employee challenge in Connecticut

2001Thus, absent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety which contravenes some important public policy, an employee may not challenge a dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." (Citation omitted.) Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co ., 204 Conn. 460 , 470-71 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); see also Deura v. Greenwich Hospital , Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 140029 (April 10, 1995, D'Andrea, J .) ( 14 Conn.L.Rptr. 49 ).

2001Thus, absent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety which contravenes some important public policy, an employee may not challenge a dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." (Citation omitted.) Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co ., 204 Conn. 460 , 470-71 , 528 A.2d 1137 (1987); see also Deura v. Greenwich Hospital , Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 140029 (April 10, 1995, D'Andrea, J .) ( 14 Conn.L.Rptr. 49 ).

1998Where employment is clearly terminable at will, a party cannot ordinarily be deemed to lack good faith in exercising this contractual right", Magnan v. Ananconda Industries Inc , 193 Conn. 558 , 572 (1984) Building upon and adopting this position the court in Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Inc. , 204 Conn. 460 , 470-471 (1987) went on to say: CT Page 14660 "Thus, absent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety which intervenes some important public policy, an employee may not challenge a dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." In the employment cont

1995The Court agrees with the defendant that case law holds that in the context of an employment at-will relationship, an employee has no claim of wrongful discharge on the theory of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing unless "the cause for dismissal is derived from some important violation of public policy." Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc., 193 Conn. 558 , 569 , 479 A.2d 781 (1984).

1998Sheets v. Teddy's frosted Foods, Inc., CT Page 5753 [ 179 Conn. 471 , 477 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980)]. 1 Whether a claim resulting from such a discharge is framed in tort or in contract should make no difference with respect to the issue of liability." Id., 572 ; see Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , supra, 204 Conn. 470 -71 ("[A]bsent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety which contravenes some important public policy, an employee may not challenge a dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing").

1998Sheets v. Teddy's frosted Foods, Inc., CT Page 5753 [ 179 Conn. 471 , 477 , 427 A.2d 385 (1980)]. 1 Whether a claim resulting from such a discharge is framed in tort or in contract should make no difference with respect to the issue of liability." Id., 572 ; see Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , supra, 204 Conn. 470 -71 ("[A]bsent a showing that the discharge involves an impropriety which contravenes some important public policy, an employee may not challenge a dismissal based upon an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing").

1994Owens v. New Britain General Hospital , 32 Conn. App. 56 (1993).

1994Owens v. New Britain General Hospital , 32 Conn. App. 56 (1993).

2020We do not also require an employee to come forward with proof—proof that would often be difficult to allege plausibly—that not only was the discrimination so bad that he had to quit, but also that his quitting was his employer’s intent all along.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 1779–80, citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 , 141–43, 124 S. Ct. 2342 , 159 L.

2020We do not also require an employee to come forward with proof—proof that would often be difficult to allege plausibly—that not only was the discrimination so bad that he had to quit, but also that his quitting was his employer’s intent all along.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 1779–80, citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 , 141–43, 124 S. Ct. 2342 , 159 L.

2020We do not also require an employee to come forward with proof—proof that would often be difficult to allege plausibly—that not only was the discrimination so bad that he had to quit, but also that his quitting was his employer’s intent all along.’’ (Citation omitted; footnote omitted.) Id., 1779–80, citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 , 141–43, 124 S. Ct. 2342 , 159 L.

2016We further note that, in Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 , 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), the plaintiff sought to hold the defendants liable for the acts of an employee under the doctrine of "apparent authority," thus using the correct terminology.

2016We further note that, in Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 , 771, 700 A.2d 1377 (1997), the plaintiff sought to hold the defendants liable for the acts of an employee under the doctrine of "apparent authority," thus using the correct terminology.

2010This employee immunity for discretionary acts is identical to the municipality’s immunity for its employees’ discretionary acts under § 52-557n.” (Citation omitted.) Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395, 401 , 853 A.2d 621 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 927 , 859 A.2d 582 (2004).

2010This employee immunity for discretionary acts is identical to the municipality’s immunity for its employees’ discretionary acts under § 52-557n.” (Citation omitted.) Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395, 401 , 853 A.2d 621 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 927 , 859 A.2d 582 (2004).

2010This employee immunity for discretionary acts is identical to the municipality’s immunity for its employees’ discretionary acts under § 52-557n.” (Citation omitted.) Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395, 401 , 853 A.2d 621 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 927 , 859 A.2d 582 (2004).

2010This employee immunity for discretionary acts is identical to the municipality’s immunity for its employees’ discretionary acts under § 52-557n.” (Citation omitted.) Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395, 401 , 853 A.2d 621 , cert. denied, 271 Conn. 927 , 859 A.2d 582 (2004).

2007Finally, the defendant argues that because dependents’ claims are “separate yet derivative of the underlying injury claim”; see Duni v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 239 Conn. 25 ; Biederzycki v. Farrel Foundry & Machine Co., 103 Conn. 701, 704-705 , 131 A. 739 (1926); the plaintiff may not resurrect a claim for compensation that the decedent “could have brought during his life but did not . . . .” By this we understand the defendant to contend that the timely filing by the employee of a claim under the act is a condition precedent to any future dependents’ claims under the act.

2007Finally, the defendant argues that because dependents’ claims are “separate yet derivative of the underlying injury claim”; see Duni v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 239 Conn. 25 ; Biederzycki v. Farrel Foundry & Machine Co., 103 Conn. 701, 704-705 , 131 A. 739 (1926); the plaintiff may not resurrect a claim for compensation that the decedent “could have brought during his life but did not . . . .” By this we understand the defendant to contend that the timely filing by the employee of a claim under the act is a condition precedent to any future dependents’ claims under the act.

2001Because the construction of a statute is a question of Law; State v. Salmon , 250 Conn. 147 , 152 , 735 A.2d 333 (1999); the court may decide the issue whether the exception applies as a matter of law.

2001Because the construction of a statute is a question of Law; State v. Salmon , 250 Conn. 147 , 152 , 735 A.2d 333 (1999); the court may decide the issue whether the exception applies as a matter of law.

1998Id., 212 .

1995Citing Belgard v. United Airlines , 857 P.2d 467 (Colo.App. 1992), cert. denied, CT Page 14011 ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1066 , 127 L.Ed.2d 386 (1994), Business Express argues further, that state law does not permit an employee to challenge an employment decision of an airline because of the federal preemption. 1 In his memorandum in opposition, Lewonchuk responds in three ways.

1995Moreover, the Supreme Court held in Morris v. Hartford Courant Co. , 200 Conn. 676 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986), that false but negligent accusations of criminal conduct are not improper reasons for dismissal nor do such dismissals violate an important public policy.

1995Moreover, the Supreme Court held in Morris v. Hartford Courant Co. , 200 Conn. 676 , 513 A.2d 66 (1986), that false but negligent accusations of criminal conduct are not improper reasons for dismissal nor do such dismissals violate an important public policy.

1995Citing Belgard v. United Airlines , 857 P.2d 467 (Colo.App. 1992), cert. denied, CT Page 14011 ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1066 , 127 L.Ed.2d 386 (1994), Business Express argues further, that state law does not permit an employee to challenge an employment decision of an airline because of the federal preemption. 1 In his memorandum in opposition, Lewonchuk responds in three ways.

1995Citing Belgard v. United Airlines , 857 P.2d 467 (Colo.App. 1992), cert. denied, CT Page 14011 ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1066 , 127 L.Ed.2d 386 (1994), Business Express argues further, that state law does not permit an employee to challenge an employment decision of an airline because of the federal preemption. 1 In his memorandum in opposition, Lewonchuk responds in three ways.

1988McNamara v. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547, 550 , 398 A.2d 1161 (1979).” Luddie v. Foremost Ins.

1985Va. Code § 23-4-2 at that time provided in relevant part: “If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter.” Larson makes the same observation concerning Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 6

1985Va. Code § 23-4-2 at that time provided in relevant part: “If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter.” Larson makes the same observation concerning Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 6

1985Va. Code § 23-4-2 at that time provided in relevant part: “If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter.” Larson makes the same observation concerning Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 6

1985Va. Code § 23-4-2 at that time provided in relevant part: “If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter.” Larson makes the same observation concerning Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 6

1985Va. Code § 23-4-2 at that time provided in relevant part: “If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow, widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of damages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter.” Larson makes the same observation concerning Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 6

1944This distinction is applied or noted in Larson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 193 Cal. 406 , 224 Pac. 744 , where compensation was allowed; and in Matter of Pisko v. Mintz, 262 N. Y. 176, 178 , 186 N. E. 434 , Guastelo v. Michigan Central R.

1944This distinction is applied or noted in Larson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 193 Cal. 406 , 224 Pac. 744 , where compensation was allowed; and in Matter of Pisko v. Mintz, 262 N. Y. 176, 178 , 186 N. E. 434 , Guastelo v. Michigan Central R.

1944This distinction is applied or noted in Larson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 193 Cal. 406 , 224 Pac. 744 , where compensation was allowed; and in Matter of Pisko v. Mintz, 262 N. Y. 176, 178 , 186 N. E. 434 , Guastelo v. Michigan Central R.

1944This distinction is applied or noted in Larson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 193 Cal. 406 , 224 Pac. 744 , where compensation was allowed; and in Matter of Pisko v. Mintz, 262 N. Y. 176, 178 , 186 N. E. 434 , Guastelo v. Michigan Central R.