employee violation in Maryland

2014For example, “[i]f the employer wanted the automatic right to discharge an employee for violation of certain company rules or for the commission of certain crimes, ... it had the opportunity to seek such an explicit exclusion from the general arbitration clause when the collective agreement was negotiated, as it may do when the collective agreement expires.” Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 Md. at 388 , 504 A.2d 1132 (quoting Local 453, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 , 28 (2d Cir.1963)).

2014For example, “[i]f the employer wanted the automatic right to discharge an employee for violation of certain company rules or for the commission of certain crimes, ... it had the opportunity to seek such an explicit exclusion from the general arbitration clause when the collective agreement was negotiated, as it may do when the collective agreement expires.” Amalgamated Transit Union, 305 Md. at 388 , 504 A.2d 1132 (quoting Local 453, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 , 28 (2d Cir.1963)).

2012The purpose of these provisions is “to provide a vehicle for employees to collect, and an incentive for employers to pay, back wages.” Battaglia v. Clinical Perfusionists, Inc., 338 Md. 352, 364 , 658 A.2d 680 (1995).

2012The purpose of these provisions is “to provide a vehicle for employees to collect, and an incentive for employers to pay, back wages.” Battaglia v. Clinical Perfusionists, Inc., 338 Md. 352, 364 , 658 A.2d 680 (1995).

2018LE § 3-507.2(b) states, "If ... a court finds that an employer withheld the wage of an employee in violation of this subtitle and not as the result of a bona fide dispute, the court may award the employee an amount not exceeding 3 times the wage, and reasonable counsel fees and other costs." The question of whether a defendant is an 'employer' under LE § 3-507.2(b) is, therefore, "a condition precedent to an action for treble damages, attorney's fees, and litigation costs under the statute, we must first consider whether the [defendant] could be subjected to such liability." *603 Pinsky v. Pik

2018App. 550 , 588, 78 A.3d 471 (2013).

2018The Court of Appeals in Peters reiterated its definition of a bona fide dispute: " 'a legitimate dispute over the validity of the claim or the amount that is owing [ ]' where the employer has a good faith basis for refusing an employee's claim for unpaid wages." 439 Md. 646 , 657, 97 A.3d 621 (2014) (citing Admiral Mort., Inc. v. Cooper , 357 Md. 533 , 543, 745 A.2d 1026 (2000) ).

2018The Court of Appeals in Peters reiterated its definition of a bona fide dispute: " 'a legitimate dispute over the validity of the claim or the amount that is owing [ ]' where the employer has a good faith basis for refusing an employee's claim for unpaid wages." 439 Md. 646 , 657, 97 A.3d 621 (2014) (citing Admiral Mort., Inc. v. Cooper , 357 Md. 533 , 543, 745 A.2d 1026 (2000) ).

2017For example, in Cohen v. Alliant Enterprises, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 536 (Ky. 2001), the plaintiff sued a doctor and an emergency care center that employed him for medical negligence.

2013In Newell v. Richards, 83 Md.App. 371 , 574 A.2d 370 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 323 Md. 717 , 594 A.2d 1152 (1991), involving a medical malpractice case filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the defendants, Dr. George J.

2013In Newell v. Richards, 83 Md.App. 371 , 574 A.2d 370 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 323 Md. 717 , 594 A.2d 1152 (1991), involving a medical malpractice case filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the defendants, Dr. George J.

2013In Newell v. Richards, 83 Md.App. 371 , 574 A.2d 370 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 323 Md. 717 , 594 A.2d 1152 (1991), involving a medical malpractice case filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the defendants, Dr. George J.

2013In Newell v. Richards, 83 Md.App. 371 , 574 A.2d 370 (1990), rev’d on other grounds, 323 Md. 717 , 594 A.2d 1152 (1991), involving a medical malpractice case filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the defendants, Dr. George J.

2008The court’s discretion is triggered ... under the Payment Law upon the court’s finding “that an employer withheld the wage of an employee in violation of this subtitle and not as a result of a bona fide dispute.” § 3-507.1(b). 403 Md. at 457 , 942 A.2d 1242 (emphasis supplied).

2008The court’s discretion is triggered ... under the Payment Law upon the court’s finding “that an employer withheld the wage of an employee in violation of this subtitle and not as a result of a bona fide dispute.” § 3-507.1(b). 403 Md. at 457 , 942 A.2d 1242 (emphasis supplied).

2004(Emphasis added.) “The principal purpose of the Act ‘[isj to provide a vehicle for employees to collect, and an incentive for employers to pay, back wages.’ ” Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 39 , 811 A.2d 297 (2002).

2004(Emphasis added.) “The principal purpose of the Act ‘[isj to provide a vehicle for employees to collect, and an incentive for employers to pay, back wages.’ ” Medex v. McCabe, 372 Md. 28, 39 , 811 A.2d 297 (2002).

1996Pennsylvania Threshermen and Farmers’ Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 233 Md. 205, 215 , 196 A.2d 76 (1963).

1996Pennsylvania Threshermen and Farmers’ Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 233 Md. 205, 215 , 196 A.2d 76 (1963).

1992In Sheets v. Teddy’s Frosted Foods, Inc., supra, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found that an employee stated a claim of abusive discharge against his employer, a producer of frozen food products, because: (a) the employee, a quality control director, identified specific deviations in the employer’s product from specifications contained in the employer’s standards and labels, which concerned the use of substandard raw materials and underweight components in the employer’s finished products; (b) false and misleading labels constituted a violation of a specific provision within the Connecticut

1991Id. at 270, 520 A.2d 1124 .

1991First, absent the liberal rule, “the law seems to be ... [that] ‘where the employer has expressly forbidden his employee to use the employer’s automobile for his own personal purposes, such use of the automobile by the employee in violation of orders is not deemed to be one with the permission of the employer within the meaning of the omnibus clause of the liability insurance policy.’ ” Washington Transit Authority, 68 Md.App. at 35 , 509 A.2d 1217 (quoting Annotation, Automobile liability insurance: permission or consent to employee’s use of car within meaning of omnibus coverage clause, 5 A.

1991First, absent the liberal rule, “the law seems to be ... [that] ‘where the employer has expressly forbidden his employee to use the employer’s automobile for his own personal purposes, such use of the automobile by the employee in violation of orders is not deemed to be one with the permission of the employer within the meaning of the omnibus clause of the liability insurance policy.’ ” Washington Transit Authority, 68 Md.App. at 35 , 509 A.2d 1217 (quoting Annotation, Automobile liability insurance: permission or consent to employee’s use of car within meaning of omnibus coverage clause, 5 A.

1991“If injury or death results to a workman from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child, children or dependents of the employee shall have the privilege either to take under this article or have cause of action against such employer, as if this article had not been passed.” Long ago this Court set forth the principles governing the interpretation of Maryland Workmen’s Compensation Act (Frazier v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 575 , 96 A. 764, 765 (1916)): “First the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the words of the Act mu

1987Count II—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are set out in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560 , 380 A.2d 611 (1977).

1987Count II—Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are set out in Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560 , 380 A.2d 611 (1977).

1986Unless clearly operating under the “liberal” rule, the law seems to be as stated in Annot., Automobile liability insurance: permission or consent to employee’s use of car within meaning of omnibus coverage clause, 5 A.L.R. 2d 600, 651 (1949): “Where the employer has expressly forbidden his employee to use the employer’s automobile for his own personal purposes, such use of the automobile by the employee in violation of orders is not deemed to be one with the permission of the employer within the meaning of the omnibus clause of the liability insurance policy.” See also Boyd v. Liberty Mutual I

1986Unless clearly operating under the “liberal” rule, the law seems to be as stated in Annot., Automobile liability insurance: permission or consent to employee’s use of car within meaning of omnibus coverage clause, 5 A.L.R. 2d 600, 651 (1949): “Where the employer has expressly forbidden his employee to use the employer’s automobile for his own personal purposes, such use of the automobile by the employee in violation of orders is not deemed to be one with the permission of the employer within the meaning of the omnibus clause of the liability insurance policy.” See also Boyd v. Liberty Mutual I

1986Casu *36 alty Co., 228 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Civ.App.1950); and 6C Appleman, supra, § 4370.

1986Unless clearly operating under the “liberal” rule, the law seems to be as stated in Annot., Automobile liability insurance: permission or consent to employee’s use of car within meaning of omnibus coverage clause, 5 A.L.R. 2d 600, 651 (1949): “Where the employer has expressly forbidden his employee to use the employer’s automobile for his own personal purposes, such use of the automobile by the employee in violation of orders is not deemed to be one with the permission of the employer within the meaning of the omnibus clause of the liability insurance policy.” See also Boyd v. Liberty Mutual I

1986Unless clearly operating under the “liberal” rule, the law seems to be as stated in Annot., Automobile liability insurance: permission or consent to employee’s use of car within meaning of omnibus coverage clause, 5 A.L.R. 2d 600, 651 (1949): “Where the employer has expressly forbidden his employee to use the employer’s automobile for his own personal purposes, such use of the automobile by the employee in violation of orders is not deemed to be one with the permission of the employer within the meaning of the omnibus clause of the liability insurance policy.” See also Boyd v. Liberty Mutual I