972It is now well settled that, simply because a request to charge ( Code Ann. § 70-207) is apt, correct and pertinent, it is not necessarily error to fail to charge it, but the test is whether the court substantially covered the principles embodied therein ( Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 553, 561 ( 170 SE2d 281 ); Young v. State, 226 Ga. 553, 556 ( 176 SE2d 52 )) or whether it was "sufficiently or substantially covered by the general charge" ( American Home Assur. 1972It is now well settled that, simply because a request to charge ( Code Ann. § 70-207) is apt, correct and pertinent, it is not necessarily error to fail to charge it, but the test is whether the court substantially covered the principles embodied therein ( Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 553, 561 ( 170 SE2d 281 ); Young v. State, 226 Ga. 553, 556 ( 176 SE2d 52 )) or whether it was "sufficiently or substantially covered by the general charge" ( American Home Assur. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences1972It is now well settled that, simply because a request to charge ( Code Ann. § 70-207) is apt, correct and pertinent, it is not necessarily error to fail to charge it, but the test is whether the court substantially covered the principles embodied therein ( Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 553, 561 ( 170 SE2d 281 ); Young v. State, 226 Ga. 553, 556 ( 176 SE2d 52 )) or whether it was "sufficiently or substantially covered by the general charge" ( American Home Assur. 1972It is now well settled that, simply because a request to charge ( Code Ann. § 70-207) is apt, correct and pertinent, it is not necessarily error to fail to charge it, but the test is whether the court substantially covered the principles embodied therein ( Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 553, 561 ( 170 SE2d 281 ); Young v. State, 226 Ga. 553, 556 ( 176 SE2d 52 )) or whether it was "sufficiently or substantially covered by the general charge" ( American Home Assur. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Atlanta City School District v. Dowling
green
2 sentences2010See also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) ("[i]t is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim"); Camden County, supra, 271 Ga. at 665 (1), 523 S.E.2d 291 ("[d]ue process entitles the employee to a... hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy"); Atlanta City School Dist., supra, 266 Ga. at 218 , 466 S.E.2d 588 2010See also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir.2000) ("[i]t is the state's failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim"); Camden County, supra, 271 Ga. at 665 (1), 523 S.E.2d 291 ("[d]ue process entitles the employee to a... hearing, but the employer's failure to provide one is not a constitutional violation under the due process clause if the state provides a later procedural remedy"); Atlanta City School Dist., supra, 266 Ga. at 218 , 466 S.E.2d 588 | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Felton Beauty Supply Company Inc. v. Levy
green
2 sentences1971If the employer discharges the employee in violation of the provision requiring one week’s notice, he is not entitled, in equity, to enjoin the employee from working for a competitor.” Felton Beauty Supply Co. v. Levy, 198 Ga. 383 ( 31 SE2d 651 , 155 ALR 647 ); WAKE Broadcasters v. Crawford, 215 Ga. 862 (1) ( 114 SE2d 26 ). 1971If the employer discharges the employee in violation of the provision requiring one week’s notice, he is not entitled, in equity, to enjoin the employee from working for a competitor.” Felton Beauty Supply Co. v. Levy, 198 Ga. 383 ( 31 SE2d 651 , 155 ALR 647 ); WAKE Broadcasters v. Crawford, 215 Ga. 862 (1) ( 114 SE2d 26 ). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
WAKE Broadcasters, Inc. v. Crawford
green
2 sentences1971If the employer discharges the employee in violation of the provision requiring one week’s notice, he is not entitled, in equity, to enjoin the employee from working for a competitor.” Felton Beauty Supply Co. v. Levy, 198 Ga. 383 ( 31 SE2d 651 , 155 ALR 647 ); WAKE Broadcasters v. Crawford, 215 Ga. 862 (1) ( 114 SE2d 26 ). 1971If the employer discharges the employee in violation of the provision requiring one week’s notice, he is not entitled, in equity, to enjoin the employee from working for a competitor.” Felton Beauty Supply Co. v. Levy, 198 Ga. 383 ( 31 SE2d 651 , 155 ALR 647 ); WAKE Broadcasters v. Crawford, 215 Ga. 862 (1) ( 114 SE2d 26 ). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus
green
2 sentences1951This court has, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 ( 6 S. E. 2d, 320 ); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 807 ); Braddy v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 871 ( 22 S. E. 2d, 801 ); Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 199 ), recognized that the institution of criminal prosecutions against one’s employees under an alleged invalid municipal ordinance, where the employer had no right to direct or control the employee in the defense thereof, or the grounds upon which a defense should be predicated, and where such prosecut 1951This court has, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 ( 6 S. E. 2d, 320 ); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 807 ); Braddy v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 871 ( 22 S. E. 2d, 801 ); Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 199 ), recognized that the institution of criminal prosecutions against one’s employees under an alleged invalid municipal ordinance, where the employer had no right to direct or control the employee in the defense thereof, or the grounds upon which a defense should be predicated, and where such prosecut | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Braddy v. City of MacOn
neutral
2 sentences1951This court has, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 ( 6 S. E. 2d, 320 ); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 807 ); Braddy v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 871 ( 22 S. E. 2d, 801 ); Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 199 ), recognized that the institution of criminal prosecutions against one’s employees under an alleged invalid municipal ordinance, where the employer had no right to direct or control the employee in the defense thereof, or the grounds upon which a defense should be predicated, and where such prosecut 1951This court has, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 ( 6 S. E. 2d, 320 ); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 807 ); Braddy v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 871 ( 22 S. E. 2d, 801 ); Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 199 ), recognized that the institution of criminal prosecutions against one’s employees under an alleged invalid municipal ordinance, where the employer had no right to direct or control the employee in the defense thereof, or the grounds upon which a defense should be predicated, and where such prosecut | 1 | 1951–1951 |
City of Albany v. Lippitt
green
2 sentences1951This court has, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 ( 6 S. E. 2d, 320 ); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 807 ); Braddy v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 871 ( 22 S. E. 2d, 801 ); Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 199 ), recognized that the institution of criminal prosecutions against one’s employees under an alleged invalid municipal ordinance, where the employer had no right to direct or control the employee in the defense thereof, or the grounds upon which a defense should be predicated, and where such prosecut 1951This court has, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 ( 6 S. E. 2d, 320 ); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 807 ); Braddy v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 871 ( 22 S. E. 2d, 801 ); Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 199 ), recognized that the institution of criminal prosecutions against one’s employees under an alleged invalid municipal ordinance, where the employer had no right to direct or control the employee in the defense thereof, or the grounds upon which a defense should be predicated, and where such prosecut | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo
green
2 sentences1951This court has, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 ( 6 S. E. 2d, 320 ); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 807 ); Braddy v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 871 ( 22 S. E. 2d, 801 ); Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 199 ), recognized that the institution of criminal prosecutions against one’s employees under an alleged invalid municipal ordinance, where the employer had no right to direct or control the employee in the defense thereof, or the grounds upon which a defense should be predicated, and where such prosecut 1951This court has, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 ( 6 S. E. 2d, 320 ); City of Albany v. Lippitt, 191 Ga. 756 ( 13 S. E. 2d, 807 ); Braddy v. City of Macon, 194 Ga. 871 ( 22 S. E. 2d, 801 ); Moultrie Milk Shed Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348 ( 57 S. E. 2d, 199 ), recognized that the institution of criminal prosecutions against one’s employees under an alleged invalid municipal ordinance, where the employer had no right to direct or control the employee in the defense thereof, or the grounds upon which a defense should be predicated, and where such prosecut | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Shiplett v. Moran
green
2 sentences1943Shiplett v. Moran, 58 Ga. App. 854 ( 200 S. E. 449 ). 1943Shiplett v. Moran, 58 Ga. App. 854 ( 200 S. E. 449 ). | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Burch v. City of Ocilla
green
2 sentences1938The fact that no legislative policy has been more tenaciously or more properly adhered to in this State than that of extending to war veterans with proper qualifications every possible exemption not forbidden by the constitution (Tyner v. Winslett, supra; Burch v. Ocilla, 5 Ga. App. 65, 70 , 62 S. E. 666 ), would not authorize this court to disregard an express later enactment creating a new restriction or regulation, or not to follow long recognized, rules of statutory construction. 1938The fact that no legislative policy has been more tenaciously or more properly adhered to in this State than that of extending to war veterans with proper qualifications every possible exemption not forbidden by the constitution (Tyner v. Winslett, supra; Burch v. Ocilla, 5 Ga. App. 65, 70 , 62 S. E. 666 ), would not authorize this court to disregard an express later enactment creating a new restriction or regulation, or not to follow long recognized, rules of statutory construction. | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.